

Attitudinal and Behavioral Responses to Populist Communication

The Impact of Populist Message Elements on Populist Attitudes and Voting Intentions

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Introduction

In the previous chapter, Hameleers et al. argued that there is evidence that populist communication mechanisms such as blame attributions, affect citizens' attitudinal responses (e.g., Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017) and may guide citizens' behavior and vote intentions (Bellucci, 2014; Hameleers et al., 2018; Marsh & Tilley, 2010). Hameleers et al. have also clarified, in their theoretical chapter, that these effects are stronger after repeated exposure. Today's media environment may repeatedly expose citizens to populist messages on a daily basis, resulting in cumulative priming effects. However, investigating how a single populist message may affect citizens' attitudes and behaviors can also help us understand the dynamics of how populist communication influences voters, and consequently, societies.

This chapter intends to provide empirical evidence for the specific effects of exposure to a populist message on citizens' political attitudes and vote intentions, and it aims to investigate whether there are country-level differences in these effects. In order to achieve these objectives, the chapter presents the results of a comparative experiment conducted in 15 European countries in which different forms of left-wing and right-wing populist messages are manipulated. In this way, the chapter clarifies how each of the elements in a populist message (i.e. people centrism, anti-political elitism and left/right out-group exclusionism) influences citizens' attitudes and propensity to vote for a populist party. This chapter also provides an important insight into the effects of populist communication in different European regions (i.e. northern, southern, central, and eastern Europe).

Against this backdrop, we have used multilevel models to study the impact of different populist communication cues on populist attitudes and voting intentions in a comparative perspective. The chapter is organized as follows: first, a review of the literature on populist attitudes and populist voting is provided to explain their meaning and how they may be influenced by populist communication. Then, a description of the method and measures used for conducting the analysis, is provided. Finally, the results of the analysis are presented and discussed in the closing section.

Theoretical Background

According to the ideational approach (Stanley, 2008), populism is a set of ideas about how politics should function (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Defining populism as an ideology has important implications since it allows the study of populism, not only with reference to populist actors (politicians and media), but also among citizens, and it suggests exploring the link between populist parties and their supporters in terms of the sharing of common ideas about politics.

The study of populism on the supply and the demand-side requires different methodological approaches. To reveal politicians' and the media's populism, we can analyze their communication documents (Kriesi, 2014). In order to assess populism amongst citizens' we have to consider their populist attitudes and voting behaviors. Populist attitudes are very important because they are connected to populist voting. In fact, a series of studies have shown that populist attitudes can play an autonomous role in electoral behaviour and are positively associated with voting for populist parties, and negatively associated with voting for mainstream parties (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, & Andreadis, 2018; Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, Llamazares, Andreadis, & Singer, 2018).

The following sections review the existing literature on populist attitudes and populist voting and on how these outcomes may be shaped by the different elements of populist communication (i.e. positive valorization of the people as a homogeneous group, criticism/blaming of the political elite,

and criticism/blaming of horizontal out-groups such as immigrants and the super-rich). Based on this review, hypotheses are formulated and tested empirically.

Populist Attitudes

Extant literature offers several suggestions on how to conceptualize and operationalize populist attitudes (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017; K. Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, 2012; Schulz et al., 2017; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, & Katsambekis, 2017). These studies have developed different sets of indicators for measuring the presence of populist attitudes among voters. However, most of them are similar since they all refer back to Mudde's (2004, p. 453) definition of populism as *'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people'*. The operationalization proposed by Hameleers et al. (2017) also considers the exclusionism dimension of populism highlighted by the definition put forward by Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p. 323): *'When political actors talk about the people and combine this with an explicit anti-establishment position and an exclusion of certain population categories, one can talk of thick populism'*, and underlined by Reinemann et al.'s (2017, pp. 23–24) conclusion: *"the people" should be regarded as the key component of populist messages, with anti-elitism and anti-out-group stances serving as optional additional elements. These elements can be combined in various ways, resulting in different types of populism'*. In this way, Hameleers et al.'s (2017) operationalization provides a complete measure of the attitudes connected to the support of both left-wing and right-wing populist ideas. In fact, combining Mudde (2004), and Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) definitions, populism consists of two core components: the failed representation of the ordinary people and the moral antagonism between the good people and the evil elites (e.g., political actors, intellectuals, economic organisations, etc.), and/or the dangerous others (e.g., immigrants, ethnic minorities, welfare scroungers, the super-rich, etc.) (Hameleers et al., 2017). Accordingly, populist attitudes consist of the perception of being part of a homogeneous and valuable in-group, in believing that citizens should have more power in

politics, in the criticism of the elites, and in the exclusionism of immigrants and other minorities (Reinemann et al., 2017).

Many studies have investigated the diffusion and spread of populist attitudes in societies and have found that the sharing of populist attitudes may be connected to specific demographic characteristics – such as being male (e.g., Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016), having a low education level (e.g., Andreadis, Stavrakakis, & Demertzis, 2018), and to being in public sector employment (e.g., Tsatsanis, Andreadis, & Teperoglou, 2018) – and to certain psychological factors such as the feeling of relative deprivation (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016). In addition, a series of recent studies have focused on the effects of information exposure. They have found that both the repeated exposure and the one-time consumption of messages containing populist cues, may affect people’s attitudes (e.g., Hameleers et al., 2017; Müller et al., 2017) as well as their emotions (e.g., Wirz et al., 2018) and behaviours (Hameleers et al., 2018). In order to explain the informational effects on populist attitudes, two psychological mechanisms should be considered: cognitive priming of social identity, and blame attribution (see Hameleers et al. in this volume).

According to cognitive priming, the way media present an event or group may activate the audience’s interest in it, influence its perception, and make it cognitively more accessible thereby strengthening its relative weight in decision-making. This is true also for social identity: a political message may make specific facets of one’s social identity more accessible and thereby strengthen some of its specific aspects while neglecting others (Reinemann et al., 2017). For example, the citizens’ sense of belonging to the national in-group of “the people” may be strengthened by a message focusing on the national facet of social identity and by associating it to positive characteristics. Moreover, this effect may even be stronger if the national in-group is also defined in opposition to other groups, such as the political elite (Hameleers et al. and Corbu et al. in this volume). This suggests that political messages that focus on the relevance of a problem for the national people and insist on their positive valorisation (*people centrism cue*), may activate a positive evaluation of the group and of its homogeneity. It hypothesizes that the exposure to a *people centrism cue* enhances

respondents' attitudes towards the popular sovereignty or/and the homogeneity of the people (*H1a*). Moreover, we can also hypothesize that being exposed to a message that combines a *people centrism cue* with an *anti-elitism cue* has an even stronger positive effect on respondents' attitudes towards the popular sovereignty or/and the homogeneity of the people (*H1b*).

