var bibbase_data = {"data":"\"Loading..\"\n\n
\n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n
\n generated by\n \n \"bibbase.org\"\n\n \n
\n \n\n
\n\n \n\n\n
\n\n Excellent! Next you can\n create a new website with this list, or\n embed it in an existing web page by copying & pasting\n any of the following snippets.\n\n
\n JavaScript\n (easiest)\n
\n \n <script src=\"https://bibbase.org/show?bib=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr%2FMaterial%2FEmmanuelChemlaBibliography.bib&filter=authors:Chemla&theme=simple&group1=type&group0=year&jsonp=1&jsonp=1\"></script>\n \n
\n\n PHP\n
\n \n <?php\n $contents = file_get_contents(\"https://bibbase.org/show?bib=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr%2FMaterial%2FEmmanuelChemlaBibliography.bib&filter=authors:Chemla&theme=simple&group1=type&group0=year&jsonp=1\");\n print_r($contents);\n ?>\n \n
\n\n iFrame\n (not recommended)\n
\n \n <iframe src=\"https://bibbase.org/show?bib=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr%2FMaterial%2FEmmanuelChemlaBibliography.bib&filter=authors:Chemla&theme=simple&group1=type&group0=year&jsonp=1\"></iframe>\n \n
\n\n

\n For more details see the documention.\n

\n
\n
\n\n
\n\n This is a preview! To use this list on your own web site\n or create a new web site from it,\n create a free account. The file will be added\n and you will be able to edit it in the File Manager.\n We will show you instructions once you've created your account.\n
\n\n
\n\n

To the site owner:

\n\n

Action required! Mendeley is changing its\n API. In order to keep using Mendeley with BibBase past April\n 14th, you need to:\n

    \n
  1. renew the authorization for BibBase on Mendeley, and
  2. \n
  3. update the BibBase URL\n in your page the same way you did when you initially set up\n this page.\n
  4. \n
\n

\n\n

\n \n \n Fix it now\n

\n
\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n 2023\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The ABC-D of animal linguistics: are syntax and compositionality for real?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Coye, C.; Leroux, M.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Biological Reviews, 98(4): 1142-1159. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{ABC-Danimallinguistics,\n\tabstract = {ABSTRACT In several animal species, an alarm call (e.g. ABC notes in the Japanese tit Parus minor) can be immediately followed by a recruitment call (e.g. D notes) to yield a complex call that triggers a third behaviour, namely mobbing. This has been taken to be an argument for animal syntax and compositionality (i.e. the property by which the meaning of a complex expression depends on the meaning of its parts and the way they are put together). Several additional discoveries were made across species. First, in some cases, animals respond with mobbing to the order alarm--recruitment but not to the order recruitment--alarm. Second, animals sometimes respond similarly to functionally analogous heterospecific calls they have never heard before, and/or to artificial hybrid sequences made of conspecific and heterospecific calls in the same order, thus adding an argument for the productivity of the relevant rules. We consider the details of these arguments for animal syntax and compositionality and argue that, with one important exception (Japanese tit ABC-D sequences), they currently remain ambiguous: there are reasonable alternatives on which each call is a separate utterance and is interpreted as such (`trivial compositionality'). More generally, we propose that future studies should argue for animal syntax and compositionality by explicitly pitting the target theory against two deflationary analyses: the `only one expression' hypothesis posits that there is no combination in the first place, for example just a simplex ABCD call; while the `separate utterances' hypothesis posits that there are separate expressions (e.g. ABC and D), but that they form separate utterances and are neither syntactically nor semantically combined.},\n\tauthor = {Schlenker, Philippe and Coye, Camille and Leroux, Ma{\\"e}l and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tdate-added = {2023-07-07 11:56:41 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-07-07 11:57:44 +0200},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12944},\n\teprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/brv.12944},\n\tjournal = {Biological Reviews},\n\tkeywords = {animal linguistics, animal semantics, compositionality, animal syntax, combinatoriality, interspecies comprehension},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {1142-1159},\n\ttitle = {The ABC-D of animal linguistics: are syntax and compositionality for real?},\n\turl = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/brv.12944},\n\tvolume = {98},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/brv.12944},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12944}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n ABSTRACT In several animal species, an alarm call (e.g. ABC notes in the Japanese tit Parus minor) can be immediately followed by a recruitment call (e.g. D notes) to yield a complex call that triggers a third behaviour, namely mobbing. This has been taken to be an argument for animal syntax and compositionality (i.e. the property by which the meaning of a complex expression depends on the meaning of its parts and the way they are put together). Several additional discoveries were made across species. First, in some cases, animals respond with mobbing to the order alarm–recruitment but not to the order recruitment–alarm. Second, animals sometimes respond similarly to functionally analogous heterospecific calls they have never heard before, and/or to artificial hybrid sequences made of conspecific and heterospecific calls in the same order, thus adding an argument for the productivity of the relevant rules. We consider the details of these arguments for animal syntax and compositionality and argue that, with one important exception (Japanese tit ABC-D sequences), they currently remain ambiguous: there are reasonable alternatives on which each call is a separate utterance and is interpreted as such (`trivial compositionality'). More generally, we propose that future studies should argue for animal syntax and compositionality by explicitly pitting the target theory against two deflationary analyses: the `only one expression' hypothesis posits that there is no combination in the first place, for example just a simplex ABCD call; while the `separate utterances' hypothesis posits that there are separate expressions (e.g. ABC and D), but that they form separate utterances and are neither syntactically nor semantically combined.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Formal Models at the Core.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Charnavel, I.; Dautriche, I.; Embick, D.; Lerdahl, F.; Patel-Grosz, P.; Poeppel, D.; and Schlenker, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive Science, 47(3): e13267. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FormalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 59 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla-FormalModels,\n\tabstract = {Abstract The grammatical paradigm used to be a model for entire areas of cognitive science. Its primary tenet was that theories are axiomatic-like systems. A secondary tenet was that their predictions should be tested quickly and in great detail with introspective judgments. While the grammatical paradigm now often seems pass{\\'e}, we argue that in fact it continues to be as efficient as ever. Formal models are essential because they are explicit, highly predictive, and typically modular. They make numerous critical predictions, which must be tested efficiently; introspective judgments do just this. We further argue that the grammatical paradigm continues to be fruitful. Within linguistics, implicature theory is a recent example, with a combination of formal explicitness, modularity, and interaction with experimental work. Beyond traditional linguistics, the grammatical paradigm has proven fruitful in the study of gestures and emojis; literature (``Free Indirect Discourse''); picture semantics and comics; music and dance cognition; and even reasoning and concepts. We argue, however, that the grammatical paradigm must be adapted to contemporary cognitive science. Computational methods are essential to derive quantitative predictions from formal models (Bayesian pragmatics is an example). And data collection techniques offer an ever richer continuum of options, from introspective judgments to large-scale experiments, which makes it possible to optimize the cost/benefit ratio of the empirical methods that are chosen to test theories.},\n\tauthor = {Chemla, Emmanuel and Charnavel, Isabelle and Dautriche, Isabelle and Embick, David and Lerdahl, Fred and Patel-Grosz, Pritty and Poeppel, David and Schlenker, Philippe},\n\tdate-added = {2023-04-27 01:34:50 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-04-27 01:35:12 +0200},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13267},\n\teprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/cogs.13267},\n\tjournal = {Cognitive Science},\n\tkeywords = {Formal models, Introspective judgments, Methods, Theories, High-order cognition},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {e13267},\n\ttitle = {Formal Models at the Core},\n\turl = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cogs.13267},\n\tvolume = {47},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cogs.13267},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13267}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Abstract The grammatical paradigm used to be a model for entire areas of cognitive science. Its primary tenet was that theories are axiomatic-like systems. A secondary tenet was that their predictions should be tested quickly and in great detail with introspective judgments. While the grammatical paradigm now often seems passé, we argue that in fact it continues to be as efficient as ever. Formal models are essential because they are explicit, highly predictive, and typically modular. They make numerous critical predictions, which must be tested efficiently; introspective judgments do just this. We further argue that the grammatical paradigm continues to be fruitful. Within linguistics, implicature theory is a recent example, with a combination of formal explicitness, modularity, and interaction with experimental work. Beyond traditional linguistics, the grammatical paradigm has proven fruitful in the study of gestures and emojis; literature (``Free Indirect Discourse''); picture semantics and comics; music and dance cognition; and even reasoning and concepts. We argue, however, that the grammatical paradigm must be adapted to contemporary cognitive science. Computational methods are essential to derive quantitative predictions from formal models (Bayesian pragmatics is an example). And data collection techniques offer an ever richer continuum of options, from introspective judgments to large-scale experiments, which makes it possible to optimize the cost/benefit ratio of the empirical methods that are chosen to test theories.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On three-valued presentations of classical logic.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Da Re, B.; Szmuc, D.; Chemla, E.; and Egré, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The Review of Symbolic Logic,1-23. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{3logic,\n\tauthor = {Bruno {Da Re} and Damian Szmuc and Emmanuel Chemla and Paul Egr\\'e},\n\tdate-added = {2023-01-04 21:58:43 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-12-14 10:49:39 +0100},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020323000114},\n\tjournal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},\n\tpages = {1-23},\n\tpublisher = {Cambridge University Press},\n\ttitle = {On three-valued presentations of classical logic},\n\turl = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/on-threevalued-presentations-of-classical-logic/B71BFF878FE682AB5E042990776DAC78},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/on-threevalued-presentations-of-classical-logic/B71BFF878FE682AB5E042990776DAC78},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020323000114}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Super Linguistics: an Introduction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Patel-Grosz, P.; Mascarenhas, S.; Chemla, E.; and Schlenker, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics & Philosophy. 2023.\n Introduction to a special issue\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SuperPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{SuperLing:intro2022,\n\tauthor = {Pritty Patel-Grosz and Salvador Mascarenhas and Emmanuel Chemla and Philippe Schlenker},\n\tdate-added = {2022-10-31 01:55:09 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-06-22 10:22:39 +0200},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-022-09377-8},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics \\& Philosophy},\n\tkeywords = {animal, linguistic inferences, gesture, music, moral},\n\tnote = {Introduction to a special issue},\n\ttitle = {Super Linguistics: an Introduction},\n\turl = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/005242/current.pdf},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/005242/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n inproceedings\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Minimum Description Length Hopfield Networks.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Abudy, M.; Lan, N.; Chemla, E.; and Katzir, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Special Collection on Associative Memory and Hopfield Networks in PRX Life, 2023. \n To appear\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Minimum more\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{MDLHN,\n\tabstract = {Associative memory architectures are designed for memorization but also offer, through their retrieval method, a form of generalization to unseen inputs: stored memories can be seen as prototypes from this point of view. Focusing on Modern Hopfield Networks (MHN), we show that a large memorization capacity undermines the generalization opportunity. We offer a solution to better optimize this tradeoff. It relies on Minimum Description Length (MDL) to determine during training which memories to store, as well as how many of them.},\n\tauthor = {Matan Abudy and Nur Lan and Emmanuel Chemla and Roni Katzir},\n\tbooktitle = {Special Collection on Associative Memory and Hopfield Networks in PRX Life},\n\tdate-added = {2023-12-20 15:46:34 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-12-20 15:48:43 +0100},\n\tnote = {To appear},\n\ttitle = {Minimum Description Length Hopfield Networks},\n\turl_more = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.06518},\n\tyear = {2023}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Associative memory architectures are designed for memorization but also offer, through their retrieval method, a form of generalization to unseen inputs: stored memories can be seen as prototypes from this point of view. Focusing on Modern Hopfield Networks (MHN), we show that a large memorization capacity undermines the generalization opportunity. We offer a solution to better optimize this tradeoff. It relies on Minimum Description Length (MDL) to determine during training which memories to store, as well as how many of them.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n It is a Bird Therefore it is a Robin: On BERT's Internal Consistency Between Hypernym Knowledge and Logical Words.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Guerin, N.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Rogers, A.; Boyd-Graber, J.; and Okazaki, N., editor(s), Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2023, pages 8807–8817, Toronto, Canada, July 2023. Association for Computational Linguistics\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ItPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{guerin-chemla-2023-bird,\n\tabstract = {The lexical knowledge of NLP systems shouldbe tested (i) for their internal consistency(avoiding groundedness issues) and (ii) bothfor content words and logical words. In thispaper we propose a new method to test the understandingof the hypernymy relationship bymeasuring its antisymmetry according to themodels. Previous studies often rely only on thedirect question (e.g., A robin is a ...), where weargue a correct answer could only rely on collocationalcues, rather than hierarchical cues. We show how to control for this, and how it isimportant. We develop a method to ask similarquestions about logical words that encode anentailment-like relation (e.g., because or therefore).Our results show important weaknessesof BERT-like models on these semantic tasks.},\n\taddress = {Toronto, Canada},\n\tauthor = {Guerin, Nicolas and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tbooktitle = {Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2023},\n\tdate-added = {2023-12-14 10:53:23 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-12-14 10:53:23 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.18653/v1/2023.findings-acl.560},\n\teditor = {Rogers, Anna and Boyd-Graber, Jordan and Okazaki, Naoaki},\n\tmonth = jul,\n\tpages = {8807--8817},\n\tpublisher = {Association for Computational Linguistics},\n\ttitle = {It is a Bird Therefore it is a Robin: On {BERT}{'}s Internal Consistency Between Hypernym Knowledge and Logical Words},\n\turl = {https://aclanthology.org/2023.findings-acl.560},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://aclanthology.org/2023.findings-acl.560},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.findings-acl.560}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n The lexical knowledge of NLP systems shouldbe tested (i) for their internal consistency(avoiding groundedness issues) and (ii) bothfor content words and logical words. In thispaper we propose a new method to test the understandingof the hypernymy relationship bymeasuring its antisymmetry according to themodels. Previous studies often rely only on thedirect question (e.g., A robin is a ...), where weargue a correct answer could only rely on collocationalcues, rather than hierarchical cues. We show how to control for this, and how it isimportant. We develop a method to ask similarquestions about logical words that encode anentailment-like relation (e.g., because or therefore).Our results show important weaknessesof BERT-like models on these semantic tasks.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Benchmarking Neural Network Generalization for Grammar Induction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Lan, N.; Chemla, E.; and Katzir, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Learning with Small Data, 2023. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"BenchmarkingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{lan2023benchmarking,\n\tauthor = {Nur Lan and Emmanuel Chemla and Roni Katzir},\n\tbooktitle = {Learning with Small Data},\n\tdate-added = {2023-08-17 09:23:34 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-08-17 19:48:10 +0200},\n\ttitle = {Benchmarking Neural Network Generalization for Grammar Induction},\n\turl = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.08253},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.08253}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n unpublished\n \n \n (6)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Inconsistent Effects of Components as Evidence for non-Compositionality in Chimpanzee Face-Gesture Combinations? A Response to Oña et al. (2019).\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cauté, Maxime; Schlenker, Philippe; and Chemla, Emmanuel\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2023.\n (under minor revisions)\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{FaceGestureComp,\n\tabstract = {Using field observations from a sanctuary, O{\\~n}a and colleagues (DOI: 10.7717/peerj.7623)\ninvestigated the semantics of face-gesture combinations in chimpanzees (Pan\ntroglodytes). The response of the animals to these signals was encoded as a binary\nmeasure: positive interactions such as approaching or grooming were considered\naffiliative; ignoring or attacking was considered non-affiliative. The relevant signals are\nillustrated in Figure 1, together with the outcome in terms of average affiliativeness. The\nauthors observe that there seems to be no systematicity in the way the faces modify the responses to the gestures, sometimes reducing affiliativeness, sometimes increasing it. A strong interpretation of this result would be that the meaning of a gesture-face combination cannot be derived from the meaning of the gesture and the meaning of the face, that is, the interpretation of chimpanzees' face-gesture combinations are non compositional in nature.We will revisit this conclusion: we will exhibit simple compositional systems which, after all, may be plausible. At the methodological level, we argue that it is critical to lay out the theoretical options explicitly for a complete comparison of their pros and cons.},\n\tauthor = {{Caut{\\'e}, Maxime} and {Schlenker, Philippe} and {Chemla, Emmanuel }},\n\tdate-added = {2023-12-20 15:22:34 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-12-20 15:32:43 +0100},\n\tnote = {(under minor revisions)},\n\ttitle = {Inconsistent {E}ffects of {C}omponents as {E}vidence for non-{C}ompositionality in {C}himpanzee {F}ace-{G}esture {C}ombinations? {A} {R}esponse to {O}{\\~n}a et al. (2019)},\n\tyear = {2023}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Using field observations from a sanctuary, Oña and colleagues (DOI: 10.7717/peerj.7623) investigated the semantics of face-gesture combinations in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). The response of the animals to these signals was encoded as a binary measure: positive interactions such as approaching or grooming were considered affiliative; ignoring or attacking was considered non-affiliative. The relevant signals are illustrated in Figure 1, together with the outcome in terms of average affiliativeness. The authors observe that there seems to be no systematicity in the way the faces modify the responses to the gestures, sometimes reducing affiliativeness, sometimes increasing it. A strong interpretation of this result would be that the meaning of a gesture-face combination cannot be derived from the meaning of the gesture and the meaning of the face, that is, the interpretation of chimpanzees' face-gesture combinations are non compositional in nature.We will revisit this conclusion: we will exhibit simple compositional systems which, after all, may be plausible. At the methodological level, we argue that it is critical to lay out the theoretical options explicitly for a complete comparison of their pros and cons.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Minimal Compositionality versus Bird Implicatures: Two Theories of ABC-D Sequences in Japanese Tits.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Philippe Schlenker; Ambre Salis; Mael Leroux; Camille Coye; Luigi Rizzi; Shane Steinert-Threlkeld; and Emmanuel Chemla\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2023.\n submitted\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MinimalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{minimalcompositionality,\n\tauthor = {{Philippe Schlenker} and {Ambre Salis} and {Mael Leroux} and {Camille Coye} and {Luigi Rizzi} and {Shane Steinert-Threlkeld} and {Emmanuel Chemla}},\n\tdate-added = {2023-12-14 10:57:13 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-12-14 11:01:00 +0100},\n\tnote = {submitted},\n\ttitle = {Minimal Compositionality versus Bird Implicatures: Two Theories of {ABC-D} Sequences in Japanese Tits},\n\turl = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007422},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007422}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Anti-Babel: Three Degrees of Interspecies Comprehension.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Philippe Schlenker; Camille Coye; Ambre Salis; Shane Steinert-Threlkeld; Lucie Ravaux; and Emmanuel Chemla\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2023.\n (minor revisions)\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Anti-Babel:Paper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{antibabel,\n\tabstract = {Recent work seeking to provide a formal account of meaning in animal communication took call form to be arbitrary (Schlenker et al. 2014, 2016b). But a long line of research (from Marler 1955 to Magrath et al. 2020) has shown that this is not always so, especially in birds: there is sometimes widespread convergence among the calls of different species, to the point that a species may understand the calls of another one that is geographically and phylogenetically extremely distant. This suggests that there might be a natural biological code by which the calls of unrelated and unfamiliar species can sometimes be understood without prior exposure. We clarify this possibility by distinguishing among three degrees of interspecies comprehension. In the first degree ('Understand Thy Neighbor'), a species understands some of the calls of a neighboring species because it is exposed to them. In the second degree ('Call Convergence'), a species may understand the calls of an unrelated and unfamiliar species by virtue of Marlerian convergence: a heterospecific call may globally resemble a conspecific call enough to yield understanding. In the third degree ('Featural Interpretation'), a species may use a rule that associates a meaning to a specific acoustic feature -- e.g. higher call rate signals greater urgency, higher pitch signals greater arousal, greater noisiness signals greater negativity. This yields a kind of featural compositionality by which a species may understand a heterospecific call that does not globally resemble any familiar call, but still includes the crucial, interpretable feature. There might thus be an entirely new road to the emergence of compositionality in studies of meaning evolution. We lay out possible mechanisms of evolution of these degrees of interspecies comprehension, and isolate predictions that distinguish the third degree from the second.},\n\tauthor = {{Philippe Schlenker} and {Camille Coye} and {Ambre Salis} and {Shane Steinert-Threlkeld} and {Lucie Ravaux} and {Emmanuel Chemla}},\n\tdate-added = {2023-12-14 10:55:49 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-12-20 15:43:16 +0100},\n\tnote = {(minor revisions)},\n\ttitle = {Anti-Babel: Three Degrees of Interspecies Comprehension},\n\turl = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007168},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007168}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Recent work seeking to provide a formal account of meaning in animal communication took call form to be arbitrary (Schlenker et al. 2014, 2016b). But a long line of research (from Marler 1955 to Magrath et al. 2020) has shown that this is not always so, especially in birds: there is sometimes widespread convergence among the calls of different species, to the point that a species may understand the calls of another one that is geographically and phylogenetically extremely distant. This suggests that there might be a natural biological code by which the calls of unrelated and unfamiliar species can sometimes be understood without prior exposure. We clarify this possibility by distinguishing among three degrees of interspecies comprehension. In the first degree ('Understand Thy Neighbor'), a species understands some of the calls of a neighboring species because it is exposed to them. In the second degree ('Call Convergence'), a species may understand the calls of an unrelated and unfamiliar species by virtue of Marlerian convergence: a heterospecific call may globally resemble a conspecific call enough to yield understanding. In the third degree ('Featural Interpretation'), a species may use a rule that associates a meaning to a specific acoustic feature – e.g. higher call rate signals greater urgency, higher pitch signals greater arousal, greater noisiness signals greater negativity. This yields a kind of featural compositionality by which a species may understand a heterospecific call that does not globally resemble any familiar call, but still includes the crucial, interpretable feature. There might thus be an entirely new road to the emergence of compositionality in studies of meaning evolution. We lay out possible mechanisms of evolution of these degrees of interspecies comprehension, and isolate predictions that distinguish the third degree from the second.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Cooccurrence statistics.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Nicolas Guerin; Emmanuel Chemla; Shane Steinert-Threlkeld; and Robin Ryder\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2023.\n in progress\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Guerin-cooc,\n\tauthor = {{Nicolas Guerin} and {Emmanuel Chemla} and {Shane Steinert-Threlkeld} and {Robin Ryder}},\n\tdate-added = {2023-04-28 10:21:44 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-12-14 10:54:47 +0100},\n\tnote = {in progress},\n\ttitle = {Cooccurrence statistics},\n\tyear = {2023}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Large Language Models and the Argument From the Poverty of the Stimulus.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Nur Lan; Emmanuel Chemla; and Roni Katzir\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2023.\n submitted\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"LargePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 21 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Lan-LLM-PoStim,\n\tauthor = {{Nur Lan} and {Emmanuel Chemla} and {Roni Katzir}},\n\tdate-added = {2023-04-28 09:36:03 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-05-12 09:15:15 +0200},\n\tnote = {submitted},\n\ttitle = {Large Language Models and the Argument From the Poverty of the Stimulus},\n\turl = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/006829},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/006829}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n The Impact of Syntactic and Semantic Proximity on Back-Translation.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Nicolas Guerin; Emmanuel Chemla; and Shane Steinert-Threlkeld\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2023.\n under revision\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Guerin-Backtranslation,\n\tauthor = {{Nicolas Guerin} and {Emmanuel Chemla} and {Shane Steinert-Threlkeld}},\n\tdate-added = {2023-04-28 09:33:29 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-05-12 09:12:29 +0200},\n\tnote = {under revision},\n\ttitle = {The Impact of Syntactic and Semantic Proximity on Back-Translation},\n\tyear = {2023}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2022\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Beyond Anthropocentrism in Comparative Cognition: Recentering Animal Linguistics.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Coye, C.; Steinert-Threlkeld, S.; Klinedinst, N.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive Science, 46(12): e13220. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"BeyondPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 16 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Anthropocentrism2022,\n\tauthor = {Schlenker, Philippe and Coye, Camille and Steinert-Threlkeld, Shane and Klinedinst, Nathan and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tdate-added = {2023-04-18 14:11:57 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-04-18 14:12:34 +0200},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13220},\n\teprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/cogs.13220},\n\tjournal = {Cognitive Science},\n\tkeywords = {animal},\n\tnumber = {12},\n\tpages = {e13220},\n\ttitle = {Beyond Anthropocentrism in Comparative Cognition: Recentering Animal Linguistics},\n\turl = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cogs.13220},\n\tvolume = {46},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cogs.13220},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13220}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Iconic Syntax: Sign Language Classifier Predicates and Gesture Sequences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Bonnet, M.; Lamberton, J.; Lamberton, J.; Chemla, E.; Santoro, M.; and Geraci, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics & Philosophy. 2022.\n in press\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"IconicPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 16 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{IconicSyntax2022,\n\tauthor = {Philippe Schlenker and Marion Bonnet and Jonathan Lamberton and Jason Lamberton and Emmanuel Chemla and Mirko Santoro and Carlo Geraci},\n\tdate-added = {2022-10-31 01:53:21 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-04-28 22:07:03 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics \\& Philosophy},\n\tkeywords = {linguistic inferences, gesture},\n\tnote = {in press},\n\ttitle = {Iconic Syntax: Sign Language Classifier Predicates and Gesture Sequences},\n\turl = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/006060/current.pdf},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/006060/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Evidence for compositionality in baboons (\\emphPapio papio) through the test case of negation.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dautriche, I.; Buccola, B.; Berthet, M.; Fagot, J.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Scientific Reports, 12(19181). 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"EvidencePaper\n  \n \n \n \"Evidence more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 26 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{NegBaboons2022,\n\tauthor = {Isabelle Dautriche and Brian Buccola and Melissa Berthet and Joel Fagot and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2022-10-31 01:45:28 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2022-11-16 20:10:46 +0200},\n\tdoi = {10.1038/s41598-022-21143-1},\n\tjournal = {Scientific Reports},\n\tkeywords = {animal, methodological, compositionality, negation},\n\tnumber = {19181},\n\ttitle = {Evidence for compositionality in baboons (\\emph{Papio papio}) through the test case of negation},\n\turl = {https://rdcu.be/cZnWK},\n\turl_more = {https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/VZ8UR},\n\tvolume = {12},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://rdcu.be/cZnWK},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-21143-1}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Minimum Description Length Recurrent Neural Networks.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Lan, N.; Geyer, M.; Chemla, E.; and Katzir, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 10: 785-799. 07 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MinimumPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 39 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Lan-MDLNN,\n\tabstract = {{We train neural networks to optimize a Minimum Description Length score, that is, to balance between the complexity of the network and its accuracy at a task. We show that networks optimizing this objective function master tasks involving memory challenges and go beyond context-free languages. These learners master languages such as anbn, anbncn, anb2n, anbmcn +m, and they perform addition. Moreover, they often do so with 100\\\\% accuracy. The networks are small, and their inner workings are transparent. We thus provide formal proofs that their perfect accuracy holds not only on a given test set, but for any input sequence. To our knowledge, no other connectionist model has been shown to capture the underlying grammars for these languages in full generality.}},\n\tauthor = {Lan, Nur and Geyer, Michal and Chemla, Emmanuel and Katzir, Roni},\n\tdate-added = {2022-08-02 16:40:08 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2023-04-27 01:35:30 +0200},\n\tdoi = {10.1162/tacl_a_00489},\n\teprint = {https://direct.mit.edu/tacl/article-pdf/doi/10.1162/tacl\\_a\\_00489/2037130/tacl\\_a\\_00489.pdf},\n\tissn = {2307-387X},\n\tjournal = {Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics},\n\tmonth = {07},\n\tpages = {785-799},\n\ttitle = {{Minimum Description Length Recurrent Neural Networks}},\n\turl = {https://doi.org/10.1162/tacl\\_a\\_00489},\n\tvolume = {10},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1162/tacl%5C_a%5C_00489},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1162/tacl_a_00489}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We train neural networks to optimize a Minimum Description Length score, that is, to balance between the complexity of the network and its accuracy at a task. We show that networks optimizing this objective function master tasks involving memory challenges and go beyond context-free languages. These learners master languages such as anbn, anbncn, anb2n, anbmcn +m, and they perform addition. Moreover, they often do so with 100\\% accuracy. The networks are small, and their inner workings are transparent. We thus provide formal proofs that their perfect accuracy holds not only on a given test set, but for any input sequence. To our knowledge, no other connectionist model has been shown to capture the underlying grammars for these languages in full generality.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2021\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Referential and General Calls in Primate Semantics.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Steinert-Threlkeld, S.; Schlenker, P.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics & Philosophy, 44: 1317–1342. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Referential more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 19 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{SST-RefGeneralCallsPrimate,\n\tauthor = {Steinert-Threlkeld, Shane and Philippe Schlenker and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2021-01-06 13:49:31 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-11-04 22:55:20 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10988-021-09322-1},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics \\& Philosophy},\n\tpages = {1317--1342},\n\ttitle = {Referential and General Calls in Primate Semantics},\n\turl_more = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005173},\n\tvolume = {44},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-021-09322-1}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The influence of polarity items on inferential judgments.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Denić, M.; Homer, V.; Rothschild, D.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 215: 104791. 2021.\n in press\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n \n \"The more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 78 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Denic-PIinferences,\n\tabstract = {Polarity sensitive items are linguistic expressions such as any, at all, some, which are felicitous in some linguistic environments but not others. Crucially, whether a polar- ity item is felicitous in a given environment is argued to depend on the inferences (in the reasoning sense) that this environment allows. We show that the inferential judgments reported for a given environment are modified in the presence of polarity sensitive items. Hence, there is a two-way influence between linguistic and reasoning abilities: the linguistic acceptability of polarity items is dependent on reasoning facts and, conversely, reasoning judgments can be altered by the mere addition of seemingly innocuous polarity items.