Reference. Reimer, M. & Michaelson, E. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Spring 2017 edition, 2017. ![Reference [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper abstract bibtex Reference is a relation that obtains between certain sorts of representational tokens (e.g., names, mental states, pictures)and objects. For instance, when I assert that “George W. Bush is a Republican,” I use a particular sort of representational token — i.e. the name‘George W. Bush’— to refer to a particular individual — namely, George W. Bush. While names and other referentialterms are hardly the only type of representational token capable ofreferring, linguistic tokens like these have long stood at the center of philosophical inquiries into the nature of reference. Accordingly,this entry will focus almost entirely on linguistic reference. For more on the reference of mental states, see the entries oncausal theories of mental content, externalism about mental content, andteleological theories of mental content. For more on the reference of pictures,see the entry onGoodman's aesthetics., Proper names are standardly considered a paradigm example of linguisticreference — or, more specifically, a relation that obtains between certain sorts of linguistic expressions and what speakers use those expressions to talk about. Other expressions which are generally consideredto be of the referring sort include indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘that’. While it is highlyquestionable that all words refer, most philosophers of language assumethat at least certain sorts of terms (e.g. proper names and indexicals) regularlyand reliably do so. It is these sorts of terms that will serve as our primaryfocus below. Assuming that at least certain sorts of terms do in fact refer, the central question regarding linguistic reference becomes: how do such terms refer? What, in other words, is the ‘mechanism’ of reference? Subsidiary questions concern the relation between reference and meaning, reference and truth, and referenceand knowledge. Some philosophers have thought that the nature of reference is able to shed light on important metaphysical or epistemological issues. Other philosophers, however, are less sanguine. Indeed, certain philosophers have gone so far asto deny that reference is a substantive relation, one deserving of serious philosophical scrutiny.
@incollection{reimer_reference_2017,
edition = {Spring 2017},
title = {Reference},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reference/},
abstract = {Reference is a relation that obtains between certain sorts of representational tokens (e.g., names, mental states, pictures)and objects. For instance, when I assert that “George W. Bush is a Republican,” I use a particular sort of representational token — i.e. the name‘George W. Bush’— to refer to a particular individual — namely, George W. Bush. While names and other referentialterms are hardly the only type of representational token capable ofreferring, linguistic tokens like these have long stood at the center of philosophical inquiries into the nature of reference. Accordingly,this entry will focus almost entirely on linguistic reference. For more on the reference of mental states, see the entries oncausal theories of mental content, externalism about mental content, andteleological theories of mental content. For more on the reference of pictures,see the entry onGoodman's aesthetics., Proper names are standardly considered a paradigm example of linguisticreference — or, more specifically, a relation that obtains between certain sorts of linguistic expressions and what speakers use those expressions to talk about. Other expressions which are generally consideredto be of the referring sort include indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘that’. While it is highlyquestionable that all words refer, most philosophers of language assumethat at least certain sorts of terms (e.g. proper names and indexicals) regularlyand reliably do so. It is these sorts of terms that will serve as our primaryfocus below. Assuming that at least certain sorts of terms do in fact refer, the central question regarding linguistic reference becomes: how do such terms refer? What, in other words, is the ‘mechanism’ of reference? Subsidiary questions concern the relation between reference and meaning, reference and truth, and referenceand knowledge. Some philosophers have thought that the nature of reference is able to shed light on important metaphysical or epistemological issues. Other philosophers, however, are less sanguine. Indeed, certain philosophers have gone so far asto deny that reference is a substantive relation, one deserving of serious philosophical scrutiny.},
urldate = {2017-03-30},
booktitle = {The {Stanford} {Encyclopedia} of {Philosophy}},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
author = {Reimer, Marga and Michaelson, Eliot},
editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
year = {2017},
keywords = {Goodman, Nelson: aesthetics, descriptions, indexicals, mental content: causal theories of, mental content: externalism about, mental content: teleological theories of, natural kinds, nonexistent objects, rigid designators, skepticism: and content externalism},
}
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While it is highlyquestionable that all words refer, most philosophers of language assumethat at least certain sorts of terms (e.g. proper names and indexicals) regularlyand reliably do so. It is these sorts of terms that will serve as our primaryfocus below. Assuming that at least certain sorts of terms do in fact refer, the central question regarding linguistic reference becomes: how do such terms refer? What, in other words, is the ‘mechanism’ of reference? Subsidiary questions concern the relation between reference and meaning, reference and truth, and referenceand knowledge. Some philosophers have thought that the nature of reference is able to shed light on important metaphysical or epistemological issues. Other philosophers, however, are less sanguine. 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