Blame attribution influences people's attitudes by indicating which actors are responsible for a negative situation. This effect has proven particularly strong with reference to government evaluation and voting behaviour: if a national government is blamed for the voters' negative economic situation, it usually receives negative evaluations (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014) and lower electoral support (Marsh & Tilley, 2010). We can assume that this mechanism is also at play in the effects of populist rhetoric that is centred on the depiction of the people as threatened by the bad decision of the political elites. This notion is also in line with Hameleers et al.'s. (2017) results. They found that political news items blaming the national or EU elites, increases the perception that the ordinary people's will is not represented by politicians (Hameleers et al., 2017, p. 21). This suggests that being exposed to a message in which the political elite is blamed, enhances both anti-establishment and popular sovereignty populist attitudes (*H2*).

However, often populist rhetoric does not only limit the attribution of blame to political elites. Social out-groups (such as immigrants or the super-wealthy) are accused, too, of threatening the well-being of the people with their behavior, or being favored by the political elites. In this regard, Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) revealed that online messages blaming the elites or immigrants, bolster citizens' exclusionist and anti-establishment populist attitudes. We therefore hypothesize that exposure to a message in which the super-wealthy are blamed, enhances respondents' anti-wealthy attitudes (*H3a*), and being exposed to a message in which immigrants are blamed, enhances respondents' anti-immigrant attitudes (*H4a*). Finally, we can also hypothesize that being exposed to a message that combines the blaming of the super-wealthy or immigrants with the blaming of the political elite, increases respondents' anti-wealthy or anti-immigrant attitudes as well as their anti-elite attitudes (*H3b*; *H4b*).

Populist Vote Intentions

In recent years, researchers have begun to systematically build an explanatory framework for the electoral performance of populist parties, in spite of the ambiguous nature of the concept of populism as well as the chimeric nature of populist party politics (Barr, 2009). The most important attempts in that regard are in line with the most influential voting behaviour models (sociological, psychological, as well as rational choice approach) that do not offer one-factor and, thus, simple explanations of individual political preference, but point to the complex and mediated nature of voting intentions (see i.e. Antunes, 2010; Lapatinas, 2014).

In this sense both country-level and individual-level factors must be considered. For example, Muis and Immerzeel (2017) noted that the socio-demographic characteristics of (right-wing) populist party followers might differ across contexts, but also highlighted that the motivations for voting for a populist party usually stem from a perceived loss of culture and economic deprivation, and largely depend on the salience of particular issues (such as immigration, law-and-order, and anti-establishment stance) for individuals (Mudde, 2015, p. 299; Rooduijn, 2017).

As far as the individual level is concerned, populist voting intentions may be explained by different psychological and informational mechanisms. First, as highlighted also by Hameleers et al. in this volume, the mechanism of blame attribution exploited by populist parties was proven to be effective in influencing the preference for political parties in government in, for instance, Great Britain and Ireland (Marsh & Tilley, 2010). According to those results, voters attribute credit and blame to governments for policy success and failure, which in turn affects their party support. The evaluation of the outcome depends on the pre-existing feeling towards a given party. Favoured parties are not blamed for policy failures and less favoured parties are not credited with policy success (Marsh & Tilley, 2010). In that regard, one can expect that people who are exposed to populist blame frames are more likely to turn to populist political parties that oppose political elites (Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou, & Exadaktylos, 2014).

Second, research has also investigated potential media effects on populist voting. For example, there is evidence that media visibility of populist parties of the right, and news coverage on issues that are focal points for them, enhance (especially when they are combined) the electoral attractiveness of these parties (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Bos, Lefevere, Thijssen, & Sheets, 2017; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, & Van Spanje, 2012). More recently, Hameleers et al. (2017) demonstrated in an experiment in the Dutch context, that participants who were exposed to populist messages that blamed the establishment, were significantly more likely to vote for the right-wing populist party, PVV, than people exposed to a message that did not use the blame frame. Their findings also indicate that when political elites are blamed for a salient national problem, people are more likely to vote for a populist party and less likely to vote for the largest party in government. This means that populist vote intentions are indirectly affected via blame perceptions.

In addition, Sheets, Bos and Boomgaarden (2016) tested the effect of being exposed to a media message containing anti-immigrant and anti-establishment stances. Despite not finding a direct effect on the probability to vote for a populist party, they found evidence that populist messages against elites and outgroups have an impact on the antecedents of populist voting, such as political cynicism and anti-immigrant attitudes (Sheets et al., 2016). Finally, Hameleers et al. (2018) found that when people-centrism and anti-elitism are combined in a media message, they may activate political action such as the sharing of a political article on social media.

Given the scarce existing literature on the effects of populist communication on vote intentions, we can state the following hypothesis: Citizens who are exposed to people centrism / anti political elite / anti-outgroup cues will have a stronger intention to vote for populist parties than citizens not exposed to those cues (*H5*). In addition, right-wing anti-outgroup cues (regarding immigrants) should favour right-wing populist parties (*H6a*), and left-wing anti-outgroup cues (regarding the wealthy) should favour left-wing populist parties (*H6b*).

Method

Experimental Design

The main intention of our analysis is to measure the impact of different populist messages on attitudes and the voting behaviour of European citizens, by using the data collected in a comparative survey experiment in 15 countries. The design was inspired by the Jagers & Walgrave (2007) typology (Hameleers et al., 2018; Reinemann et al., 2017). The main idea of the experiment was to study how a message with elements of people centrism, anti-elitism, and anti-outgroup cues (either right-wing or left-wing) would affect attitudes and the voting intentions of respondents. In the experiment, respondents were asked to read one of the versions of a short news item on the economic crisis, randomly assigned to them. After reading the manipulated news story, respondents were asked to answer a series of questions regarding their populist attitudes and voting behavior (see methods chapter by Hameleers, Andreadis, and Reinemann for a detailed description of the experimental design).

Sample

All data was collected in the first months of 2017 by both international and national research organizations which were thoroughly instructed to apply similar procedures with regards to recruiting, sampling, stimulus presentation, survey layout, and data collection. The final dataset represents a sample of European citizens with diverse characteristics (see Appendix B for an overview of respondent's background characteristics per country). After cleaning the data (see methods chapter by Hameleers, Andreadis, & Reinemann for additional details), 2,050 low-quality responses were removed, resulting in a total of 14,499 eligible respondents.¹

Procedure

The experiments were conducted online. All participants gave their informed consent and

¹ The removal of these respondents results in more precise estimates, yet yields to similar findings and conclusions.

filled in the pre-test questionnaire (demographics, control variables). Afterwards, they were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. In each of these conditions, participants were instructed to read a news article for at least 20 seconds (for a report on randomization and manipulation checks, see the methods chapter by Hameleers, Andreadis, and Reinemann in this volume). The post-test section of the survey contained the dependent variables and manipulation checks, as well as a debriefing and a message of thanks.

Stimuli

The mother versions (templates) of the stimuli were produced in English. It was translated by native speakers in all countries, after thorough discussion about potential inconsistencies and cultural specificities. The control stimulus consisted of a piece of news allegedly published on a fictional online newspaper (*news.com*) which closely mimicked the *euronews.com* template - a common familiar template in all European countries. The story referred to a future decline of the purchase power in the country, reported by the fictive foundation, *FutureNow*. A picture of an empty wallet accompanied the text. In the six treatment conditions, the typology of populist communication as outlined in the theoretical framework, was manipulated (also see the methods chapter by Hameleers, Andreadis, and Reinemann in this volume). Two additional conditions served as controls (see Appendix A for all stimuli).