},\n\tauthor = {Milica Deni\\'c and Vncent Homer and Daniel Rothschild and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2019-03-19 13:44:05 +1100},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-11-04 22:45:03 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104791},\n\tissn = {0010-0277},\n\tjournal = {Cognition},\n\tkeywords = {modularity; polarity; monotonicity; inferences; intuitions; reasoning},\n\tnote = {in press},\n\tpages = {104791},\n\ttitle = {The influence of polarity items on inferential judgments},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WY4OTMzO/Denic-Homer-Rothschild-Chemla-NPI-inferences.pdf},\n\turl_more = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WY4OTMzO/Denic-Homer-Rothschild-Chemla-NPI-inferences.html},\n\tvolume = {215},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WY4OTMzO/Denic-Homer-Rothschild-Chemla-NPI-inferences.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Polarity sensitive items are linguistic expressions such as any, at all, some, which are felicitous in some linguistic environments but not others. Crucially, whether a polar- ity item is felicitous in a given environment is argued to depend on the inferences (in the reasoning sense) that this environment allows. We show that the inferential judgments reported for a given environment are modified in the presence of polarity sensitive items. Hence, there is a two-way influence between linguistic and reasoning abilities: the linguistic acceptability of polarity items is dependent on reasoning facts and, conversely, reasoning judgments can be altered by the mere addition of seemingly innocuous polarity items.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Connectedness as a constraint on exhaustification.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Enguehard, E.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics and Philosophy, 44: 79-112. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ConnectednessPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 39 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Enguehard-Chemla-ConnExh,\n\tabstract = {`Scalar implicatures' is a phrase used to refer to some inferences arising from the competition between alternatives: typically, `Mary read some of the books' ends up conveying that Mary did not read all books, because one could have said `Mary read all books'. The so-called grammatical theory argues that these inferences obtain from the application of a covert operator exh, which not only has the capability to negate alternative sentences, but also the capability to be embedded within sentences under other linguistic operators, i.e. exh has the potential to add to the meaning of expressions (not necessarily full sentences), the negation of their alternatives. This view typically seeks support from the existence of readings that could not be explained without the extra-capability of exh to occur in embedded positions. However, if some embedded positions seem to be accessible to exh, not all conceivable positions that exh could occupy yield sensible results. In short: the exh approach is powerful, maybe too powerful.\n\nVarious approaches based on logical strength and monotonicity have been proposed to justify on principled grounds the limited distribution of exh; these approaches are mostly based on a comparison between possible parses, and considerations of monotonicity (e.g., the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis). We propose a new constraint based instead on ``connectedness'', ruling out parses because of inherent problems their outcome may raise. Connectedness is a sister notion of monotonicity, which has been recruited to explain certain lexical restrictions on nouns, adjectives and more recently quantifiers; we propose here that connectedness could play a similar role at the level of propositional meanings.},\n\tauthor = {Enguehard, Emile and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tdate-added = {2018-10-04 14:38:52 +1000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-05-15 23:31:20 +0200},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10988-019-09286-3},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},\n\tpages = {79-112},\n\ttitle = {Connectedness as a constraint on exhaustification},\n\turl = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/004247/current.pdf},\n\tvolume = {44},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/004247/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n `Scalar implicatures' is a phrase used to refer to some inferences arising from the competition between alternatives: typically, `Mary read some of the books' ends up conveying that Mary did not read all books, because one could have said `Mary read all books'. The so-called grammatical theory argues that these inferences obtain from the application of a covert operator exh, which not only has the capability to negate alternative sentences, but also the capability to be embedded within sentences under other linguistic operators, i.e. exh has the potential to add to the meaning of expressions (not necessarily full sentences), the negation of their alternatives. This view typically seeks support from the existence of readings that could not be explained without the extra-capability of exh to occur in embedded positions. However, if some embedded positions seem to be accessible to exh, not all conceivable positions that exh could occupy yield sensible results. In short: the exh approach is powerful, maybe too powerful. Various approaches based on logical strength and monotonicity have been proposed to justify on principled grounds the limited distribution of exh; these approaches are mostly based on a comparison between possible parses, and considerations of monotonicity (e.g., the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis). We propose a new constraint based instead on ``connectedness'', ruling out parses because of inherent problems their outcome may raise. Connectedness is a sister notion of monotonicity, which has been recruited to explain certain lexical restrictions on nouns, adjectives and more recently quantifiers; we propose here that connectedness could play a similar role at the level of propositional meanings.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n From Many-Valued Consequence to Many-Valued Connectives.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Egré, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Synthese, 198(22): 5315-5352. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FromPaper\n  \n \n \n \"From more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 20 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{ChemlaEgre-ManyValuedConsequenceAndConnectives,\n\tabstract = {Given a consequence relation in many-valued logic, what connectives can be defined? For instance, does there always exist a conditional operator internalizing the consequence relation, and which form should it take? In this paper, we pose this question in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting for the class of so-called intersective mixed consequence relations, which extends the class of Tarskian relations. Using computer-aided methods, we answer extensively for 3-valued and 4-valued logics, focusing not only on conditional operators, but on what we call Gentzen-regular connectives (including negation, conjunction, and disjunction). For arbitrary N-valued logics, we state necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such connectives in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting. The results show that mixed consequence relations admit all classical connectives, and among them pure consequence relations are those that admit no other Gentzen-regular connectives. Conditionals can also be found for a broader class of intersective mixed consequence relations, but with the exclusion of order-theoretic consequence relations.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Paul Egr\\'e},\n\tdate-added = {2018-08-31 11:11:42 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-11-04 22:24:29 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02344-0},\n\tjournal = {Synthese},\n\tnumber = {22},\n\tpages = {5315-5352},\n\ttitle = {From Many-Valued Consequence to Many-Valued Connectives},\n\turl = {https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.01066},\n\turl_more = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.01066v1/anc},\n\tvolume = {198},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/utmc0c09r59dk4j/Chemla-Egre-From%20Many-Valued%20Consequence%20to%20Many-Valued%20Connectives.pdf?dl=0}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Given a consequence relation in many-valued logic, what connectives can be defined? For instance, does there always exist a conditional operator internalizing the consequence relation, and which form should it take? In this paper, we pose this question in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting for the class of so-called intersective mixed consequence relations, which extends the class of Tarskian relations. Using computer-aided methods, we answer extensively for 3-valued and 4-valued logics, focusing not only on conditional operators, but on what we call Gentzen-regular connectives (including negation, conjunction, and disjunction). For arbitrary N-valued logics, we state necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such connectives in a multi-premise multi-conclusion setting. The results show that mixed consequence relations admit all classical connectives, and among them pure consequence relations are those that admit no other Gentzen-regular connectives. Conditionals can also be found for a broader class of intersective mixed consequence relations, but with the exclusion of order-theoretic consequence relations.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Conceptual alternatives: Competition in language and beyond.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Buccola, B.; Križ, M.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics & Philosophy. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ConceptualPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Conceptual more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 40 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Buccola:2017aa,\n\tabstract = {Competition between sentences is at the core of numerous phenomena in natural language semantics. For instance, the competition between sentences such as \\emph{Some of the shapes are red} and \\emph{All the shapes are red} is taken to explain why an utterance of the former implicates that the latter is false. It is generally assumed that such competition is regulated by the relative syntactic simplicity of the competing utterances. Using theoretical and experimental tools devised to study human non-linguistic, conceptual abilities, we provide evidence for a new perspective: the rules that govern competition in natural language may be better and more deeply understood as rooted in relative conceptual simplicity, and thus are inherited from non-linguistic domains. We also provide evidence that the various construals of numerals preferentially attested in human language may likewise be rooted in non-linguistic, conceptual preferences.},\n\tauthor = {Brian Buccola and Manuel Kri\\v{z} and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 09:17:17 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-11-04 22:50:17 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10988-021-09327-w},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics \\& Philosophy},\n\tkeywords = {concepts; language of thought; formal semantics; linguistic competition; implicature},\n\ttitle = {Conceptual alternatives: Competition in language and beyond},\n\turl = {https://rdcu.be/clHm8},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WE2NzVlY/buccola-kriz-chemla-conceptual-alternatives.html},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003208/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Competition between sentences is at the core of numerous phenomena in natural language semantics. For instance, the competition between sentences such as \\emphSome of the shapes are red and \\emphAll the shapes are red is taken to explain why an utterance of the former implicates that the latter is false. It is generally assumed that such competition is regulated by the relative syntactic simplicity of the competing utterances. Using theoretical and experimental tools devised to study human non-linguistic, conceptual abilities, we provide evidence for a new perspective: the rules that govern competition in natural language may be better and more deeply understood as rooted in relative conceptual simplicity, and thus are inherited from non-linguistic domains. We also provide evidence that the various construals of numerals preferentially attested in human language may likewise be rooted in non-linguistic, conceptual preferences.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2020\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The effect of three basic task features on the sensitivity of acceptability judgment tasks.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; Chemla, E.; and Sprouse, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Glossa: a journal of general linguistics, 5(1): 72. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 45 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{MartyChemlaSprouse2019,\n\tabstract = {Sprouse and Almeida (2017) provide a first systematic investigation of the sensitivity of four acceptability judgment tasks. In this project, we build on these results by decomposing those tasks into three constituent task features (single versus joint presentation, number of response options, and use of response labels), and explore the consequences of those task features on the sensitivity of acceptability judgment experiments. We present 6 additional experiments (for a total of 10) designed to probe the effect of those task features on sensitivity, both independently and in combination. Our results suggest three notable conclusions: (i) there is a clear advantage to joint presentation of theoretically-related sentence types, regardless of the type of response scale used in the experiment; (ii) tasks involving a continuous slider (which have an infinite number of response options, and few labels) offer good sensitivity, while relying solely on spatial reasoning rather than numeric reasoning; and (iii) there are a number of subtle interactions among the three task features that may warrant further investigation. We discuss the potential benefits and concerns of each of these features in detail, along with the relevance of these findings for deciding how to investigate both simple and higher-order acceptability contrasts.},\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Emmanuel Chemla and Jon Sprouse},\n\tdate-added = {2019-05-04 23:33:59 +1000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-21 20:29:17 +0200},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.980},\n\tjournal = {Glossa: a journal of general linguistics},\n\tkeywords = {acceptability judgments, statistical power, experimental syntax, quantitative methods, linguistic methodology, syntax},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {72},\n\ttitle = {The effect of three basic task features on the sensitivity of acceptability judgment tasks},\n\turl = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/004588},\n\tvolume = {5},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/004588}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sprouse and Almeida (2017) provide a first systematic investigation of the sensitivity of four acceptability judgment tasks. In this project, we build on these results by decomposing those tasks into three constituent task features (single versus joint presentation, number of response options, and use of response labels), and explore the consequences of those task features on the sensitivity of acceptability judgment experiments. We present 6 additional experiments (for a total of 10) designed to probe the effect of those task features on sensitivity, both independently and in combination. Our results suggest three notable conclusions: (i) there is a clear advantage to joint presentation of theoretically-related sentence types, regardless of the type of response scale used in the experiment; (ii) tasks involving a continuous slider (which have an infinite number of response options, and few labels) offer good sensitivity, while relying solely on spatial reasoning rather than numeric reasoning; and (iii) there are a number of subtle interactions among the three task features that may warrant further investigation. We discuss the potential benefits and concerns of each of these features in detail, along with the relevance of these findings for deciding how to investigate both simple and higher-order acceptability contrasts.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Quantifier-spreading in children as distributive inferences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Denić, M.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistic Inquiry, 51(1): 141-153. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Quantifier-spreadingPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Quantifier-spreading more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 34 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Denic:2017ab,\n\tabstract = {Children may judge sentences such as "Every girl took an apple" as false when all relevant girls took an apple indeed but some apple was not taken. We compare this phenomenon to distributive inferences, the fact that "Every girl took an apple or a pear" implies that some girl took an apple and some took a pear. Under some current assumptions about implicatures, the child phenomenon receives a natural explanation, and it is the behavior of adults, rather than that of children, that remains to be explained.\n},\n\tauthor = {Milica Deni\\'c and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-08-02 13:24:52 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-01-07 21:15:41 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.1162/ling_a_00340},\n\tjournal = {Linguistic Inquiry},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {141-153},\n\ttitle = {Quantifier-spreading in children as distributive inferences},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GEzMDU4N/Denic-Chemla-quantifier-spreading-distributive-inferences.pdf},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GEzMDU4N/Denic-Chemla-quantifier-spreading-distributive-inferences.html},\n\tvolume = {51},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GEzMDU4N/Denic-Chemla-quantifier-spreading-distributive-inferences.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Children may judge sentences such as \"Every girl took an apple\" as false when all relevant girls took an apple indeed but some apple was not taken. We compare this phenomenon to distributive inferences, the fact that \"Every girl took an apple or a pear\" implies that some girl took an apple and some took a pear. Under some current assumptions about implicatures, the child phenomenon receives a natural explanation, and it is the behavior of adults, rather than that of children, that remains to be explained. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n inproceedings\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On the Spontaneous Emergence of Discrete and Compositional Signals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Geffen Lan, N.; Chemla, E.; and Steinert-Threlkeld, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pages 4794–4800, Online, July 2020. Association for Computational Linguistics\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 15 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{geffen-lan-etal-2020-spontaneous,\n\tabstract = {We propose a general framework to study language emergence through signaling games with neural agents. Using a continuous latent space, we are able to (i) train using backpropagation, (ii) show that discrete messages nonetheless naturally emerge. We explore whether categorical perception effects follow and show that the messages are not compositional.},\n\taddress = {Online},\n\tauthor = {Geffen Lan, Nur and Chemla, Emmanuel and Steinert-Threlkeld, Shane},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-23 22:57:42 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2022-10-31 02:44:19 +0200},\n\tkeywords = {acquisition, word learning},\n\tmonth = jul,\n\tpages = {4794--4800},\n\tpublisher = {Association for Computational Linguistics},\n\ttitle = {{O}n the {S}pontaneous {E}mergence of {D}iscrete and {C}ompositional {S}ignals},\n\turl = {https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/2020.acl-main.433},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/2020.acl-main.433}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We propose a general framework to study language emergence through signaling games with neural agents. Using a continuous latent space, we are able to (i) train using backpropagation, (ii) show that discrete messages nonetheless naturally emerge. We explore whether categorical perception effects follow and show that the messages are not compositional.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2019\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (10)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Constraints on the lexicons of human languages have cognitive roots present in baboons (\\emphPapio papio).\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Dautriche, I.; Buccola, B.; and Fagot, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(30): 14926-14930. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Constraints more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 33 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{chemla2018connectingBABOONS,\n\tabstract = {Using a pattern extraction task, we show that baboons, like humans, have a learning bias that helps them discover connected patterns more easily than disconnected ones, i.e. they favor rules like `contains between 20% and 60% red' over rules like `contains less than 20% or more than 60% red'. The task was made as similar as possible to a task previously run on humans, which was argued to reveal a bias that is responsible for shaping the lexicons of human languages, both content words (nouns and adjectives) and logical words (quantifiers). The current baboon result thus suggests that the cognitive roots responsible for regularities across the content and logical lexicons of human languages are present in a similar form in other species.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Isabelle Dautriche and Brian Buccola and Joel Fagot},\n\tdate-added = {2018-09-01 11:02:48 +1000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-10-01 22:00:10 +0200},\n\tdoi = {10.1073/pnas.1907023116},\n\tjournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\n\tkeywords = {animal; word learning; connectedness; human languages and their lexicons; primate semantics},\n\tnumber = {30},\n\tpages = {14926-14930},\n\ttitle = {Constraints on the lexicons of human languages have cognitive roots present in baboons (\\emph{Papio papio})},\n\turl_more = {https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/U72H3},\n\tvolume = {116},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/004172/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Using a pattern extraction task, we show that baboons, like humans, have a learning bias that helps them discover connected patterns more easily than disconnected ones, i.e. they favor rules like `contains between 20% and 60% red' over rules like `contains less than 20% or more than 60% red'. The task was made as similar as possible to a task previously run on humans, which was argued to reveal a bias that is responsible for shaping the lexicons of human languages, both content words (nouns and adjectives) and logical words (quantifiers). The current baboon result thus suggests that the cognitive roots responsible for regularities across the content and logical lexicons of human languages are present in a similar form in other species.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Linguistic inferences without words.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Schlenker, P.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(20): 9796-9801. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"LinguisticPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Linguistic more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 57 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu201821018,\n\tabstract = {Linguistic meaning encompasses a rich typology of inferences, characterized by distinct patterns of interaction with logical expressions. For example, ``Robin has continued to smoke'' triggers the presuppositional inference that Robin smoked before, characterized by the preservation of the inference under negation in ``Robin hasn't continued to smoke.'' We show experimentally that four main inference types can be robustly replicated with iconic gestures and visual animations. These nonlinguistic objects thus display the same type of logical behavior as spoken words. Because the gestures and animations were novel to the participants, the results suggest that people may productively divide new informational content among the components of the inferential typology using general algorithms that apply to linguistic and nonlinguistic objects alike.Contemporary semantics has uncovered a sophisticated typology of linguistic inferences, characterized by their conversational status and their behavior in complex sentences. This typology is usually thought to be specific to language and in part lexically encoded in the meanings of words. We argue that it is neither. Using a method involving ``composite'' utterances that include normal words alongside novel nonlinguistic iconic representations (gestures and animations), we observe successful ``one-shot learning'' of linguistic meanings, with four of the main inference types (implicatures, presuppositions, supplements, homogeneity) replicated with gestures and animations. The results suggest a deeper cognitive source for the inferential typology than usually thought: Domain-general cognitive algorithms productively divide both linguistic and nonlinguistic information along familiar parts of the linguistic typology.},\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Schlenker, Philippe and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tdate-added = {2019-04-25 14:44:14 +1000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-05-22 01:50:16 +1000},\n\tdoi = {10.1073/pnas.1821018116},\n\telocation-id = {201821018},\n\teprint = {https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2019/04/23/1821018116.full.pdf},\n\tissn = {0027-8424},\n\tjournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\n\tkeywords = {presupposition, implicature, homogeneity, supplement, gesture, word learning, projection},\n\tnumber = {20},\n\tpages = {9796-9801},\n\tpublisher = {National Academy of Sciences},\n\ttitle = {Linguistic inferences without words},\n\turl = {https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2019/04/23/1821018116},\n\turl_more = {https://osf.io/q9zyf},\n\tvolume = {116},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2019/04/23/1821018116},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1821018116}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Linguistic meaning encompasses a rich typology of inferences, characterized by distinct patterns of interaction with logical expressions. For example, ``Robin has continued to smoke'' triggers the presuppositional inference that Robin smoked before, characterized by the preservation of the inference under negation in ``Robin hasn't continued to smoke.'' We show experimentally that four main inference types can be robustly replicated with iconic gestures and visual animations. These nonlinguistic objects thus display the same type of logical behavior as spoken words. Because the gestures and animations were novel to the participants, the results suggest that people may productively divide new informational content among the components of the inferential typology using general algorithms that apply to linguistic and nonlinguistic objects alike.Contemporary semantics has uncovered a sophisticated typology of linguistic inferences, characterized by their conversational status and their behavior in complex sentences. This typology is usually thought to be specific to language and in part lexically encoded in the meanings of words. We argue that it is neither. Using a method involving ``composite'' utterances that include normal words alongside novel nonlinguistic iconic representations (gestures and animations), we observe successful ``one-shot learning'' of linguistic meanings, with four of the main inference types (implicatures, presuppositions, supplements, homogeneity) replicated with gestures and animations. The results suggest a deeper cognitive source for the inferential typology than usually thought: Domain-general cognitive algorithms productively divide both linguistic and nonlinguistic information along familiar parts of the linguistic typology.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Orangutans' Comprehension of Zoo Keepers' Communicative Signals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dezecache, G.; Bourgeois, A.; Bazin, C.; Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; and Maille, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Animals, 9(6): 300. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Orangutans'Paper\n  \n \n \n \"Orangutans' more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Dezecache-al-Orangutans,\n\tabstract = {Zoological institutions often encourage cooperative interactions between keepers and animals so as to promote animals' welfare. One useful technique has been conditioning training, whereby animals learn to respond to keepers' requests, which facilitates a number of, otherwise sensitive, daily routines. As various media have been used to convey keepers' instructions, the question remains of which modality is best to promote mutual understanding. Here, we explored this question with two captive female orangutans. In the first experiment, we compared orangutans' understanding of previously acquired instructions when those were performed with verbal signals only, gazes only, gestures only, and when all those modalities were combined. Our results showed that gestures were sufficient for successful comprehension by these two apes. In the second experiment, we asked whether this preference could be driven by the non-arbitrary relationship that gestures bear to what they refer to, through iconicity or pointing. Our results revealed that neither iconicity nor pointing helped the subjects comprehend the keepers' instructions. Our results indicate a preference for instructions given through gestural signals in two captive female orangutans, although its cause remains elusive. Future practice may encourage the use of gestures in communication between keepers and orangutans in general or potentially other animals.},\n\tauthor = {Dezecache, Guillaume and Bourgeois, Aude and Bazin, Christophe and Schlenker, Philippe and Chemla, Emmanuel and Maille, Audrey},\n\tdate-added = {2019-05-27 15:09:52 +1000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-05-31 12:43:18 +1000},\n\tdoi = {10.3390/ani9060300},\n\tjournal = {Animals},\n\tkeywords = {animal welfare; medical training; gestures; speech; inter-species communication; orangutans},\n\tnumber = {6},\n\tpages = {300},\n\ttitle = {Orangutans' Comprehension of Zoo Keepers' Communicative Signals},\n\turl = {https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/9/6/300/pdf},\n\turl_more = {https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/9/6/300},\n\tvolume = {9},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/9/6/300/pdf},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.3390/ani9060300}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Zoological institutions often encourage cooperative interactions between keepers and animals so as to promote animals' welfare. One useful technique has been conditioning training, whereby animals learn to respond to keepers' requests, which facilitates a number of, otherwise sensitive, daily routines. As various media have been used to convey keepers' instructions, the question remains of which modality is best to promote mutual understanding. Here, we explored this question with two captive female orangutans. In the first experiment, we compared orangutans' understanding of previously acquired instructions when those were performed with verbal signals only, gazes only, gestures only, and when all those modalities were combined. Our results showed that gestures were sufficient for successful comprehension by these two apes. In the second experiment, we asked whether this preference could be driven by the non-arbitrary relationship that gestures bear to what they refer to, through iconicity or pointing. Our results revealed that neither iconicity nor pointing helped the subjects comprehend the keepers' instructions. Our results indicate a preference for instructions given through gestural signals in two captive female orangutans, although its cause remains elusive. Future practice may encourage the use of gestures in communication between keepers and orangutans in general or potentially other animals.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Connecting content and logical words.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Buccola, B.; and Dautriche, I.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ConnectingPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Connecting more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 60 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla:2017ab,\n\tabstract = {Content words - e.g., nouns and adjectives - are generally connected: there are no gaps in their denotations; no noun means 'table or shoe' or 'animal or house'. We explore a formulation of connectedness which is applicable to content and logical words alike, and which compares well with the classic notion of monotonicity for quantifiers. On a first inspection, logical words satisfy this generalized version of the connectedness property at least as well as content words do - that is, both in terms of what may be observed in the lexicons of natural languages (although our investigations remain modest in that respect) and in terms of acquisition biases (with an artificial rule learning experiment). This reduces the putative differences between content and logical words, as well as the associated challenges these differences would pose, e.g., for learners.},\n\tauthor = {Chemla, Emmanuel and Buccola, Brian and Dautriche, Isabelle},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 09:15:33 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-10-13 20:37:15 +0200},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/jos/ffz001},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\tkeywords = {word learning, connectedness, quantifiers},\n\ttitle = {Connecting content and logical words},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WVhYzUwM/Chemla-Buccola-Dautriche-ConnectWords.html},\n\turl_more = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WVhYzUwM/Chemla-Buccola-Dautriche-ConnectWords.html},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WVhYzUwM/Chemla-ConnectWords.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Content words - e.g., nouns and adjectives - are generally connected: there are no gaps in their denotations; no noun means 'table or shoe' or 'animal or house'. We explore a formulation of connectedness which is applicable to content and logical words alike, and which compares well with the classic notion of monotonicity for quantifiers. On a first inspection, logical words satisfy this generalized version of the connectedness property at least as well as content words do - that is, both in terms of what may be observed in the lexicons of natural languages (although our investigations remain modest in that respect) and in terms of acquisition biases (with an artificial rule learning experiment). This reduces the putative differences between content and logical words, as well as the associated challenges these differences would pose, e.g., for learners.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Revealing abstract semantic mechanisms through priming: the distributive/collective contrast.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Maldonado, M.; Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 182: 171-176. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"RevealingPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Revealing more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 31 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Maldonadoetal:2018:PrimingDistrib,\n\tabstract = {Sentences such as The bags are light allow both collective (i.e. they are light together) and distributive interpretations (i.e. each bag is light). We report the results of two experiments showing that this collective/distributive contrast gives rise to priming effects. These findings suggest that the abstract interpretative mechanisms posited to account for this ambiguity are represented as such during comprehension, independently of the specific verification strategies associated with each reading.},\n\tauthor = {Maldonado, Mora and Chemla, Emmanuel and Spector, Benjamin},\n\tdate-added = {2018-09-11 14:53:40 +1000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-09-28 08:26:09 +1000},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2018.09.009},\n\tjournal = {Cognition},\n\tpages = {171-176},\n\ttitle = {Revealing abstract semantic mechanisms through priming: the distributive/collective contrast},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/zVhYTdjY/MaldonadoChemlaSpector2018_paper.pdf},\n\turl_more = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/zVhYTdjY/index.html},\n\tvolume = {182},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/zVhYTdjY/MaldonadoChemlaSpector2018_paper.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentences such as The bags are light allow both collective (i.e. they are light together) and distributive interpretations (i.e. each bag is light). We report the results of two experiments showing that this collective/distributive contrast gives rise to priming effects. These findings suggest that the abstract interpretative mechanisms posited to account for this ambiguity are represented as such during comprehension, independently of the specific verification strategies associated with each reading.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Mouse tracking as a window into decision making.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Maldonado, M.; Chemla, E.; and Dunbar, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavior Research Methods,1–17. 2 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MousePaper\n  \n \n \n \"Mouse more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 10 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Maldonado-et-al-MouseTracking,\n\tabstract = {Mouse tracking promises to be an efficient method to investigate the dynamics of cognitive processes: It is easier to deploy than eyetracking, yet in principle it is much more fine-grained than looking at response times. We investigated these claimed benefits directly, asking how the features of decision processes---notably, decision changes---might be captured in mouse movements. We ran two experiments, one in which we explicitly manipulated whether our stimuli triggered a flip in decision, and one in which we replicated more ecological, classical mouse-tracking results on linguistic negation (Dale & Duran, Cognitive Science, 35, 983--996, 2011). We concluded, first, that spatial information (mouse path) is more important than temporal information (speed and acceleration) for detecting decision changes, and we offer a comparison of the sensitivities of various typical measures used in analyses of mouse tracking (area under the trajectory curve, direction flips, etc.). We do so using an ``optimal'' analysis of our data (a linear discriminant analysis explicitly trained to classify trajectories) and see what type of data (position, speed, or acceleration) it capitalizes on. We also quantify how its results compare with those based on more standard measures.