Studying the History of Philosophical Ideas: support tools for research discovery, navigation, and awareness.
van den Berg, H.; Parra, G.; Jentzsch, A.; Drakos, A.; and Duval, E.
In
I-Know 2014, Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Knowledge Technologies and Data-driven Business, volume Article no. 12, Graz, Austria, 2014. ACM
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@inproceedings{van_den_berg_studying_2014,
address = {Graz, Austria},
title = {Studying the {History} of {Philosophical} {Ideas}: support tools for research discovery, navigation, and awareness},
volume = {Article no. 12},
doi = {10.1145/2637748.2638412},
abstract = {The use of computational tools in the humanities for science 2.0 practices is steadily increasing. This paper examines current research practices of a group of philosophers studying the history of philosophical concepts. We explain the methodology and workflow of these philosophers and provide an overview of tools they currently use in their research. The case study highlights a number of fundamental challenges facing these researchers, including: (i) accessing known relevant research content or resources; (ii) discovering new research content or data; (iii) working collaboratively rather than individually. We propose a mash-up of search, visualization, and awareness tools addressing these challenges and discuss the design of the mash-up, its implementation, and evaluation with the target users. Through our case study, we demonstrate the benefits of a user-centered design approach, as well as the benefits of the concrete mash-up for historians of philosophy, and, importantly, the limitations of these tools for conducting historical and philosophical research.},
booktitle = {I-{Know} 2014, {Proceedings} of the 14th {International} {Conference} on {Knowledge} {Technologies} and {Data}-driven {Business}},
publisher = {ACM},
author = {van den Berg, Hein and Parra, Gonzalo and Jentzsch, Anja and Drakos, Andreas and Duval, Erik},
year = {2014},
}
The use of computational tools in the humanities for science 2.0 practices is steadily increasing. This paper examines current research practices of a group of philosophers studying the history of philosophical concepts. We explain the methodology and workflow of these philosophers and provide an overview of tools they currently use in their research. The case study highlights a number of fundamental challenges facing these researchers, including: (i) accessing known relevant research content or resources; (ii) discovering new research content or data; (iii) working collaboratively rather than individually. We propose a mash-up of search, visualization, and awareness tools addressing these challenges and discuss the design of the mash-up, its implementation, and evaluation with the target users. Through our case study, we demonstrate the benefits of a user-centered design approach, as well as the benefits of the concrete mash-up for historians of philosophy, and, importantly, the limitations of these tools for conducting historical and philosophical research.
Critique Post: 'Hein van den Berg on Jennifer Mensch's "Kant's Organicism".
van den Berg, H.
Critique: Discussing Works on Kant and German Idealism. 2014.
![Critique Post: 'Hein van den Berg on Jennifer Mensch's "Kant's Organicism". [link]](//bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "Paper")
Paper
link
bibtex
1 download
@article{van_den_berg_critique_2014,
title = {Critique {Post}: '{Hein} van den {Berg} on {Jennifer} {Mensch}'s "{Kant}'s {Organicism}".},
url = {http://virtualcritique.wordpress.com/2014/04/02/hein-v-d-berg-on-jennifer-menschs-kants-organicism/.},
journal = {Critique: Discussing Works on Kant and German Idealism},
author = {van den Berg, Hein},
year = {2014},
}
Review of Jennifer Mensch, Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy.
van den Berg, H.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 28(1): 99–101. 2014.
doi
link
bibtex
@article{van_den_berg_review_2014,
title = {Review of {Jennifer} {Mensch}, {Kant}'s {Organicism}: {Epigenesis} and the {Development} of {Critical} {Philosophy}},
volume = {28},
doi = {10.1080/02698595.2014.915657},
number = {1},
journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
author = {van den Berg, Hein},
year = {2014},
pages = {99--101},
}
Kant on Proper Science: Biology in the Critical Philosophy and the Opus postumum.
van den Berg, H.
Springer Science & Business Media, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York & London, 2014.