Measures

Populist attitudes indices. To measure populist attitudes, respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agree with a series of statements presented in a randomized order (see Table 11.1) on a scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). The first three items reflect the people centrist dimension of populism, and, more specifically, attitudes related to popular sovereignty. The following four items reflect perceptions of people's homogeneity. A third set of items reflect anti-political elite attitudes using statements referring to the perceived corruptness of politicians and their responsiveness to people's demands. Another group of items reflect left-wing anti-outgroup attitudes

by using statements about “the rich” and “big corporations”. And finally, there are anti-immigrant statements reflecting the right-wing anti-outgroup dimension of populism.

Table 11.1 Populist attitudes by dimensions (means, standard deviations)

Dimension/Items	N	Mean	SD
<i>Popular Sovereignty</i>			
“The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.”	14453	5.28	1.79
“The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken.”	14456	5.40	1.72
“The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people.”	14453	5.79	1.39
<i>People Homogeneity</i>			
“Although the [country members, e.g. British] are very different from each other, when it comes down to it, they all think the same.”	14448	4.21	1.77
“Ordinary people all pull together.”	14436	4.33	1.74
“Ordinary people share the same values and interests.”	14444	4.35	1.73
“Ordinary people are of good and honest character.”	14438	4.53	1.64
<i>Political Elite</i>			
“Politicians in government are corrupt.”	14481	4.84	1.83
“Politicians make decisions that harm the interests of the ordinary people.”	14478	5.2	1.67
“Politicians are not really interested in what people like me think.”	14472	5.35	1.69
“MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people.”	14479	5.68	1.47
<i>Left-Wing Outgroup (the wealthy)</i>			
“International financial institutions have colonized our country.”	14445	4.76	1.75
“A bunch of rich families are really running this country.”	14475	4.86	1.82
“Big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people.”	14475	5.23	1.67
<i>Right-Wing Outgroup (immigrants)</i>			
“Immigrants are responsible for a lot of our nation’s problems.”	14455	3.54	2.03
“People who are not originally from our country, should have no rights on our social benefits.”	14448	3.72	2.11
“Immigrants are threatening the purity of our culture.”	14455	3.83	2.18
“Immigrants cost our country a lot of money that should rather be invested in our own people.”	14444	4.35	2.13

Note. Means are based on scales of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).

In line with the theoretical dimensional structure that is described above, we have created five indices by calculating the average value of these variables (items): (1) popular sovereignty index, (2) people’s homogeneity index, (3) anti political elite index, (4) left-wing anti-outgroup index, and (5) right-wing anti-outgroup index, and we use these indices as our dependent variables. In Table 11.2 and 11.3, we present descriptive statistics of the indices in each country along with the MSA H coefficient. Although, the coefficients in all countries are larger than the typical rule of thumb used in MSA (0.3), we can observe that there are significant differences between the countries.

As for the mean values of the popular sovereignty index, the lowest value appears in Sweden (4.19) while the highest values appear in Romania (6.09), Poland (5.94), Spain (5.84), France (5.81),

and Italy (5.72). Regarding the homogeneity index, we do not observe considerable fluctuations in the mean values of the countries. The only exception is Greece with a lower mean value (3.58). This means that respondents in Greece were less inclined to view their fellow-citizens as positively valued in-group with similar interests and values. Regarding the anti-political index, the country with the highest mean value is Romania (5.97), and Spain and France follow with mean values 5.85 and 5.83, respectively. The lowest mean value is observed in Sweden (3.96) and Norway (4.31). This shows that citizens in these northern European countries have the most positive view of their politicians (see also the chapter by Corbu et al.).

Table 11.3 presents the descriptive statistics and MSA H coefficients of the left and right anti-outgroup indices. The left anti-outgroup scale is not as strong as the other indices. On a country level, it is stronger in Greece ($H=0.661$) and much weaker in Israel ($H=0.373$). As far as the mean values of the left anti-outgroup index are concerned, the lowest value appears in Sweden (3.87), while the highest value is observed in Romania (5.89). This means that respondents in Romania had the most negative attitudes towards “the rich” and “big corporations”, whereas attitudes were much more positive in Sweden. The right anti-outgroup scale is the strongest among all scales used in this chapter. The scale is weaker in Romania ($H=0.491$). Attitudes towards immigrants are most negative in Italy (4.54), France (4.46), and Austria (4.43), while they are much more positive in Sweden (2.79) and Greece (2.83). This means that immigrants are perceived very differently by our respondents in the various countries and that this perception evidently cannot simply be traced back to their geographical location or the number of immigrants they have accepted in recent years.

Table 11.2 Populist attitudes indices per country (means, standard deviations and MSA H coefficients)

Country	Popular Sovereignty				People Homogeneity				Political Elite			
	N	Mean	SD	H	N	Mean	SD	H	N	Mean	SD	H
Austria	1065	5.62	1.37	0.710	1065	4.34	1.55	0.699	1065	5.13	1.32	0.644
France	1033	5.81	1.25	0.753	1033	4.33	1.56	0.664	1039	5.83	1.13	0.578
Germany	817	5.47	1.35	0.686	817	4.43	1.45	0.673	816	4.99	1.35	0.631
Greece	1101	5.34	1.73	0.766	1093	3.58	1.56	0.605	1102	5.78	1.12	0.531
Ireland	771	5.66	1.33	0.727	771	4.61	1.35	0.648	775	5.36	1.31	0.672
Israel	913	5.40	1.30	0.635	913	4.01	1.46	0.626	918	5.60	1.13	0.558
Italy	852	5.72	1.38	0.758	852	4.54	1.49	0.734	858	5.79	1.15	0.599
Netherlands	742	4.86	1.49	0.712	741	4.33	1.27	0.582	743	4.71	1.21	0.453
Norway	866	5.15	1.34	0.663	866	4.48	1.08	0.444	866	4.31	1.44	0.603
Poland	1096	5.94	1.20	0.772	1097	4.63	1.47	0.657	1098	5.62	1.21	0.619
Romania	1297	6.09	1.19	0.581	1297	4.71	1.51	0.613	1297	5.97	1.28	0.617
Spain	942	5.84	1.25	0.692	942	4.79	1.34	0.631	945	5.85	1.17	0.621
Sweden	1030	4.19	1.68	0.586	1030	4.25	1.15	0.350	1030	3.96	1.62	0.664
Switzerland	1030	5.62	1.24	0.649	1030	4.09	1.39	0.576	1034	4.42	1.39	0.631
United Kingdom	907	5.28	1.44	0.722	907	4.24	1.39	0.667	910	5.27	1.26	0.641
Total	14462	5.49	1.45	0.714	14454	4.35	1.45	0.624	14496	5.27	1.42	0.664

Note. Means are based on scales of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).