},\n\tauthor = {Mora Maldonado and Emmanuel Chemla and Ewan Dunbar},\n\tdate-added = {2018-09-22 07:38:07 +1000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-02-17 07:36:32 +1100},\n\tdoi = {10.3758/s13428-018-01194-x},\n\tjournal = {Behavior Research Methods},\n\tkeywords = {methodological, mouse-tracking, decision making, negation},\n\tmonth = {2},\n\tpages = {1--17},\n\ttitle = {Mouse tracking as a window into decision making},\n\turl = {https://rdcu.be/bmtvN},\n\turl_more = {https://osf.io/rbx3m/},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://osf.io/7qnzu/?view_only=45edf46a29c54926903e4121d2b7011d}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Mouse tracking promises to be an efficient method to investigate the dynamics of cognitive processes: It is easier to deploy than eyetracking, yet in principle it is much more fine-grained than looking at response times. We investigated these claimed benefits directly, asking how the features of decision processes—notably, decision changes—might be captured in mouse movements. We ran two experiments, one in which we explicitly manipulated whether our stimuli triggered a flip in decision, and one in which we replicated more ecological, classical mouse-tracking results on linguistic negation (Dale & Duran, Cognitive Science, 35, 983–996, 2011). We concluded, first, that spatial information (mouse path) is more important than temporal information (speed and acceleration) for detecting decision changes, and we offer a comparison of the sensitivities of various typical measures used in analyses of mouse tracking (area under the trajectory curve, direction flips, etc.). We do so using an ``optimal'' analysis of our data (a linear discriminant analysis explicitly trained to classify trajectories) and see what type of data (position, speed, or acceleration) it capitalizes on. We also quantify how its results compare with those based on more standard measures.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Alternatives of disjunction: when a disjunct contains the antecedent of a pronoun.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Buccola, B.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Snippets, 37: 16-18. 2019.\n Making and Meaning, Special issue in honor of Uli Sauerland\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"AlternativesPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{BuccolaChemla-DisjunctionAlt,\n\tauthor = {Buccola, Brian and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tdate-added = {2018-04-04 15:20:30 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-15 17:36:19 +0200},\n\tdoi = {10.7358/snip-2019-037-buch},\n\tjournal = {Snippets},\n\tnote = {Making and Meaning, Special issue in honor of Uli Sauerland},\n\tpages = {16-18},\n\ttitle = {Alternatives of disjunction: when a disjunct contains the antecedent of a pronoun},\n\turl = {https://www.ledonline.it/snippets/allegati/snippets37007.pdf},\n\tvolume = {37},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003967/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Suszko's problem: mixed consequence and compositionality.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Egré, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Review of Symbolic Logic,1-32. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Suszko'sPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 17 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{ChemlaEgre-Suszko,\n\tabstract = {Suszko's problem is the problem of finding the minimal number of truth values needed to semantically characterize a syntactic consequence relation. Suszko proved that every Tarskian consequence relation can be characterized using only two truth values. Malinowski showed that this number can equal three if some of Tarski's structural constraints are relaxed. By so doing, Malinowski introduced a case of so-called mixed consequence, allowing the notion of a designated value to vary between the premises and the conclusions of an argument. In this article we give a more systematic perspective on Suszko's problem and on mixed consequence. First, we prove general representation theorems relating structural properties of a consequence relation to their semantic interpretation, uncovering the semantic counterpart of substitution-invariance, and establishing that (intersective) mixed consequence is fundamentally the semantic counterpart of the structural property of monotonicity. We use those theorems to derive maximum-rank results proved recently in a different setting by French and Ripley, as well as by Blasio, Marcos, and Wansing, for logics with various structural properties (reflexivity, transitivity, none, or both). We strengthen these results into exact rank results for nonpermeable logics (roughly, those which distinguish the role of premises and conclusions). We discuss the underlying notion of rank, and the associated reduction proposed independently by Scott and Suszko. As emphasized by Suszko, that reduction fails to preserve compositionality in general, meaning that the resulting semantics is no longer truth-functional. We propose a modification of that notion of reduction, allowing us to prove that over compact logics with what we call regular connectives, rank results are maintained even if we request the preservation of truth-functionality and additional semantic properties.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Paul Egr\\'e},\n\tdate-added = {2017-07-26 11:57:42 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-05-22 01:24:12 +1000},\n\tdoi = {10.1017/S1755020318000503},\n\tjournal = {Review of Symbolic Logic},\n\tpages = {1-32},\n\tpublisher = {Cambridge University Press},\n\ttitle = {Suszko's problem: mixed consequence and compositionality},\n\turl = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08017},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Suszko's problem is the problem of finding the minimal number of truth values needed to semantically characterize a syntactic consequence relation. Suszko proved that every Tarskian consequence relation can be characterized using only two truth values. Malinowski showed that this number can equal three if some of Tarski's structural constraints are relaxed. By so doing, Malinowski introduced a case of so-called mixed consequence, allowing the notion of a designated value to vary between the premises and the conclusions of an argument. In this article we give a more systematic perspective on Suszko's problem and on mixed consequence. First, we prove general representation theorems relating structural properties of a consequence relation to their semantic interpretation, uncovering the semantic counterpart of substitution-invariance, and establishing that (intersective) mixed consequence is fundamentally the semantic counterpart of the structural property of monotonicity. We use those theorems to derive maximum-rank results proved recently in a different setting by French and Ripley, as well as by Blasio, Marcos, and Wansing, for logics with various structural properties (reflexivity, transitivity, none, or both). We strengthen these results into exact rank results for nonpermeable logics (roughly, those which distinguish the role of premises and conclusions). We discuss the underlying notion of rank, and the associated reduction proposed independently by Scott and Suszko. As emphasized by Suszko, that reduction fails to preserve compositionality in general, meaning that the resulting semantics is no longer truth-functional. We propose a modification of that notion of reduction, allowing us to prove that over compact logics with what we call regular connectives, rank results are maintained even if we request the preservation of truth-functionality and additional semantic properties.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Children's acquisition of homogeneity in plural definite descriptions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Križ, M.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Psychology. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Children'sPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Children's more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu:2019ab,\n\tabstract = {Plural definite descriptions give rise to homogeneity effects: the positive The trucks are blue and the negative The trucks aren't blue are neither true nor false when some of the trucks are blue and some are not, i.e. when the group of trucks is not homogeneous with respect to the property of being blue (L\\''obbner 1987; Schwarzschild 1994, among others; for experimental evidence of this truth value gap, see Kri\\v{z} &amp; Chemla 2015). A recent account of homogeneity posits that definite plurals have a literal existential meaning that can be strengthened to the universal meaning through a scalar implicature (Magri 2014). In this study, we investigated preschool-aged children's comprehension of plural definite descriptions of non-homogeneous contexts. We conducted two experiments with 4- and 5-year-old French-speaking children, one using a standard Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain &amp; Thornton 1998) and one using a ternary judgment task (Katsos &amp; Bishop 2011). The experiments revealed three distinct subgroups of children who differed in how they interpreted plural definite descriptions and standard cases of scalar implicatures. One group of children both interpreted the definite plurals existentially and failed to compute scalar implicatures. Another group of children accessed homogeneous interpretations and computed implicatures. A smaller subgroup of children appeared to access homogeneous interpretations without computing implicatures. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of homogeneity, and in particular for the implicature theory of homogeneity, proposing that such a theory has a role to play in children's development of homogeneity.\n},\n\tauthor = {Lyn Tieu and Manuel Kri\\v{z} and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 21:27:12 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-11-06 12:02:06 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02329},\n\tjournal = {Frontiers in Psychology},\n\ttitle = {Children's acquisition of homogeneity in plural definite descriptions},\n\turl = {https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02329/full?&utm_source=Email_to_authors_&utm_medium=Email&utm_content=T1_11.5e1_author&utm_campaign=Email_publication&field=&journalName=Frontiers_in_Psychology&id=463805},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DM5YjA1M/Tieu-Kriz-Chemla-AcqHomogeneity.html},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DM5YjA1M/TKC-AcqHomogeneity.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Plural definite descriptions give rise to homogeneity effects: the positive The trucks are blue and the negative The trucks aren't blue are neither true nor false when some of the trucks are blue and some are not, i.e. when the group of trucks is not homogeneous with respect to the property of being blue (L'́obbner 1987; Schwarzschild 1994, among others; for experimental evidence of this truth value gap, see Križ & Chemla 2015). A recent account of homogeneity posits that definite plurals have a literal existential meaning that can be strengthened to the universal meaning through a scalar implicature (Magri 2014). In this study, we investigated preschool-aged children's comprehension of plural definite descriptions of non-homogeneous contexts. We conducted two experiments with 4- and 5-year-old French-speaking children, one using a standard Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain & Thornton 1998) and one using a ternary judgment task (Katsos & Bishop 2011). The experiments revealed three distinct subgroups of children who differed in how they interpreted plural definite descriptions and standard cases of scalar implicatures. One group of children both interpreted the definite plurals existentially and failed to compute scalar implicatures. Another group of children accessed homogeneous interpretations and computed implicatures. A smaller subgroup of children appeared to access homogeneous interpretations without computing implicatures. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of homogeneity, and in particular for the implicature theory of homogeneity, proposing that such a theory has a role to play in children's development of homogeneity. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Distinctions between primary and secondary scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dieuleveut, A.; Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Memory and Language, 106: 150-171. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"DistinctionsPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Distinctions more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 10 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Dieuleveut-Chemla-Spector-WeakStrongSI,\n\tabstract = {An utterance of 'Some of the students are home' usually triggers the inference that it is not the case that the speaker believes that all students are home (Primary Scalar Implicature). It may also license a stronger inference: that the speaker believes that not all students are home (Secondary Scalar Implicature). Using an experimental paradigm which allows to distinguish between these three distinct readings as such (literal reading, primary SI, secondary SI), we show that the secondary SI can be accessed even in contexts where the speaker is not presented as being well-informed, a result which goes against classical neo-Gricean pragmatic approaches to Scalar Implicature, but is compatible with both the 'grammatical' approach to Scalar Implicatures and some more recent game-theoretic pragmatic models in which speakers and listeners engage in sophisticated higher-order reasoning about each other. Second, we use this paradigm to compare standard scalar items such as some and expressions whose interpretation has been argued to involve SIs, but controversially: almost, numerals and plural morphology. For some and almost, we find that speakers do access three distinct readings, but for numerals and plural morphology, only the literal reading and the secondary implicature could be detected, and no primary implicature, which suggests that the pragmatic and semantic mechanisms at play are different for both types of items.},\n\tauthor = {Dieuleveut, Anouk and Chemla, Emmanuel and Spector, Benjamin},\n\tdate-added = {2016-12-24 08:39:41 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2019-05-22 01:21:56 +1000},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.jml.2019.02.008},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Memory and Language},\n\tpages = {150-171},\n\ttitle = {Distinctions between primary and secondary scalar implicatures},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2Q1MWRlM/Dieuleveut-Chemla-Spector - Distinctions between primary and secondary scalar implicatures.pdf},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2Q1MWRlM/Dieuleveut-Chemla-Spector - Distinctions between primary and secondary scalar implicatures.html},\n\tvolume = {106},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2Q1MWRlM/Dieuleveut-Chemla-Spector-Weak%20and%20Strong%20Quantity%20Implicatures%20-%20An%20experimental%20investigation.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n An utterance of 'Some of the students are home' usually triggers the inference that it is not the case that the speaker believes that all students are home (Primary Scalar Implicature). It may also license a stronger inference: that the speaker believes that not all students are home (Secondary Scalar Implicature). Using an experimental paradigm which allows to distinguish between these three distinct readings as such (literal reading, primary SI, secondary SI), we show that the secondary SI can be accessed even in contexts where the speaker is not presented as being well-informed, a result which goes against classical neo-Gricean pragmatic approaches to Scalar Implicature, but is compatible with both the 'grammatical' approach to Scalar Implicatures and some more recent game-theoretic pragmatic models in which speakers and listeners engage in sophisticated higher-order reasoning about each other. Second, we use this paradigm to compare standard scalar items such as some and expressions whose interpretation has been argued to involve SIs, but controversially: almost, numerals and plural morphology. For some and almost, we find that speakers do access three distinct readings, but for numerals and plural morphology, only the literal reading and the secondary implicature could be detected, and no primary implicature, which suggests that the pragmatic and semantic mechanisms at play are different for both types of items.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2018\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Competition and symmetry in an artificial word learning task.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Buccola, B.; Dautriche, I.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Psychology. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CompetitionPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Competition more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{BDE-MinimalCompetition,\n\tabstract = {Natural language involves competition. The sentences we choose to utter activate alternative sentences (those we chose not to utter), which hearers typically infer to be false. Hence, as a first approximation, the more alternatives a sentence activates, the more inferences it will trigger. But a closer look at the theory of competition shows that this is not quite true and that under specific circumstances, so-called symmetric alternatives cancel each other out. We present an artificial word learning experiment in which participants learn words that may enter into competition with one another. The results show that a mechanism of competition takes place, and that the subtle prediction that alternatives trigger inferences, and may stop triggering them after a point due to symmetry, is borne out. This study provides a minimal testing paradigm to reveal competition and some of its subtle characteristics in human languages and beyond.},\n\tauthor = {Brian Buccola and Isabelle Dautriche and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2018-05-07 19:43:27 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-11-14 23:58:19 +1100},\n\tdoi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02176},\n\tjournal = {Frontiers in Psychology},\n\tkeywords = {implicature; linguistic inferences; word learning},\n\ttitle = {Competition and symmetry in an artificial word learning task},\n\turl = {https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02176/full?&utm_source=Email_to_authors_&utm_medium=Email&utm_content=T1_11.5e1_author&utm_campaign=Email_publication&field=&journalName=Frontiers_in_Psychology&id=391735},\n\turl_more = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DJmNjYxY/index.html},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003992/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Natural language involves competition. The sentences we choose to utter activate alternative sentences (those we chose not to utter), which hearers typically infer to be false. Hence, as a first approximation, the more alternatives a sentence activates, the more inferences it will trigger. But a closer look at the theory of competition shows that this is not quite true and that under specific circumstances, so-called symmetric alternatives cancel each other out. We present an artificial word learning experiment in which participants learn words that may enter into competition with one another. The results show that a mechanism of competition takes place, and that the subtle prediction that alternatives trigger inferences, and may stop triggering them after a point due to symmetry, is borne out. This study provides a minimal testing paradigm to reveal competition and some of its subtle characteristics in human languages and beyond.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Intervention effects in NPI licensing: a quantitative assessment of the scalar implicature explanation.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Denić, M.; Chemla, E.; and Tieu, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Glossa: a journal of general linguistics, 3(1): 49. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"InterventionPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Intervention more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 10 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Denic:2017aa,\n\tabstract = {This paper reports on five experiments about intervention effects in NPI licensing. Such intervention effects involve the unexpected ungrammaticality of sentences that contain an intervener, such as a universal quantifier, in between the NPI and its licensor. For example, the licensing of the NPI any in the sentence *Monkey didn't give every lion any chocolate is disrupted by intervention. Interveners also happen to be items that trigger scalar implicatures in environments in which NPIs are licensed (Chierchia 2004, 2013). A natural hypothesis, initially proposed in Chierchia (2004), is that there is a link between the two phenomena. In this paper, we investigate whether intervention effects arise when scalar implicatures are derived.},\n\tauthor = {Milica Deni\\'c and Emmanuel Chemla and Lyn Tieu},\n\tdate-added = {2017-03-23 21:45:34 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-04-20 20:09:39 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.5334/gjgl.388},\n\tjournal = {Glossa: a journal of general linguistics},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {49},\n\ttitle = {Intervention effects in NPI licensing: a quantitative assessment of the scalar implicature explanation},\n\turl = {http://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.388},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2U2ODU3N/Denic-Chemla-Tieu-InterventionEffects.html},\n\tvolume = {3},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2U2ODU3N/Denic-Chemla-Tieu-InterventionEffects.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n This paper reports on five experiments about intervention effects in NPI licensing. Such intervention effects involve the unexpected ungrammaticality of sentences that contain an intervener, such as a universal quantifier, in between the NPI and its licensor. For example, the licensing of the NPI any in the sentence *Monkey didn't give every lion any chocolate is disrupted by intervention. Interveners also happen to be items that trigger scalar implicatures in environments in which NPIs are licensed (Chierchia 2004, 2013). A natural hypothesis, initially proposed in Chierchia (2004), is that there is a link between the two phenomena. In this paper, we investigate whether intervention effects arise when scalar implicatures are derived.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Gestural agreement.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language & Linguistic Theory, 36(2): 587–625. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"GesturalPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Gestural more\n  \n \n \n \"Gestural preprint\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Schlenker:2018aa,\n\tabstract = {We argue that a gesture replacing an English verb -- a 'gestural verb'-- displays some properties of 'agreement verbs' in American Sign Language (ASL). Specifically, gestural verbs involving (among others) slapping and punching can be realized as targeting the addressee (SLAP-2, PUNCH-2) if the object is second person, or as targeting some other position (SLAP-a, PUNCH-a) if the object is third person. This property is shared with ASL verbs that display object agreement. Strikingly, in both cases the object agreement marker can be disregarded under ellipsis and under the focus-sensitive particle only, a behavior which is shared with phi-features in spoken language -- and is not entirely reducible to the presuppositional nature of the marker. The main findings are based on introspective judgments, but crucial examples are validated by an experimental approach. In sum, we provide initial evidence that English gestural verbs have a grammar, and that it partly mirrors that of some sign language constructions.},\n\tauthor = {Philippe Schlenker and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 17:46:44 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-09-06 10:17:15 +1000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11049-017-9378-8},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language \\& Linguistic Theory},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {587--625},\n\ttitle = {Gestural agreement},\n\turl = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11049-017-9378-8#citeas},\n\turl_more = {https://osf.io/76kyu/},\n\turl_preprint = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003120/current.pdf},\n\tvolume = {36},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003120/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We argue that a gesture replacing an English verb – a 'gestural verb'– displays some properties of 'agreement verbs' in American Sign Language (ASL). Specifically, gestural verbs involving (among others) slapping and punching can be realized as targeting the addressee (SLAP-2, PUNCH-2) if the object is second person, or as targeting some other position (SLAP-a, PUNCH-a) if the object is third person. This property is shared with ASL verbs that display object agreement. Strikingly, in both cases the object agreement marker can be disregarded under ellipsis and under the focus-sensitive particle only, a behavior which is shared with phi-features in spoken language – and is not entirely reducible to the presuppositional nature of the marker. The main findings are based on introspective judgments, but crucial examples are validated by an experimental approach. In sum, we provide initial evidence that English gestural verbs have a grammar, and that it partly mirrors that of some sign language constructions.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Co-speech gesture projection: Evidence from inferential judgments.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Pasternak, R.; Schlenker, P.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Glossa: a journal of general linguistics, 3(1): 109. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Co-speechPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Co-speech more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 9 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu:2017ac,\n\tabstract = {Co-speech gestures have been reported to give rise to so-called cosuppositional inferences (Schlenker 2015, 2016). For example, a sentence like ``John will not [use the stairs] UP'', produced with an UP gesture (finger pointed upwards) co-occurring with the verb phrase is argued to give rise to the conditional presupposition that if John were to use the stairs, he would go up the stairs. Such a presuppositional treatment of the gestural inference predicts that it should project out of certain linguistic environments. We tested this prediction using an Inferential Judgment Task, in which participants had to rate the strength of inferences arising from the use of the co-speech gestures UP and DOWN, when produced with the predicate ``use the stairs'', in six different linguistic environments: plain affirmative and negative sentences, modal sentences containing ``might'', and quantified sentences involving ``each'', ``none'', and ``exactly one''. The results provide evidence that the conditional inference projects from the scope of negation, and projects universally from the scope of ``none'' and ``exactly one''. In addition, the data suggest that the cosupposition can also be locally accommodated in the scope of negation and ``none''. Both findings are compatible with the view that co-speech gestures trigger cosuppositions, and are incompatible with the view that gestures merely make at-issue contributions. We discuss their relevance for a third theory of co-speech gestures, according to which their meanings are supplements, just like those of appositive relative clauses (Ebert & Ebert 2014). While some choice points in the Supplemental theory can arguably lead to appropriate predictions regarding patterns of projection, it is not clear that the theory can account for the existence of local accommodation in the sentences under consideration. Finally, we compare our findings to those of Tieu et al. (2017), who tested the very same sentences using a truth value judgment task and a picture selection task, and found evidence for existential rather than universal projection (along with local accommodation).},\n\tauthor = {Lyn Tieu and Robert Pasternak and Philippe Schlenker and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-03-24 10:38:20 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-10-17 10:34:53 +1100},\n\tdoi = {10.5334/gjgl.580},\n\tjournal = {Glossa: a journal of general linguistics},\n\tkeywords = {co-speech gestures, presupposition, projection, local accommodation, inferences, inferential judgments},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {109},\n\ttitle = {Co-speech gesture projection: Evidence from inferential judgments},\n\turl = {http://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.580},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jBiMmUwM/TieuPasternakSchlenkerChemla_GestureInferences.html},\n\tvolume = {3},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jBiMmUwM/TieuPasternakSchlenkerChemla_GestureInferences.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Co-speech gestures have been reported to give rise to so-called cosuppositional inferences (Schlenker 2015, 2016). For example, a sentence like ``John will not [use the stairs] UP'', produced with an UP gesture (finger pointed upwards) co-occurring with the verb phrase is argued to give rise to the conditional presupposition that if John were to use the stairs, he would go up the stairs. Such a presuppositional treatment of the gestural inference predicts that it should project out of certain linguistic environments. We tested this prediction using an Inferential Judgment Task, in which participants had to rate the strength of inferences arising from the use of the co-speech gestures UP and DOWN, when produced with the predicate ``use the stairs'', in six different linguistic environments: plain affirmative and negative sentences, modal sentences containing ``might'', and quantified sentences involving ``each'', ``none'', and ``exactly one''. The results provide evidence that the conditional inference projects from the scope of negation, and projects universally from the scope of ``none'' and ``exactly one''. In addition, the data suggest that the cosupposition can also be locally accommodated in the scope of negation and ``none''. Both findings are compatible with the view that co-speech gestures trigger cosuppositions, and are incompatible with the view that gestures merely make at-issue contributions. We discuss their relevance for a third theory of co-speech gestures, according to which their meanings are supplements, just like those of appositive relative clauses (Ebert & Ebert 2014). While some choice points in the Supplemental theory can arguably lead to appropriate predictions regarding patterns of projection, it is not clear that the theory can account for the existence of local accommodation in the sentences under consideration. Finally, we compare our findings to those of Tieu et al. (2017), who tested the very same sentences using a truth value judgment task and a picture selection task, and found evidence for existential rather than universal projection (along with local accommodation).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Cross-linguistic regularities and learner biases reflect ``core'' mechanics.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Strickland, B.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLOS ONE, 13(1): 1–20. 01 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Strickland:2018aa,\n\tabstract = {Recent research in infant cognition and adult vision suggests that the mechanical object relationships may be more salient and naturally attention grabbing than similar but non-mechanical relationships. Here we examine two novel sources of evidence from language related to this hypothesis. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that adults preferentially infer that the meaning of a novel preposition refers to a mechanical as opposed to a non-mechanical relationship. Experiments 3 and 4 examine cross-linguistic adpositions obtained on a large scale from machines or from experts, respectively. While these methods differ in the ease of data collection relative to the reliability of the data, their results converge: we find that across a range of diverse and historically unrelated languages, adpositions (such as prepositions) referring to the mechanical relationships of containment (e.g ``in'') and support (e.g. ``on'') are systematically shorter than closely matched but not mechanical words such as ``behind,'' ``beside,'' ``above,'' ``over,'' ``out,'' and ``off.'' These results first suggest that languages regularly contain traces of core knowledge representations and that cross-linguistic regularities can therefore be a useful and easily accessible form of information that bears on the foundations of non-linguistic thought.},\n\tauthor = {Brent Strickland and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 21:30:29 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-01-16 17:23:21 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0184132},\n\tjournal = {{PLOS} {ONE}},\n\tmonth = {01},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {1--20},\n\tpublisher = {Public Library of Science},\n\ttitle = {Cross-linguistic regularities and learner biases reflect ``core'' mechanics},\n\tvolume = {13},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184132}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Recent research in infant cognition and adult vision suggests that the mechanical object relationships may be more salient and naturally attention grabbing than similar but non-mechanical relationships. Here we examine two novel sources of evidence from language related to this hypothesis. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that adults preferentially infer that the meaning of a novel preposition refers to a mechanical as opposed to a non-mechanical relationship. Experiments 3 and 4 examine cross-linguistic adpositions obtained on a large scale from machines or from experts, respectively. While these methods differ in the ease of data collection relative to the reliability of the data, their results converge: we find that across a range of diverse and historically unrelated languages, adpositions (such as prepositions) referring to the mechanical relationships of containment (e.g ``in'') and support (e.g. ``on'') are systematically shorter than closely matched but not mechanical words such as ``behind,'' ``beside,'' ``above,'' ``over,'' ``out,'' and ``off.'' These results first suggest that languages regularly contain traces of core knowledge representations and that cross-linguistic regularities can therefore be a useful and easily accessible form of information that bears on the foundations of non-linguistic thought.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2017\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (11)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Priming methods in semantics and pragmatics.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Maldonado, M.; Spector, B.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 40. 2017.\n Commentary on Branigan and Pickering (2017)\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PrimingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Maldonado:2017ab,\n\tabstract = {Structural priming is a powerful method to inform theories of linguistic structure. We argue that the method extends nicely beyond syntax, to theories of meaning, where priming can serve to reveal abstract interpretive operations. In doing so, however, we will see that structural priming should still be seen as only one of the tools available for linguistic data collection. In particular, because priming can occur at different, potentially conflicting levels, it cannot detect every aspect of linguistic representations.},\n\tauthor = {Maldonado, Mora and Spector, Benjamin and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tdate-added = {2017-03-12 15:54:29 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-12-01 14:42:27 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1017/S0140525X17000516},\n\tjournal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},\n\tnote = {Commentary on Branigan and Pickering (2017)},\n\tpublisher = {Cambridge University Press},\n\ttitle = {Priming methods in semantics and pragmatics},\n\turl = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003369/current.pdf?_s=kQ-TZWT3xZeDHWD5},\n\tvolume = {40},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003369/current.pdf?_s=kQ-TZWT3xZeDHWD5}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Structural priming is a powerful method to inform theories of linguistic structure. We argue that the method extends nicely beyond syntax, to theories of meaning, where priming can serve to reveal abstract interpretive operations. In doing so, however, we will see that structural priming should still be seen as only one of the tools available for linguistic data collection. In particular, because priming can occur at different, potentially conflicting levels, it cannot detect every aspect of linguistic representations.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Co-speech gesture projection: Evidence from truth-value judgment and picture selection tasks.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Pasternak, R.; Schlenker, P.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Glossa, 2(1): 102. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Co-speechPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Co-speech more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu:2017aa,\n\tabstract = {Two main analyses have been proposed to explain how co-speech gestures interact with logical operators. According to the Supplemental analysis (Ebert \\& Ebert 2014), co-speech gestures have the same semantic status as appositive relative clauses. According to the Cosuppositional analysis (Schlenker 2016a; b), co-speech gestures trigger a particular kind of presupposition. The sentence "John will not use the stairs", produced with an UP gesture (finger pointed upwards) is argued to give rise to the conditional presupposition that if John were to use the stairs, he would use the stairs in an upwards trajectory. Both the Supplemental and Cosuppositional analyses predict that inferences triggered by co-speech gestures should `project' out of the scope of operators, but not quite in the same way. We present an experimental investigation of the projection properties of the inferences arising from the co-speech gestures UP and DOWN in six different linguistic environments (plain affirmative and negative sentences, modal sentences containing "might", and quantified sentences containing "each", "none", and "exactly one"). Applying a reading detection analysis (Cremers \\& Chemla 2015) to the responses of a Truth Value Judgment Task and a Picture Selection Task, we find evidence for existential projection of the gestural inferences in the scope of "each", "none", and "exactly one", and, to some degree, local accommodation of the inferences. These results can be derived by the Cosuppositional analysis, in combination with an analysis of presupposition projection such as Beaver (2001), which predicts existential projection out of quantified structures; on the other hand, both findings are difficult to reconcile with the Supplemental analysis. Our projection results bring gestural inferences and verbal presuppositions closer together, but a remaining puzzle is why in quantified structures we obtain existential rather than universal inferences (Chemla 2009), the latter being the more standard finding in the presuppositional literature (though see Tieu et al. 2016 for evidence of universal projection of the same gestural inferences).