Paper
link
bibtex
abstract
@book{van_den_berg_kant_2014,
address = {Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York \& London},
title = {Kant on {Proper} {Science}: {Biology} in the {Critical} {Philosophy} and the {Opus} postumum},
url = {http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789400771390},
abstract = {This book provides a novel treatment of Immanuel Kant’s views on proper natural science and biology. The status of biology in Kant’s system of science is often taken to be problematic. By analyzing Kant’s philosophy of biology in relation to his conception of proper science, the present book determines Kant’s views on the scientific status of biology. Combining a broad ideengeschichtlich approach with a detailed historical reconstruction of philosophical and scientific texts, the book establishes important interconnections between Kant’s philosophy of science, his views on biology, and his reception of late 18th century biological theories. It discusses Kant’s views on science and biology as articulated in his published writings and in the Opus postumum. The book shows that although biology is a non-mathematical science and the relation between biology and other natural sciences is not specified, Kant did allow for the possibility of providing scientific explanations in biology and assigned biology a specific domain of investigation.},
publisher = {Springer Science \& Business Media},
author = {van den Berg, Hein},
year = {2014},
}
This book provides a novel treatment of Immanuel Kant’s views on proper natural science and biology. The status of biology in Kant’s system of science is often taken to be problematic. By analyzing Kant’s philosophy of biology in relation to his conception of proper science, the present book determines Kant’s views on the scientific status of biology. Combining a broad ideengeschichtlich approach with a detailed historical reconstruction of philosophical and scientific texts, the book establishes important interconnections between Kant’s philosophy of science, his views on biology, and his reception of late 18th century biological theories. It discusses Kant’s views on science and biology as articulated in his published writings and in the Opus postumum. The book shows that although biology is a non-mathematical science and the relation between biology and other natural sciences is not specified, Kant did allow for the possibility of providing scientific explanations in biology and assigned biology a specific domain of investigation.
@PhilosTEI: Final user evaluation report.
Betti, A.; and van den Berg, H.
Technical Report Amsterdam, November 2014.
Paper
link
bibtex
abstract
@techreport{betti_philostei:_2014,
address = {Amsterdam},
type = {Technical {Report}},
title = {@{PhilosTEI}: {Final} user evaluation report},
url = {http://1drv.ms/20NhO3n},
abstract = {This deliverable reports on the evaluation of the workflow developed in TiCCLing Philosophy: a TEI corpus building workflow towards a new computational methodology for philosophy (@PhilosTEI). Within @PhilosTEI, a demonstrator tool providing a web-based workflow from textual images to TEI has been created and evaluated. In this document, we present the evaluation of this workflow based on the user testing conducted within the project.},
author = {Betti, Arianna and van den Berg, Hein},
month = nov,
year = {2014},
pages = {15},
}
This deliverable reports on the evaluation of the workflow developed in TiCCLing Philosophy: a TEI corpus building workflow towards a new computational methodology for philosophy (@PhilosTEI). Within @PhilosTEI, a demonstrator tool providing a web-based workflow from textual images to TEI has been created and evaluated. In this document, we present the evaluation of this workflow based on the user testing conducted within the project.
Modelling the History of Ideas.
Betti, A.; and van den Berg, H.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22(4): 812–835. 2014.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
5 downloads
@article{betti_modelling_2014,
title = {Modelling the {History} of {Ideas}},
volume = {22},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09608788.2014.949217#.VHcEBWTF9fw},
doi = {10.1080/09608788.2014.949217},
abstract = {We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner’s objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology.},
number = {4},
journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy},
author = {Betti, Arianna and van den Berg, Hein},
year = {2014},
pages = {812--835},
}
We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner’s objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology.
@PhilosTEI: user scenario.
Betti, A.; and van den Berg, H.
Technical Report Amsterdam, November 2014.
link
bibtex
@techreport{betti_philostei:_2014-1,
address = {Amsterdam},
type = {Technical {Report}},
title = {@{PhilosTEI}: user scenario},
author = {Betti, Arianna and van den Berg, Hein},
month = nov,
year = {2014},
pages = {1},
}
Bolzano on Necessary Existence [to appear].