Table 11.3 Indices of populist attitudes toward left-wing (“the wealthy”) and right-wing outgroups (“immigrants”) per country (index means; standard deviations; MSA H coefficients)

Country	Left-Wing Outgroup (immigrants)				Right-Wing Outgroup (the wealthy)			
	N	Mean	SD	H	N	Mean	SD	H
Austria	1065	5.07	1.16	0.498	1065	4.43	1.91	0.789
France	1039	5.65	1.07	0.538	1033	4.46	1.95	0.776
Germany	817	4.95	1.2	0.511	817	4.26	1.82	0.754
Greece	1104	5.66	1.11	0.661	1102	2.83	1.76	0.708
Ireland	775	5.29	1.19	0.555	771	3.52	1.82	0.734
Israel	918	5.42	1.02	0.373	913	3.90	1.69	0.679
Italy	858	5.64	1.02	0.528	852	4.54	1.49	0.745
Netherlands	743	4.49	1.20	0.511	741	3.89	1.76	0.753
Norway	866	4.35	1.28	0.549	866	3.77	1.87	0.755
Poland	1098	5.47	1.1	0.478	1097	4.06	1.75	0.698
Romania	1297	5.89	1.09	0.597	1297	4.14	1.58	0.491
Spain	945	5.65	1.1	0.563	942	3.72	1.81	0.737
Sweden	1030	3.87	1.35	0.593	1030	2.79	1.85	0.757
Switzerland	1034	4.55	1.22	0.49	1030	3.8	1.81	0.741
United Kingdom	910	5.22	1.15	0.564	907	3.99	1.96	0.782
Total	14499	5.17	1.29	0.591	14463	3.86	1.88	0.738

Note. Means and standard deviations are based on indices using scales of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Higher values indicate more negative attitudes towards the respective outgroups.

Populist vote intention models. For our other dependent variable, also measured after the stimuli, we gave respondents a list of up to nine political parties in each individual country and prompted them to indicate for each of these parties, how probable it is that they will ever vote for it. We used an 11-point scale where 0 means “not at all probable” and 10 means “very probable”.

In order to classify parties as populist or non-populist, we used data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al., 2017). In order to discover how each party ranks within its country on the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric and the salience of reducing political corruption, we use two items measured in CHES 2014. The questions posed to national experts were as follows: “Next, we’d like you to consider the salience of the following issues for each party over the course of 2014 i) Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, and ii) Salience of reducing political

corruption”. These items are measured on an 11-point scale where 0 means “not important at all” and 10 means “extremely important”. We use the average value of these two items to identify the populist actors on the supply-side in each country.²

Although we consider populism to be a gradual phenomenon, we chose to apply a threshold here in order to classify the parties as populist or not. Using a common threshold for all countries would not work because the salience of these issues differs significantly from country to country. For instance, in Norway, the highest score is 3.83 (*Progress Party*) and the average score of all Norwegian parties is 2.48, while in Greece, the lowest score is 3.44 (*New Democracy*) and the average score of all Greek parties is 7.07. Although their scores are very close to each other, the *Progress Party* can be considered as an anti-establishment populist party in Norway, while *New Democracy* is one of the anti-populist parties in Greece.

Instead of using a common threshold for all countries, we therefore used the average score of all parties in a country as the threshold for each country. Then we were able to classify as populist, the parties that have a score higher than the average national score. Of course, the national average can be considered a low threshold and we may have some false positives because there may be parties with high anti-establishment scores which are not considered populist by most of the scholars. On the other hand, selecting any other value instead of the average value as our threshold, would be more arbitrary.

With this approach, we were able to classify correctly all populist parties known from the literature (Aalberg et al., 2017). Of course, other criteria could be used to classify parties as populist. For instance, Rooduijn (2017) selects parties, which are prototypically populist (categorized as

² We should note that the CHES 2014 (the most recent CHES data covering all countries under study) items measure the salience of anti-establishment and anti-corruption positions of parties, but they are not able to measure the other significant dimensions of populism used here: popular sovereignty, i.e. that power should be transferred to the people as well as left-wing anti-outgroup sentiment towards “the rich”. CHES also covers socio-cultural preferences (e.g. attitudes towards immigrants; see below).

populist by the most country experts). However, our study includes 123 political parties in 15 different countries and the manual classification of them would be not only time consuming, but even impossible for some of the smaller or newer parties. In addition, experts may be in disagreement about the classification of many parties, even for some larger and well-known parties: for instance, the German party, *The Left*, is classified as populist by Rooduijn (2017), but Fawzi, Obermaier, and Reinemann (2017) argue that “The Left, can currently be called a mainstream party, at least in eastern Germany”.

The political preferences and the ideological position of the voters of left-wing populist parties is different from the position of the voters of right-wing populist parties (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017). Thus, we need to further classify our populist parties as left-wing or right-wing. Following a similar procedure, as we did with the populism classification, we have used the GAL/TAN, immigration and multiculturalism CHES item for the classification of parties as (socio-culturally) left (libertarian) or right (authoritarian). More specifically, we have classified the populist parties with scores higher than their national GAL/TAN, immigration, and multiculturalism average as (socio-culturally) right-wing populist parties,³ and we have classified the rest of the populist parties as left-wing populist parties. At this point it is worth mentioning that a simple quantitative criterion may not be adequate to correctly classify all kinds of parties. Therefore, we acknowledge that there may be disputed cases in the area of populism/extremism, such as the *Golden Dawn* party in Greece or the *NPD* in Germany. On the other hand, i) it is beyond the scope of this chapter to make a precise classification of all European political parties, and ii) even extremist parties such as *Golden Dawn* are capable of speaking populism and in fact they often use populist discourse (Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser & Andreadis, 2018).

³ A similar classification using the GAL/TAN and populism dimensions of the CHES 2014 dataset have been used by Norris & Inglehart (2019), but instead of using the term “right-wing populist parties”, they prefer the term “authoritarian parties”.

Finally, for our voting intention models, we create three dependent variables: i) voting intentions for populist parties in general (using the average voting intention for all parties classified as populist), ii) voting intentions for right-wing populist parties (using the average voting intention for all parties classified as right-wing populist), and iii) voting intentions for left-wing populist parties (using the average voting intention for all parties classified as left-wing populist). In Table 11.4, we display descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. The parties that have been classified in the populist groups (both left and right) are displayed as notes to the table.

Our dataset has a hierarchical structure with respondents nested within 15 different countries. To test the effects of populist cues on voters' populist attitudes and voting intention (dependent variables) in all country samples simultaneously whilst controlling for the dependency of the observations on the country level, we have run multilevel models. In order to study each country separately, we also used OLS regressions for each country (see methods chapter by Hameleers, Andreadis, & Reinemann for a further discussion of using multilevel models with a rather small number of level II units).