},\n\tauthor = {Lyn Tieu and Robert Pasternak and Philippe Schlenker and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 01:34:53 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-12-04 20:49:20 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.5334/gjgl.334},\n\tjournal = {Glossa},\n\tkeywords = {gesture},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {102},\n\ttitle = {Co-speech gesture projection: Evidence from truth-value judgment and picture selection tasks},\n\turl = {http://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.334},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GM0ZWNlM/Tieu-Pasternak-Schlenker-Chemla_Gestures.html},\n\tvolume = {2},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GM0ZWNlM/TPSC_Gestures.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Two main analyses have been proposed to explain how co-speech gestures interact with logical operators. According to the Supplemental analysis (Ebert & Ebert 2014), co-speech gestures have the same semantic status as appositive relative clauses. According to the Cosuppositional analysis (Schlenker 2016a; b), co-speech gestures trigger a particular kind of presupposition. The sentence \"John will not use the stairs\", produced with an UP gesture (finger pointed upwards) is argued to give rise to the conditional presupposition that if John were to use the stairs, he would use the stairs in an upwards trajectory. Both the Supplemental and Cosuppositional analyses predict that inferences triggered by co-speech gestures should `project' out of the scope of operators, but not quite in the same way. We present an experimental investigation of the projection properties of the inferences arising from the co-speech gestures UP and DOWN in six different linguistic environments (plain affirmative and negative sentences, modal sentences containing \"might\", and quantified sentences containing \"each\", \"none\", and \"exactly one\"). Applying a reading detection analysis (Cremers & Chemla 2015) to the responses of a Truth Value Judgment Task and a Picture Selection Task, we find evidence for existential projection of the gestural inferences in the scope of \"each\", \"none\", and \"exactly one\", and, to some degree, local accommodation of the inferences. These results can be derived by the Cosuppositional analysis, in combination with an analysis of presupposition projection such as Beaver (2001), which predicts existential projection out of quantified structures; on the other hand, both findings are difficult to reconcile with the Supplemental analysis. Our projection results bring gestural inferences and verbal presuppositions closer together, but a remaining puzzle is why in quantified structures we obtain existential rather than universal inferences (Chemla 2009), the latter being the more standard finding in the presuppositional literature (though see Tieu et al. 2016 for evidence of universal projection of the same gestural inferences).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Characterizing Logical Consequence in many-valued logic.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Egré, P.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Logic and Computation, 27(7): 2193-2226. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CharacterizingPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Characterizing more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 16 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla:2017aa,\n\tabstract = {Several definitions of logical consequence have been proposed in many-valued logic, which coincide in the two-valued case, but come apart as soon as three truth values come into play. Those definitions include so-called pure consequence, order-theoretic consequence, and mixed consequence. In this paper, we examine whether those definitions together carve out a natural class of consequence relations. We respond positively by identifying a small set of properties that we see instantiated in those various consequence relations, namely truth-relationality, value-monotonicity, validity-coherence, and a constraint of bivalence-compliance, provably replaceable by a structural requisite of non-triviality. Our main result is that the class of consequence relations satisfying those properties coincides exactly with the class of mixed consequence relations and their intersections, including pure consequence relations and order-theoretic consequence. We provide an enumeration of the set of those relations in finite many-valued logics of two extreme kinds: those in which truth values are well-ordered and those in which values between 0 and 1 are incomparable.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Paul Egr\\'e and Benjamin Spector},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-21 23:56:39 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-10-18 18:25:09 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/logcom/exx001},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Logic and Computation},\n\tnumber = {7},\n\tpages = {2193-2226},\n\ttitle = {Characterizing Logical Consequence in many-valued logic},\n\turl = {https://academic.oup.com/logcom/article/27/7/2193/3067506/Characterizing-logical-consequence-in-manyvalued?guestAccessKey=b60b5f9c-bbaf-4e70-8e83-3dbc3cdc3cc8},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GQzYTM4N/Chemla-Egre-Spector-LCrelations.html},\n\tvolume = {27},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GQzYTM4N/Chemla-Egre-Spector-LCrelations.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Several definitions of logical consequence have been proposed in many-valued logic, which coincide in the two-valued case, but come apart as soon as three truth values come into play. Those definitions include so-called pure consequence, order-theoretic consequence, and mixed consequence. In this paper, we examine whether those definitions together carve out a natural class of consequence relations. We respond positively by identifying a small set of properties that we see instantiated in those various consequence relations, namely truth-relationality, value-monotonicity, validity-coherence, and a constraint of bivalence-compliance, provably replaceable by a structural requisite of non-triviality. Our main result is that the class of consequence relations satisfying those properties coincides exactly with the class of mixed consequence relations and their intersections, including pure consequence relations and order-theoretic consequence. We provide an enumeration of the set of those relations in finite many-valued logics of two extreme kinds: those in which truth values are well-ordered and those in which values between 0 and 1 are incomparable.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Priming plural ambiguities.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Maldonado, M.; Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Memory and Language, 95: 89 - 101. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PrimingPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Priming journal link\n  \n \n \n \"Priming more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 11 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Maldonado:2017aa,\n\tabstract = {Sentences that involve plural expressions, such as numerical expressions, give rise to systematic ambiguities. For example, the sentence Two boys have three balloons can either mean that there are two boys who, between them, have three balloons (cumulative reading) or that there are two boys who each have three balloons (distributive reading). In this paper, we report the results of three experiments which show that the distributive/cumulative ambiguity can give rise to priming effects. That is, when subjects perform a sentence-picture matching task which creates a strong bias towards one of the two types of readings, they are more likely to access the very same type of interpretation when subsequently presented with a different sentence-picture pair which does not create a similar bias. This finding suggests that the abstract constructs that linguists posit to account for different types of readings describe some real features of mental representations.},\n\tauthor = {Mora Maldonado and Emmanuel Chemla and Benjamin Spector},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-21 23:55:23 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.jml.2017.02.002},\n\tissn = {0749-596X},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Memory and Language},\n\tkeywords = {Semantics},\n\tpages = {89 - 101},\n\ttitle = {Priming plural ambiguities},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/ThhYTBiO/Maldonado-Chemla-Spector-Priming-Plural-Ambiguities.pdf},\n\turl_journal_link = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749596X17300098},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/ThhYTBiO/primingplurals.html},\n\tvolume = {95},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/ThhYTBiO/paper.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentences that involve plural expressions, such as numerical expressions, give rise to systematic ambiguities. For example, the sentence Two boys have three balloons can either mean that there are two boys who, between them, have three balloons (cumulative reading) or that there are two boys who each have three balloons (distributive reading). In this paper, we report the results of three experiments which show that the distributive/cumulative ambiguity can give rise to priming effects. That is, when subjects perform a sentence-picture matching task which creates a strong bias towards one of the two types of readings, they are more likely to access the very same type of interpretation when subsequently presented with a different sentence-picture pair which does not create a similar bias. This finding suggests that the abstract constructs that linguists posit to account for different types of readings describe some real features of mental representations.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Titi semantics: Context and meaning in Titi monkey call sequences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; Cäsar, C.; Ryder, R.; and Zuberbühler, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language & Linguistic Theory, 35(1): 271–298. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TitiPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{schlenker2017titi,\n\tabstract = {C\\''asar et al. 2013 show that the structure of Titi monkey call sequences can, with just two call types (A and B), reflect information about predator type and predator location. Using the general methods of Schlenker et al. 2014, we ask what these facts show about the 'linguistic' structure of Titi calls. We first demonstrate that the simplest behavioral assumptions make it challenging to provide lexical specifications for A- and B-calls: B-calls rather clearly have the distribution of general alarm calls; but A-calls are also found in highly heterogeneous contexts (e.g. they are triggered by 'cat in the canopy' and 'raptor on the ground' situations). We discuss two possible solutions to the problem. One posits that entire sequences are endowed with meanings that are not compositionally derived from their individual parts (a related idea was proposed by Arnold and Zuberb\\''uhler to analyze pyow-hack sequences in Putty-nosed monkeys). The second analysis combines a very simple compositional analysis with some more sophisticated assumptions about the environmental context in which the calls are used; specifically, we argue that the B-call is a general alarm call, that the A-call is used for serious non-ground threats, and that they are combined by the simplest (conjunctive) rule; but their interaction with the context conspires to make it possible for call sequences to reflect information about predator nature and predator location.},\n\tauthor = {Schlenker, Philippe and Chemla, Emmanuel and C{\\"a}sar, Cristiane and Ryder, Robin and Zuberb{\\"u}hler, Klaus},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-21 23:45:15 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:40:55 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language \\& Linguistic Theory},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {271--298},\n\tpublisher = {Springer},\n\ttitle = {Titi semantics: Context and meaning in Titi monkey call sequences},\n\turl = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002411/current.pdf},\n\tvolume = {35},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002411/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n C'́asar et al. 2013 show that the structure of Titi monkey call sequences can, with just two call types (A and B), reflect information about predator type and predator location. Using the general methods of Schlenker et al. 2014, we ask what these facts show about the 'linguistic' structure of Titi calls. We first demonstrate that the simplest behavioral assumptions make it challenging to provide lexical specifications for A- and B-calls: B-calls rather clearly have the distribution of general alarm calls; but A-calls are also found in highly heterogeneous contexts (e.g. they are triggered by 'cat in the canopy' and 'raptor on the ground' situations). We discuss two possible solutions to the problem. One posits that entire sequences are endowed with meanings that are not compositionally derived from their individual parts (a related idea was proposed by Arnold and Zuberb'́uhler to analyze pyow-hack sequences in Putty-nosed monkeys). The second analysis combines a very simple compositional analysis with some more sophisticated assumptions about the environmental context in which the calls are used; specifically, we argue that the B-call is a general alarm call, that the A-call is used for serious non-ground threats, and that they are combined by the simplest (conjunctive) rule; but their interaction with the context conspires to make it possible for call sequences to reflect information about predator nature and predator location.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On the Role of Alternatives in the Acquisition of Simple and Complex Disjunctions in French and Japanese.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Yatsushiro, K.; Cremers, A.; Romoli, J.; Sauerland, U.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 34(1): 127-152. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n \n \"On more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu2016,\n\tabstract = {When interpreting disjunctive sentences of the form 'A or B,' young children have been reported to differ from adults in two ways. First, children have been reported to interpret disjunction inclusively rather than exclusively, accepting 'A or B' in contexts in which both A and B are true (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia, &amp; Guasti 2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, &amp; Thornton 2001). Second, some children have been reported to interpret disjunction conjunctively, rejecting 'A or B' in contexts in which only one of the disjuncts is true (Paris 1973; Braine &amp; Rumain 1981; Chierchia, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain, &amp; Foppolo 2004; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar, &amp; Fox 2015). In this paper, we extend the investigation of children's interpretation of disjunction to include both simple and complex forms of disjunction, in two typologically unrelated languages: French and Japanese. First, given that complex disjunctions have been argued to give rise to obligatory exclusivity inferences (Spector 2014), we investigated whether the obligatoriness of the inference would play a role in the acquisition of the exclusive interpretation. Second, using a paradigm that makes the use of disjunction felicitous, we aimed to establish whether the finding of conjunctive interpretations would be replicated for both simple and complex forms of disjunction, and in languages other than English. The main findings from our experiment are that both French- and Japanese-speaking children interpreted the simple and complex disjunctions either inclusively or conjunctively; in contrast, adults generally accessed exclusive readings of both disjunctions. We argue that our results lend further support to the proposal put forth in Singh et al. (2015), according to which the reason some children compute conjunctive meanings while adults compute exclusive meanings is that the two groups differ in their respective sets of alternatives for disjunction. Crucially, adults access conjunction as an alternative to disjunction, and compute exclusive interpretations; in contrast, children access only the individual disjuncts as alternatives, and therefore either interpret the disjunction literally or compute conjunctive inferences. More generally, our findings can be explained quite naturally within recent proposals according to which children differ from adults in the computation of scalar inferences because they are more restricted than adults in the set of scalar alternatives they can access (Barner, Brooks, &amp; Bale 2011; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, &amp; Crain 2015, among others).\n\n},\n\tauthor = {Lyn Tieu and Katsushiro Yatsushiro and Alexandre Cremers and Jacopo Romoli and Uli Sauerland and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-21 23:42:04 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 00:14:36 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/jos/ffw010},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Semantics},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {127-152},\n\tpublisher = {Oxford University Press ({OUP})},\n\ttitle = {On the Role of Alternatives in the Acquisition of Simple and Complex Disjunctions in French and Japanese},\n\turl = {http://academic.oup.com//jos/article/34/1/127/2555477/On-the-Role-of-Alternatives-in-the-Acquisition-of?guestAccessKey=d01ca2ce-345d-437b-95eb-e58c68a32edf},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mE4YmYwN/TYCRSC-AcqDisj.html},\n\tvolume = {34},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fjos%2Fffw010},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffw010}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n When interpreting disjunctive sentences of the form 'A or B,' young children have been reported to differ from adults in two ways. First, children have been reported to interpret disjunction inclusively rather than exclusively, accepting 'A or B' in contexts in which both A and B are true (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia, & Guasti 2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, & Thornton 2001). Second, some children have been reported to interpret disjunction conjunctively, rejecting 'A or B' in contexts in which only one of the disjuncts is true (Paris 1973; Braine & Rumain 1981; Chierchia, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain, & Foppolo 2004; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar, & Fox 2015). In this paper, we extend the investigation of children's interpretation of disjunction to include both simple and complex forms of disjunction, in two typologically unrelated languages: French and Japanese. First, given that complex disjunctions have been argued to give rise to obligatory exclusivity inferences (Spector 2014), we investigated whether the obligatoriness of the inference would play a role in the acquisition of the exclusive interpretation. Second, using a paradigm that makes the use of disjunction felicitous, we aimed to establish whether the finding of conjunctive interpretations would be replicated for both simple and complex forms of disjunction, and in languages other than English. The main findings from our experiment are that both French- and Japanese-speaking children interpreted the simple and complex disjunctions either inclusively or conjunctively; in contrast, adults generally accessed exclusive readings of both disjunctions. We argue that our results lend further support to the proposal put forth in Singh et al. (2015), according to which the reason some children compute conjunctive meanings while adults compute exclusive meanings is that the two groups differ in their respective sets of alternatives for disjunction. Crucially, adults access conjunction as an alternative to disjunction, and compute exclusive interpretations; in contrast, children access only the individual disjuncts as alternatives, and therefore either interpret the disjunction literally or compute conjunctive inferences. More generally, our findings can be explained quite naturally within recent proposals according to which children differ from adults in the computation of scalar inferences because they are more restricted than adults in the set of scalar alternatives they can access (Barner, Brooks, & Bale 2011; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain 2015, among others). \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Training and Timing Local Scalar Enrichments under Global Pragmatic Pressures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Cummins, C.; and Singh, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 34(1): 107-126. may 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TrainingPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Training more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla2016,\n\tabstract = {Atomic sentences containing the quantificational determiner some seem to be ambiguous between a 'weak' existential meaning ∃ and a 'strengthened' some but not all meaning ∃+. The strengthened meaning is commonly assumed to be the output of a general enrichment mechanism, call it G (for 'global'), that applies to the weak meaning of the sentence: G(∃) = ∃+. The application of G has been shown to come with a processing cost (e.g., Bott and Noveck 2004). We used a self-paced reading task together with offline comprehension questions to investigate the interpretation of sentences containing some when embedded inside a disjunction, a position that G cannot access. Our findings suggest (i) that the strengthened meaning ∃+ is available in embedded positions, suggesting that a mechanism of local strengthening L must be available: L(∃) = ∃+, (ii) that local enrichment can be facilitated by global pragmatic pressures (Chierchia et al. 2008, Mayr and Romoli 2014), (iii) that subjects can be quickly trained to systematically prefer one of G or L to the other, (iv) that application of L, like the application of G, comes with a processing cost. We highlight consequences of our findings for debates about the characterization of enrichment mechanisms, focussing on the relation between G and L.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Chris Cummins and Raj Singh},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-21 23:40:01 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 12:13:35 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/jos/ffw006},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Semantics},\n\tkeywords = {experiment},\n\tmonth = {may},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {107-126},\n\tpublisher = {Oxford University Press ({OUP})},\n\ttitle = {Training and Timing Local Scalar Enrichments under Global Pragmatic Pressures},\n\turl = {http://academic.oup.com//jos/article/34/1/107/2555469/Training-and-Timing-Local-Scalar-Enrichments-under?guestAccessKey=5525b34e-91f6-4a77-9bf1-e5d199ce720a},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2M5Nzk4Z/CCS-Embedded-scalars-processing.html},\n\tvolume = {34},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fjos%2Fffw006},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffw006}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Atomic sentences containing the quantificational determiner some seem to be ambiguous between a 'weak' existential meaning ∃ and a 'strengthened' some but not all meaning ∃+. The strengthened meaning is commonly assumed to be the output of a general enrichment mechanism, call it G (for 'global'), that applies to the weak meaning of the sentence: G(∃) = ∃+. The application of G has been shown to come with a processing cost (e.g., Bott and Noveck 2004). We used a self-paced reading task together with offline comprehension questions to investigate the interpretation of sentences containing some when embedded inside a disjunction, a position that G cannot access. Our findings suggest (i) that the strengthened meaning ∃+ is available in embedded positions, suggesting that a mechanism of local strengthening L must be available: L(∃) = ∃+, (ii) that local enrichment can be facilitated by global pragmatic pressures (Chierchia et al. 2008, Mayr and Romoli 2014), (iii) that subjects can be quickly trained to systematically prefer one of G or L to the other, (iv) that application of L, like the application of G, comes with a processing cost. We highlight consequences of our findings for debates about the characterization of enrichment mechanisms, focussing on the relation between G and L.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Color Adjectives, Standards, and Thresholds: An Experimental Investigation.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Hansen, N.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics & Philosophy, 40(3): 239-278. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ColorPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Color more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 12 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Hansen-Chemla-ColorAdj,\n\tabstract = {Are color adjectives ("red", "green", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives attempt to answer that question using informal ("armchair") judgments. The informal judgments of theorists conflict: it has been proposed that color adjectives are absolute with standards anchored at the minimum degree on the scale, that they are absolute but have near-midpoint standards, and that they are relative. In this paper we conduct two experiments, one based on entailment patterns and one based on presupposition accommodation, that investigate the meaning of scalar adjectives. We find evidence confirming the existence of subgroups of the population who operate with each type of standard for color adjectives that has been proposed in the literature. But the evidence of interpersonal variation in where standards are located on the relevant scale and how those standards can be adjusted indicates that all of the existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives are only partially correct. We also find evidence that paradigmatic relative adjectives ("tall", "wide") behave in ways that are not predicted by the standard "off the shelf" theory of scalar adjectives. We discuss several different possible explanations for this unexpected behavior. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our findings for philosophical debates about the nature and extent of semantically encoded context sensitivity for which color adjectives have played a key role.},\n\tauthor = {Nathaniel Hansen and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2016-02-23 11:18:25 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-12-16 14:00:08 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10988-016-9202-7},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics \\& Philosophy},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {239-278},\n\ttitle = {Color Adjectives, Standards, and Thresholds: An Experimental Investigation},\n\turl = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-016-9202-7},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TVmMjMwY/Hansen-Chemla-ColorAdj.html},\n\tvolume = {40},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TVmMjMwY/Hansen-Chemla-ColorAdj.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Are color adjectives (\"red\", \"green\", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives attempt to answer that question using informal (\"armchair\") judgments. The informal judgments of theorists conflict: it has been proposed that color adjectives are absolute with standards anchored at the minimum degree on the scale, that they are absolute but have near-midpoint standards, and that they are relative. In this paper we conduct two experiments, one based on entailment patterns and one based on presupposition accommodation, that investigate the meaning of scalar adjectives. We find evidence confirming the existence of subgroups of the population who operate with each type of standard for color adjectives that has been proposed in the literature. But the evidence of interpersonal variation in where standards are located on the relevant scale and how those standards can be adjusted indicates that all of the existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives are only partially correct. We also find evidence that paradigmatic relative adjectives (\"tall\", \"wide\") behave in ways that are not predicted by the standard \"off the shelf\" theory of scalar adjectives. We discuss several different possible explanations for this unexpected behavior. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our findings for philosophical debates about the nature and extent of semantically encoded context sensitivity for which color adjectives have played a key role.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Experiments on the acceptability and possible readings of questions embedded under emotive-factives.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cremers, A.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics, 25(3): 223–261. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ExperimentsPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Experiments more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 10 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Cremers-Chemla-ExpEmotiveFactives,\n\tabstract = {Emotive-factive predicates, such as surprise or be happy are a source of empirical and theoretical puzzles in the literature on embedded questions. Although they embed wh-questions, they seem not to embed whether-questions. They have complex interactions with negative polarity items such as any or even, and they have been argued to preferentially give rise to weakly exhaustive readings with embedded questions (in contrasts with most other verbs, which have been argued to give rise to strongly exhaustive readings). We offer an empirical overview of the situation in three experiments collecting acceptability judgments, monotonicity judgments and truth-value judgments. The results first straightforwardly confirm the special selectional properties of emotive-factive predicates. More interestingly, the results reveal the existence of strongly exhaustive readings for surprise. The results also suggest that the special properties of emotive-factives cannot be solely explained by their monotonicity profiles, which was not found to differ from the profiles of other responsive predicates.},\n\tauthor = {Alexandre Cremers and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2016-01-19 18:19:43 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-09-05 11:36:06 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11050-017-9135-x},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\tkeywords = {emotive-factive predicates; embedded questions; acceptability judgment tasks; monotonicity; reading detection task},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {223--261},\n\ttitle = {Experiments on the acceptability and possible readings of questions embedded under emotive-factives},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GRhZmM4N/Cremers-Chemla-ExpEmotiveFactives.pdf},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GRhZmM4N/Cremers-Chemla-ExpEmotiveFactives.html},\n\tvolume = {25},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GRhZmM4N/Cremers-Chemla-ExpEmotiveFactives.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Emotive-factive predicates, such as surprise or be happy are a source of empirical and theoretical puzzles in the literature on embedded questions. Although they embed wh-questions, they seem not to embed whether-questions. They have complex interactions with negative polarity items such as any or even, and they have been argued to preferentially give rise to weakly exhaustive readings with embedded questions (in contrasts with most other verbs, which have been argued to give rise to strongly exhaustive readings). We offer an empirical overview of the situation in three experiments collecting acceptability judgments, monotonicity judgments and truth-value judgments. The results first straightforwardly confirm the special selectional properties of emotive-factive predicates. More interestingly, the results reveal the existence of strongly exhaustive readings for surprise. The results also suggest that the special properties of emotive-factives cannot be solely explained by their monotonicity profiles, which was not found to differ from the profiles of other responsive predicates.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n More Hybrid Agreement: simultaneous agreement with two competing triggers.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Charnavel, I.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Snippets, 31: 7–8. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MorePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Charnavel:2015HybAg,\n\tauthor = {Isabelle Charnavel and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2015-11-16 10:57:35 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-07-04 20:03:39 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.7358/snip-2017-031-char},\n\tjournal = {Snippets},\n\tpages = {7--8},\n\ttitle = {More Hybrid Agreement: simultaneous agreement with two competing triggers},\n\turl = {http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/allegati/snippets31002.pdf},\n\tvolume = {31},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/allegati/snippets31002.pdf},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.7358/snip-2017-031-char}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Children's exhaustive readings of questions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cremers, A.; Tieu, L.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language Acquisition: A Journal of Developmental Linguistics, 24(4): 343-360. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Children'sPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Children's preprint\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Cremers-Tieu-Chemla-AcquisitionExhQuestions,\n\tabstract = {Questions, just like plain declarative sentences, can give rise to multiple interpretations. As discussed by Spector &amp; Egr\\'e (2015), among others, questions embedded under know are ambiguous between weakly exhaustive (WE), intermediate exhaustive (IE), and strongly exhaustive (SE) interpretations (for experimental evidence of this ambiguity, see Cremers &amp; Chemla 2014). These three interpretations are related in terms of strength. The SE reading entails both the IE and WE readings, and the IE reading entails the WE reading. Certain proposals derive the stronger readings from weaker ones through the same process of enrichment that underlies scalar implicatures, in particular through comparison with alternatives (Klinedinst &amp; Rothschild 2011). Given previous developmental studies of scalar implicatures that suggest children typically perform this enrichment less often than adults do (Noveck 2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti &amp; Thornton 2001; Papafragou &amp; Musolino 2003, among many others), such proposals lead us to expect that children may initially prefer weak readings of embedded questions. The present study revealed that 5-year-olds were sensitive to the multiple readings of questions embedded under savoir 'know'. Compared to adults, however, children were more tolerant of weak readings. These findings relate scalar implicatures and exhaustive readings of embedded questions from a developmental perspective, and are consistent with a close connection between the two: in both cases, children are sensitive to the various possible interpretations but favor the weaker one more than adults do.},\n\tauthor = {Alexandre Cremers and Lyn Tieu and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2015-04-02 19:53:49 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1080/10489223.2016.1176173},\n\tjournal = {Language Acquisition: A Journal of Developmental Linguistics},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {343-360},\n\tpublisher = {Routledge},\n\ttitle = {Children's exhaustive readings of questions},\n\turl = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10489223.2017.1366207},\n\turl_preprint = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2I1ZTAyM/QuestionsAcquisition.pdf},\n\tvolume = {24},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2I1ZTAyM/QuestionsAcquisition.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Questions, just like plain declarative sentences, can give rise to multiple interpretations. As discussed by Spector & Egré (2015), among others, questions embedded under know are ambiguous between weakly exhaustive (WE), intermediate exhaustive (IE), and strongly exhaustive (SE) interpretations (for experimental evidence of this ambiguity, see Cremers & Chemla 2014). These three interpretations are related in terms of strength. The SE reading entails both the IE and WE readings, and the IE reading entails the WE reading. Certain proposals derive the stronger readings from weaker ones through the same process of enrichment that underlies scalar implicatures, in particular through comparison with alternatives (Klinedinst & Rothschild 2011). Given previous developmental studies of scalar implicatures that suggest children typically perform this enrichment less often than adults do (Noveck 2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001; Papafragou & Musolino 2003, among many others), such proposals lead us to expect that children may initially prefer weak readings of embedded questions. The present study revealed that 5-year-olds were sensitive to the multiple readings of questions embedded under savoir 'know'. Compared to adults, however, children were more tolerant of weak readings. These findings relate scalar implicatures and exhaustive readings of embedded questions from a developmental perspective, and are consistent with a close connection between the two: in both cases, children are sensitive to the various possible interpretations but favor the weaker one more than adults do.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n incollection\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Semantics and Pragmatics of Monkey Communication.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; and Zuberbühler, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Aronoff, M., editor(s), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SemanticsPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Schlenker:2017ab,\n\tabstract = {Rich data gathered in experimental primatology in the last 40 years are beginning to benefit from analytical methods used in contemporary linguistics, especially in the area of semantics and pragmatics. These methods have started to clarify five questions: (i) What morphology and syntax, if any, do monkey calls have? (ii) What is the `lexical meaning' of individual calls? (iii) How are the meanings of individual calls combined? (iv) How do calls or call sequences compete with each other when several are appropriate in a given situation? (v) How did the form and meaning of calls evolve? Four case studies from this emerging field of `primate linguistics' provide initial answers, pertaining to Old World monkeys (putty-nosed monkeys, Campbell's monkeys, and colobus monkeys) and New World monkeys (black-fronted Titi monkeys). The morphology mostly involves simple calls, but in at least one case (Campbell's -oo) one finds a root--suffix structure, possibly with a compositional semantics. The syntax is in all clear cases simple and finite-state. With respect to meaning, nearly all cases of call concatenation can be analyzed as being semantically conjunctive. But a key question concerns the division of labor between semantics, pragmatics, and the environmental context (`world' knowledge and context change). An apparent case of dialectal variation in the semantics (Campbell's krak) can arguably be analyzed away if one posits sufficiently powerful mechanisms of competition among calls, akin to scalar implicatures. An apparent case of noncompositionality (putty-nosed pyow--hack sequences) can be analyzed away if one further posits a pragmatic principle of `urgency'. Finally, rich Titi sequences in which two calls are re-arranged in complex ways so as to reflect information about both predator identity and location are argued not to involve a complex syntax/semantics interface, but rather a fine-grained interaction between simple call meanings and the environmental context. With respect to call evolution, the remarkable preservation of call form and function over millions of years should make it possible to lay the groundwork for an evolutionary monkey linguistics, illustrated with cercopithecine booms.