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\n \n 2025\n \n \n (8)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Inclusionary and Exclusionary Preferences: A Test of Three Cognitive Mechanisms.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Landau-Wells, M.; Lydic, K. O; Kennedy, J.; Mittman, B. G; Thompson, T. W; Gupta, A.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Political Behavior. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Inclusionary$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Inclusionary and Exclusionary Preferences: A Test of Three Cognitive Mechanisms},\nauthor = {Marika Landau-Wells and Kirsten O Lydic and Joachim Kennedy and Benjamin G Mittman and Todd W Thompson and Akhil Gupta and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-025-10091-x},\ndoi = {10.1007/s11109-025-10091-x},\nissn = {},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-11-22},\nurldate = {2025-11-22},\njournal = {Political Behavior},\nabstract = {Exclusionary social policies take a significant toll on the mental and physical health \nof targeted groups. Support for specific exclusionary policies does not always align \nwith general antipathy towards the targeted group, however. Does support for \nspecific exclusionary policies rely on particular thought processes (i.e., cognitive \nmechanisms)? Does opposition? We investigate these questions through the lens of \n“bathroom laws” across two studies. In Study 1, we use functional neuroimaging \nto test three candidate cognitive mechanisms from the literature: (1) threat-related \nemotions (e.g., fear, disgust) supporting exclusionary preferences; (2) mentalizing \n(e.g., empathy, perspective-taking) supporting inclusionary preferences; and (3) \nself-regulation (e.g., aligning one’s behavior with one’s goals) supporting inclusion\nary preferences. Consistent with the intergroup conflict and prejudice literatures, \nwe find evidence of a motivated self-regulation mechanism in bathroom law op\nponents. In Study 2, we investigate a possible source of this motivation using text \nanalysis of open-ended policy preference justifications. We find that bathroom law \nopponents link their policy preference to a small number of specific values, par\nticularly autonomy of action. Taken together, these studies point to a value-driven, \nmotivational account of inclusionary preferences that reconciles puzzling patterns \nof public opinion, offers new levers for tolerance interventions, and provides some \ninsight into the brain-basis of political behavior.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An Efficient Multifunction fMRI Localizer for High-Level Visual, Auditory, and Cognitive Regions in Humans .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mavi, A. I.; Hutchinson, S.; Fedorenko, E.; Saxe, R. R.; Kamps, F. S.; Regev, T. I.; Chen, E. M.; and Kanwisher, N. G.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Imaging Neuroscience - MIT Press. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"An$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {An Efficient Multifunction fMRI Localizer for High-Level Visual, Auditory, and Cognitive Regions in Humans },\nauthor = {Ammar I. Mavi and Sam Hutchinson and Evelina Fedorenko and Rebecca R. Saxe and Frederik S. Kamps and Tamar I. Regev and Emily M. Chen and Nancy G. Kanwisher},\nurl = {https://direct.mit.edu/imag/article/doi/10.1162/IMAG.a.905/133159},\ndoi = {10.1162/IMAG.a.905},\nissn = {2837-6056},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-09-15},\nurldate = {2025-09-15},\njournal = {Imaging Neuroscience - MIT Press},\nabstract = {One of the most robust findings in human cognitive neuroscience is the discovery that many regions of the cortex are engaged in distinctive, often very specific, functions. Although these regions are found in approximately the same location in almost all typical participants, their exact location varies from one individual to the next. Thus the first step in studying these regions is to identify them in each participant individually. Standard functional localizers have been devised to accomplish this goal, but most localizers identify only a few regions. Many important questions in modern neuroscience can only be answered by measuring the responses of multiple cortical regions at the same time. Here we introduce a new Efficient Multifunction fMRI localizer (EMFL) in which visual and auditory conditions are presented simultaneously, enabling the identification, in just 14 minutes of fMRI scan time, of fourteen of the most widely-studied cortical regions: those selectively engaged in perceiving faces, places, bodies, words, objects, and speech sounds; understanding language and other people’s thoughts; and engaging broadly in demanding cognitive tasks (the “multiple demand” system). We validate the EMFL by showing that it identifies the major functional regions of interest as well as the standard localizers do, in a quarter of the scan time. The stimuli and presentation code for this new localizer are publicly available, enabling future studies to efficiently identify the major functional regions of interest with the same procedure across labs.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What people learn from punishment: A cognitive model.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Radkani, S.; Tenenbaum, J. B.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 122: e2500730122. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"What$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {What people learn from punishment: A cognitive model},\nauthor = {Setayesh Radkani and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2500730122},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.2500730122},\nissn = {1091-6490},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-08-04},\nurldate = {2025-08-04},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {122},\nissue = {32},\npages = {e2500730122},\nabstract = {Authorities, from parents of toddlers to leaders of formal institutions, use punishment to communicate disapproval and enforce social norms. Ideally, from whether and how severely a transgression is punished, targets and observers infer shared social norms. Yet in light of every punitive choice, observers also evaluate the motives and legitimacy of the authority. Here, we show that the effects of punishment can only be understood by considering these inferences simultaneously. We measured human observers’ joint inferences empirically in three preregistered experiments (N = 1,254) and developed a rational Bayesian model using an inverse planning framework that captures and explains these inferences and their interactions quantitatively and parsimoniously. When people have different priors about norms or authorities, the model predicted and we experimentally confirmed that observing punishment by the authority can sustain polarization. This work reveals the rational logic behind how people learn from punishment and a key constraint on the function of punishment in establishing shared social norms.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Origins of Face Responses in the Human Cortex: fNIRS and fMRI Evidence From Infants.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; and Kosakowski, H. L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Directions in Psychological Science, 0: 0. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Origins$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Origins of Face Responses in the Human Cortex: fNIRS and fMRI Evidence From Infants},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Heather L. Kosakowski},\nurl = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09637214251327113, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/saxe-kosakowski-2025-origins-of-face-responses-in-the-human-cortex-fnirs-and-fmri-evidence-from-infants.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1177/09637214251327113},\nissn = {0963-7214},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-04-18},\njournal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},\nvolume = {0},\nissue = {OnlineFirst},\npages = {0},\nabstract = {In adults, cortical regions in the fusiform face area (FFA), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) respond selectively to faces but underlie distinct perceptual and social processes. When do each of these regions, and their distinctive functions, develop? We reviewed recent studies of awake human infants’ cortical responses to faces using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) and functional MRI (fMRI). The results converged and do not support a slow, sequential posterior-to-anterior development of face-selective responses. Instead, cortical face-selective responses arise very early and simultaneously in infancy and may reflect distinctively social processes from the start.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Beliefs about social dynamics and open science.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Thomas, A. J.; Bourg, C.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n R. Soc. Open Sci, 12(230061). 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Beliefs$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{thomasBeliefsSocialDynamics2025,\ntitle = {Beliefs about social dynamics and open science},\nauthor = {Ashley J. Thomas and Chris Bourg and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.230061, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/thomas-et-al-beliefs-about-social-dynamics-and-open-science.pdf, PDF\nhttps://osf.io/4g2tu/, OSF},\ndoi = {10.1098/rsos.230061},\nissn = {2054-5703},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-04-09},\njournal = {R. Soc. Open Sci},\nvolume = {12},\nnumber = {230061},\nissue = {5},\nabstract = {Open science advocates argue that publicly and freely available scientific manuscripts, data and code will have wide-reaching collective benefits. However, the adoption of open science practices may depend on the fit between researchers' perceptions of open science and the social dynamics of their field. For example, if researchers understand open science as primarily a means of cooperating with other researchers, its adoption may be faster and more effective among researchers who see their field as less competitive and less hierarchical. The present studies operationalize open science attitudes as plans to publicly share manuscripts/preprints, code, stimuli/instruments and data, as well as participants’ perceptions of the importance of these practices. In Study 1, researchers perceived the social dynamics of their field (competition and hierarchy) as distinct from the traits of individuals in their field (warmth and competence). In Study 2, neither researchers’ perceptions of social dynamics, nor their view of open science as motivated by cooperation, predicted their attitudes to open science practices. However, attitudes about open science were generally very positive among researchers who opt-in to a study about open science, limiting the variance to be explained. Moreover, people’s self-reported motivations for sharing manuscripts and materials differed from their perceptions of why others share manuscripts and materials. Study 3 tested the same questions in an independent and more representative sample. Results of Study 3 agreed with results of Study 2: neither researchers’ perceptions of social dynamics, nor their view of open science as motivated by cooperation, predicted their open science practices. Again, attitudes about open science were generally very positive among researchers even in this representative sample and people’s self-reported motivations for sharing manuscripts and materials differed from their perceptions of why others share manuscripts and materials.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n

\n Open science advocates argue that publicly and freely available scientific manuscripts, data and code will have wide-reaching collective benefits. However, the adoption of open science practices may depend on the fit between researchers' perceptions of open science and the social dynamics of their field. For example, if researchers understand open science as primarily a means of cooperating with other researchers, its adoption may be faster and more effective among researchers who see their field as less competitive and less hierarchical. The present studies operationalize open science attitudes as plans to publicly share manuscripts/preprints, code, stimuli/instruments and data, as well as participants’ perceptions of the importance of these practices. In Study 1, researchers perceived the social dynamics of their field (competition and hierarchy) as distinct from the traits of individuals in their field (warmth and competence). In Study 2, neither researchers’ perceptions of social dynamics, nor their view of open science as motivated by cooperation, predicted their attitudes to open science practices. However, attitudes about open science were generally very positive among researchers who opt-in to a study about open science, limiting the variance to be explained. Moreover, people’s self-reported motivations for sharing manuscripts and materials differed from their perceptions of why others share manuscripts and materials. Study 3 tested the same questions in an independent and more representative sample. Results of Study 3 agreed with results of Study 2: neither researchers’ perceptions of social dynamics, nor their view of open science as motivated by cooperation, predicted their open science practices. Again, attitudes about open science were generally very positive among researchers even in this representative sample and people’s self-reported motivations for sharing manuscripts and materials differed from their perceptions of why others share manuscripts and materials.\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n How Do Infants Experience Caregiving?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Thomas, A. J.; Steele, C. M.; Gopnik, A.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Daedalus, 154: 14–35. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"How$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {How Do Infants Experience Caregiving?