Table 11.4 Populist vote intentions per country (average propensity to vote for right-wing, left-wing, or populist parties in general)

Country	Right-wing Populist Parties*		Left-wing Populist Parties**		Populist Parties Combined	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Austria	2.22	2.19	3.17	2.9	2.6	1.64
France	3.03	2.73	2.78	3.04	2.94	2.08
Germany	1.58	2.53	2.05	2.34	1.82	1.94
Greece	0.89	1.48	1.92	2.5	1.34	1.52
Ireland	3.64	3.56	3.21	2.69	3.35	2.55
Israel	3.45	3.19	4.33	2.81	4.04	2.44
Italy	2.86	3.52	3.23	2.54	3.11	2.19
Netherlands	2.96	2.65	4.11	3.56	3.34	2.26
Norway	3.13	2.39	1.91	2.49	2.52	1.58
Poland	2.76	2.57	-	-	2.76	2.57
Romania	-	-	2.62	2.62	2.62	2.62
Spain	3.44	3.29	2.91	3.21	3.08	2.21
Sweden	2.16	3.61	2.76	3.03	2.56	1.91
Switzerland	3.09	2.57	3.24	2.93	3.14	2.12
United Kingdom	2.66	3.37	2.21	2.57	2.36	2.06

Notes. Table entries are mean values and standard deviations of propensities to vote for the parties in each group. Propensity to vote was measured on 11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all probable) to 10 (very probable).

* Right wing populist parties: FPÖ -Austrian Freedom Party, Team Stronach, BZÖ - Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria); National Front, Movement for France (France); AfD - Alternative for Germany, NPD - National Democratic Party (Germany); Golden Dawn, ANEL, Union of Center (Greece); 3 Sinn Fein (Ireland); Kulanu (Israel); Northern League (Italy); Party for the Freedom, 50 Plus (Netherlands); Senterpartiet - The Centre Party, Fremskrittspartiet - Progress party (Norway); Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - Law and Justice, Kukiz' 15, Kongres Nowej Prawicy - The New Right Congress (Poland); Ciudadanos – Partido de la Ciudadanía (C's)/ Citizens – Party of the Citizenry (Spain); Sverigedemokraterna (SD) - Sweden Democrats or Swedish Democrats (Sweden); Swiss People's Party, Federal Democratic Union (Switzerland); UK Independence Party – UKIP (United Kingdom)

** Left wing populist parties: Austrian Green Party, NEOS -The New Austria and Liberal Forum (Austria); Europe Ecology – The Greens (France); The Left, Pirate Party (Germany); SYRIZA, KKE (Greece); Green; AA / PBP (Ireland); Zionist Union, Yesh Atid, Meretz (Israel); Five Stars Movement, Left Ecology & Freedom/Italian Left (Italy); Socialist Party (Netherlands); Sosialistisk Venstreparti - The Socialist Left Party, Miljøpartiet De Grønne - The Green Party (Norway); PMP - People's Movement Party, PNL - National Liberal Party (Romania); Podemos – “We Can” and their confluences, United Left (Spain); Vänsterpartiet (V) - The Left Party, Miljöpartiet (MP) - The Green Party (Sweden); Christian Democratic People's Party (Switzerland); Green Party of England and Wales, Scottish National Party – SNP (United Kingdom).

Results

Populist Attitudes

The subsequent section looks at the impact of the different cues used in populist communication (“people centrism”, “anti political elite”, “anti-outgroup”) and of interactions between them on populist attitudes.

People centrism cue. According to the coefficients presented in Table 11.5, the people centrism cue strengthens the populist attitudes of readers related to popular sovereignty and people homogeneity – as was expected – but also anti-political elite and left-wing anti-outgroup attitudes. Presenting an article that portrays the people as victims of the future crisis of purchase power activates popular sovereignty (0.094) and people homogeneity (0.073) when compared with people who have read a version of the news article that refers to the crisis *without* portraying the people as victims. The small effect size appears as statistically significant due to the large sample size of the combined dataset.

Thus, if we focus on each country separately, there is a statistically significant impact only in Italy and Spain, and only for the popular sovereignty index. Moreover, a statistically significant impact of the people centrism cue is also observed on anti-political elite and anti-wealthy (left-wing anti-outgroup) attitudes, and the effect size is estimated at 0.095 and 0.077, respectively. Here, priming the ingroup indeed makes citizens more populist – although very slightly, confirming our first hypothesis (*H1a*). If we check on interactions with the anti-political elite cue (Table 11.6), we do not notice any significant effect on popular sovereignty or homogeneity attitudes of the reader, as we expected (*H1b*). However, there is a significant impact of this interaction on anti-immigrant attitudes.

Table 11.5 Main effects of populist cues on populist attitudes (multilevel models; unstandardized coefficients; standard errors)

	Popular Sovereignty Index	People Homogeneity Index	Anti-Elite Index	Left-wing Anti-outgroup Index	Right-Wing Anti-outgroup Index
Intercept	5.392 (0.121)***	4.283 (0.081)***	5.167 (0.160)***	5.074 (0.149)***	3.802 (0.131)***
<i>Level 1 fixed effects</i>					
People centrism cue	.094 (0.032)**	.073 (0.033)*	.095 (0.030)**	.077 (0.027)**	.040 (0.042)
Anti-political elite cue	.020 (0.023)	.029 (0.024)	.028 (0.021)	.027 (0.019)	.057 (0.030)
Left-wing anti-outgroup cue	.070 (0.032)*	.099 (0.033)**	.086 (0.030)**	.098 (0.027)***	.017 (0.042)
Right-wing anti-outgroup cue	.101 (0.032)**	.070 (0.033)*	.056 (0.030)	.052 (0.027)	.081 (0.042)
<i>Random effects</i>					
Country-level variance	.210 (0.077)***	.088 (0.033)***	.377 (0.138)**	.324 (0.119)**	.240 (0.089)***
Individual-level variance	1.894 (0.022)***	2.007 (0.024)***	1.636 (0.019)***	1.326 (0.016)***	3.266 (0.038)***
Intra-country correlation	.100	.042	.187	.196	.068
Log likelihood	-25173.062	-25571.145	-24179.350	-22662.253	-29113.778
<i>N</i>	14462	14454	14496	14499	14463

Note. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Anti-political elite cue. The results show that exposure to news stories that blame politicians for economic problems does *not* activate populist attitudes in the public. We do not observe a significant impact of anti-elite cue in any of the indices of the analysis. The coefficients are positive but relatively small (0.020-0.057) and even in the large, combined sample, they are not significant. As revealed by individual country analyses, news blaming politicians does not translate into significant changes of populist attitudes in any of the countries. Hence, we should reject our second hypothesis (*H2*).

Left-wing anti-outgroup cue. Exposure to a news article that blames wealthy people for economic problems seems to have a positive impact on almost all the populist attitudes of readers. As it was expected (*H3a*), presenting an article that blames the wealthy for future economic problems activates anti-wealthy attitudes. However, Table 11.5 demonstrates that although the value of this coefficient is statistically significant, the effect size of this cue is also small (0.098). If we focus on each country separately, there is a statistically significant impact in five of the countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK. In addition, we notice a statistically significant impact of the left anti-outgroup cue on people centrism (0.099 and 0.070) and on anti-political elite (0.086) attitudes. Hence, even though the first part of our hypothesis is confirmed (*H3a*), if we check on the interaction with the anti-political elite cue (Table 11.6), we do not observe any significant impact on populist attitudes (*H3b*).