},\n\tauthor = {Schlenker, Philippe and Chemla, Emmanuel and Zuberb\\"{u}hler, Klaus},\n\tbooktitle = {Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics},\n\tdate-added = {2017-03-12 16:05:46 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-07-28 16:42:25 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.013.220},\n\teditor = {Mark Aronoff},\n\tpublisher = {New York: Oxford University Press},\n\ttitle = {Semantics and Pragmatics of Monkey Communication},\n\turl = {http://linguistics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199384655.001.0001/acrefore-9780199384655-e-220},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/003272/current.pdf?_s=CwWSZ_d3dxzii7D7}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Rich data gathered in experimental primatology in the last 40 years are beginning to benefit from analytical methods used in contemporary linguistics, especially in the area of semantics and pragmatics. These methods have started to clarify five questions: (i) What morphology and syntax, if any, do monkey calls have? (ii) What is the `lexical meaning' of individual calls? (iii) How are the meanings of individual calls combined? (iv) How do calls or call sequences compete with each other when several are appropriate in a given situation? (v) How did the form and meaning of calls evolve? Four case studies from this emerging field of `primate linguistics' provide initial answers, pertaining to Old World monkeys (putty-nosed monkeys, Campbell's monkeys, and colobus monkeys) and New World monkeys (black-fronted Titi monkeys). The morphology mostly involves simple calls, but in at least one case (Campbell's -oo) one finds a root–suffix structure, possibly with a compositional semantics. The syntax is in all clear cases simple and finite-state. With respect to meaning, nearly all cases of call concatenation can be analyzed as being semantically conjunctive. But a key question concerns the division of labor between semantics, pragmatics, and the environmental context (`world' knowledge and context change). An apparent case of dialectal variation in the semantics (Campbell's krak) can arguably be analyzed away if one posits sufficiently powerful mechanisms of competition among calls, akin to scalar implicatures. An apparent case of noncompositionality (putty-nosed pyow–hack sequences) can be analyzed away if one further posits a pragmatic principle of `urgency'. Finally, rich Titi sequences in which two calls are re-arranged in complex ways so as to reflect information about both predator identity and location are argued not to involve a complex syntax/semantics interface, but rather a fine-grained interaction between simple call meanings and the environmental context. With respect to call evolution, the remarkable preservation of call form and function over millions of years should make it possible to lay the groundwork for an evolutionary monkey linguistics, illustrated with cercopithecine booms.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Stereotyped Vocalizations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Zuberbühler, K.; Chemla, E.; and Schlenker, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science, pages 1–5. Springer Nature, 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StereotypedPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Zuberbhler2017,\n\tabstract = {How did human communication evolve from an animal-like vocal system to spoken language? Research on primate communication in particular has produced a wealth of data, which highlight the various evolutionary continuities and discontinuities between animal and human communication. Research topics include the mechanisms and flexibility of sound production, how different call units are assembled into complex utterances, how meaning is extracted from vocal structures, and how the psychological mechanisms underlying animal call production and comprehension compare to those of humans. The purpose of this chapter is to present the state-of-the-art of these various strands of research and to show how methodological tools of linguistics can help decipher animal communication.},\n\tauthor = {Klaus Zuberb\\"{u}hler and Emmanuel Chemla and Philippe Schlenker},\n\tbooktitle = {Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science},\n\tdate-added = {2017-03-12 16:02:10 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-12 16:04:59 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3330-1},\n\tpages = {1--5},\n\tpublisher = {Springer Nature},\n\ttitle = {Stereotyped Vocalizations},\n\turl = {https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-319-16999-6_3330-1},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-319-16999-6_3330-1},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3330-1}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n How did human communication evolve from an animal-like vocal system to spoken language? Research on primate communication in particular has produced a wealth of data, which highlight the various evolutionary continuities and discontinuities between animal and human communication. Research topics include the mechanisms and flexibility of sound production, how different call units are assembled into complex utterances, how meaning is extracted from vocal structures, and how the psychological mechanisms underlying animal call production and comprehension compare to those of humans. The purpose of this chapter is to present the state-of-the-art of these various strands of research and to show how methodological tools of linguistics can help decipher animal communication.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Probability Judgments of Gappy Sentences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cremers, A.; Križ, M.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Pistoia-Reda, S.; and Domaneschi, F., editor(s), Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Approaches on Implicatures and Presuppositions, pages 111-150. Palgrave, 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ProbabilityPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Probability more\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{CKC:ProbasGaps,\n\tabstract = {Numerous linguistic phenomena have been described as giving rise to truth value gaps: presuppositions, homogeneity, vagueness, as well as various sorts of implicatures. The sim- ilarities and differences between these phenomena are most traditionally studied through their projection properties, investigating whether these various sources of gap give rise to the same behavior under negation, modals, in the restrictors and scopes of various quantifiers, etc. We propose to add a new method in the linguist toolbox to address the same comparative question, asking how probabilities are assigned to sentences under the risk of a truth value gap. This question is directly imported from the classical issue in philosophy of language concerned with deciding what the probability of a conditional sentence is, and we also import experimental methods which have been used to illuminate this issue. In three experiments, we show that homogeneity and vagueness consistently behave alike by this measure, while presuppositions behave differently, with surprising differences within the class of presupposition triggers, however.},\n\tauthor = {Alexandre Cremers and Manuel Kri\\v{z} and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tbooktitle = {Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Approaches on Implicatures and Presuppositions},\n\tdate-added = {2015-04-27 13:12:52 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-05-22 13:32:57 +0000},\n\teditor = {Pistoia-Reda, Salvatore and Filippo Domaneschi},\n\tpages = {111-150},\n\tpublisher = {Palgrave},\n\ttitle = {Probability Judgments of Gappy Sentences},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DZjNWY0N/CKC-GappyProbability.pdf},\n\turl_more = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DZjNWY0N/Cremers-Kriz-Chemla-ProbasAndGaps.html},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DZjNWY0N/CKC-GappyProbability.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Numerous linguistic phenomena have been described as giving rise to truth value gaps: presuppositions, homogeneity, vagueness, as well as various sorts of implicatures. The sim- ilarities and differences between these phenomena are most traditionally studied through their projection properties, investigating whether these various sources of gap give rise to the same behavior under negation, modals, in the restrictors and scopes of various quantifiers, etc. We propose to add a new method in the linguist toolbox to address the same comparative question, asking how probabilities are assigned to sentences under the risk of a truth value gap. This question is directly imported from the classical issue in philosophy of language concerned with deciding what the probability of a conditional sentence is, and we also import experimental methods which have been used to illuminate this issue. In three experiments, we show that homogeneity and vagueness consistently behave alike by this measure, while presuppositions behave differently, with surprising differences within the class of presupposition triggers, however.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n unpublished\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Heuristic Local Contexts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2017.\n Ms. LSCP.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"HeuristicPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Chemla:2017ac,\n\tabstract = {Local contexts provide a conceptually motivated system of presupposition projection (Schlenker, 2010). The system works in two steps: first, compute the local context in which the presuppositional phrase occurs and, second, ensure that this local context entails the presupposition triggered. The system is conceptually and technically elegant, but the actual calculations necessary to obtain projected presuppositions are complicated (by some intuitive measure). We first describe a theorem that helps compute the predicted presupposition in one step (see also Schlenker, 2009). We then propose that, at least in some occasions, speakers may follow heuristics and approximate what the projected presupposition is. We describe such heuristics. They provide a computationally simpler way to derive projected presuppositions, which match the prediction of the plain system in numerous cases (certainly for all propositional triggers). From the perspective of cognitive plausibility, a simpler computational system may a priori be seen as valuable, but it is hard to evaluate such a claim properly: humans surely perform some complex computational tasks with ease, language use itself is one such task. Hence, the system will be tested not through complexity measures, but through its divergent predictions. The Heuristic Local Context system accounts for a critical empirical difficulty for the ideal Local Context theory (and many of its alternatives), namely the variability in presupposition projection from quantified sentences.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-07-27 15:31:30 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-01-06 13:55:22 +0100},\n\tkeywords = {presupposition, projection, local contexts, reasoning, heuristics, quantification},\n\tnote = {Ms. LSCP.},\n\ttitle = {Heuristic Local Contexts},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WQwNGI5O/Chemla-Heuristic%20Local%20Contexts.pdf},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WQwNGI5O/Chemla-Heuristic%20Local%20Contexts.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Local contexts provide a conceptually motivated system of presupposition projection (Schlenker, 2010). The system works in two steps: first, compute the local context in which the presuppositional phrase occurs and, second, ensure that this local context entails the presupposition triggered. The system is conceptually and technically elegant, but the actual calculations necessary to obtain projected presuppositions are complicated (by some intuitive measure). We first describe a theorem that helps compute the predicted presupposition in one step (see also Schlenker, 2009). We then propose that, at least in some occasions, speakers may follow heuristics and approximate what the projected presupposition is. We describe such heuristics. They provide a computationally simpler way to derive projected presuppositions, which match the prediction of the plain system in numerous cases (certainly for all propositional triggers). From the perspective of cognitive plausibility, a simpler computational system may a priori be seen as valuable, but it is hard to evaluate such a claim properly: humans surely perform some complex computational tasks with ease, language use itself is one such task. Hence, the system will be tested not through complexity measures, but through its divergent predictions. The Heuristic Local Context system accounts for a critical empirical difficulty for the ideal Local Context theory (and many of its alternatives), namely the variability in presupposition projection from quantified sentences.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2016\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (10)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Word Learning: Homophony and the Distribution of Learning Exemplars.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dautriche, I.; Chemla, E.; and Christophe, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language Learning and Development, 12(3): 231–251. mar 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WordPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Word more\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 10 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Dautriche2016wl,\n\tabstract = {How do children infer the meaning of a word? Current accounts of word learning assume that children expect a word to map onto exactly one concept whose members form a coherent category. If this assumption was strictly true, children should infer that a homophone, such as ``bat'', refers to a single superordinate category that encompasses both animal-bats and baseball-bats. The current study explores the situations that lead children to postulate that a single word-form maps onto several distinct mean- ings, rather than a single superordinate meaning. Three experiments showed that adults and 5-year-old French children use information about the sampling of learning exemplars (and in particular the fact that they can be regrouped in two distinct clusters in conceptual space) to postulate homophony. This unexplored sensitivity and the very possibility of homophony are critically missing from current word learning accounts.},\n\tauthor = {Isabelle Dautriche and Emmanuel Chemla and Anne Christophe},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 00:12:25 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-04-07 11:40:54 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1080/15475441.2015.1127163},\n\tjournal = {Language Learning and Development},\n\tkeywords = {acquisition},\n\tmonth = {mar},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {231--251},\n\tpublisher = {Informa {UK} Limited},\n\ttitle = {Word Learning: Homophony and the Distribution of Learning Exemplars},\n\turl = {http://www.lscp.net/persons/dautriche/publi/2016_homophony_sampling_distribution.pdf},\n\turl_more = {https://osf.io/v2iy9/},\n\tvolume = {12},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1080%2F15475441.2015.1127163},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2015.1127163}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n How do children infer the meaning of a word? Current accounts of word learning assume that children expect a word to map onto exactly one concept whose members form a coherent category. If this assumption was strictly true, children should infer that a homophone, such as ``bat'', refers to a single superordinate category that encompasses both animal-bats and baseball-bats. The current study explores the situations that lead children to postulate that a single word-form maps onto several distinct mean- ings, rather than a single superordinate meaning. Three experiments showed that adults and 5-year-old French children use information about the sampling of learning exemplars (and in particular the fact that they can be regrouped in two distinct clusters in conceptual space) to postulate homophony. This unexplored sensitivity and the very possibility of homophony are critically missing from current word learning accounts.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Pyow-hack revisited: Two analyses of putty-nosed monkey alarm calls.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; Arnold, K.; and Zuberbühler, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Lingua, 171: 1–23. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Pyow-hackPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{schlenker2016pyow,\n\tabstract = {Male putty-nosed monkeys have two main alarm calls, pyows and hacks. While pyows have a broad distribution suggestive of a general call, hacks are often indicative of eagles. In a series of articles, Arnold and Zuberb\\"uhler showed that putty-nosed monkeys sometimes produce distinct pyow-hack sequences made of a small number of pyows followed by a small number of hacks; and that these are predictive of group movement. Arnold and Zuberb\\"uhler claimed that pyow-hack sequences are syntactically combinatorial but not semantically compositional because their meaning can't be derived from the meanings of their component parts. We compare two theories of this phenomenon. One formalizes and modifies the non-compositional theory. The other presents a semantically compositional alternative based on weak meanings for pyow ('general alarm') and hack ('non-ground movement'), combined with pragmatic principles of competition; a crucial one is an 'Urgency Principle' whereby calls that provide information about the nature/location of a threat must come before calls that don't. Semantically, pyow-hack sequences are compatible with any kind of situation involving (moving) aerial predators or (arboreal) movement of the monkeys themselves. But in the former case, hacks provide information about the location of a threat, and hence should appear at the beginning of sequences. As a result, pyow-hack sequences can only be used for non-threat-related situations involving movement, hence a possible inference that they involve group movement. Without adjudicating the debate, we argue that a formal analysis can help clarify competing theories and derive new predictions that might decide between them.},\n\tauthor = {Schlenker, Philippe and Chemla, Emmanuel and Arnold, Kate and Zuberb{\\"u}hler, Klaus},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 00:05:54 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:41:34 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Lingua},\n\tpages = {1--23},\n\tpublisher = {Elsevier},\n\ttitle = {Pyow-hack revisited: Two analyses of putty-nosed monkey alarm calls},\n\turl = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002318/current.pdf},\n\tvolume = {171},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002318/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Male putty-nosed monkeys have two main alarm calls, pyows and hacks. While pyows have a broad distribution suggestive of a general call, hacks are often indicative of eagles. In a series of articles, Arnold and Zuberbühler showed that putty-nosed monkeys sometimes produce distinct pyow-hack sequences made of a small number of pyows followed by a small number of hacks; and that these are predictive of group movement. Arnold and Zuberbühler claimed that pyow-hack sequences are syntactically combinatorial but not semantically compositional because their meaning can't be derived from the meanings of their component parts. We compare two theories of this phenomenon. One formalizes and modifies the non-compositional theory. The other presents a semantically compositional alternative based on weak meanings for pyow ('general alarm') and hack ('non-ground movement'), combined with pragmatic principles of competition; a crucial one is an 'Urgency Principle' whereby calls that provide information about the nature/location of a threat must come before calls that don't. Semantically, pyow-hack sequences are compatible with any kind of situation involving (moving) aerial predators or (arboreal) movement of the monkeys themselves. But in the former case, hacks provide information about the location of a threat, and hence should appear at the beginning of sequences. As a result, pyow-hack sequences can only be used for non-threat-related situations involving movement, hence a possible inference that they involve group movement. Without adjudicating the debate, we argue that a formal analysis can help clarify competing theories and derive new predictions that might decide between them.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What Homophones Say about Words.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dautriche, I.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLOS ONE, 11(9): e0162176. sep 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WhatPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Dautriche2016,\n\tabstract = {The number of potential meanings for a new word is astronomic. To make the word-learning problem tractable, one must restrict the hypothesis space. To do so, current word learning accounts often incorporate constraints about cognition or about the mature lexicon directly in the learning device. We are concerned with the convexity constraint, which holds that concepts (privileged sets of entities that we think of as "coherent") do not have gaps (if A and B belong to a concept, so does any entity "between" A and B). To leverage from it a linguistic constraint, learning algorithms have percolated this constraint from concepts, to word forms: some algorithms rely on the possibility that word forms are associated with convex sets of objects. Yet this does have to be the case: homophones are word forms associated with two separate words and meanings. Two sets of experiments show that when evidence suggests that a novel label is associated with a disjoint (non-convex) set of objects, either a) because there is a gap in conceptual space between the learning exemplars for a given word or b) because of the intervention of other lexical items in that gap, adults prefer to postulate homophony, where a single word form is associated with two separate words and meanings, rather than inferring that the word could have a disjunctive, discontinuous meaning. These results about homophony must be integrated to current word learning algorithms. We conclude by arguing for a weaker specialization of word learning algorithms, which too often could miss important constraints by focusing on a restricted empirical basis (e.g., non-homophonous content words).\n\n},\n\tauthor = {Isabelle Dautriche and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 00:01:26 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 01:07:14 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0162176},\n\teditor = {Philip Allen},\n\tjournal = {{PLOS} {ONE}},\n\tkeywords = {Learning, Language acquisition, lexicons, word learning},\n\tmonth = {sep},\n\tnumber = {9},\n\tpages = {e0162176},\n\tpublisher = {Public Library of Science ({PLoS})},\n\ttitle = {What Homophones Say about Words},\n\turl = {http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0162176},\n\tvolume = {11},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0162176},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0162176}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n The number of potential meanings for a new word is astronomic. To make the word-learning problem tractable, one must restrict the hypothesis space. To do so, current word learning accounts often incorporate constraints about cognition or about the mature lexicon directly in the learning device. We are concerned with the convexity constraint, which holds that concepts (privileged sets of entities that we think of as \"coherent\") do not have gaps (if A and B belong to a concept, so does any entity \"between\" A and B). To leverage from it a linguistic constraint, learning algorithms have percolated this constraint from concepts, to word forms: some algorithms rely on the possibility that word forms are associated with convex sets of objects. Yet this does have to be the case: homophones are word forms associated with two separate words and meanings. Two sets of experiments show that when evidence suggests that a novel label is associated with a disjoint (non-convex) set of objects, either a) because there is a gap in conceptual space between the learning exemplars for a given word or b) because of the intervention of other lexical items in that gap, adults prefer to postulate homophony, where a single word form is associated with two separate words and meanings, rather than inferring that the word could have a disjunctive, discontinuous meaning. These results about homophony must be integrated to current word learning algorithms. We conclude by arguing for a weaker specialization of word learning algorithms, which too often could miss important constraints by focusing on a restricted empirical basis (e.g., non-homophonous content words). \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Classification and automatic transcription of primate calls.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Versteegh, M.; Kuhn, J.; Synnaeve, G.; Ravaux, L.; Chemla, E.; Cäsar, C.; Fuller, J.; Murphy, D.; Schel, A.; and Dunbar, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 140(1): EL26–EL30. jul 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ClassificationPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Versteegh2016,\n\tabstract = {This paper reports on an automated and openly available tool for automatic acoustic analysis and transcription of primate calls, which takes raw field recordings and outputs call labels time-aligned with the audio. The system's output predicts a majority of the start times of calls accurately within 200 milliseconds. The tools do not require any manual acoustic analysis or selection of spectral features by the researcher.},\n\tauthor = {Maarten Versteegh and Jeremy Kuhn and Gabriel Synnaeve and Lucie Ravaux and Emmanuel Chemla and Cristiane C\\"{a}sar and James Fuller and Derek Murphy and Anne Schel and Ewan Dunbar},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-21 23:58:44 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 01:08:21 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1121/1.4954887},\n\tjournal = {The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America},\n\tmonth = {jul},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {EL26--EL30},\n\tpublisher = {Acoustical Society of America ({ASA})},\n\ttitle = {Classification and automatic transcription of primate calls},\n\turl = {http://asa.scitation.org/doi/full/10.1121/1.4954887},\n\tvolume = {140},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1121%2F1.4954887},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.4954887}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n This paper reports on an automated and openly available tool for automatic acoustic analysis and transcription of primate calls, which takes raw field recordings and outputs call labels time-aligned with the audio. The system's output predicts a majority of the start times of calls accurately within 200 milliseconds. The tools do not require any manual acoustic analysis or selection of spectral features by the researcher.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Formal monkey linguistics.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; Schel, A. M.; Fuller, J.; Gautier, J.; Kuhn, J.; Veselinović, D.; Arnold, K.; Cäsar, C.; Keenan, S.; Lemasson, A.; Ouattara, K.; Ryder, R.; and Zuberbühler, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Linguistics, 42(1-2): 1–90. 2016.\n Target article.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FormalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{schlenker2016formal,\n\tabstract = {We argue that rich data gathered in experimental primatology in the last 40 years can benefit from analytical methods used in contemporary linguistics. Focusing on the syntactic and especially semantic side, we suggest that these methods could help clarify five questions: (i) what morphology and syntax, if any, do monkey calls have? (ii) what is the 'lexical meaning' of individual calls? (iii) how are the meanings of individual calls combined? (iv) how do calls or call sequences compete with each other when several are appropriate in a given situation? (v) how did the form and meaning of calls evolve? We address these questions in five case studies pertaining to cercopithecines (Putty-nosed and Blue monkeys, Campbell's monkeys), colobinae (Guereza and King Colobus monkeys), and New World monkeys (Titis). The morphology mostly involves simple calls, but in at least one case (Campbell's -oo) we find a root-suffix structure, possibly with a compositional semantics. The syntax is in all clear cases simple and finite-state. With respect to meaning, nearly all cases of call concatenation can be analyzed as conjunction. But a key question concerns the division of labor between semantics, pragmatics and the environmental context ('world' knowledge and context change). An apparent case of dialectal variation in the semantics (Campbell's krak) can arguably be analyzed away if one posits sufficiently powerful mechanisms of competition among calls, akin to scalar implicatures. An apparent case of non-compositionality (Putty-nosed pyow-hack) can be analyzed away if one further posits a pragmatic principle of 'urgency', whereby threat-related calls must come early in sequences (another potential case of non-compositionality -- Colobus snort-roar sequences -- might justify assigning non-compositional meanings to complex calls, but results are tentative). Finally, rich Titi sequences in which two calls are re-arranged in complex ways so as to reflect information about both predator identity and location are argued not to involve a complex syntax/semantics interface, but rather a fine-grained interaction between simple call meanings and the environmental context. With respect to call evolution, we suggest that the remarkable preservation of call form and function over millions years should make it possible to lay the groundwork for an evolutionary monkey linguistics, which we illustrate with cercopithecine booms, and with a comparative analysis of Blue monkey and Putty-nosed monkey repertoires. Throughout, we aim to compare possible theories rather than to fully adjudicate between them, and our claims are correspondingly modest. But we hope that our methods could lay the groundwork for a formal monkey linguistics combining data from primatology with formal techniques from linguistics (from which it does not follow that the calls under study share non-trivial properties, let alone an evolutionary history, with human language).},\n\tauthor = {Philippe Schlenker and Emmanuel Chemla and Anne M. Schel and James Fuller and Jean-Pierre Gautier and Jeremy Kuhn and Dunja Veselinovi\\'c and Kate Arnold and Cristiane C\\"asar and Sumir Keenan and Alban Lemasson and Karim Ouattara and Robin Ryder and Klaus Zuberb\\"uhler},\n\tdoi = {10.1515/tl-2016-0001},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Linguistics},\n\tnote = {Target article.},\n\tnumber = {1-2},\n\tpages = {1--90},\n\ttitle = {Formal monkey linguistics},\n\turl = {https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/thli.2016.42.issue-1-2/tl-2016-0001/tl-2016-0001.xml?format=INT},\n\tvolume = {42},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002752/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We argue that rich data gathered in experimental primatology in the last 40 years can benefit from analytical methods used in contemporary linguistics. Focusing on the syntactic and especially semantic side, we suggest that these methods could help clarify five questions: (i) what morphology and syntax, if any, do monkey calls have? (ii) what is the 'lexical meaning' of individual calls? (iii) how are the meanings of individual calls combined? (iv) how do calls or call sequences compete with each other when several are appropriate in a given situation? (v) how did the form and meaning of calls evolve? We address these questions in five case studies pertaining to cercopithecines (Putty-nosed and Blue monkeys, Campbell's monkeys), colobinae (Guereza and King Colobus monkeys), and New World monkeys (Titis). The morphology mostly involves simple calls, but in at least one case (Campbell's -oo) we find a root-suffix structure, possibly with a compositional semantics. The syntax is in all clear cases simple and finite-state. With respect to meaning, nearly all cases of call concatenation can be analyzed as conjunction. But a key question concerns the division of labor between semantics, pragmatics and the environmental context ('world' knowledge and context change). An apparent case of dialectal variation in the semantics (Campbell's krak) can arguably be analyzed away if one posits sufficiently powerful mechanisms of competition among calls, akin to scalar implicatures. An apparent case of non-compositionality (Putty-nosed pyow-hack) can be analyzed away if one further posits a pragmatic principle of 'urgency', whereby threat-related calls must come early in sequences (another potential case of non-compositionality – Colobus snort-roar sequences – might justify assigning non-compositional meanings to complex calls, but results are tentative). Finally, rich Titi sequences in which two calls are re-arranged in complex ways so as to reflect information about both predator identity and location are argued not to involve a complex syntax/semantics interface, but rather a fine-grained interaction between simple call meanings and the environmental context. With respect to call evolution, we suggest that the remarkable preservation of call form and function over millions years should make it possible to lay the groundwork for an evolutionary monkey linguistics, which we illustrate with cercopithecine booms, and with a comparative analysis of Blue monkey and Putty-nosed monkey repertoires. Throughout, we aim to compare possible theories rather than to fully adjudicate between them, and our claims are correspondingly modest. But we hope that our methods could lay the groundwork for a formal monkey linguistics combining data from primatology with formal techniques from linguistics (from which it does not follow that the calls under study share non-trivial properties, let alone an evolutionary history, with human language).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Formal monkey linguistics: The debate.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; Schel, A. M.; Fuller, J.; Gautier, J.; Kuhn, J.; Veselinović, D.; Arnold, K.; Cäsar, C.; Keenan, S.; Lemasson, A.; Ouattara, K.; Ryder, R.; and Zuberbühler, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Linguistics, 42(1-2): 173–201. 2016.\n Replies to Commentaries.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FormalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{schlenker2016formaldebate,\n\tabstract = {We explain why general techniques from formal linguistics can and should be applied to the analysis of monkey communication -- in the areas of syntax and especially semantics. An informed look at our recent proposals shows that such techniques needn't rely excessively on categories of human language: syntax and semantics provide versatile formal tools that go beyond the specificities of human linguistics. We argue that 'formal monkey linguistics' can yield new insights into monkey morphology, syntax, and semantics, as well as raise provocative new questions about the existence of a pragmatic, competition-based component in these communication systems. Finally, we argue that evolutionary questions, which are highly speculative in human language, can be addressed in an empirically satisfying fashion in primate linguistics, and we lay out problems that should be addressed at the interface between evolutionary primate linguistics and formal analyses of language evolution.},\n\tauthor = {Philippe Schlenker and Emmanuel Chemla and Anne M. Schel and James Fuller and Jean-Pierre Gautier and Jeremy Kuhn and Dunja Veselinovi\\'c and Kate Arnold and Cristiane C\\"asar and Sumir Keenan and Alban Lemasson and Karim Ouattara and Robin Ryder and Klaus Zuberb\\"uhler},\n\tdoi = {10.1515/tl-2016-0010},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Linguistics},\n\tnote = {Replies to Commentaries.},\n\tnumber = {1-2},\n\tpages = {173--201},\n\ttitle = {Formal monkey linguistics: The debate},\n\turl = {https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/thli.2016.42.issue-1-2/tl-2016-0010/tl-2016-0010.xml?format=INT},\n\tvolume = {42},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002903/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We explain why general techniques from formal linguistics can and should be applied to the analysis of monkey communication – in the areas of syntax and especially semantics. An informed look at our recent proposals shows that such techniques needn't rely excessively on categories of human language: syntax and semantics provide versatile formal tools that go beyond the specificities of human linguistics. We argue that 'formal monkey linguistics' can yield new insights into monkey morphology, syntax, and semantics, as well as raise provocative new questions about the existence of a pragmatic, competition-based component in these communication systems. Finally, we argue that evolutionary questions, which are highly speculative in human language, can be addressed in an empirically satisfying fashion in primate linguistics, and we lay out problems that should be addressed at the interface between evolutionary primate linguistics and formal analyses of language evolution.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What Do Monkey Calls Mean?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; and Zuberbühler, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(12): 894–904. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WhatPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{schlenker2016monkey,\n\tabstract = {A field of primate linguistics is gradually emerging. It combines general questions and tools from theoretical linguistics with rich data gathered in experimental primatology. Analyses of several monkey systems have uncovered very simple morphological and syntactic rules and have led to the development of a primate semantics that asks new questions about the division of semantic labor between the literal meaning of monkey calls, additional mechanisms of pragmatic enrichment, and the environmental context. We show that comparative studies across species may validate this program and may in some cases help in reconstructing the evolution of monkey communication over millions of years.},\n\tauthor = {Schlenker, Philippe and Chemla, Emmanuel and Zuberb{\\"u}hler, Klaus},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.tics.2016.10.004},\n\tjournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\n\tnumber = {12},\n\tpages = {894--904},\n\tpublisher = {Elsevier},\n\ttitle = {What Do Monkey Calls Mean?},\n\turl = {https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/fulltext/S1364-6613(16)30171-1},\n\tvolume = {20},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/002903/current.pdf?