},\nauthor = {Ashley J. Thomas and Christina M. Steele and Alison Gopnik and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/daed_a_02121.pdf, PDF\nhttps://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/154/1/14/127945, Publisher},\ndoi = {10.1162/daed_a_02121},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-02-01},\njournal = {Daedalus},\nvolume = {154},\nissue = {1},\npages = {14–35},\nabstract = {Almost all of human infants’ experience and learning takes place in the context of caregiving relationships. This essay considers how infants understand the care they receive. We begin by outlining plausible features of an “intuitive theory” of care. In this intuitive theory, caregiving has both a distinctive foundational structure and distinctive features that differentiate it from other social relationships. We then review methods and findings from research on infants’ understanding of people and social relationships. We propose that even before infants can use language, they may understand caregiving as an abstract intuitive theory with some features in common with how adults think about caregiving. In particular, infants understand care relationships as intimate, altruistic, and asymmetric. We review work that starts to shed light on this proposal, including the findings that infants distinguish between intimate relationships and merely positive ones and that they have asymmetric expectations of responses to distress in intimate relationships between large and small individuals. The proposal that infants can make these inferences has societal and political implications for how we structure caregiving in early life.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Representation of navigational affordances and ego-motion in the occipital place area.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kamps, F. S.; Chen, E.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Imaging Neuroscience, 3: imag_a_00424. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Representation$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{,\ntitle = {Representation of navigational affordances and ego-motion in the occipital place area},\nauthor = {Frederik S. Kamps and Emily Chen and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/imag_a_00424.pdf, PDF\nhttps://direct.mit.edu/imag/article/doi/10.1162/imag_a_00424/125630, Publisher\nhttps://osf.io/6yehp/?view_only=53ba7725d61343a29a2e3e6da5d75f28, OSF\nhttps://openneuro.org/datasets/ds005783/versions/1.0.1, Dataset\n},\ndoi = {10.1162/imag_a_00424},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-01-10},\nurldate = {2025-01-10},\njournal = {Imaging Neuroscience},\nvolume = {3},\npages = {imag_a_00424},\nabstract = {Humans effortlessly use vision to plan and guide navigation through the local environment, or “scene.” A network of three cortical regions responds selectively to visual scene information, including the occipital (OPA), parahippocampal (PPA), and medial place areas (MPA)—but how this network supports visually guided navigation is unclear. Recent evidence suggests that one region, in particular, the OPA, supports visual representations for navigation, while PPA and MPA support other aspects of scene processing. However, most previous studies tested only static scene images, which lack the dynamic experience of navigating through scenes. We used dynamic movie stimuli to test whether OPA, PPA, and MPA represent two critical kinds of navigationally relevant information: navigational affordances (e.g., can I walk to the left, right, or both?) and ego-motion (e.g., am I walking forward or backward? turning left or right?). We found that OPA is sensitive to both affordances and ego-motion, as well as the conflict between these cues—for example, turning toward vs. away from an open doorway. These effects were significantly weaker or absent in PPA and MPA. Responses in OPA were also dissociable from those in early visual cortex, consistent with the idea that OPA responses are not merely explained by lower-level visual features. OPA responses to affordances and ego-motion were stronger in the contralateral than in ipsilateral visual field, suggesting that OPA encodes navigationally relevant information within an egocentric reference frame. Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that OPA contains visual representations that are useful for planning and guiding navigation through scenes.},\nhowpublished = {bioRxiv},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n How will developmental neuroimaging contribute to the prediction of neurodevelopmental or psychiatric disorders? Challenges and opportunities.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Pérez-Edgar, K.; Dozier, M.; Saxe, R.; and MacDuffie, K. E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Elsevier Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 71: 101490. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"How$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {How will developmental neuroimaging contribute to the prediction of neurodevelopmental or psychiatric disorders? Challenges and opportunities},\nauthor = {Koraly Pérez-Edgar and Mary Dozier and Rebecca Saxe and Katherine E. MacDuffie},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/DCN-2025.pdf, PDF\nhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1878929324001518, Publisher},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.dcn.2024.101490},\nyear  = {2025},\ndate = {2025-01-04},\njournal = {Elsevier Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience},\nvolume = {71},\npages = {101490},\nabstract = {Successful developmental neuroimaging efforts require interdisciplinary expertise to ground scientific questions in knowledge of human development, modify and create technologies and data processing pipelines suited to the young brain, and ensure research procedures meet the needs and protect the interests of young children and their caregivers. This paper brings together four interdisciplinary perspectives to tackle a set of questions that are central for the field to address as we imagine a future role for developmental neuroimaging in the prediction of neurodevelopmental or psychiatric disorders: 1) How do we generate a strong evidence base for causality and clinical relevance? 2) How do we ensure the integrity of the data and support fair and wide access? 3) How can these technologies be implemented in the clinic? 4) What are the ethical obligations for neuroimaging researchers working with infants and young children?},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2024\n \n \n (7)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n How rational inference about authority debunking can curtail, sustain, or spread belief polarization.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Radkani, S.; Landau-Wells, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PNAS Nexus, 3: 393. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"How$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {How rational inference about authority debunking can curtail, sustain, or spread belief polarization},\nauthor = {Setayesh Radkani and Marika Landau-Wells and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/3/10/pgae393/7821174, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/radkani-2024.pdf, PDF\n},\ndoi = {10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae393},\nyear  = {2024},\ndate = {2024-10-15},\nurldate = {2025-10-15},\njournal = {PNAS Nexus},\nvolume = {3},\nissue = {10},\npages = {393},\nabstract = {In polarized societies, divided subgroups of people have different perspectives on a range of topics. Aiming to reduce polarization, authorities may use debunking to lend support to one perspective over another. Debunking by authorities gives all observers shared information, which could reduce disagreement. In practice, however, debunking may have no effect or could even contribute to further polarization of beliefs. We developed a cognitively inspired model of observers’ rational inferences from an authority’s debunking. After observing each debunking attempt, simulated observers simultaneously update their beliefs about the perspective underlying the debunked claims and about the authority’s motives, using an intuitive causal model of the authority’s decision-making process. We varied the observers’ prior beliefs and uncertainty systematically. Simulations generated a range of outcomes, from belief convergence (less common) to persistent divergence (more common). In many simulations, observers who initially held shared beliefs about the authority later acquired polarized beliefs about the authority’s biases and commitment to truth. These polarized beliefs constrained the authority’s influence on new topics, making it possible for belief polarization to spread. We discuss the implications of the model with respect to beliefs about elections.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Perceptual and conceptual novelty independently guide infant looking behaviour: a systematic review and meta-analysis.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kunin, L.; Piccolo, S. H.; Saxe, R.; and Liu, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature Human Behaviour, 8: 2342–2356. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Perceptual$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Perceptual and conceptual novelty independently guide infant looking behaviour: a systematic review and meta-analysis},\nauthor = {Linette Kunin and Sabrina H. Piccolo and Rebecca Saxe and Shari Liu },\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/s41562-024-01965-x.pdf, PDF\nhttps://osf.io/jghc3, OSF\nhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-024-01965-x, Publisher},\ndoi = {10.1038/s41562-024-01965-x},\nyear  = {2024},\ndate = {2024-10-15},\nurldate = {2024-10-15},\njournal = {Nature Human Behaviour},\nvolume = {8},\npages = {2342–2356},\nabstract = {Human infants are born with their eyes open and an otherwise limited motor repertoire; thus, studies measuring infant looking are commonly used to investigate the developmental origins of perception and cognition. However, scholars have long expressed concerns about the reliability and interpretation of looking behaviours. We evaluated these concerns using a pre-registered (https://osf.io/jghc3), systematic meta-analysis of 76 published and unpublished studies of infants’ early physical and psychological reasoning (total n = 1,899; 3- to 12-month-old infants; database search and call for unpublished studies conducted July to August 2022). We studied two effects in the same datasets: looking towards expected versus unexpected events (violation of expectation (VOE)) and looking towards visually familiar versus visually novel events (perceptual novelty (PN)). Most studies implemented methods to minimize the risk of bias (for example, ensuring that experimenters were naive to the conditions and reporting inter-rater reliability). There was mixed evidence about publication bias for the VOE effect. Most centrally to our research aims, we found that these two effects varied systematically—with roughly equal effect sizes (VOE, standardized mean difference 0.290 and 95% confidence interval (0.208, 0.372); PN, standardized mean difference 0.239 and 95% confidence interval (0.109, 0.369))—but independently, based on different predictors. Age predicted infants’ looking responses to unexpected events, but not visually novel events. Habituation predicted infants’ looking responses to visually novel events, but not unexpected events. From these findings, we suggest that conceptual and perceptual novelty independently influence infants’ looking behaviour.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Intervening on Emotions by Planning Over a Theory of Mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chen*, T.; Houlihan*, S. D.; Chandra, K.; Tenenbaum, J.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 46. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Intervening$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{chenInterveningEmotionsPlanning2024a,\ntitle = {Intervening on Emotions by Planning Over a Theory of Mind},\nauthor = {Tony Chen* and Sean Dae Houlihan* and Kartik Chandra and Joshua Tenenbaum and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4gz7c85c, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/chen-houlihan-2024.pdf, PDF},\nyear  = {2024},\ndate = {2024-07-25},\njournal = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\nvolume = {46},\nabstract = {Much of social cognition involves reasoning about others' minds: predicting their reactions, inferring their feelings, and explaining their behavior. By representing mental contents like beliefs, desires, and emotions, Bayesian theory of mind models have made progress in capturing how humans manage these cognitive feats. But social life is not merely observation: humans must also plan to intervene on these same mental contents. The present work models how people choose interventions to influence others' emotions. Building on a prior model of people's intuitive theory of emotions, we model how people use their intuitive theory to evaluate and simulate the effects of different interventions. We apply our model to data from behavioral experiments requiring counterfactual and joint interventions, and show a close alignment with human choices. Our results provide a step towards a potentially unifying explanation for emotion prediction and intervention, suggesting that they could arise from the same underlying generative model.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cortical Face-Selective Responses Emerge Early in Human Infancy.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kosakowski, H.; Cohen, M.; Herrera, L.; Nichoson, I.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n eNeuro, 11. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Cortical$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{kosakowskiCorticalFaceSelectiveResponses2024,\ntitle = {Cortical Face-Selective Responses Emerge Early in Human Infancy},\nauthor = {Heather Kosakowski and Michael Cohen and Lynee Herrera and Isabel Nichoson and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.eneuro.org/content/11/7/ENEURO.0117-24.2024.abstract, Publisher\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:5bg8sr1QxYwC, Google Scholar\nhttps://osf.io/h7rbv/, OSF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/kosakowski_eneuro_2024.pdf, PDF\n},\ndoi = {10.1523/ENEURO.0117-24.2024},\nissn = {2373-2822},\nyear  = {2024},\ndate = {2024-07-01},\nurldate = {2024-07-01},\njournal = {eNeuro},\nvolume = {11},\nissue = {7},\nabstract = {In human adults, multiple cortical regions respond robustly to faces, including the occipital face area (OFA) and fusiform face area (FFA), implicated in face perception, and the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), implicated in higher-level social functions. When in development, does face selectivity arise in each of these regions? Here, we combined two awake infant functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) datasets to create a sample size twice the size of previous reports (n = 65 infants; 2.6–9.6 months). Infants watched movies of faces, bodies, objects, and scenes, while fMRI data were collected. Despite variable amounts of data from each infant, individual subject whole-brain activation maps revealed responses to faces compared to nonface visual categories in the approximate location of OFA, FFA, STS, and MPFC. To determine the strength and nature of face selectivity in these regions, we used cross-validated functional region of interest analyses. Across this larger sample size, face responses in OFA, FFA, STS, and MPFC were significantly greater than responses to bodies, objects, and scenes. Even the youngest infants (2–5 months) showed significantly face-selective responses in FFA, STS, and MPFC, but not OFA. These results demonstrate that face selectivity is present in multiple cortical regions within months of birth, providing powerful constraints on theories of cortical development.