Right-wing anti-outgroup cue. A news article about an economic problem that is attributed to immigrants seems to activate people centrism populist attitudes, but not anti-immigrant attitudes as it was expected (*H4a*). As shown in Table 11.5, being exposed to this populist cue has a positive and significant effect only on respondents' popular sovereignty (0.101) and homogeneity of the people (0.070) attitudes. Nevertheless, if we focus on each country separately, there is a statistically significant impact on anti-immigrant attitudes only in Italy and Greece. Moreover, if we check on potential interactions with the anti-political elite cue (Table 11.6), we do not observe any significant impact on populist attitudes of the readers, rejecting our research hypothesis (*H4b*).

Interactions. Finally, we explore any impact of potential interactions on populist attitudes. As Table 11.5 displays, the only significant impact that we notice, as mentioned above, is the interaction of people centrism and anti-political elite cues on anti-immigrant attitudes (0.170). We have not observed any other interactions with a statistically significant impact on populist attitudes indices.

Table 11.6 Effects of populist cues' interactions on populist attitudes (multilevel models; unstandardized coefficients, standard errors)

	Popular Sovereignty Index	People Homogeneity Index	Anti-Political Elite Index	Left-Wing Anti-outgroup Index	Right-Wing Anti-outgroup Index
Intercept	5.379 (0.122) ^{***}	4.293 (0.083) ^{***}	5.158 (0.161) ^{***}	5.063 (0.149) ^{***}	3.842 (0.133) ^{***}
<i>Level 1 fixed effects</i>					
People centrism cue	.103 (0.046) [*]	.023 (0.047)	.080 (0.042)	.066 (0.038)	-.045 (0.060)
Anti-political elite cue	.046 (0.045)	.009 (0.046)	.046 (0.042)	.049 (0.038)	-.024 (0.059)
Left-wing anti-outgroup cue	.084 (0.046)	.087 (0.047)	.095 (0.042) [*]	.112 (0.038) ^{**}	-.012 (0.060)
Right-wing anti-outgroup cue	.130 (0.045) ^{**}	.091 (0.047)	.097 (0.042) [*]	.093 (0.038) [*]	.033 (0.059)
People centrism × Anti-political elite cue	-.018 (0.065)	.100 (0.067)	.029 (0.060)	.023 (0.054)	.170 (0.085) [*]
Left Anti-outgroup × Anti-political elite cue	-.027 (0.064)	.023 (0.066)	-.019 (0.060)	-.027 (0.054)	.059 (0.085)
Right Anti-outgroup × Anti-political elite Cues	-.058 (0.064)	-.042 (0.066)	-.083 (0.060)	-.082 (0.054)	.097 (0.084)
<i>Random effects</i>					
Country-level variance	.210 (0.077) ^{***}	.088 (0.033) ^{***}	.377 (0.138) ^{**}	.324 (0.119) ^{**}	.240 (0.089) ^{***}
Individual-level variance	1.894 (0.022) ^{***}	2.006 (0.024) ^{***}	1.636 (0.019) ^{***}	1.326 (0.016) ^{***}	3.265 (0.038) ^{***}
Intra-country correlation	.100	.042	.187	.197	.068
Log likelihood	-25172.627	-25568.774	-24177.493	-22660.168	-29111.673
<i>N</i>	14462	14454	14496	14499	14463

Note. ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Populist Vote Intentions

In this section we analyze whether cues in the news affect voting intentions for populist parties in general, and left and right-wing parties in particular.

People centrism cue. Table 11.7 shows that the people centrism cue is not associated with any significant impact on voting intentions for populist parties, neither right-wing, nor left-wing. However, on a country level analysis, in Romania the people centrism cue seems to be associated with votes for populist parties, and more specifically, when we study left and right-wing parties separately we find that the people centrism cue is associated with the left populist vote. On the other hand, in Sweden, voting for the single party that has been classified by our method as a right-wing populist party in this country (*Swedish Democrats*), is increased among the voters who have been exposed to the people centrism cue.

Anti-political elite cue: As with the people centrism cue, an anti-political elite cue does not seem to have any significant impact on populist voting intentions. Blaming the political elites for an economic problem does not have any significant effect on the voting intentions of readers, neither for right-wing, nor for left-wing, populist parties⁴. On the country level, the highest impact of the anti-political elite cue on voting intentions for populist parties is apparent in Switzerland. When we focus separately on left and right-wing parties, we find that the anti-elite cue is associated with the left-wing populist vote.

Left-wing anti-outgroup cue: As with the abovementioned cues, blaming the wealthy does not have any significant impact on populist voting intentions of readers. As for country level analyses, the presentation of a left-out group cue seems to be associated with more votes for

⁴ In addition, none of the interactions between the anti-elite and the rest of the cues (tables not shown here to save space) are significant.

populist parties in Romania, but when we study left and right-wing parties separately, we observe that the left anti-outgroup cue is associated with the right populist vote, although anti-wealthy rhetoric usually belongs to the left-wing political agenda. The same also happens in Greece; the left anti-outgroup cue has a positive impact on voting for the right-wing anti-establishment parties (*Golden Dawn, ANEL, and Union of Center*).

Right-wing anti-outgroup cue: In contrast to the cues analyzed so far, a news article about an economic problem that is attributed to immigrants, seems to increase voting intentions for populist parties according to the findings in the combined dataset. More specifically, a right-wing anti-outgroup cue has no impact on voting for left-wing populist parties, but it has a positive impact on voting for right-wing populist parties. According to the individual country analyses, a right-wing anti-outgroup cue has a positive impact on voting for right-wing populist parties in Norway, where the two parties that have been classified by our method as right-wing anti-establishment parties (the *Centre Party* and the *Progress party*), have higher vote intention scores among people who have been exposed to the article blaming immigrants.

Table 11.7. *Multilevel model: Effects of populist cues on voting intentions for anti-establishment parties (unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses)*

	Voting intentions for populist parties	Voting intentions for right-wing populist parties	Voting intentions for left-wing populist parties
Intercept	2.704 (0.166) ^{***}	2.599 (0.203) ^{***}	2.866 (0.197) ^{***}
<i>Level 1 fixed effects:</i>			
People Centrist Cue	0.008 (0.051)	0.031 (0.071)	-0.036 (0.069)
Anti-political elite Cue	0.060 (0.036)	0.067 (0.050)	0.057 (0.049)
Right Anti-outgroup Cue	0.104 (0.050) [*]	0.171 (0.070) [*]	0.024 (0.069)
Left Anti-outgroup Cue	0.043 (0.050)	0.090 (0.071)	-0.012 (0.069)
<i>Random effects</i>			
Country-level variance	0.391 (0.145) [*]	0.533 (0.205)	0.501 (0.193)
Individual-level variance	4.597 (0.054) ^{***}	8.215 (0.102) ^{***}	7.915 (0.097) ^{***}

Intra-country correlation	0.078	0.061	0.060
Log likelihood	-31308.369	-32230.639	-32488.610
<i>N</i>	14336	13027	13231

Note. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. In Romania, we were not able to find right-wing anti-establishment parties. In Poland, we were not able to find left-wing anti-establishment parties.