_s=S-ibADjIdGXbUZI9}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n A field of primate linguistics is gradually emerging. It combines general questions and tools from theoretical linguistics with rich data gathered in experimental primatology. Analyses of several monkey systems have uncovered very simple morphological and syntactic rules and have led to the development of a primate semantics that asks new questions about the division of semantic labor between the literal meaning of monkey calls, additional mechanisms of pragmatic enrichment, and the environmental context. We show that comparative studies across species may validate this program and may in some cases help in reconstructing the evolution of monkey communication over millions of years.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Shared and distinct mechanisms in deriving linguistic enrichment.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bott, L.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Memory and Language, 91: 117–140. dec 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SharedPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Bott2016,\n\tabstract = {Meanings of basic expressions can be enriched by considering what the speaker could have said, but chose not to, that is, the alternatives. We report three priming experiments that test whether there are shared enrichment mechanisms across a diverse range of linguistic categories. We find that quantifier, number, and ad hoc enrichments exhibit robust priming within their categories and between each other. Plural enrichments, in contrast, demonstrate within-category priming but no between-category priming. Our results demonstrate that (1) enrichment typically thought of as pragmatic or semantic can be primed in the same way as syntactic structures and (2) there are mechanisms that are shared across different enrichment categories, and that some phenomena (e.g., plurals) are excluded from this class. We discuss the implications of our findings for psychological models of enrichment, theories of individual categories of enrichment, and structural priming.\n\n},\n\tauthor = {Lewis Bott and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-21 23:34:43 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 01:20:04 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.jml.2016.04.004},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Memory and Language},\n\tmonth = {dec},\n\tpages = {117--140},\n\tpublisher = {Elsevier {BV}},\n\ttitle = {Shared and distinct mechanisms in deriving linguistic enrichment},\n\turl = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749596X16300109},\n\tvolume = {91},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.jml.2016.04.004},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2016.04.004}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Meanings of basic expressions can be enriched by considering what the speaker could have said, but chose not to, that is, the alternatives. We report three priming experiments that test whether there are shared enrichment mechanisms across a diverse range of linguistic categories. We find that quantifier, number, and ad hoc enrichments exhibit robust priming within their categories and between each other. Plural enrichments, in contrast, demonstrate within-category priming but no between-category priming. Our results demonstrate that (1) enrichment typically thought of as pragmatic or semantic can be primed in the same way as syntactic structures and (2) there are mechanisms that are shared across different enrichment categories, and that some phenomena (e.g., plurals) are excluded from this class. We discuss the implications of our findings for psychological models of enrichment, theories of individual categories of enrichment, and structural priming. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A psycholinguistic study of the exhaustive readings of embedded questions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cremers, A.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 33(1): 49–85. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Cremers-Chemla-EmbeddedQuestions,\n\tabstract = {What is the semantic content of a question? As pointed out by Karttunen (1977), declarative sentences that embed interrogative complements (such as ``John knows which students called'') can provide relatively easy access to the semantics of questions. Recent theories attribute different readings to such sentences and their predictions depend in various ways on the embedding verb ('know' in this example). Through a series of four experiments, we provide quantitative offline data to evaluate critical judgments from the literature. We show that the so-called strongly exhaustive reading is not the only available reading for 'know', providing an argument against approaches inspired by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982, 1984). We also describe processing data which may further constrain theories, provided hypotheses about the derivation processes are made explicit.\n\n},\n\tauthor = {Alexandre Cremers and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2014-03-05 09:27:07 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 00:16:43 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/jos/ffu014},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {49--85},\n\ttitle = {A psycholinguistic study of the exhaustive readings of embedded questions},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DU3YWU2M/CremersChemla%20-%20Embedded%20Questions.pdf},\n\tvolume = {33},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffu014}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n What is the semantic content of a question? As pointed out by Karttunen (1977), declarative sentences that embed interrogative complements (such as ``John knows which students called'') can provide relatively easy access to the semantics of questions. Recent theories attribute different readings to such sentences and their predictions depend in various ways on the embedding verb ('know' in this example). Through a series of four experiments, we provide quantitative offline data to evaluate critical judgments from the literature. We show that the so-called strongly exhaustive reading is not the only available reading for 'know', providing an argument against approaches inspired by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982, 1984). We also describe processing data which may further constrain theories, provided hypotheses about the derivation processes are made explicit. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Can we agree about `agree'?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and George, B. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(1): 243-264. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CanPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla-George-Agree,\n\tabstract = {This squib attempts to constrain semantic theories of agree wh constructions by broadening the data set and collecting naive speakers' intuitions. Overall, our data suggest relatively permissive truth-conditions for these constructions. They also suggest a previously undiscussed presupposition for agree wh and also indicate that agree wh is not straightforwardly reducible to agree that. Although some accounts suggest differences in truth conditions among different asymmetrical agree with constructions and symmetrical agree constructions, we do not find any indication of such truth-conditional distinctions. In the course of our exploration of the data, we offer a new approach to distinguishing between truth, falsity and presuppositional failure.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Benjamin R. George},\n\tdate-added = {2013-11-18 14:15:45 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 00:17:48 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s13164-015-0278-8},\n\tjournal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},\n\tkeywords = {experiment},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {243-264},\n\ttitle = {Can we agree about `agree'?},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mNhMzU4M/Chemla-George-agree.pdf},\n\tvolume = {7},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0278-8}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n This squib attempts to constrain semantic theories of agree wh constructions by broadening the data set and collecting naive speakers' intuitions. Overall, our data suggest relatively permissive truth-conditions for these constructions. They also suggest a previously undiscussed presupposition for agree wh and also indicate that agree wh is not straightforwardly reducible to agree that. Although some accounts suggest differences in truth conditions among different asymmetrical agree with constructions and symmetrical agree constructions, we do not find any indication of such truth-conditional distinctions. In the course of our exploration of the data, we offer a new approach to distinguishing between truth, falsity and presuppositional failure.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2015\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (8)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An attentional effect of musical metrical structure.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Katz, J.; Chemla, E.; and Pallier, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PloS one, 10(11): e0140895. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"AnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{KatzChemlaPallier:Meter,\n\tabstract = {Theories of metrical structure postulate the existence of several degrees of beat strength. While previous work has clearly established that humans are sensitive to the distinction between strong beats and weak ones, there is little evidence for a more fine grained distinction between intermediate levels. Here, we present experimental data showing that attention can be allocated to an intermediate level of beat strength. Comparing the effects of short exposures to 6/8 and 3/4 metrical structures on a tone detection task, we observe that subjects respond differently to beats of intermediate strength than to weak beats.},\n\tauthor = {Jonah Katz and Emmanuel Chemla and Christophe Pallier},\n\tdate-added = {2015-11-16 10:44:43 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:37:29 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0140895},\n\tjournal = {PloS one},\n\tnumber = {11},\n\tpages = {e0140895},\n\ttitle = {An attentional effect of musical metrical structure},\n\turl = {http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0140895},\n\tvolume = {10},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0140895},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0140895}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Theories of metrical structure postulate the existence of several degrees of beat strength. While previous work has clearly established that humans are sensitive to the distinction between strong beats and weak ones, there is little evidence for a more fine grained distinction between intermediate levels. Here, we present experimental data showing that attention can be allocated to an intermediate level of beat strength. Comparing the effects of short exposures to 6/8 and 3/4 metrical structures on a tone detection task, we observe that subjects respond differently to beats of intermediate strength than to weak beats.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Event representations constrain the structure of language: Sign language as a window into universally accessible linguistic biases.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Strickland, B.; Geraci, C.; Chemla, E.; Schlenker, P.; Kelepir, M.; and Pfau, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(19): 5968-5973. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"EventPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Strickland-TelicitySL,\n\tabstract = {According to a theoretical tradition dating back to Aristotle, verbs can be classified into two broad categories. Telic verbs (e.g., ``decide,'' ``sell,'' ``die'') encode a logical endpoint, whereas atelic verbs (e.g., ``think,'' ``negotiate,'' ``run'') do not, and the denoted event could therefore logically continue indefinitely. Here we show that sign languages encode telicity in a seemingly universal way and moreover that even nonsigners lacking any prior experience with sign language understand these encodings. In experiments 1--5, nonsigning English speakers accurately distinguished between telic (e.g., ``decide'') and atelic (e.g., ``think'') signs from (the historically unrelated) Italian Sign Language, Sign Language of the Netherlands, and Turkish Sign Lan- guage. These results were not due to participants' inferring that the sign merely imitated the action in question. In experiment 6, we used pseudosigns to show that the presence of a salient visual boundary at the end of a gesture was sufficient to elicit telic interpretations, whereas repeated movement without salient boundaries elicited atelic interpretations. Experiments 7--10 confirmed that these visual cues were used by all of the sign languages studied here. Together, these results suggest that signers and nonsigners share universally accessible notions of telicity as well as universally accessible ``map- ping biases'' between telicity and visual form.},\n\tauthor = {Brent Strickland and Carlo Geraci and Emmanuel Chemla and Philippe Schlenker and Meltem Kelepir and Roland Pfau},\n\tdate-added = {2015-04-02 19:44:25 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 00:18:16 +0000},\n\tdoi = {doi:10.1073/pnas.1423080112},\n\tjournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\n\tnumber = {19},\n\tpages = {5968-5973},\n\ttitle = {Event representations constrain the structure of language: Sign language as a window into universally accessible linguistic biases},\n\turl = {http://brentstrickland.net/event%20telicity%20PNAS.pdf},\n\tvolume = {112},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1423080112}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n According to a theoretical tradition dating back to Aristotle, verbs can be classified into two broad categories. Telic verbs (e.g., ``decide,'' ``sell,'' ``die'') encode a logical endpoint, whereas atelic verbs (e.g., ``think,'' ``negotiate,'' ``run'') do not, and the denoted event could therefore logically continue indefinitely. Here we show that sign languages encode telicity in a seemingly universal way and moreover that even nonsigners lacking any prior experience with sign language understand these encodings. In experiments 1–5, nonsigning English speakers accurately distinguished between telic (e.g., ``decide'') and atelic (e.g., ``think'') signs from (the historically unrelated) Italian Sign Language, Sign Language of the Netherlands, and Turkish Sign Lan- guage. These results were not due to participants' inferring that the sign merely imitated the action in question. In experiment 6, we used pseudosigns to show that the presence of a salient visual boundary at the end of a gesture was sufficient to elicit telic interpretations, whereas repeated movement without salient boundaries elicited atelic interpretations. Experiments 7–10 confirmed that these visual cues were used by all of the sign languages studied here. Together, these results suggest that signers and nonsigners share universally accessible notions of telicity as well as universally accessible ``map- ping biases'' between telicity and visual form.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Scalar implicatures of embedded disjunction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Crnič, L.; Chemla, E.; and Fox, D.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics, 23(4): 271-305. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ScalarPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 13 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Crnic-etal-Disjunctions,\n\tabstract = {Sentences with disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier, Every A is P or Q, tend to give rise to distributive inferences that each of the disjuncts holds of at least one individual in the domain of the quantifier, (Some A is P) AND (Some A is Q). These inferences are standardly derived as an entailment of the meaning of the sentence together with the scalar implicature that it is not the case that either disjunct holds of every individual in the domain of the quantifier, NOT (Every A is P) AND NOT (Every A is Q) (plain negated inferences). This derivation faces a challenge in that distributive inferences may obtain in the absence of plain negated inferences. We address this challenge by showing that on particular assumptions about alternatives a derivation of distributive inferences as scalar implicatures can be maintained without necessitating the absent plain negated inferences. These assumptions accord naturally with the grammatical approach to scalar implicatures. The paper concludes by presenting experimental data that suggest that plain negated inferences are not only unnecessary for deriving distributive inferences, but might in fact be unavailable.},\n\tauthor = {Luka Crni\\v{c} and Emmanuel Chemla and Danny Fox},\n\tdate-added = {2015-04-02 19:36:09 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:39:18 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {271-305},\n\ttitle = {Scalar implicatures of embedded disjunction},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TZiZjNkY/ccf-disjunction.pdf},\n\tvolume = {23},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TZiZjNkY/ccf-disjunction.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentences with disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier, Every A is P or Q, tend to give rise to distributive inferences that each of the disjuncts holds of at least one individual in the domain of the quantifier, (Some A is P) AND (Some A is Q). These inferences are standardly derived as an entailment of the meaning of the sentence together with the scalar implicature that it is not the case that either disjunct holds of every individual in the domain of the quantifier, NOT (Every A is P) AND NOT (Every A is Q) (plain negated inferences). This derivation faces a challenge in that distributive inferences may obtain in the absence of plain negated inferences. We address this challenge by showing that on particular assumptions about alternatives a derivation of distributive inferences as scalar implicatures can be maintained without necessitating the absent plain negated inferences. These assumptions accord naturally with the grammatical approach to scalar implicatures. The paper concludes by presenting experimental data that suggest that plain negated inferences are not only unnecessary for deriving distributive inferences, but might in fact be unavailable.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Linguistic Experiments and Ordinary Language Philosophy.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Hansen, N.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Ratio, 28(4): 422-445. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Linguistic philpapers\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Hansen-Chemla-BeatingADeadDonkey,\n\tabstract = {J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his `donkey stories', that `mistake' and `accident' apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as 'intentionally' and 'deliberately'). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.},\n\tauthor = {Nat Hansen and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2015-04-02 19:32:07 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:43:51 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Ratio},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {422-445},\n\ttitle = {Linguistic Experiments and Ordinary Language Philosophy},\n\turl_philpapers = {https://philpapers.org/rec/HANLEA-4},\n\tvolume = {28},\n\tyear = {2015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his `donkey stories', that `mistake' and `accident' apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as 'intentionally' and 'deliberately'). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Structural priming to study scopal representations and operations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Bott, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistic Inquiry, 46(1): 157–172. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StructuralPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{chemlabott:pSc,\n\tabstract = {Sentences can be ambiguous with respect to which expressions "take scope" over others. For example, Every student read a book can be understood as meaning that all students read a (possibly different) book or that there is a single book read by all students. Previous work by Raffray and Pickering (2010) has shown that if people are exposed to one of the two interpretations, they can be primed to interpret subsequent scopally ambiguous sentences with that same interpretation. This could be seen as evidence for a Logical Form representation capturing scopal properties or as evidence for a scope reversal operation, whose application could be facilitated by a previous application (c.f. Quantifier Raising). We discuss the usefulness of such simple priming studies in linguistics. Based on the scope ambiguity example, we show that priming of representation and priming of operation can be distinguished. In an experiment testing the relevant predictions for our test case, we obtain that (1) priming is based not on operations but on representations, but (2) the relevant level of representation encodes only scopal relations between specific quantified expressions.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Lewis Bott},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:45:25 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Linguistic Inquiry},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {157--172},\n\ttitle = {Structural priming to study scopal representations and operations},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jVlZTEzN/Chemla-Bott-ScopePriming.pdf},\n\tvolume = {46},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jVlZTEzN/Chemla-Bott-ScopePriming.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentences can be ambiguous with respect to which expressions \"take scope\" over others. For example, Every student read a book can be understood as meaning that all students read a (possibly different) book or that there is a single book read by all students. Previous work by Raffray and Pickering (2010) has shown that if people are exposed to one of the two interpretations, they can be primed to interpret subsequent scopally ambiguous sentences with that same interpretation. This could be seen as evidence for a Logical Form representation capturing scopal properties or as evidence for a scope reversal operation, whose application could be facilitated by a previous application (c.f. Quantifier Raising). We discuss the usefulness of such simple priming studies in linguistics. Based on the scope ambiguity example, we show that priming of representation and priming of operation can be distinguished. In an experiment testing the relevant predictions for our test case, we obtain that (1) priming is based not on operations but on representations, but (2) the relevant level of representation encodes only scopal relations between specific quantified expressions.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Phantom readings: the case of modified numerals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 30(4): 462-477. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PhantomPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Marty-PhantomBetween,\n\tabstract = {We investigate the mechanisms proposed in formal semantics to account for the ambiguity generated by simple numerical expressions (e.g., 'three students'). We explain how these mechanisms, when ap- plied to more complex numerical expressions such as 'between n and m' (e.g., 'between three and five students'), predict a surprising ambiguity between a doubly-bounded (e.g., 'at least three and at most five students') and a lower-bounded reading (e.g., 'at least three students'). While the lower-bounded reading is not detectable intuitively, results from three offline experiments and a response time study provide evidence in favor of its existence. Our contribution is twofold. On the experimental side, we present two psycholinguistic methods powerful enough to detect what we call phantom readings, i.e. readings that do not seem to have consequences for actual interpretation, but have detectable effects on processing. On the theoretical side, we show that certain semantic mechanisms that might be thought to overgenerate are in fact vindicated, since they are able to predict certain processing facts that would otherwise remain mysterious. We discuss how these results illustrate the need for a strong integration of formal semantics and psycholinguistic approaches.},\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Emmanuel Chemla and Benjamin Spector},\n\tdate-added = {2014-06-03 08:22:20 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:46:39 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Language, Cognition and Neuroscience},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {462-477},\n\ttitle = {Phantom readings: the case of modified numerals},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jE2YjE1Z/PhantomReadingsMartyChemlaSpector.pdf},\n\tvolume = {30},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jE2YjE1Z/PhantomReadingsMartyChemlaSpector.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We investigate the mechanisms proposed in formal semantics to account for the ambiguity generated by simple numerical expressions (e.g., 'three students'). We explain how these mechanisms, when ap- plied to more complex numerical expressions such as 'between n and m' (e.g., 'between three and five students'), predict a surprising ambiguity between a doubly-bounded (e.g., 'at least three and at most five students') and a lower-bounded reading (e.g., 'at least three students'). While the lower-bounded reading is not detectable intuitively, results from three offline experiments and a response time study provide evidence in favor of its existence. Our contribution is twofold. On the experimental side, we present two psycholinguistic methods powerful enough to detect what we call phantom readings, i.e. readings that do not seem to have consequences for actual interpretation, but have detectable effects on processing. On the theoretical side, we show that certain semantic mechanisms that might be thought to overgenerate are in fact vindicated, since they are able to predict certain processing facts that would otherwise remain mysterious. We discuss how these results illustrate the need for a strong integration of formal semantics and psycholinguistic approaches.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Two methods to find truth value gaps and their application to the projection problem of homogeneity.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Križ, M.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics, 23(3): 205-248. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TwoPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Kriz-Chemla-ProjHom,\n\tabstract = {Presupposition, vagueness, oddness can lead some sentences to fail to have a truth value. Homogeneity of definite descriptions may also create truth value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them is, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying two methods of general interest to identify truth value gaps. Method A consists in collecting both truth value judgments (completely true vs not completely true) and, independently, false value judgments (completely false vs not completely false). Method B is based on one shot ternary judgments: completely true vs completely false vs neither. After a calibration of these methods, we use them to demonstrate that homogeneity projects out of negation, the scope of universal sentences and the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly 3, to some extent. We assess our results in light of different approaches of homogeneity, whether these approaches are based on presuppositions, scalar implicatures or supervaluations. We identify free parameters in these theories and assess various variants thereof based on our results. We identify critical situations to further distinguish between these approaches (and their variants). In the future, the methods may also be applied to study other phenomena that cause some sort of failure of a sentence to have a truth-value.},\n\tauthor = {Manuel Kri\\v{z} and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2014-03-25 19:41:04 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-06-26 00:20:46 +0200},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11050-015-9114-z},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\tkeywords = {experiment},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {205-248},\n\ttitle = {Two methods to find truth value gaps and their application to the projection problem of homogeneity},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DZiZDY5Z/Kriz%20Chemla%202014%20Finding%20Gaps.pdf},\n\tvolume = {23},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DZiZDY5Z/Kriz%20Chemla%202014%20Finding%20Gaps.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Presupposition, vagueness, oddness can lead some sentences to fail to have a truth value. Homogeneity of definite descriptions may also create truth value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them is, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying two methods of general interest to identify truth value gaps. Method A consists in collecting both truth value judgments (completely true vs not completely true) and, independently, false value judgments (completely false vs not completely false). Method B is based on one shot ternary judgments: completely true vs completely false vs neither. After a calibration of these methods, we use them to demonstrate that homogeneity projects out of negation, the scope of universal sentences and the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly 3, to some extent. We assess our results in light of different approaches of homogeneity, whether these approaches are based on presuppositions, scalar implicatures or supervaluations. We identify free parameters in these theories and assess various variants thereof based on our results. We identify critical situations to further distinguish between these approaches (and their variants). In the future, the methods may also be applied to study other phenomena that cause some sort of failure of a sentence to have a truth-value.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Predicting moral judgments from causal judgments.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Egré, P.; and Schlenker, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Philosophical Psychology, 28(1): 21–48. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PredictingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{ChemlaEgreSchlenker:2012Moral,\n\tabstract = {Several factors have been put forward to explain the variability of moral judgments for superficially analogous moral dilemmas, in particular in the paradigm of trolley cases. In this paper we elaborate on Mikhail's view that (i) causal analysis is at the core of moral judgments and that (ii) causal judgments can be quantified by linguistic methods. According to this model, our moral judgments depend both on utilitarian considerations (whether positive effects outweigh negative effects) and on a representation of the causal structure of the action (whether the negative effects are essentially side-effects rather than main goals). However the exact contribution of each factor, as well as the precise way in which causal considerations interact with utilitarian considerations, has yet to be quantified and investigated. We present several variations on trolley dilemmas in which subjects had to assess the morality of the action and to evaluate their preference between two competing descriptions of the scene ('a caused the death of m, thereby saving n' vs. 'a saved n, thereby causing the death of m'). Our main finding is that moral judgments are highly correlated with causal judgments in terms of such descriptions, allowing us to predict the former from the latter. Furthermore, we observe that the effect of causal judgments on the relative permissibility of actions is felt even in anti-utilitarian scenarios, namely scenarios for which the proposed action diminishes aggregate utility.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Paul Egr\\'e and Philippe Schlenker},\n\tdate-added = {2012-02-22 14:21:14 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 00:21:22 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Philosophical Psychology},\n\tkeywords = {experiment},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {21--48},\n\ttitle = {Predicting moral judgments from causal judgments},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Egre-Schlenker-Moral.pdf},\n\tvolume = {28},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Egre-Schlenker-Moral.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Several factors have been put forward to explain the variability of moral judgments for superficially analogous moral dilemmas, in particular in the paradigm of trolley cases. In this paper we elaborate on Mikhail's view that (i) causal analysis is at the core of moral judgments and that (ii) causal judgments can be quantified by linguistic methods. According to this model, our moral judgments depend both on utilitarian considerations (whether positive effects outweigh negative effects) and on a representation of the causal structure of the action (whether the negative effects are essentially side-effects rather than main goals). However the exact contribution of each factor, as well as the precise way in which causal considerations interact with utilitarian considerations, has yet to be quantified and investigated. We present several variations on trolley dilemmas in which subjects had to assess the morality of the action and to evaluate their preference between two competing descriptions of the scene ('a caused the death of m, thereby saving n' vs. 'a saved n, thereby causing the death of m'). Our main finding is that moral judgments are highly correlated with causal judgments in terms of such descriptions, allowing us to predict the former from the latter. Furthermore, we observe that the effect of causal judgments on the relative permissibility of actions is felt even in anti-utilitarian scenarios, namely scenarios for which the proposed action diminishes aggregate utility.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2014\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Remarks on the experimental turn in the study of scalar implicature, Part II.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Singh, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language and Linguistics Compass, 8(9): 387–399. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Remarks part 1 and part 2\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{ChemlaSinghSIp2,\n\tabstract = {There has been a recent 'experimental turn' in the study of scalar implicature, yielding important results concerning online processing and acquisition. This paper highlights some of these results and places them in the current theoretical context. We argue that there is some- times a mismatch between theoretical and experimental studies, and we point out how some of these mismatches can be resolved. We furthermore highlight ways in which the current theoret- ical and experimental landscape is richer than is often assumed, and in light of this discussion we offer some suggestions for what seem to us promising directions for the experimental turn to explore.\nThe article is divided in two parts. Part I first presents the two dominant families of accounts of scalar implicature, the domain-general Gricean account and the domain-specific grammatical account. We try to separate the various components of these theories and con- nect them to relevant psycholinguistic predictions. Part II examines and reinterprets several prominent experimental results in light of the theoretical presentation proposed in the first part.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Raj Singh},\n\tdate-added = {2014-01-01 20:34:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:50:54 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1111/lnc3.12080},\n\tjournal = {Language and Linguistics Compass},\n\tnumber = {9},\n\tpages = {387--399},\n\ttitle = {Remarks on the experimental turn in the study of scalar implicature, {P}art {II}},\n\turl_part_1_and_part_2 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mM4NWQ2Z/Chemla-Singh-SI-Part1and2.pdf},\n\tvolume = {8},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lnc3.12080}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n There has been a recent 'experimental turn' in the study of scalar implicature, yielding important results concerning online processing and acquisition. This paper highlights some of these results and places them in the current theoretical context. We argue that there is some- times a mismatch between theoretical and experimental studies, and we point out how some of these mismatches can be resolved. We furthermore highlight ways in which the current theoret- ical and experimental landscape is richer than is often assumed, and in light of this discussion we offer some suggestions for what seem to us promising directions for the experimental turn to explore. The article is divided in two parts. Part I first presents the two dominant families of accounts of scalar implicature, the domain-general Gricean account and the domain-specific grammatical account. We try to separate the various components of these theories and con- nect them to relevant psycholinguistic predictions. Part II examines and reinterprets several prominent experimental results in light of the theoretical presentation proposed in the first part.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Remarks on the experimental turn in the study of scalar implicature, Part I.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Singh, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language and Linguistics Compass, 8(9): 373-386. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Remarks part 1 and part 2\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{ChemlaSinghSIp1,\n\tabstract = {There has been a recent 'experimental turn' in the study of scalar implicature, yielding important results concerning online processing and acquisition. This paper highlights some of these results and places them in the current theoretical context. We argue that there is some- times a mismatch between theoretical and experimental studies, and we point out how some of these mismatches can be resolved. We furthermore highlight ways in which the current theoret- ical and experimental landscape is richer than is often assumed, and in light of this discussion we offer some suggestions for what seem to us promising directions for the experimental turn to explore.\nThe article is divided in two parts. Part I first presents the two dominant families of accounts of scalar implicature, the domain-general Gricean account and the domain-specific grammatical account. We try to separate the various components of these theories and con- nect them to relevant psycholinguistic predictions. Part II examines and reinterprets several prominent experimental results in light of the theoretical presentation proposed in the first part.