Roski, S.; and Rusnock, P.
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 2014.
link
bibtex
@article{roski_bolzano_2014,
title = {Bolzano on {Necessary} {Existence} [to appear]},
journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie},
author = {Roski, Stefan and Rusnock, Paul},
year = {2014},
keywords = {Bolzano},
}
Bolzano's Notion of Grounding and the Classical Model of Science.
Roski, S.
Ph.D. Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2014.
link
bibtex
@phdthesis{roski_bolzanos_2014,
type = {Dissertation},
title = {Bolzano's {Notion} of {Grounding} and the {Classical} {Model} of {Science}},
school = {Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam},
author = {Roski, Stefan},
year = {2014},
}
Towards transfinite type theory: rereading Tarski’s Wahrheitsbegriff.
Loeb, I.
Synthese, 191(10): 2281–2299. 2014.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{loeb_towards_2014,
title = {Towards transfinite type theory: rereading {Tarski}’s {Wahrheitsbegriff}},
volume = {191},
issn = {1573-0964},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0399-0},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0399-0},
abstract = {In his famous paper Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen (Polish edition: Nakładem/Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, wydzial, III, 1933), Alfred Tarski constructs a materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term “true sentence” for certain kinds of formalised languages. In the case of other formalised languages, he shows that such a construction is impossible but that the term “true sentence” can nevertheless be consistently postulated. In the Postscript that Tarski added to a later version of this paper (Studia Philosophica, 1, 1935), he does not explicitly include limits for the kinds of language for which such a construction is possible. This absence of such limits has been interpreted as an implied claim that such a definition of the term “true sentence” can be constructed for every language. This has far-reaching consequences, not least for the widely held belief that Tarski changed from an universalistic to an anti-universalistic standpoint. We will claim that the consequence of anti-universalism is unwarranted, given that it can be argued that the Postscript is not in conflict with the existence of limits outside of which a definition of “true sentence” cannot be constructed. Moreover, by a discussion of transfinite type theory, we will also be able to accommodate other of the changes made in Tarski’s Postscript within a type-theoretical framework. The awareness of transfinite type theory afforded by this discussion will lead, in turn, to an account of Tarski’s Postscript that shows a gradual change in his logical work, rather than any of the more radical transitions which the Postscript has been claimed to reflect.},
number = {10},
journal = {Synthese},
author = {Loeb, Iris},
year = {2014},
pages = {2281--2299},
}
In his famous paper Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen (Polish edition: Nakładem/Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, wydzial, III, 1933), Alfred Tarski constructs a materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term “true sentence” for certain kinds of formalised languages. In the case of other formalised languages, he shows that such a construction is impossible but that the term “true sentence” can nevertheless be consistently postulated. In the Postscript that Tarski added to a later version of this paper (Studia Philosophica, 1, 1935), he does not explicitly include limits for the kinds of language for which such a construction is possible. This absence of such limits has been interpreted as an implied claim that such a definition of the term “true sentence” can be constructed for every language. This has far-reaching consequences, not least for the widely held belief that Tarski changed from an universalistic to an anti-universalistic standpoint. We will claim that the consequence of anti-universalism is unwarranted, given that it can be argued that the Postscript is not in conflict with the existence of limits outside of which a definition of “true sentence” cannot be constructed. Moreover, by a discussion of transfinite type theory, we will also be able to accommodate other of the changes made in Tarski’s Postscript within a type-theoretical framework. The awareness of transfinite type theory afforded by this discussion will lead, in turn, to an account of Tarski’s Postscript that shows a gradual change in his logical work, rather than any of the more radical transitions which the Postscript has been claimed to reflect.
Uniting model theory and the universalist tradition of logic: Carnap’s early axiomatics.
Loeb, I.