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An asynchronous, hands-off workflow for looking time experiments with infants.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Raz, G.; Piccolo, S.; Medrano, J.; Liu, S.; Lydic, K.; Mei, C.; Nguyen, V.; Shu, T.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Development Psychology. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"An$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{razAsynchronousHandsoffWorkflow2024,\ntitle = {An asynchronous, hands-off workflow for looking time experiments with infants.},\nauthor = {Gal Raz and Sabrina Piccolo and Janine Medrano and Shari Liu and Kirsten Lydic and Catherine Mei and Victoria Nguyen and Tianmin Shu and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2024-97072-001.html, Publisher\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:EPG8bYD4jVwC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/raz_devpsych_2024.pdf, PDF\nhttps://osf.io/ndkt6/, OSF\n},\ndoi = {10.1037/dev0001791},\nissn = {1939-0599},\nyear  = {2024},\ndate = {2024-06-24},\njournal = {Development Psychology},\nabstract = {Infant looking time experiments have provided critical insights into early cognition, but traditionally very time-consuming and expensive. We run a classical violation-of-expectation experiment through a workﬂow in which data collection and analysis are automated and compare the results to the same study run in the lab and on Zoom. The automated workﬂow shows a small reduction in effect size and power, while allowing for signiﬁcantly larger sample sizes, thereby enabling a more robust developmental science.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Violations of physical and psychological expectations in the human adult brain.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Liu, S.; Lydic, K.; Mei, L.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Imaging Neuroscience, 2: 1-24. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Violations$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{liuViolationsPhysicalPsychological2024,\ntitle = {Violations of physical and psychological expectations in the human adult brain},\nauthor = {Shari Liu and Kirsten Lydic and Lingjie Mei and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {https://direct.mit.edu/imag/article/doi/10.1162/imag_a_00068/118940, Publisher\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:jU7OWUQzBzMC, Google Scholar\nhttps://openneuro.org/datasets/ds004934, Openneuro\nhttps://osf.io/sa7jy/, OSF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/liu_imagingneuroscience_2024.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1162/imag_a_00068},\nyear  = {2024},\ndate = {2024-02-01},\nurldate = {2024-02-01},\njournal = {Imaging Neuroscience},\nvolume = {2},\npages = {1-24},\nabstract = {After seeing one solid object apparently passing through another, or a person taking the long route to a destination when a shortcut was available, human adults classify those events as surprising. When tested on these events in violation-of-expectation (VOE) experiments, infants look longer at the same outcomes, relative to similar but expected outcomes. What cognitive processes underlie these judgments from adults, and perhaps infants’ sustained attention to these events? As one approach to test this question, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to scan the brains of human adults (total N = 49, 22 female, mean age of 26 years) while they viewed stimuli that were originally designed to test for physical and psychological expectations in infants. We examined non-mutually exclusive candidates for the processes underlying the VOE effect, including domain-general processes, like visual prediction error and curiosity, and domain-specific processes, like prediction error with respect to distinctively physical and psychological expectations (objects are solid; agents behave rationally). Early visual regions did not distinguish between expected and unexpected events from either domain. By contrast, multiple demand regions, involved in goal-directed attention, responded more to unexpected events in both domains, providing evidence for domain-general goal-directed attention as a mechanism for VOE. Left supramarginal gyrus (LSMG) was engaged during physical prediction and responded preferentially to unexpected events from the physical domain, providing evidence for domain-specific physical prediction error. Thus, in adult brains, violations of physical and psychological expectations involve domain-specific, and domain-general, though not purely visual, computations.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Open dataset of theory of mind reasoning in early to middle childhood.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Sotomayor-Enriquez, K.; Gweon, H.; Saxe, R.; and Richardson, H.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Data in Brief, 52: 109905. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Open$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{sotomayor-enriquezOpenDatasetTheory2024,\ntitle = {Open dataset of theory of mind reasoning in early to middle childhood},\nauthor = {Koraima Sotomayor-Enriquez and Hyowon Gweon and Rebecca Saxe and Hilary Richardson},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352340923009484, Publisher\nhttps://osf.io/g5zpv/, OSF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sotomayor-enriquezOpenDatasetTheory2024.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.dib.2023.109905},\nissn = {2352-3409},\nyear  = {2024},\ndate = {2024-02-01},\njournal = {Data in Brief},\nvolume = {52},\npages = {109905},\nabstract = {Theory of mind (ToM) reasoning refers to the process by which we reason about the mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions) of others. Here, we describe an open dataset of responses from children who completed a story booklet task for assessing ToM reasoning (n = 321 3–12-year-old children, including 64 (neurotypical) children assessed longitudinally and 68 autistic children). Children completed one of two versions of the story booklet task (Booklet 1 or 2). Both versions include two-alternative forced choice and free response questions that tap ToM concepts ranging in difficulty from reasoning about desires and beliefs to reasoning about moral blameworthiness and mistaken referents. Booklet 2 additionally includes items that assess understanding of sarcasm, lies, and second-order belief-desire reasoning. Compared to other ToM tasks, the booklet task provides relatively dense sampling of ToM reasoning within each child (Booklet 1: 41 items; Booklet 2: 65 items). Experimental sessions were video recorded and data were coded offline; the open dataset consists of children's accuracy (binary) on each item and, for many children (n = 171), transcriptions of free responses. The dataset also includes children's scores on standardized tests of receptive language and non-verbal IQ, as well as other demographic information. As such, this dataset is a valuable resource for investigating the development of ToM reasoning in early and middle childhood.