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Raj Singh},\n\tdate-added = {2014-01-01 20:34:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:51:47 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1111/lnc3.12081},\n\tjournal = {Language and Linguistics Compass},\n\tnumber = {9},\n\tpages = {373-386},\n\ttitle = {Remarks on the experimental turn in the study of scalar implicature, {P}art {I}},\n\turl_part_1_and_part_2 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mM4NWQ2Z/Chemla-Singh-SI-Part1and2.pdf},\n\tvolume = {8},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lnc3.12081}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n There has been a recent 'experimental turn' in the study of scalar implicature, yielding important results concerning online processing and acquisition. This paper highlights some of these results and places them in the current theoretical context. We argue that there is some- times a mismatch between theoretical and experimental studies, and we point out how some of these mismatches can be resolved. We furthermore highlight ways in which the current theoret- ical and experimental landscape is richer than is often assumed, and in light of this discussion we offer some suggestions for what seem to us promising directions for the experimental turn to explore. The article is divided in two parts. Part I first presents the two dominant families of accounts of scalar implicature, the domain-general Gricean account and the domain-specific grammatical account. We try to separate the various components of these theories and con- nect them to relevant psycholinguistic predictions. Part II examines and reinterprets several prominent experimental results in light of the theoretical presentation proposed in the first part.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cross-situational word learning in the right situations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dautriche, I.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40(3): 892-903. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Cross-situationalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Dautriche-Chemla-XSL,\n\tabstract = {Upon hearing a novel word, language learners must identify its correct meaning from a diverse set of situationally relevant options. Such referential ambiguity could be reduced through repetitive exposure to the novel word across diverging learning situations, a learning mechanism referred to as cross-situational learning. Previous research has focused on the amount of information learners carry over from one learning instance to the next. The present paper investigates how context can modulate the learning strategy and its efficiency. Results from four cross-situational learning experiments with adults suggest that (1) Learners encode more than the specific hypotheses they form about the meaning of a word, providing evidence against the recent view referred to as ``single hypothesis testing''. (2) Learning is faster when learning situations consistently contain members from a given group, regardless of whether this group is a semantically coherent group (e.g., animals) or induced through repetition (objects being presented together repetitively, just like a fork and a door may occur together repetitively in a kitchen). (3) Learners are subject to memory illusions, in a way that suggests that the learning situation itself appears to be encoded in memory during learning. Overall, our findings demonstrate that realistic contexts (such as the situation in which a given word has occurred, e.g., in the zoo or in the kitchen) help learners retrieve or discard potential referents for a word, because such contexts can be memorized and associated with a to-be-learned word.\n},\n\tauthor = {Isabelle Dautriche and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2013-11-15 21:22:52 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-04-07 11:40:41 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition},\n\tkeywords = {acquisition},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {892-903},\n\ttitle = {Cross-situational word learning in the right situations},\n\turl = {http://www.lscp.net/persons/dautriche/publi/2014_right_situations_for_cross_situational_learning.pdf},\n\tvolume = {40},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.lscp.net/persons/dautriche/publi/2014_right_situations_for_cross_situational_learning.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Upon hearing a novel word, language learners must identify its correct meaning from a diverse set of situationally relevant options. Such referential ambiguity could be reduced through repetitive exposure to the novel word across diverging learning situations, a learning mechanism referred to as cross-situational learning. Previous research has focused on the amount of information learners carry over from one learning instance to the next. The present paper investigates how context can modulate the learning strategy and its efficiency. Results from four cross-situational learning experiments with adults suggest that (1) Learners encode more than the specific hypotheses they form about the meaning of a word, providing evidence against the recent view referred to as ``single hypothesis testing''. (2) Learning is faster when learning situations consistently contain members from a given group, regardless of whether this group is a semantically coherent group (e.g., animals) or induced through repetition (objects being presented together repetitively, just like a fork and a door may occur together repetitively in a kitchen). (3) Learners are subject to memory illusions, in a way that suggests that the learning situation itself appears to be encoded in memory during learning. Overall, our findings demonstrate that realistic contexts (such as the situation in which a given word has occurred, e.g., in the zoo or in the kitchen) help learners retrieve or discard potential referents for a word, because such contexts can be memorized and associated with a to-be-learned word. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Monkey Semantics: Two 'Dialects' of Campbell's Monkey Alarm Calls.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schlenker, P.; Chemla, E.; Arnold, K.; Lemasson, A.; Ouattara, K.; Keenan, S.; Stephan, C.; Ryder, R.; and Zuberbühler, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics and Philosophy, 37(6): 439-501. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MonkeyPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Schlenker-Campbells_Semantics,\n\tabstract = {We develop a formal semantic analysis of the alarm calls used by Campbell's monkeys in the Tai forest (Ivory Coast) and on Tiwai island (Sierra Leone) -- two sites that differ in the main predators that the monkeys are exposed to (eagles on Tiwai vs. eagles and leopards in Tai). Building on earlier work (Ouattara et al. 2009a,b) and on new data, we argue that on both sites alarm calls include the roots krak, hok, wak, which can optionally be affixed with -oo, a kind of attenuating suffix; in addition, sentences can start with boom boom, which indicates that the context is not one of predation. In line with Arnold et al. 2013, we show that the meaning of the roots is not quite the same in Tai and on Tiwai: krak often functions as a leopard alarm call in Tai, but as a general alarm call on Tiwai. We develop models based on a compositional semantics in which concatenation is interpreted as conjunction, roots have lexical meanings, -oo is an attenuating suffix, and an all-purpose alarm parameter is raised with each individual call. The first model accounts for the difference between Tai and Tiwai by way of different lexical entries for krak. The second model gives the same underspecified entry to krak in both locations (= general alarm call), but it makes use of a competition mechanism akin to scalar implicatures. In Tai, strengthening yields a meaning equivalent to non-aerial dangerous predator and turns out to single out leopards. On Tiwai, strengthening yields a nearly contradictory meaning due to the absence of ground predators, and only the unstrengthened meaning is used.},\n\tauthor = {Philippe Schlenker and Emmanuel Chemla and Kate Arnold and Alban Lemasson and Karim Ouattara and Sumir Keenan and Claudia Stephan and Robin Ryder and Klaus Zuberb{\\"u}hler},\n\tdate-added = {2013-09-28 12:33:32 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:44:25 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},\n\tnumber = {6},\n\tpages = {439-501},\n\ttitle = {Monkey Semantics: Two 'Dialects' of Campbell's Monkey Alarm Calls},\n\turl = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/001792/current.pdf},\n\tvolume = {37},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/001792/current.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We develop a formal semantic analysis of the alarm calls used by Campbell's monkeys in the Tai forest (Ivory Coast) and on Tiwai island (Sierra Leone) – two sites that differ in the main predators that the monkeys are exposed to (eagles on Tiwai vs. eagles and leopards in Tai). Building on earlier work (Ouattara et al. 2009a,b) and on new data, we argue that on both sites alarm calls include the roots krak, hok, wak, which can optionally be affixed with -oo, a kind of attenuating suffix; in addition, sentences can start with boom boom, which indicates that the context is not one of predation. In line with Arnold et al. 2013, we show that the meaning of the roots is not quite the same in Tai and on Tiwai: krak often functions as a leopard alarm call in Tai, but as a general alarm call on Tiwai. We develop models based on a compositional semantics in which concatenation is interpreted as conjunction, roots have lexical meanings, -oo is an attenuating suffix, and an all-purpose alarm parameter is raised with each individual call. The first model accounts for the difference between Tai and Tiwai by way of different lexical entries for krak. The second model gives the same underspecified entry to krak in both locations (= general alarm call), but it makes use of a competition mechanism akin to scalar implicatures. In Tai, strengthening yields a meaning equivalent to non-aerial dangerous predator and turns out to single out leopards. On Tiwai, strengthening yields a nearly contradictory meaning due to the absence of ground predators, and only the unstrengthened meaning is used.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Processing inferences at the semantics/pragmatics frontier: disjunctions and \\emphfree choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Bott, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 130(3): 380-396. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ProcessingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla-Bott-FreeChoice,\n\tabstract = {Linguistic inferences have traditionally been studied and categorized in several categories, such as entailments, implicatures or presuppositions. This typology is mostly based on traditional linguistic means, such as introspective judgments about phrases occurring in different constructions, in different conversational contexts. More recently, the processing properties of these inferences have also been studied (see, e.g., recent work showing that scalar implicatures is a costly phenomenon). Our focus is on free choice permission, a phenomenon by which conjunctive inferences are unexpectedly added to disjunctive sentences. For instance, a sentence such as ``Mary is allowed to eat an ice-cream or a cake'' is normally understood as granting permission both for eating an ice-cream and for eating a cake. We provide data from four processing studies, which show that, contrary to arguments coming from the theoretical literature, free choice inferences are different from scalar implicatures.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Lewis Bott},\n\tdate-added = {2011-11-14 10:19:25 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 00:22:10 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.013},\n\tjournal = {Cognition},\n\tkeywords = {pragmatics; processing; free choice; scalar implicatures; presuppositions; experiment},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {380-396},\n\ttitle = {Processing inferences at the semantics/pragmatics frontier: disjunctions and \\emph{free choice}},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Bott-FreeChoice.pdf},\n\tvolume = {130},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.013}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Linguistic inferences have traditionally been studied and categorized in several categories, such as entailments, implicatures or presuppositions. This typology is mostly based on traditional linguistic means, such as introspective judgments about phrases occurring in different constructions, in different conversational contexts. More recently, the processing properties of these inferences have also been studied (see, e.g., recent work showing that scalar implicatures is a costly phenomenon). Our focus is on free choice permission, a phenomenon by which conjunctive inferences are unexpectedly added to disjunctive sentences. For instance, a sentence such as ``Mary is allowed to eat an ice-cream or a cake'' is normally understood as granting permission both for eating an ice-cream and for eating a cake. We provide data from four processing studies, which show that, contrary to arguments coming from the theoretical literature, free choice inferences are different from scalar implicatures.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n incollection\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Direct and indirect scalar implicatures share the same processing signature.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cremers, A.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Pistoia Reda, S., editor(s), Pragmatics, Semantics and the Case of Scalar Implicatures, of Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition, pages 201–227. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"DirectPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Cremers:2014aa,\n\tabstract = {Following the seminal work of Bott and Noveck (2004), investigations into the psy- cholinguistic properties of scalar implicatures (SIs) have mostly focused on direct SIs, e.g. when a sentence with `some' is understood as negating a stronger alternative with `all' (``Some x are y'' implies that it is not the case that ``All x are y''). Most previous studies found that SIs incur a processing cost. In this study, we investigate indirect SIs, i.e. implicatures which arise when a sentence with `all' is understood as negating an alternative with `some'. This typically happens in negative sentences (``Not all x are y'' implies some x are y), for negation reverses entailment relations between sentences. We report on two truth-value judgement tasks designed to compare direct and indirect SIs. In Exp. 1, we found the traditional cost observed for direct SIs but not for indirect SIs. However, in Exp. 2 we show that once effects of negation are factored out, the two classes of SIs can be seen to share the same processing properties. Hence, there is a cost inherent to SIs and it generalizes across different subclasses of the phenomenon. This ``signature'' of SIs should now be compared with other kinds of inferences, either to understand these inferences and their relation to SIs (Chemla and Bott, 2011, 2012) or to better identify which subprocesses specifically involved in the derivation of an SI are responsible for this cost.\n},\n\tauthor = {Cremers, Alexandre and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tbooktitle = {Pragmatics, Semantics and the Case of Scalar Implicatures},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 00:19:18 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-24 10:46:50 +0000},\n\teditor = {Salvatore {Pistoia Reda}},\n\tpages = {201--227},\n\tpublisher = {London: Palgrave Macmillan},\n\tseries = {Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition},\n\ttitle = {Direct and indirect scalar implicatures share the same processing signature},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WM0NGE5Z/Cremers-Chemla-IndirectSIprocessing.pdf},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WM0NGE5Z/Cremers-Chemla-IndirectSIprocessing.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Following the seminal work of Bott and Noveck (2004), investigations into the psy- cholinguistic properties of scalar implicatures (SIs) have mostly focused on direct SIs, e.g. when a sentence with `some' is understood as negating a stronger alternative with `all' (``Some x are y'' implies that it is not the case that ``All x are y''). Most previous studies found that SIs incur a processing cost. In this study, we investigate indirect SIs, i.e. implicatures which arise when a sentence with `all' is understood as negating an alternative with `some'. This typically happens in negative sentences (``Not all x are y'' implies some x are y), for negation reverses entailment relations between sentences. We report on two truth-value judgement tasks designed to compare direct and indirect SIs. In Exp. 1, we found the traditional cost observed for direct SIs but not for indirect SIs. However, in Exp. 2 we show that once effects of negation are factored out, the two classes of SIs can be seen to share the same processing properties. Hence, there is a cost inherent to SIs and it generalizes across different subclasses of the phenomenon. This ``signature'' of SIs should now be compared with other kinds of inferences, either to understand these inferences and their relation to SIs (Chemla and Bott, 2011, 2012) or to better identify which subprocesses specifically involved in the derivation of an SI are responsible for this cost. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n unpublished\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Distinguishing typicality and ambiguities, the case of local scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2014.\n Ms. LSCP & IJN.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"DistinguishingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Chemla-Spector-Typicality,\n\tabstract = {We refine previous methods to evaluate the existence of local scalar implicatures. We show that these refined methods further confirm the existence of local scalar implicatures (contra previous claims). We also demonstrate that these same methods can be applied to settle other controversies, not restricted to scalar implicatures. Specifically, these methods provide the way to quantify the relative salience of different interpretations for ambiguous sentences, generally. Based on this method, we defend a conceptually motivated theory of 'typicality projection'.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Benjamin Spector},\n\tdate-added = {2014-01-03 00:02:50 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-27 19:46:57 +0000},\n\tnote = {Ms. LSCP \\& IJN.},\n\ttitle = {Distinguishing typicality and ambiguities, the case of local scalar implicatures},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Spector-Typicality.pdf},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Spector-Typicality.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We refine previous methods to evaluate the existence of local scalar implicatures. We show that these refined methods further confirm the existence of local scalar implicatures (contra previous claims). We also demonstrate that these same methods can be applied to settle other controversies, not restricted to scalar implicatures. Specifically, these methods provide the way to quantify the relative salience of different interpretations for ambiguous sentences, generally. Based on this method, we defend a conceptually motivated theory of 'typicality projection'.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2013\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Moral Judgments and Semantic Judgments: A Case Study (Comments on Mikhail).\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Egré, P.; and Schlenker, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MoralPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{ChemlaEgreSchlenker:MikhailBook,\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Egr{\\'e}, Paul and Schlenker, Philippe},\n\tdate-added = {2013-07-18 07:36:55 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-02 00:20:57 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/jrls/jls013},\n\teprint = {http://jrls.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/01/jrls.jls013.full.pdf+html},\n\tjournal = {Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies},\n\tkeywords = {experiment},\n\ttitle = {Moral Judgments and Semantic Judgments: A Case Study (Comments on Mikhail)},\n\turl = {http://jrls.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/01/jrls.jls013.short},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://jrls.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/01/jrls.jls013.short},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrls/jls013}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Interpreting numerals and scalar items under memory load.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Lingua, 133: 152-163. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"InterpretingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Marty-Chemla-Spector-WMNumScal,\n\tabstract = {A sentence such as `Four children are blond' can be interpreted as meaning either that at least four children are blond (weak reading), or that exactly four children are blond (strong reading). On the classical neo-Gricean view (Horn 1972), this ambiguity is similar to the ambiguity generated by scalar terms such as `some', for which both a weak reading (i.e., some (possibly all)) and a strong reading (i.e., some but not all) are available. On this view, the strong reading of numerals, just like the strong reading of `some', is derived as a scalar implicature (SI), on the basis of the weak reading. However, more recent studies have found significant differences between the two phenomena. The syntactic distribution of the strong reading is not the same in both cases (Horn 1992, Breheny 2008), and children seem to acquire the strong reading of numerals before they acquire the strong reading of standard scalar items (Noveck 2001, a.o.). Using a dual task approach, we provide evidence for another type of difference between numerals and standard scalar items. We show that tapping memory resources has opposite effects on `some' and on bare numerals. Under high cognitive load, participants reported fewer SIs for sentences involving `some' (compared to low cognitive load conditions), but they report more strong readings for sentences involving bare numerals. We discuss the consequences of this result for the current theoretical debates regarding the semantics of numerals.\n},\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Emmanuel Chemla and Benjamin Spector},\n\tdate-added = {2012-02-04 12:59:14 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:56:37 +0000},\n\tdoi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2013.03.006},\n\tissn = {0024-3841},\n\tjournal = {Lingua},\n\tpages = {152-163},\n\ttitle = {Interpreting numerals and scalar items under memory load},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WQ2ODcyY/MartyChemlaSpector2013.pdf},\n\tvolume = {133},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2013.03.006}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n A sentence such as `Four children are blond' can be interpreted as meaning either that at least four children are blond (weak reading), or that exactly four children are blond (strong reading). On the classical neo-Gricean view (Horn 1972), this ambiguity is similar to the ambiguity generated by scalar terms such as `some', for which both a weak reading (i.e., some (possibly all)) and a strong reading (i.e., some but not all) are available. On this view, the strong reading of numerals, just like the strong reading of `some', is derived as a scalar implicature (SI), on the basis of the weak reading. However, more recent studies have found significant differences between the two phenomena. The syntactic distribution of the strong reading is not the same in both cases (Horn 1992, Breheny 2008), and children seem to acquire the strong reading of numerals before they acquire the strong reading of standard scalar items (Noveck 2001, a.o.). Using a dual task approach, we provide evidence for another type of difference between numerals and standard scalar items. We show that tapping memory resources has opposite effects on `some' and on bare numerals. Under high cognitive load, participants reported fewer SIs for sentences involving `some' (compared to low cognitive load conditions), but they report more strong readings for sentences involving bare numerals. We discuss the consequences of this result for the current theoretical debates regarding the semantics of numerals. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Experimenting on Contextualism.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Hansen, N.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mind and Language, 28(3): 287–322. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ExperimentingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Hansen-Chemla-ExpContextualism,\n\tabstract = {This paper concerns the central method of generating evidence in support of contextualist theories, what we call context shifting experiments. We begin by explaining the standard design of context shifting experiments, which are used in both quantitative surveys and more traditional thought experiments to show how context affects the content of natural language expressions. We discuss some recent experimental studies that have tried and failed to find evidence that confirms contextualist predictions about the results of context shifting experiments, and consider the criticisms of those studies made by DeRose (forthcoming). We show that DeRose's criticisms are incomplete, and we argue that the design of context shifting experiments he proposes is itself subject to some of the same problems as the studies he criticizes. We propose a refined approach to the design of context shifting experiments that addresses these problems and which allows us to to investigate the effect of context on both positive and negative sentences. This aspect of our design allows us to control for several forms of bias, including a particular form of "truth bias" that favors positive over negative sentences. We then deploy our improved design in an experiment that tests a large number of scenarios involving different types of expressions of interest to contextualists, including "know" and color adjectives like "green". Our experiment (i) reveals an effect of changing contexts on the evaluation of uses of the sentences that we examined, thereby overturning the absence of results reported in previous experimental studies (so-called null results) and (ii) reveals previously unnoticed distinctions between the strength of the contextual effects we observed for scenarios involving knowledge ascriptions and for scenarios concerning color and other miscellaneous scenarios.},\n\tauthor = {Nat Hansen and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2011-09-06 21:14:59 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:58:27 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Mind and Language},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {287--322},\n\ttitle = {Experimenting on Contextualism},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Hansen-Chemla-ExpContextualism.pdf},\n\tvolume = {28},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Hansen-Chemla-ExpContextualism.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n This paper concerns the central method of generating evidence in support of contextualist theories, what we call context shifting experiments. We begin by explaining the standard design of context shifting experiments, which are used in both quantitative surveys and more traditional thought experiments to show how context affects the content of natural language expressions. We discuss some recent experimental studies that have tried and failed to find evidence that confirms contextualist predictions about the results of context shifting experiments, and consider the criticisms of those studies made by DeRose (forthcoming). We show that DeRose's criticisms are incomplete, and we argue that the design of context shifting experiments he proposes is itself subject to some of the same problems as the studies he criticizes. We propose a refined approach to the design of context shifting experiments that addresses these problems and which allows us to to investigate the effect of context on both positive and negative sentences. This aspect of our design allows us to control for several forms of bias, including a particular form of \"truth bias\" that favors positive over negative sentences. We then deploy our improved design in an experiment that tests a large number of scenarios involving different types of expressions of interest to contextualists, including \"know\" and color adjectives like \"green\". Our experiment (i) reveals an effect of changing contexts on the evaluation of uses of the sentences that we examined, thereby overturning the absence of results reported in previous experimental studies (so-called null results) and (ii) reveals previously unnoticed distinctions between the strength of the contextual effects we observed for scenarios involving knowledge ascriptions and for scenarios concerning color and other miscellaneous scenarios.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Scalar implicatures: working memory and a comparison with 'only'.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Psychology, 4(403). 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ScalarPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Marty-Chemla-SIWMO,\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2011-03-05 19:07:11 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2015-04-02 20:57:14 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00403},\n\tissn = {1664-1078},\n\tjournal = {Frontiers in Psychology},\n\tnumber = {403},\n\ttitle = {Scalar implicatures: working memory and a comparison with 'only'},\n\turl = {http://www.frontiersin.org/language_sciences/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00403/abstract},\n\tvolume = {4},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.frontiersin.org/language_sciences/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00403/abstract},\n\tbdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00403}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Processing presuppositions: dynamic semantics vs pragmatic enrichment.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Bott, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language and Cognitive Processes, 28(3): 241-260. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ProcessingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{chemlabott:procpres,\n\tabstract = {One defining and yet puzzling feature of linguistic presuppositions is the way they interact with linguistic operators. For instance, when a presupposition trigger (e.g., realise) occurs under negation (e.g., Zoologists do not realise that elephants are mammals), the sentence is most commonly interpreted with the same global presupposition (elephants are mammals) as if negation was not present. Alternatively, the presupposition may be locally accommodated, i.e., the presupposition may become part of what is negated. In this paper, we use a sentence verification task similar to that used to study scalar implicatures (Bott and Noveck, 2004) to show that global interpretations are faster than local interpretations. We argue that these results are inconsistent with certain pragmatic accounts of presupposition projection.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Lewis Bott},\n\tdate-added = {2010-02-23 13:02:46 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 22:55:35 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Language and Cognitive Processes},\n\tkeywords = {presupposition; processing; scalar implicatures; pragmatics; dynamic semantics},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {241-260},\n\ttitle = {Processing presuppositions: dynamic semantics vs pragmatic enrichment},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Bott-ProcPresProj.pdf},\n\tvolume = {28},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Bott-ProcPresProj.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n One defining and yet puzzling feature of linguistic presuppositions is the way they interact with linguistic operators. For instance, when a presupposition trigger (e.g., realise) occurs under negation (e.g., Zoologists do not realise that elephants are mammals), the sentence is most commonly interpreted with the same global presupposition (elephants are mammals) as if negation was not present. Alternatively, the presupposition may be locally accommodated, i.e., the presupposition may become part of what is negated. In this paper, we use a sentence verification task similar to that used to study scalar implicatures (Bott and Noveck, 2004) to show that global interpretations are faster than local interpretations. We argue that these results are inconsistent with certain pragmatic accounts of presupposition projection.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n inproceedings\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Pragmatic priming and the search for alternatives.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bott, L.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2013. \n This is an initial version of Chemla and Bott (2016).\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PragmaticPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Bott:2013aa,\n\tabstract = {Meanings of basic expressions can be enriched by considering what the speaker could have said, but chose not to, that is, the alternatives. We report three experiments testing whether there is a single enrichment procedure that stretches across diverse linguistic phenomena. Participants were primed to understand either the basic meaning or the enriched meaning of a sentence. We found that the enrichment mechanism could be primed across some expressions but not others, arguing against a universal enrichment mechanism. Our results have implications for understanding the processing of implied meaning and how linguistic phenomenon should be grouped together.},\n\tauthor = {Bott, Lewis and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 00:20:59 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:48:00 +0000},\n\tnote = {This is an initial version of Chemla and Bott (2016).},\n\ttitle = {Pragmatic priming and the search for alternatives},\n\turl = {https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2013/papers/0068/paper0068.pdf},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2013/papers/0068/paper0068.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Meanings of basic expressions can be enriched by considering what the speaker could have said, but chose not to, that is, the alternatives. We report three experiments testing whether there is a single enrichment procedure that stretches across diverse linguistic phenomena. Participants were primed to understand either the basic meaning or the enriched meaning of a sentence. We found that the enrichment mechanism could be primed across some expressions but not others, arguing against a universal enrichment mechanism. Our results have implications for understanding the processing of implied meaning and how linguistic phenomenon should be grouped together.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n unpublished\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Frequencies of apparent Hurford constraint obviations track implication rates.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2013.\n Ms. LSCP.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FrequenciesPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Chemla-HurfordCounts,\n\tabstract = {The higher the derivation rate of a scalar implicature X&rarr;not-Y, the more frequent is a disjunction of the form "X or Y".},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2013-09-28 12:28:07 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-27 19:47:13 +0000},\n\tnote = {Ms. LSCP.},\n\ttitle = {Frequencies of apparent Hurford constraint obviations track implication rates},\n\turl = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mQ1Nzk2O/Chemla-HurfordCounts.pdf},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mQ1Nzk2O/Chemla-HurfordCounts.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n The higher the derivation rate of a scalar implicature X→not-Y, the more frequent is a disjunction of the form \"X or Y\".\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2012\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Incremental vs. Symmetric Accounts of Presupposition Projection: An Experimental Approach.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Schlenker, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics, 20(2): 177-226. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"IncrementalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{chemla:2009:sym,\n\tabstract = {The presupposition triggered by an expression E is generally satisfied by information that comes before rather than after E in the sentence or discourse. In Heim's classic theory (1983), this left-right asymmetry is encoded in the lexical semantics of dynamic connectives and operators. But several recent analyses offer a more nuanced approach, in which presupposition satisfaction has two separate components: a general principle (which varies from theory to theory) specifies under what conditions a presupposition triggered by an expression E is satisfied; and an `incremental' component specifies that the principle must be checked on the basis of information that comes before E. Several researchers take this incremental component to be a processing bias, which can be overcome at some cost. If so, it should be possible, though costly, to satisfy presuppositions `symmetrically', i.e. taking into account linguistic material that comes both before and after the presupposition trigger. We test this claim with experimental means. Using inferential (and to some extent acceptability) tasks involving `anaphoric' triggers, we show that in the propositional case symmetric readings are indeed possible (albeit degraded) in environments involving the connectives if, or and unless.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Philippe Schlenker},\n\tdate-added = {2009-07-01 20:20:58 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:02:15 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11050-012-9080-7},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\tkeywords = {presupposition projection; symmetry; incremental; processing; experiment},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {177-226},\n\ttitle = {Incremental vs. Symmetric Accounts of Presupposition Projection: An Experimental Approach},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Schlenker-SymExp.pdf},\n\tvolume = {20},\n\tyear = {2012},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11050-012-9080-7}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n The presupposition triggered by an expression E is generally satisfied by information that comes before rather than after E in the sentence or discourse. In Heim's classic theory (1983), this left-right asymmetry is encoded in the lexical semantics of dynamic connectives and operators. But several recent analyses offer a more nuanced approach, in which presupposition satisfaction has two separate components: a general principle (which varies from theory to theory) specifies under what conditions a presupposition triggered by an expression E is satisfied; and an `incremental' component specifies that the principle must be checked on the basis of information that comes before E. Several researchers take this incremental component to be a processing bias, which can be overcome at some cost. If so, it should be possible, though costly, to satisfy presuppositions `symmetrically', i.e. taking into account linguistic material that comes both before and after the presupposition trigger. We test this claim with experimental means. Using inferential (and to some extent acceptability) tasks involving `anaphoric' triggers, we show that in the propositional case symmetric readings are indeed possible (albeit degraded) in environments involving the connectives if, or and unless.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n inproceedings\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Free choice at no cost.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Bott, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2011, 2012. \n This is an initial version of Chemla and Bott (2014).