Synthese, 191(12): 2815–2833. 2014.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{loeb_uniting_2014,
title = {Uniting model theory and the universalist tradition of logic: {Carnap}’s early axiomatics},
volume = {191},
issn = {1573-0964},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0425-2},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0425-2},
abstract = {We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. This point is illustrated by Carnap’s early semantics and model theory, which he developed within a type theoretical framework and which stand out both for their universalistic treatment and for certain idiosyncratic technicalities by which the construction is supported. One special property is that individuals are context relative in Carnap’s system. This leads to a model theory in which the model domains are more flexible than has been suggested in the literature.},
number = {12},
journal = {Synthese},
author = {Loeb, Iris},
year = {2014},
pages = {2815--2833},
}
We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. This point is illustrated by Carnap’s early semantics and model theory, which he developed within a type theoretical framework and which stand out both for their universalistic treatment and for certain idiosyncratic technicalities by which the construction is supported. One special property is that individuals are context relative in Carnap’s system. This leads to a model theory in which the model domains are more flexible than has been suggested in the literature.
Tarski’s one and only concept of truth.
Smid, J.
Synthese, 191(14): 3393–3406. 2014.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{smid_tarskis_2014,
title = {Tarski’s one and only concept of truth},
volume = {191},
issn = {1573-0964},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0450-1},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0450-1},
abstract = {In a recent article, David (Tarski’s convention T and the concept of truth, pp. 133–156, 2008) distinguishes between two interpretations of Tarski’s work on truth. The standard interpretation has it that Tarski gave us a definition of truth in-L within the meta-language; the non-standard interpretation, that Tarski did not give us a definition of true sentence in L, but rather a definition of truth, and Tarski does so for L within the meta-language. The difference is crucial: for on the standard view, there are different concepts of truth, while in the alternative interpretation there is just one concept. In this paper we will have a brief look at the distinction between these two interpretations and at the arguments David gives for each view. We will evaluate one of David’s arguments for the alternative view by looking at Tarski’s ‘On the concept of truth in formalized languages’ (CTF), and his use of the term ‘extension’ therein, which, we shall find, yields no conclusive evidence for either position. Then we will look at how Tarski treats ‘satisfaction’, an essential concept for his definition of ‘true sentence’. It will be argued that, in light of how Tarski talks about ‘satisfaction’ in Sect. 4 of ‘CTF’ and his claims in the Postscript, the alternative view is more likely than the standard one.},
number = {14},
journal = {Synthese},
author = {Smid, Jeroen},
year = {2014},
pages = {3393--3406},
}
In a recent article, David (Tarski’s convention T and the concept of truth, pp. 133–156, 2008) distinguishes between two interpretations of Tarski’s work on truth. The standard interpretation has it that Tarski gave us a definition of truth in-L within the meta-language; the non-standard interpretation, that Tarski did not give us a definition of true sentence in L, but rather a definition of truth, and Tarski does so for L within the meta-language. The difference is crucial: for on the standard view, there are different concepts of truth, while in the alternative interpretation there is just one concept. In this paper we will have a brief look at the distinction between these two interpretations and at the arguments David gives for each view. We will evaluate one of David’s arguments for the alternative view by looking at Tarski’s ‘On the concept of truth in formalized languages’ (CTF), and his use of the term ‘extension’ therein, which, we shall find, yields no conclusive evidence for either position. Then we will look at how Tarski treats ‘satisfaction’, an essential concept for his definition of ‘true sentence’. It will be argued that, in light of how Tarski talks about ‘satisfaction’ in Sect. 4 of ‘CTF’ and his claims in the Postscript, the alternative view is more likely than the standard one.
On Haslanger’s Focal Analysis of Race and Gender in Resisting Reality as an Interpretive Model.
Betti, A.
Krisis, 1: 13–18. 2014.
![On Haslanger’s Focal Analysis of Race and Gender in Resisting Reality as an Interpretive Model [pdf]](//bibbase.org/img/filetypes/pdf.svg "Paper")
Paper
link
bibtex
@article{betti_haslangers_2014,
title = {On {Haslanger}’s {Focal} {Analysis} of {Race} and {Gender} in {Resisting} {Reality} as an {Interpretive} {Model}},
volume = {1},
url = {http://www.krisis.eu/content/2014-1/krisis-2014-1-03-betti.pdf},
journal = {Krisis},
author = {Betti, Arianna},
year = {2014},
pages = {13--18},
}
The Naming of Facts and the Methodology of Language-Based Metaphysics.