Discussion and Conclusion

In most of the countries in this experiment, populist attitudes of citizens are not influenced considerably by the populist communication cues or their interactions. Most notably, an article with an anti-elite cue does not seem to activate populist attitudes of citizens when compared to a news article that refers to the crisis without blaming the political elite. Hence, it is hard to notice strong populist communication effects after one single message. This finding is compatible with the literature and scholars who argue that populist attitudes among citizens are a stable trait, and communication effects are stronger when the exposure is repeated (e.g., Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Schemer, 2014) or habitual (e.g., Hameleers et al. in this volume). In addition, given that the economic crisis is a salient issue, people may have already developed a solid prior opinion on who should be blamed for a future economic crisis, too.

On the other hand, people centrism and left-wing anti-outgroup cues exhibit the strongest priming impact on almost all the populist attitudes, and especially on people centrism (popular sovereignty and homogeneity) and anti-wealthy attitudes, respectively, confirming at least two of our hypotheses (*H1a* and *H3a*). However, it is worth mentioning that although the impact of these cues is statistically significant, the effect size is relatively small. Another interesting finding is related to the right-wing anti-outgroup cue. Although it does not significantly affect the anti-immigrant attitudes, as we had expected, we have observed a significant impact on people centrism attitudes. As for the interactions of populist communication cues, the only significant impact we

have observed is the impact of the interaction between people centrism and anti-political elite on anti-immigrant attitudes.

On a country level, we do not observe specific geographic patterns among countries. People centrism cues have an impact on popular sovereignty attitudes in two southern European countries, Italy and Spain, but they do not have a significant effect on homogeneity attitudes in any country of the study. The anti-political elite cue has no impact in any of the countries at least as far as attitudes towards the political elite are concerned. On the contrary, the left-wing anti-outgroup cue influences populist attitudes in a large number of countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK). Moreover, the right-wing anti-outgroup cue activates significantly anti-immigrant attitudes in Italy and Greece, two countries affected considerably by the refugee crisis. In addition, this cue has affected anti-wealthy attitudes in Poland and Romania and people centrism attitudes in Ireland, Poland, and Greece. Hence, the right-wing anti-outgroup cue is also effective in countries not affected considerably by the refugee crisis and where immigration is lower than emigration. This strengthens the notion of the resentments and myths of populist politics, i.e. sometimes it is possible for a populist party to appear as a solution to serious problems, even when the problem is not real, as long as the voters perceive the problem to be real.

Finally, there are countries in which the populist attitudes of citizens are not affected by any of the populist message elements at all (i.e. Norway, Sweden, France, Austria, and Israel). Some of these countries are more familiar with populist actors than others; hence a single news article with a populist context is not able to radically change the profile of the electorate.

As far as voting intentions for populist parties are concerned, the anti-immigrant cue has the strongest impact on voting for right-wing populist parties. As revealed by the individual country analyses, at least one of the cues has an effect on populist voting in five of the 15 countries (Greece, Norway, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland). More specifically, the individual country analyses

have shown that an anti-immigrant cue has a significant effect on voters in Norway for right-wing populist parties. In Switzerland, the anti-elite cue had the strongest impact on voting intentions for left-wing populist parties. In Romania, being exposed to the people-centrism cue is associated with a higher likelihood of a left-wing populist vote, and reading the anti-wealthy cue is associated with right-wing populist voting intentions. The anti-wealthy cue also considerably affected voting intentions for the Greek right-wing populist parties, showing that anti-wealthy rhetoric not only appeals to the voters of left-wing populist parties. Finally, voting for the *Sweden Democrats*, which is classified as a right-wing populist party in our method, is influenced by the people centrism cue.

The above analysis and the underpinning empirical study (social experiment) is an attempt to analyze populism and its core elements, such as antiestablishment sentiment, outside of the political realm led by the conviction that populist messages can become even more persuasive and influential beyond the party politics sphere while present in public debate in the media (Rooduijn, 2014). We followed the line of studies demonstrating that public debates have become more populist over the years, and that the degree of populism interplays with the success of populist parties. What has been tested here is an alleged influence of the online-based populist message, on the European public and voters' attitudes and voting intentions.

Contrary to the voting behavior or intentions that can be driven by short-term factors or singular, non-recurring events, people's attitudes are harder to change - which seems to be the result of a long-term process of (political) socialization (see also the theory chapter by Hameleers et al. in this volume). Hence, any kind of influence proved to be the result of a single exposition to the online message, can be seen as an important hint in understanding the spread of populism and its in-depth social effects. Interestingly, a left-wing anti-outgroup cue had stronger effects on the attitudinal responses of the voters, especially in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK. On the other hand, the cue without any significant influence on voters' populist attitudes, was

the anti-elite cue. Finally, an interesting contribution to this study is the evidence that shows blaming immigrants can also be effective in countries not affected considerably by the refugee crisis and where immigration is lower than emigration (e.g. Romania and Poland).

The introductory finding aligns with the existing texts and recommendations to look carefully at the country context as well as the salience of particular issues for populist supporters (Mudde, 2015). When it comes to the explanatory potential of the relationship between exposure to populist messages, and political preferences, the anti-immigrant cues had a positive impact on voting for right-wing populist parties according to the findings in the combined dataset. Ascribing guilt for a future economic downfall to immigrants, triggered the populist parties support in Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway), whereas in countries of the south (Greece and Romania), much more touched by the economic downfall, the notion of the guilty wealthy was echoed in the political choices of the respondents.

An important motivator for continuing and developing the study, is the lack of significant relationship between mediated populism and individual political choices in eight out of 15 countries. This does not necessarily indicate a lack of influence of populist messages, as mentioned earlier, but it indicates that things are much more complicated. Therefore, a necessary next step in the analysis of the effects of attitudes and behavior, is to test the moderating role of individual predispositions which have been shown to be crucial in media effects in general, and populist effects in particular (e.g., Hameleers et al., 2017; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017). Moreover, it will be necessary to include country characteristics in a more systematic fashion (Hameleers et al., 2018). Finally, considering the complex nature of populism and of voting behaviors, a further step would be to test the possible results on non-partisan populist attitudes on the individual, and at country level.