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2023\n \n \n (11)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Left-hemisphere cortical language regions respond equally to observed dialogue and monologue.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Olson, H.; Chen, E.; Lydic, K.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neurobiology of Language, 4: 575-610. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Left-hemisphere$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{olsonLeftHemisphereCorticalLanguage2023,\ntitle = {Left-hemisphere cortical language regions respond equally to observed dialogue and monologue},\nauthor = {Halie Olson and Emily Chen and Kirsten Lydic and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://direct.mit.edu/nol/article/4/4/575/117766/Left-Hemisphere-Cortical-Language-Regions-Respond, Publisher\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:7BrZ7Jt4UNcC, Google Scholar\nhttps://osf.io/whsb7/, OSF\nhttps://openneuro.org/datasets/ds004467/versions/1.0.0, OpenNeuro\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/olson_nol_2023.pdf, PDF\n},\ndoi = {10.1162/nol_a_00123},\nissn = {2641-4368},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-12-14},\nurldate = {2023-12-14},\njournal = {Neurobiology of Language},\nvolume = {4},\nissue = {4},\npages = {575-610},\nabstract = {Much of the language we encounter in our everyday lives comes in the form of conversation, yet the majority of research on the neural basis of language comprehension has used input from only one speaker at a time. Twenty adults were scanned while passively observing audiovisual conversations using functional magnetic resonance imaging. In a block-design task, participants watched 20 s videos of puppets speaking either to another puppet (the dialogue condition) or directly to the viewer (the monologue condition), while the audio was either comprehensible (played forward) or incomprehensible (played backward). Individually functionally localized left-hemisphere language regions responded more to comprehensible than incomprehensible speech but did not respond differently to dialogue than monologue. In a second task, participants watched videos (1–3 min each) of two puppets conversing with each other, in which one puppet was comprehensible while the other’s speech was reversed. All participants saw the same visual input but were randomly assigned which character’s speech was comprehensible. In left-hemisphere cortical language regions, the time course of activity was correlated only among participants who heard the same character speaking comprehensibly, despite identical visual input across all participants. For comparison, some individually localized theory of mind regions and right-hemisphere homologues of language regions responded more to dialogue than monologue in the first task, and in the second task, activity in some regions was correlated across all participants regardless of which character was speaking comprehensibly. Together, these results suggest that canonical left-hemisphere cortical language regions are not sensitive to differences between observed dialogue and monologue.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Neural correlates of theory of mind reasoning in congenitally blind children.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H.; Saxe, R.; and Bedny, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 63: 101285. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Neural$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Neural correlates of theory of mind reasoning in congenitally blind children},\nauthor = {Hilary Richardson and Rebecca Saxe and Marina Bedny},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:prdVHNxh-e8C, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/richardson2023.pdf, pdf\nhttps://osf.io/pavdg/, data\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Supp-Richardson-2023.pdf, supplemental materials},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.dcn.2023.101285},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-10-01},\nurldate = {2023-10-01},\njournal = {Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience},\nvolume = {63},\npages = {101285},\nabstract = {Vision is an important source of information about other minds for sighted children, especially prior to the onset of language. Visually observed actions, eye gaze, and facial expressions of others provide information about mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. Does such experience contribute causally to the development of cortical networks supporting social cognition? To address this question we compared functional development of brain regions supporting theory of mind (ToM), as well as behavioral ToM reasoning, across congenitally blind (n=17) and sighted (n=114) children and adolescents (4–17 years old). We find that blind children in this age range show slightly lower ToM behavioral performance relative to sighted children. Likewise, the functional profile of ToM brain regions is qualitatively similar, but quantitatively weaker in blind relative to sighted children. Alongside prior research, these data suggest that vision facilitates, but is not necessary for, ToM development.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Houlihan, S. D.; Kleiman-Weiner, M.; Hewitt, L. B; Tenenbaum, J. B; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 381: 20220047. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Emotion$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{houlihan2023computedappraisals,\ntitle = {Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind},\nauthor = {Sean Dae Houlihan and Max Kleiman-Weiner and Luke B Hewitt and Joshua B Tenenbaum and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:kw52XkFRtyQC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/houlihan2023computedappraisals.pdf, pdf\nhttps://github.com/daeh/computed-appraisals, GitHub\n},\ndoi = {10.1098/rsta.2022.0047},\nissn = {1364-503X, 1471-2962},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-07-24},\nurldate = {2023-07-24},\njournal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A},\nvolume = {381},\nissue = {2251},\npages = {20220047},\nabstract = {From sparse descriptions of events, observers can make systematic and nuanced predictions of what emotions the people involved will experience. We propose a formal model of emotion prediction in the context of a public high-stakes social dilemma. This model uses inverse planning to infer a person's beliefs and preferences, including social preferences for equity and for maintaining a good reputation. The model then combines these inferred mental contents with the event to compute 'appraisals': whether the situation conformed to the expectations and fulfilled the preferences. We learn functions mapping computed appraisals to emotion labels, allowing the model to match human observers' quantitative predictions of 20 emotions, including joy, relief, guilt and envy. Model comparison indicates that inferred monetary preferences are not sufficient to explain observers' emotion predictions; inferred social preferences are factored into predictions for nearly every emotion. Human observers and the model both use minimal individualizing information to adjust predictions of how different people will respond to the same event. Thus, our framework integrates inverse planning, event appraisals and emotion concepts in a single computational model to reverse-engineer people's intuitive theory of emotions.