Betti, A.
In Reboul, A., editor(s),
MIND, VALUES AND METAPHYSICS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS DEDICATED TO KEVIN MULLIGAN. Springer, Berlin, 2014.
Paper
link
bibtex
abstract
12 downloads
@incollection{betti_naming_2014,
address = {Berlin},
title = {The {Naming} of {Facts} and the {Methodology} of {Language}-{Based} {Metaphysics}},
url = {http://www.philosophie.ch/kevin/festschrift/Betti-paper},
abstract = {According to Mulligan \& Correia 2008, "any philosophy of facts owes us an account of the form of such expressions as "the fact that Sam is sad". They also suggest that expressions of the form "the fact that p" have the form of definite descriptions, and that one possible account of such expressions as definite descriptions is the one given by Hochberg 2001. According to Hochberg, 'the fact that p' is analysed as 'the fact that contains a as a term and F as an attribute and that is of the form ϕx exists'. Why should we ask that any philosophy of facts be equipped with names for facts (or, more neutrally, with ways to refer to facts)? A descriptive metaphysician accepting facts might care about the naming of facts; but I do not see why a revisionary metaphysician should: I do not see whether a revisionary metaphysician accepting facts should care even as to whether it is at all possible to name them. A fortiori, for a revisionary metaphysician there does not seem to be any need for the expression 'the fact that p' to come out as a definite description. So it seems that the only philosophers for whom Hochberg's analysis is relevant are those who think that linguistic analyses of that kind can be used in support of a philosophy of facts independently of theoretical considerations. But this, I argue, is misguided: since it presupposes a specific philosophy of facts from the start, Hochberg's analysis can't be used in support of that very philosophy or of any other philosophy of facts. Hochberg, H. 2001. The Positivist and the Ontologist. Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism, Amsterdam: Rodopi. Mulligan, Kevin and Correia, Fabrice, "Facts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = {\textless}http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/facts/{\textgreater}.},
booktitle = {{MIND}, {VALUES} {AND} {METAPHYSICS}: {PHILOSOPHICAL} {PAPERS} {DEDICATED} {TO} {KEVIN} {MULLIGAN}},
publisher = {Springer},
author = {Betti, Arianna},
editor = {Reboul, Anne},
year = {2014},
}
According to Mulligan & Correia 2008, "any philosophy of facts owes us an account of the form of such expressions as "the fact that Sam is sad". They also suggest that expressions of the form "the fact that p" have the form of definite descriptions, and that one possible account of such expressions as definite descriptions is the one given by Hochberg 2001. According to Hochberg, 'the fact that p' is analysed as 'the fact that contains a as a term and F as an attribute and that is of the form ϕx exists'. Why should we ask that any philosophy of facts be equipped with names for facts (or, more neutrally, with ways to refer to facts)? A descriptive metaphysician accepting facts might care about the naming of facts; but I do not see why a revisionary metaphysician should: I do not see whether a revisionary metaphysician accepting facts should care even as to whether it is at all possible to name them. A fortiori, for a revisionary metaphysician there does not seem to be any need for the expression 'the fact that p' to come out as a definite description. So it seems that the only philosophers for whom Hochberg's analysis is relevant are those who think that linguistic analyses of that kind can be used in support of a philosophy of facts independently of theoretical considerations. But this, I argue, is misguided: since it presupposes a specific philosophy of facts from the start, Hochberg's analysis can't be used in support of that very philosophy or of any other philosophy of facts. Hochberg, H. 2001. The Positivist and the Ontologist. Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism, Amsterdam: Rodopi. Mulligan, Kevin and Correia, Fabrice, "Facts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = \textlesshttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/facts/\textgreater.
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![GlamMap: Geovisualization for e-humanities [pdf]](http://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/pdf.svg "Paper")
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abstract