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Appendix A Comparative experiment: Stimuli for all eight conditions

(1) people centrist / empty populism

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 1”

here

(2) anti political elite populism

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 2”

here

(3) right-wing exclusionist populism

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 3”

here

(4) right-wing complete populism

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 4”

here

(5) left-wing exclusionist populism

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 5”

here

(6) left-wing complete populism

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 6”

here

(7) control 1 factual story

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 7”

here

(8) control 2 anti political elite

include

“CommPop Appendix A Condition 8”

here

Appendix B Comparative experiment: Background characteristics of respondents (entire sample vs. cleaned sample)

Country	Gender		Age		Education		Political interest		Ideology	
	(female)		(M, N, SD)		(lower, medium, higher)		(M, N, SD, 1-7 point scale)		(M, SD, N, 1-10 point scale)	
	Entire sample	Cleaned sample	Entire sample	Cleaned sample	Entire sample	Cleaned sample	Entire sample	Cleaned sample	Entire sample	Cleaned sample
Austria	51.4%	51.3%	M=43.70	M=43.28	L=9.5%	L=9.9%	M=4.47	M=4.44	M=4.83	M=4.83
			N=1,065	N=1,138	M=49.0%	M=49.3%	N=1,065	N=1,135	N=957	N=1,016
			SD=13.84	SD=13.94	H=41.5%	H=40.7%	SD=1.74	SD=1.75	SD=2.26	SD=2.26
France	51.8%	52.1%	M=48.39	M=48.07	L=15.1%	L=15.7%	M=4.41	M=4.32	M=5.17	M=5.20
			N=1,003	N=1,084	M=25.5%	M=25.1%	N=1,039	N=1,191	N=887	N=996
			SD=16.06	SD=16.04	H=59.4%	H=59.2%	SD=1.79	SD=1.82	SD=3.01	SD=3.01
Germany	49.0%	49.5%	M=41.81	M=41.02	L=30.8%	L=32.1%	M=4.99	M=4.94	M=4.80	M=4.87
			N=817	N=991	M=36.1%	M=34.1%	N=817	N=991	N=739	N=892
			SD=13.09	SD=13.01	H=33.1%	H=33.8%	SD=1.56	SD=1.59	SD=2.08	SD=2.12
Greece	30.0%	29.9%	M=45.42	M=45.46	L=3.7%	L=3.7%	M=5.66	M=5.67	M=4.69	M=4.68
			N=1,104	N=1,116	M=38.4%	M=38.3%	N=1,098	N=1,110	N=1,055	N=1,067
			SD=14.97	SD=14.92	H=57.9%	H=58.1%	SD=1.50	SD=1.49	SD=2.54	SD=2.55
Ireland	51.2%	51.6%	M=43.66	M=42.13	L=9.0%	L=10.4%	M=4.56	M=4.54	M=5.08	M=5.21
			N=767	N=926	M=51.7%	M=50.4%	N=775	N=950	N=652	N=797
			SD=16.18	SD=15.94	H=39.2%	H=39.2%	SD=1.70	SD=1.72	SD=2.26	SD=2.34

Israel	51.3%	50.7%	M=42.44	M=42.05	L=17.4%	L=18.1%	M=4.65	M=4.59	M=5.93	M=5.96
			N=908	N=981	M=46.4%	M=46.1%	N=918	N=1,016	N=900	N=990
			SD=16.40	SD=16.40	H=36.2%	H=35.8%	SD=1.57	SD=1.59	SD=2.41	SD=2.44
Italy	51.3%	51.8%	M=50.29	M=48.74	L=13.3%	L=12.2%	M=5.16	M=5.11	M=4.90	M=5.04
			N=846	N=1,029	M=72.7%	M=72.5%	N=858	N=1,054	N=791	N=955
			SD=15.34	SD=15.49	H=14.0%	H=15.3%	SD=1.54	SD=1.58	SD=2.80	SD=2.81
Netherlands	51.5%	51.0%	M=46.39	M=45.32	L=20.5%	L=21.7%	M=4.56	M=4.47	M=4.91	M=4.92
			N=734	N=881	M=40.9%	M=40.3%	N=743	N=934	N=687	N=847
			SD=13.09	SD=13.37	H=38.6%	H=37.9%	SD=1.52	SD=1.53	SD=2.49	SD=2.50
Norway	48.0%	50.0%	M=50.31	M=49.50	L=9.1%	L=10.1%	M=4.62	M=4.47	M=5.56	M=5.54
			N=866	N=1,009	M=48.0%	M=48.2%	N=866	N=1,009	N=793	N=896
			SD=15.97	SD=16.11	H=42.8%	H=41.7%	SD=1.46	SD=1.52	SD=2.65	SD=2.64
Poland	49.5%	48.6%	M=42.33	M=42.35	L=31.1%	L=32.9%	M=4.15	M=4.05	M=5.18	M=5.20
			N=1,093	N=1,328	M=31.0%	M=31.1%	N=1,098	N=1,365	N=892	N=1,085
			SD=13.13	SD=12.87	H=38.0%	H=36.0%	SD=1.83	SD=1.85	SD=2.66	SD=2.70
Romania	64.8%	65.9%	M=41.72	M=41.11	L=9.0%	L=9.1%	M=3.95	M=3.87	M=5.39	M=5.29
			N=1,297	N=1,468	M=39.6%	M=40.0%	N=1,297	N=1,468	N=1,070	N=1,205
			SD=13.81	SD=13.76	H=51.3%	H=50.9%	SD=1.83	SD=1.84	SD=2.72	SD=2.74
Spain	49.7%	50.1%	M=49.28	M=48.83	L=35.6%	L=36.4%	M=4.94	M=4.89	M=4.43	M=4.45
			N=936	N=994	M=25.5%	M=25.3%	N=945	N=1,010	N=897	N=954
			SD=14.63	SD=14.69	H=38.9%	H=38.3%	SD=1.63	SD=1.67	SD=2.69	SD=2.70

			M=50.00	M=49.95	L=7.1%	L=7.1%	M=5.27	M=5.26	M=4.93	M=4.93
Sweden	46.8%	47.1%	N=1,025	N=1,045	M=64.0%	M=63.9%	N=1,030	N=1,063	N=1,005	N=1,037
			SD=15.19	SD=15.19	H=28.9%	H=29.0%	SD=1.31	SD=1.31	SD=2.49	SD=2.48
			M=48.06	M=47.74	L=8.2%	L=9.2%	M=4.63	M=4.58	M=5.14	M=5.11
Switzerland	51.7%	51.9%	N=1,013	N=1,091	M=63.1%	M=63.2%	N=1,033	N=1,133	N=973	N=1,060
			SD=17.20	SD=17.17	H=28.7%	H=27.6%	SD=1.66	SD=1.67	SD=2.26	SD=2.25
			M=48.89	M=48.03	L=27.0%	L=28.5%	M=4.50	M=4.39	M=5.06	M=5.10
United Kingdom	50.3%	50.8%	N=891	N=1,021	M=35.4%	M=34.7%	N=910	N=1,103	N=762	N=901
			SD=15.52	SD=15.50	H=37.6%	H=36.8%	SD=1.74	SD=1.82	SD=2.27	SD=2.32
			M=45.43	M=46.05	L=17.1%	L=16.1%	M=4.61	M=4.69	M=5.09	M=5.07
Total	50.04%	50.0%	N=16,102	N=15,326	M=43.7%	M=44.1%	N=16,532	N=14,492	N=14,698	N=13,060
			SD=15.30	SD=15.33	H=39.2%	H=39.8%	SD=1.73	SD=1.70	SD=2.57	SD=2.55