\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Chemla:2012aa,\n\tauthor = {Chemla, Emmanuel and Bott, Lewis},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2011},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-22 00:25:15 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:48:11 +0000},\n\tnote = {This is an initial version of Chemla and Bott (2014).},\n\ttitle = {Free choice at no cost},\n\tyear = {2012}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2011\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Modularity and intuitions in formal semantics: the case of polarity items.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Homer, V.; and Rothschild, D.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics and Philosophy, 34(6): 537-570. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ModularityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 17 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla-Homer-Rothschild-NPI,\n\tabstract = {The presupposition triggered by an expression E is generally satisfied by information that comes before rather than after E in the sentence or discourse. In Heim's classic theory (1983), this left-right asymmetry is encoded in the lexical semantics of dynamic connectives and operators. But several recent analyses offer a more nuanced approach, in which presupposition satisfaction has two separate components: a general principle (which varies from theory to theory) specifies under what conditions a presupposition triggered by an expression E is satisfied; and an `incremental' component specifies that the principle must be checked on the basis of information that comes before E. Several researchers take this incremental component to be a processing bias, which can be overcome at some cost. If so, it should be possible, though costly, to satisfy presuppositions `symmetrically', i.e. taking into account linguistic material that comes both before and after the presupposition trigger. We test this claim with experimental means. Using inferential (and to some extent acceptability) tasks involving `anaphoric' triggers, we show that in the propositional case symmetric readings are indeed possible (albeit degraded) in environments involving the connectives if, or and unless.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Vincent Homer and Daniel Rothschild},\n\tdate-added = {2011-09-06 21:24:06 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:03:03 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10988-012-9106-0},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},\n\tnumber = {6},\n\tpages = {537-570},\n\ttitle = {Modularity and intuitions in formal semantics: the case of polarity items},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Homer-Rothschild-NPI.pdf},\n\tvolume = {34},\n\tyear = {2011},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-012-9106-0}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n The presupposition triggered by an expression E is generally satisfied by information that comes before rather than after E in the sentence or discourse. In Heim's classic theory (1983), this left-right asymmetry is encoded in the lexical semantics of dynamic connectives and operators. But several recent analyses offer a more nuanced approach, in which presupposition satisfaction has two separate components: a general principle (which varies from theory to theory) specifies under what conditions a presupposition triggered by an expression E is satisfied; and an `incremental' component specifies that the principle must be checked on the basis of information that comes before E. Several researchers take this incremental component to be a processing bias, which can be overcome at some cost. If so, it should be possible, though costly, to satisfy presuppositions `symmetrically', i.e. taking into account linguistic material that comes both before and after the presupposition trigger. We test this claim with experimental means. Using inferential (and to some extent acceptability) tasks involving `anaphoric' triggers, we show that in the propositional case symmetric readings are indeed possible (albeit degraded) in environments involving the connectives if, or and unless.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Experimental evidence for embedded scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 28(3): 359–400. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ExperimentalPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Experimental 2 page version\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{chemlaspector:eSI,\n\tabstract = {Scalar implicatures are traditionally viewed as pragmatic inferences which result from a reasoning about speakers' communicative intentions (Grice 1989). This view has been challenged in recent years by theories which propose that scalar implica- tures are a grammatical phenomenon. Such theories claim that scalar implicatures can be computed in embedded positions and enter into the recursive computation of meaning---something that is not expected under the traditional, pragmatic view. Recently, Geurts and Pouscoulous (2009) presented an experimental study in which embedded scalar implicatures were not detected. Using a novel version of the truth value judgment tasks, we provide evidence that subjects sometimes compute embed- ded scalar implicatures.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Benjamin Spector},\n\tdate-added = {2009-10-17 19:51:57 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:07:24 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/jos/ffq023},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Semantics},\n\tkeywords = {scalar implicatures, localism, globalism, experiment},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {359--400},\n\ttitle = {Experimental evidence for embedded scalar implicatures},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Spector-eSI.pdf},\n\turl_2_page_version = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-Spector-eSI-abstract.pdf},\n\tvolume = {28},\n\tyear = {2011},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffq023}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Scalar implicatures are traditionally viewed as pragmatic inferences which result from a reasoning about speakers' communicative intentions (Grice 1989). This view has been challenged in recent years by theories which propose that scalar implica- tures are a grammatical phenomenon. Such theories claim that scalar implicatures can be computed in embedded positions and enter into the recursive computation of meaning—something that is not expected under the traditional, pragmatic view. Recently, Geurts and Pouscoulous (2009) presented an experimental study in which embedded scalar implicatures were not detected. Using a novel version of the truth value judgment tasks, we provide evidence that subjects sometimes compute embed- ded scalar implicatures.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Expressible semantics for expressible counterfactuals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Review of Symbolic Logic, 4(1): 63–80. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ExpressiblePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{chemla:2009:ExpIf,\n\tabstract = {Lewis (1981) showed the equivalence between two dominant semantic frameworks for counterfactuals: ordering semantics, which relies on orders between possible worlds, and premise semantics, which relies on sets of propositions (so-called ordering sources). I define a natural, restricted version of premise semantics, expressible premise semantics, which is based on ordering sources containing only expressible propositions. First, I extend Lewis' (1981) equivalence result to expressible premise semantics and some corresponding expressible version of ordering semantics. Second, I show that expressible semantics are strictly less powerful than their nonexpressible counterparts, even when attention is restricted to the truth values of expressible counterfactuals. Assuming that the expressibility constraint is natural for premise semantics, this result breaks the equivalence between ordering semantics and (expressible) premise semantics. Finally, I show that these results cast doubt on various desirable conjectures, and in particular on a particular defense of the so-called limit assumption.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2009-09-12 22:24:46 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:11:42 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1017/S175502031000016X},\n\tjournal = {Review of Symbolic Logic},\n\tkeywords = {counterfactuals; ordering semantics; premise semantics; expressive power; limit assumption; relevance},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {63--80},\n\ttitle = {Expressible semantics for expressible counterfactuals},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-If.pdf},\n\tvolume = {4},\n\tyear = {2011},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S175502031000016X}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Lewis (1981) showed the equivalence between two dominant semantic frameworks for counterfactuals: ordering semantics, which relies on orders between possible worlds, and premise semantics, which relies on sets of propositions (so-called ordering sources). I define a natural, restricted version of premise semantics, expressible premise semantics, which is based on ordering sources containing only expressible propositions. First, I extend Lewis' (1981) equivalence result to expressible premise semantics and some corresponding expressible version of ordering semantics. Second, I show that expressible semantics are strictly less powerful than their nonexpressible counterparts, even when attention is restricted to the truth values of expressible counterfactuals. Assuming that the expressibility constraint is natural for premise semantics, this result breaks the equivalence between ordering semantics and (expressible) premise semantics. Finally, I show that these results cast doubt on various desirable conjectures, and in particular on a particular defense of the so-called limit assumption.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2010\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n incollection\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Experimental Detection of Embedded Implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; and Spector, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Aloni, M.; Bastiaanse, H.; de Jager, T.; and Schulz, K., editor(s), Logic, Language and Meaning: 17th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 16-18, 2009, Revised Selected Papers, pages 53–62. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010.\n This is an initial version of Chemla and Spector (2011).\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ExperimentalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Chemla2010,\n\taddress = {Berlin, Heidelberg},\n\tauthor = {Chemla, Emmanuel and Spector, Benjamin},\n\tbooktitle = {Logic, Language and Meaning: 17th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 16-18, 2009, Revised Selected Papers},\n\tdate-added = {2017-02-23 23:08:50 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-27 20:48:03 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/978-3-642-14287-1_6},\n\teditor = {Aloni, Maria and Bastiaanse, Harald and de Jager, Tikitu and Schulz, Katrin},\n\tisbn = {978-3-642-14287-1},\n\tnote = {This is an initial version of Chemla and Spector (2011).},\n\tpages = {53--62},\n\tpublisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},\n\ttitle = {Experimental Detection of Embedded Implicatures},\n\turl = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14287-1_6},\n\tyear = {2010},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14287-1_6}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2009\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Presuppositions of quantified sentences: experimental data.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics, 17(4): 299–340. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PresuppositionsPaper\n  \n \n \n \"Presuppositions more\n  \n \n \n \"Presuppositions poster\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 19 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla2007ExpPres,\n\tabstract = {Some theories (e.g., Beaver, 1994, 2001) assume that sentences with presupposition triggers in the scope of a quantifier carry an existential presupposition, as in (2), others (e.g., Heim, 1983 or Schlenker, 2008a,b) assume that they carry a universal presupposition, as in (3).\n(1) No student knows that he is lucky.\n(2) Existential presupposition: At least one student is lucky. \n(3) Universal presupposition: Every student is lucky.\nThis work is an experimental investigation of this issue. In short, naive speakers were recruited to evaluate the robustness of the inference from (1) to (3). The first result is that presuppositions triggered from the scope of the quantifier No are universal. More importantly, the present results suggest that the presuppositions triggered from the scope of a given quantifier depend on the quantifier.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2009-11-23 19:18:51 +0100},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11050-009-9043-9},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\tkeywords = {projection},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {299--340},\n\tread = {No},\n\ttitle = {{Presuppositions of quantified sentences: experimental data}},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Pres-Exp.pdf},\n\turl_more = {http://osf.io/x5qa2},\n\turl_poster = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/PosterOSU.pdf},\n\tvolume = {17},\n\tyear = {2009},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11050-009-9043-9}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Some theories (e.g., Beaver, 1994, 2001) assume that sentences with presupposition triggers in the scope of a quantifier carry an existential presupposition, as in (2), others (e.g., Heim, 1983 or Schlenker, 2008a,b) assume that they carry a universal presupposition, as in (3). (1) No student knows that he is lucky. (2) Existential presupposition: At least one student is lucky. (3) Universal presupposition: Every student is lucky. This work is an experimental investigation of this issue. In short, naive speakers were recruited to evaluate the robustness of the inference from (1) to (3). The first result is that presuppositions triggered from the scope of the quantifier No are universal. More importantly, the present results suggest that the presuppositions triggered from the scope of a given quantifier depend on the quantifier.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Universal Implicatures and Free Choice Effects: Experimental Data.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics and Pragmatics, 2(2): 1–33. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Universal pdf\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{chemla:2009:implicatures,\n\tabstract = {Universal inferences like (i) have been taken as evidence for a local/syntactic treatment of scalar implicatures (i.e. theories where the enrichment of "some" into "some but not all" can happen sub-sententially):\n\n(i) Everybody read some of the books\n--> Everybody read [some but not all the books].\n\nIn this paper, I provide experimental evidence which casts doubt on this argument. The counter-argument relies on a new set of data involving free choice inferences (a sub-species of scalar implicatures) and negative counterparts of (i), namely sentences with the quantifier "no" instead of "every".\n\nThe results show that the globalist account of scalar implicatures is incomplete (mainly because of free choice inferences) but that the distribution of universal inferences made available by the localist move remains incomplete as well (mainly because of the negative cases).},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2009-05-23 14:22:53 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:15:52 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.3765/sp.2.2},\n\tjournal = {Semantics and Pragmatics},\n\tkeywords = {experiment, scalar implicatures, free choice},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {1--33},\n\ttitle = {Universal Implicatures and Free Choice Effects: Experimental Data},\n\turl_pdf = {http://semprag.org/article/view/sp.2.2/72},\n\tvolume = {2},\n\tyear = {2009},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.2.2}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Universal inferences like (i) have been taken as evidence for a local/syntactic treatment of scalar implicatures (i.e. theories where the enrichment of \"some\" into \"some but not all\" can happen sub-sententially): (i) Everybody read some of the books –> Everybody read [some but not all the books]. In this paper, I provide experimental evidence which casts doubt on this argument. The counter-argument relies on a new set of data involving free choice inferences (a sub-species of scalar implicatures) and negative counterparts of (i), namely sentences with the quantifier \"no\" instead of \"every\". The results show that the globalist account of scalar implicatures is incomplete (mainly because of free choice inferences) but that the distribution of universal inferences made available by the localist move remains incomplete as well (mainly because of the negative cases).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Categorizing Words Using `Frequent Frames': What Cross-Linguistic Analyses Reveal About Distributional Acquisition Strategies.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.; Mintz, T. H.; Bernal, S.; and Christophe, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Developmental Science, 12(3): 396–406. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CategorizingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla:2007frfr,\n\tabstract = {Mintz (2003) described a distributional environment called a frame, defined as the co-occurrence of two context words with one intervening target word. Analyses of English child-directed speech showed that words that fell within any frequently occurring frame consistently belonged to the same grammatical category (e.g. noun, verb, adjective, etc.). In this paper, we first generalize this result to French, a language in which the function word system allows patterns that are potentially detrimental to a frame-based analysis procedure. Second, we show that the discontinuity of the chosen environments (i.e. the fact that target words are framed by the context words) is crucial for the mechanism to be efficient. This property might be relevant for any computational approach to grammatical categorization. Finally, we investigate a recursive application of the procedure and observe that the categorization is paradoxically worse when context elements are categories rather than actual lexical items. Item-specificity is thus also a core computational principle for this type of algorithm. Our analysis, along with results from behavioural studies (G\\'omez, 2002; G\\'omez and Maye, 2005; Mintz, 2006), provides strong support for frames as a basis for the acquisition of grammatical categories by infants. Discontinuity and item-specificity appear to be crucial features.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla and Toby H. Mintz and Savita Bernal and Anne Christophe},\n\tdate-added = {2007-10-23 10:17:44 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:19:48 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00825.x},\n\tjournal = {{Developmental Science}},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {396--406},\n\ttitle = {{Categorizing Words Using `Frequent Frames': What Cross-Linguistic Analyses Reveal About Distributional Acquisition Strategies}},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Frequent%20Frames.pdf},\n\tvolume = {12},\n\tyear = {2009},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00825.x}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Mintz (2003) described a distributional environment called a frame, defined as the co-occurrence of two context words with one intervening target word. Analyses of English child-directed speech showed that words that fell within any frequently occurring frame consistently belonged to the same grammatical category (e.g. noun, verb, adjective, etc.). In this paper, we first generalize this result to French, a language in which the function word system allows patterns that are potentially detrimental to a frame-based analysis procedure. Second, we show that the discontinuity of the chosen environments (i.e. the fact that target words are framed by the context words) is crucial for the mechanism to be efficient. This property might be relevant for any computational approach to grammatical categorization. Finally, we investigate a recursive application of the procedure and observe that the categorization is paradoxically worse when context elements are categories rather than actual lexical items. Item-specificity is thus also a core computational principle for this type of algorithm. Our analysis, along with results from behavioural studies (Gómez, 2002; Gómez and Maye, 2005; Mintz, 2006), provides strong support for frames as a basis for the acquisition of grammatical categories by infants. Discontinuity and item-specificity appear to be crucial features.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n incollection\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n An anti-introduction to presupposition.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Égré, P.; and Magri, G., editor(s), Presuppositions and implicatures. MIT Working Papers in Linguistics, 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Chemla:2008kx,\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tbooktitle = {Presuppositions and implicatures},\n\tdate-added = {2008-12-11 03:15:39 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-22 01:29:31 +0000},\n\teditor = {\\'Egr{\\'e}, Paul and Magri, Giorgio},\n\tpublisher = {MIT Working Papers in Linguistics},\n\ttitle = {An anti-introduction to presupposition},\n\tyear = {2009}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An experimental approach to adverbial modification.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Sauerland, U.; and Yatsushiro, K., editor(s), Semantics and Pragmatics: From Experiment to Theory, pages 249–263. Palgrave Macmillan New York, 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"AnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Chemla:2008AM,\n\tabstract = {<p>Adverbial modification gives rise to inferences which pattern very much like presuppositions. In particular, these inferences persist when the original sentence &mdash;e.g., (i)&mdash; is embedded in various downward entailing environments &mdash;e.g., negation in (ii), the scope of the quantifiers 'none' and 'less than 3' in (iii) and (iv):</p>\n\n<ol class="examples">\n<li>John arrived late.<br />\n\t<i>implies that:</i> John came.</li>\n<li>John didn't arrive late.<br />\n\t<i>also implies that:</i> John came.</li>\n<li>None of these 10 students arrived late.<br />\n\t<i>implies that:</i> all of the 10 students involved came.</li>\n<li>Less than 3 of these 10 students arrived late.<br />\n\t<i>implies that:</i> all of the 10 students involved came.</li>\n</ol>\n\n<p>In this paper, adverbial modification is compared to presuppositions and to (indirect) scalar implicatures which also show intriguing similarities with presuppositions. The present experiment reveals differences between implicatures and presuppositions, both in terms of their projection properties and the underlying derivation processes (reaction times). However, in this very same experiment, adverbial modification cannot be distinguished from any of the other two phenomena.</p>\n\n<p>These results paradoxically argue against a strong distinction between presuppositions and scalar implicatures. They support recent proposals which account for presuppositions in terms of implicatures (Simons 2001, Schlenker 2008, Chemla 2009) which would allow adverbial modification to fall in the middle of this hierarchial spectrum of linguistic inferences.</p>},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tbooktitle = {Semantics and Pragmatics: From Experiment to Theory},\n\tdate-added = {2008-07-10 15:38:12 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:26:25 +0000},\n\teditor = {Uli Sauerland and Kazuko Yatsushiro},\n\tpages = {249--263},\n\tpublisher = {Palgrave Macmillan New York},\n\ttitle = {An experimental approach to adverbial modification},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-AdvModif-Xprag.pdf},\n\tyear = {2009},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-AdvModif-Xprag.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n

Adverbial modification gives rise to inferences which pattern very much like presuppositions. In particular, these inferences persist when the original sentence —e.g., (i)— is embedded in various downward entailing environments —e.g., negation in (ii), the scope of the quantifiers 'none' and 'less than 3' in (iii) and (iv):

  1. John arrived late.
    implies that: John came.
  2. John didn't arrive late.
    also implies that: John came.
  3. None of these 10 students arrived late.
    implies that: all of the 10 students involved came.
  4. Less than 3 of these 10 students arrived late.
    implies that: all of the 10 students involved came.

In this paper, adverbial modification is compared to presuppositions and to (indirect) scalar implicatures which also show intriguing similarities with presuppositions. The present experiment reveals differences between implicatures and presuppositions, both in terms of their projection properties and the underlying derivation processes (reaction times). However, in this very same experiment, adverbial modification cannot be distinguished from any of the other two phenomena.

These results paradoxically argue against a strong distinction between presuppositions and scalar implicatures. They support recent proposals which account for presuppositions in terms of implicatures (Simons 2001, Schlenker 2008, Chemla 2009) which would allow adverbial modification to fall in the middle of this hierarchial spectrum of linguistic inferences.

\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n unpublished\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Similarity: towards a Unified Account of Scalar Implicatures, Free Choice Permission and Presupposition Projection.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2009.\n Ms. LSCP & MIT. Also similar in content to Chapter 5 of my dissertation.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Similarity:Paper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 21 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{chemla2007sifcp,\n\tabstract = {I propose a new theory of scalar implicatures: the speaker should be in the same epistemic status with respect to alternatives obtained via similar transformations (e.g., replacements of a scalar items with various stronger items). This theory extends naturally to explain presupposition projection. Cases where scalar items and presupposition triggers co-occur are also accounted for. The main focus is the unification between various phenomena: scalar implicatures, free choice effects and presupposition projection. Yet, the system can be split into independent proposals for each of these issues.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2007-12-05 09:20:33 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-07-28 09:50:58 +0000},\n\tnote = {Ms. LSCP \\& MIT. Also similar in content to Chapter 5 of my dissertation.},\n\ttitle = {Similarity: towards a Unified Account of Scalar Implicatures, Free Choice Permission and Presupposition Projection},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-SIandPres.pdf},\n\tyear = {2009},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-SIandPres.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n I propose a new theory of scalar implicatures: the speaker should be in the same epistemic status with respect to alternatives obtained via similar transformations (e.g., replacements of a scalar items with various stronger items). This theory extends naturally to explain presupposition projection. Cases where scalar items and presupposition triggers co-occur are also accounted for. The main focus is the unification between various phenomena: scalar implicatures, free choice effects and presupposition projection. Yet, the system can be split into independent proposals for each of these issues.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2008\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Transparency Theory: Empirical Issues and Psycholinguistic Routes.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Linguistics, 34(3): 229–236. 2008.\n Commentary.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TransparencyPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla:2008TTTL,\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2008-07-03 16:03:20 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-03-12 15:53:38 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1515/THLI.2008.015},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Linguistics},\n\tnote = {Commentary.},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {229--236},\n\ttitle = {Transparency Theory: Empirical Issues and Psycholinguistic Routes},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Chemla-TransparencyComments.pdf},\n\tvolume = {34},\n\tyear = {2008},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2008.015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An Epistemic Step for Anti-Presupposition.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 25(2): 141–173. 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"AnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla:2008AntiPres,\n\tabstract = {Sentence (1) strongly suggests that the speaker does not have a sister:\n(1) John believes that I have a sister.\na. Alternative: John knows that I have a sister.\nb. Actual inference: the speaker does not have a sister.\nc. Predicted inference: it is not common belief that the speaker has a sister.\nAccording to Heim (1991), Percus (2006), and Sauerland (2006), this inference should follow from the comparison of (1) to (1a). However, such an analysis would only predict a very weak implicature: it is not common belief that the speaker has a sister.\nI propose to strengthen this prediction by two means. First, I rely on a precise understanding of the modern Stalnakerian view of presuppositions and common ground (Stalnaker, 1998, 2002; von Fintel, 2000; Schlenker, 2006). Second, I argue that this inference depends on contextual factors. More precisely, I show that the Competence Assumption (see Spector, 2003, van Rooij and Schulz, 2004, and Sauerland, 2004) necessary to obtain secondary scalar implicatures should be supplemented with an Authority Assumption. I motivate this additional assumption on independent empirical grounds. Finally, I show how my proposal accounts for a wide variety of inferences with fine variations governed by (i) contextual differences and (ii) specific properties of the presupposition triggers involved.},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2007-10-23 09:58:43 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:21:14 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/jos/ffm017},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {141--173},\n\ttitle = {{An Epistemic Step for Anti-Presupposition}},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/AntiPresuppositionAndEpistemicStep.pdf},\n\tvolume = {25},\n\tyear = {2008},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffm017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentence (1) strongly suggests that the speaker does not have a sister: (1) John believes that I have a sister. a. Alternative: John knows that I have a sister. b. Actual inference: the speaker does not have a sister. c. Predicted inference: it is not common belief that the speaker has a sister. According to Heim (1991), Percus (2006), and Sauerland (2006), this inference should follow from the comparison of (1) to (1a). However, such an analysis would only predict a very weak implicature: it is not common belief that the speaker has a sister. I propose to strengthen this prediction by two means. First, I rely on a precise understanding of the modern Stalnakerian view of presuppositions and common ground (Stalnaker, 1998, 2002; von Fintel, 2000; Schlenker, 2006). Second, I argue that this inference depends on contextual factors. More precisely, I show that the Competence Assumption (see Spector, 2003, van Rooij and Schulz, 2004, and Sauerland, 2004) necessary to obtain secondary scalar implicatures should be supplemented with an Authority Assumption. I motivate this additional assumption on independent empirical grounds. Finally, I show how my proposal accounts for a wide variety of inferences with fine variations governed by (i) contextual differences and (ii) specific properties of the presupposition triggers involved.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n inproceedings\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Projecting presuppositions with scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Alte Grø nn, editor(s), Proceedings of SuB 12, Oslo: Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages, University of Oslo., pages 81-91, 2008. \n This is an initial version of the Similarity Theory.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Chemla2008SuB,\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of SuB 12, Oslo: Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages, University of Oslo.},\n\tdate-added = {2008-07-09 14:02:22 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:48:58 +0000},\n\teditor = {{Alte Gr\\o nn}},\n\tnote = {This is an initial version of the Similarity Theory.},\n\tpages = {81-91},\n\ttitle = {Projecting presuppositions with scalar implicatures},\n\tyear = {2008}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n phdthesis\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Présuppositions et implicatures scalaires: études formelles et expérimentales.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Ph.D. Thesis, EHESS, 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@phdthesis{chemla2008phd,\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2009-05-24 20:49:42 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 01:50:56 +0000},\n\tschool = {EHESS},\n\ttitle = {Pr\\'esuppositions et implicatures scalaires: \\'etudes formelles et exp\\'erimentales},\n\tyear = {2008}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2007\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n article\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n French both: a gap in the theory of antipresupposition.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Snippets, 15: 4-5. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FrenchPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 10 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chemla:2007both,\n\tabstract = {Contrary to other languages, there is no word for 'both' in French. This is relevant to find the proper account of the deviance of "Philippe broke all of his arms" and of its French equivalent "Philippe s'est cass{\\'e} les deux bras.``},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2007-10-23 10:10:10 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-23 23:22:01 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Snippets},\n\tpages = {4-5},\n\ttitle = {French \\textit{both}: a gap in the theory of antipresupposition},\n\turl = {http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/allegati/snippets15001.pdf},\n\tvolume = {15},\n\tyear = {2007},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/allegati/snippets15001.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Contrary to other languages, there is no word for 'both' in French. This is relevant to find the proper account of the deviance of \"Philippe broke all of his arms\" and of its French equivalent \"Philippe s'est cassé les deux bras.``\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2006\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n unpublished\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Local Implicatures and Double Negatives.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2006.\n Ms. LSCP.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"LocalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Chemla:2006rz,\n\tabstract = {In this note, I investigate a particular aspect of Chierchia (2004)'s local derivation of implicatures: the system relies on a hardwire asymmetry between downward and upward monotonic operators. As a result, logically equivalent sentences might have different implicatures. I argue that it reveals a lack of motivation for some operations in the system.\n\nJohn ate an apple, a banana or an orange.\nPredicted implicature: John ate exactly one of these fruits.\n\nIt's not true that John did not eat an apple, a banana or an orange.Predicted implicature</em>: If John ate an orange, he did not eat any apple or banana.\n},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2008-10-23 20:19:23 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-27 19:47:35 +0000},\n\tnote = {Ms. LSCP.},\n\ttitle = {Local Implicatures and Double Negatives},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Localism-DoubleNegatives.pdf},\n\tyear = {2006},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/Localism-DoubleNegatives.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n In this note, I investigate a particular aspect of Chierchia (2004)'s local derivation of implicatures: the system relies on a hardwire asymmetry between downward and upward monotonic operators. As a result, logically equivalent sentences might have different implicatures. I argue that it reveals a lack of motivation for some operations in the system. John ate an apple, a banana or an orange. Predicted implicature: John ate exactly one of these fruits. It's not true that John did not eat an apple, a banana or an orange.Predicted implicature: If John ate an orange, he did not eat any apple or banana. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Aren't Dummy Alternatives only Technical Shortcuts?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2006.\n Ms. LSCP & MIT.\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Aren'tPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Chemla:2006DummyAlt,\n\tabstract = {The transparency theory seems to make heavy use of tautologous pieces of sentences. I discuss here the necessity of such a baffling technical trick to match the achievement of dynamic semantics (Heim, 1983). I show that 1) tautologies are not necessary when the language is limited to the propositional fragment proposed in the first part of Schlenker's analysis and 2) they are necessary for quantificational cases (and similarly with modal operators but this is not part of Schlenker's discussion). Finally, I suggest that this trick could actually be avoided in more expressive frameworks.\n},\n\tauthor = {Emmanuel Chemla},\n\tdate-added = {2007-05-15 17:20:26 -0400},\n\tdate-modified = {2017-02-27 19:47:56 +0000},\n\tnote = {Ms. LSCP \\& MIT.},\n\ttitle = {{Aren't Dummy Alternatives only Technical Shortcuts?}},\n\turl = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/DummyAlternatives.pdf},\n\tyear = {2006},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://www.emmanuel.chemla.free.fr/Material/DummyAlternatives.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n The transparency theory seems to make heavy use of tautologous pieces of sentences. I discuss here the necessity of such a baffling technical trick to match the achievement of dynamic semantics (Heim, 1983). I show that 1) tautologies are not necessary when the language is limited to the propositional fragment proposed in the first part of Schlenker's analysis and 2) they are necessary for quantificational cases (and similarly with modal operators but this is not part of Schlenker's discussion). Finally, I suggest that this trick could actually be avoided in more expressive frameworks. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n\n
\n"}; document.write(bibbase_data.data);