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Desperation and inequality increase crime: evidence from experimental micro-societies.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Radkani, S.; Holton, E.; de Courson, B.; Saxe, R.; and Nettle, D.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n R. Soc. Open Sci.,221385. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Desperation$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Desperation and inequality increase crime: evidence from experimental micro-societies},\nauthor = {Setayesh Radkani and Eleanor Holton and Benoît de Courson and Rebecca Saxe and Daniel Nettle},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:XUvXOeBm_78C, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/radkani2022.pdf, pdf\nhttps://osf.io/kf87e/, data},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.221385},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-07-19},\nurldate = {2023-07-19},\njournal = {R. Soc. Open Sci.},\nissue = {10},\npages = {221385},\nabstract = {People facing material deprivation are more likely to turn to acquisitive crime. It is not clear why it makes sense for them to do so, given that apprehension and punishment may make their situation even worse. Recent theory suggests that people should be more willing to steal if they are on the wrong side of a ‘desperation threshold’; that is, a level of resources critical to wellbeing. Below such a threshold, people should pursue any risky behaviour that offers the possibility of a short route back above, and should be insensitive to the severity of possible punishments, since they have little left to lose. We developed a multi-round, multi-player economic game with a desperation threshold and the possibility of theft as well as cooperation. Across four experiments with 1000 UK and US adults, we showed that falling short of a desperation threshold increased stealing from other players, even when the payoff from stealing was negative on average. Within the microsocieties created in the game, the presence of more players with below-threshold resources produced low trust, driven by the experience of being stolen from. Contrary to predictions, our participants appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the severity of punishment for being caught trying to steal. Our results show, in an experimental microcosm, that some members of society falling short of a threshold of material desperation can have powerful social consequences.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Radkani, S.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PsyArXiv. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"What$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices},\nauthor = {Setayesh Radkani and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/legitimacy_wrongness_punishment_cogsci2023.pdf, pdf\nhttps://osf.io/6x2we/, data},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-06-02},\nurldate = {2023-06-02},\njournal = {PsyArXiv},\nabstract = {Punishment is a cost imposed on a target, in response to an undesirable action. Yet choosing to punish also reveals information about the authority’s own motives and values. We propose that observers jointly infer the wrongness of the action and the authority’s motivations. Using hypothetical scenarios in unfamiliar societies, we experimentally manipulated observers’ prior beliefs and measured human observers’ inferences after observing punishment. These inferences were recapitulated in a formal model that inverts an intuitive causal model of authorities who make rational choices about punishment by weighing its costs and benefits (ie utilities). An essential component of this model, driving these inferences, is that legitimate authorities consider the utility of a proportional response to harmful actions, which depends on the balance between the wrongness of the act and the severity of the punishment.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Habituation reflects optimal exploration over noisy perceptual samples.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cao, A.; Raz, G.; Saxe, R.; and Frank, M. C\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Topics in Cognitive Science, 15: 290-302. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Habituation$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Habituation reflects optimal exploration over noisy perceptual samples},\nauthor = {Anjie Cao and Gal Raz and Rebecca Saxe and Michael C Frank },\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:AHdEip9mkN0C, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/cao_gal_topics2023.pdf, pdf},\ndoi = {10.1111/tops.12631},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-04-01},\njournal = {Topics in Cognitive Science},\nvolume = {15},\nissue = {2},\npages = {290-302},\nabstract = {From birth, humans constantly make decisions about what to look at and for how long. Yet, the\nmechanism behind such decision-making remains poorly understood. Here, we present the rational\naction, noisy choice for habituation (RANCH) model. RANCH is a rational learning model that takes\nnoisy perceptual samples from stimuli and makes sampling decisions based on expected information\ngain (EIG). The model captures key patterns of looking time documented in developmental research:\nhabituation and dishabituation. We evaluated the model with adult looking time collected from a\nparadigm analogous to the infant habituation paradigm. We compared RANCH with baseline models (no learning model, no perceptual noise model) and models with alternative linking hypotheses\n(Surprisal, KL divergence). We showed that (1) learning and perceptual noise are critical assumptions\nof the model, and (2) Surprisal and KL are good proxies for EIG under the current learning context.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Preliminary evidence for selective cortical responses to music in one‐month‐old infants.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kosakowski, H. L; Norman-Haignere, S.; Mynick, A.; Takahashi, A.; Saxe, R.; and Kanwisher, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Developmental Science,e13387. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Preliminary$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Preliminary evidence for selective cortical responses to music in one‐month‐old infants},\nauthor = {Heather L Kosakowski and Samnuel Norman-Haignere and Anna Mynick and Atsushi Takahashi and Rebecca Saxe and Nancy Kanwisher},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:FiytvqdAVhgC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Developmental-Science-2023-Kosakowski.pdf, pdf},\ndoi = {10.1111/desc.13387},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-03-23},\njournal = {Developmental Science},\npages = {e13387},\nabstract = {Prior studies have observed selective neural responses in the adult human auditory cortex to music and speech that cannot be explained by the differing lower-level acoustic properties of these stimuli. Does infant cortex exhibit similarly selective responses to music and speech shortly after birth? To answer this question, we attempted to collect functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from 45 sleeping infants (2.0- to 11.9-weeks-old) while they listened to monophonic instrumental lullabies and infant-directed speech produced by a mother. To match acoustic variation between music and speech sounds we (1) recorded music from instruments that had a similar spectral range as female infant-directed speech, (2) used a novel excitation-matching algorithm to match the cochleagrams of music and speech stimuli, and (3) synthesized “model-matched” stimuli that were matched in spectrotemporal modulation statistics to (yet perceptually distinct from) music or speech. Of the 36 infants we collected usable data from, 19 had significant activations to sounds overall compared to scanner noise. From these infants, we observed a set of voxels in non-primary auditory cortex (NPAC) but not in Heschl's Gyrus that responded significantly more to music than to each of the other three stimulus types (but not significantly more strongly than to the background scanner noise). In contrast, our planned analyses did not reveal voxels in NPAC that responded more to speech than to model-matched speech, although other unplanned analyses did. These preliminary findings suggest that music selectivity arises within the first month of life. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://youtu.be/c8IGFvzxudk.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Challenging the classical view: recognition of identity and expression as integrated processes.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Schwartz, E.; O'Nell, K.; Saxe, R.; and Anzellotti, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Brain Sciences, 13: 296. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Challenging$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Challenging the classical view: recognition of identity and expression as integrated processes},\nauthor = {Emily Schwartz and Kathryn O'Nell and Rebecca Saxe and Stefano Anzellotti},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:j7_hQOaDUrUC, Google Scholar},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-02-10},\nurldate = {2023-02-10},\njournal = {Brain Sciences},\nvolume = {13},\nissue = {2},\npages = {296},\nabstract = {Recent neuroimaging evidence challenges the classical view that face identity and facial expression are processed by segregated neural pathways, showing that information about identity and expression are encoded within common brain regions. This article tests the hypothesis that integrated representations of identity and expression arise spontaneously within deep neural networks. A subset of the CelebA dataset is used to train a deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) to label face identity (chance = 0.06%, accuracy = 26.5%), and the FER2013 dataset is used to train a DCNN to label facial expression (chance = 14.2%, accuracy = 63.5%). The identity-trained and expression-trained networks each successfully transfer to labeling both face identity and facial expression on the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces dataset. This study demonstrates that DCNNs trained to recognize face identity and DCNNs trained to recognize facial expression spontaneously develop representations of facial expression and face identity, respectively. Furthermore, a congruence coefficient analysis reveals that features distinguishing between identities and features distinguishing between expressions become increasingly orthogonal from layer to layer, suggesting that deep neural networks disentangle representational subspaces corresponding to different sources.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n No evidence for discontinuity between infants and adults (Response Paper).\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Liu, S.; Raz, G.; Kamps, F. S.; Grossmann, T.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PsyArXiv, 14. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"No$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {No evidence for discontinuity between infants and adults (Response Paper)},\nauthor = {Shari Liu and Gal Raz and Frederik S. Kamps and Tobias Grossmann and Rebecca Saxe },\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Liu_etal_2023_BAResponse_R1.pdf, pdf},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-02-01},\njournal = {PsyArXiv},\nvolume = {14},\nabstract = {Based on studies of infant gaze, developmental psychologists have ascribed abstract cognitive functions to young infants. In their thought-provoking article, Blumberg and Adolph (B+ A)[1] consider the implications of developmental neurobiology for these claims. Abstract cognitive functions in adults depend on cortical circuits; however, B+ A hypothesize that the developing cortex is too immature to drive gaze in the youngest infants. If this is true, then subcortical regions must be driving all observed gaze behavior in young infants.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Violations of physical and psychological expectations in the human adult brain.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Liu, S.; Lydic, K.; Mei, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, volume 45, 2023. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Violations$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inproceedings{nokey,\ntitle = {Violations of physical and psychological expectations in the human adult brain},\nauthor = {Shari Liu and Kirsten Lydic and Lingjie Mei and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:jU7OWUQzBzMC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/voe_proceedings2023.pdf, pdf},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-01-01},\nurldate = {2023-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\nvolume = {45},\nissue = {45},\nabstract = {When adults see one solid object pass through another, or see a person take the long route to a destination when a shortcut was available, we classify those events as surprising. Infants look infants look longer at the same unexpected outcomes, compared with visually similar but expected outcomes, in violation-of-expectation (VOE) experiments. What domain-specific and domain-general cognitive processes support these judgments? In a pre-registered experiment, we scanned 32 adults using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they watched videos designed for infant research. One region implicated in physical reasoning responded selectively to unexpected physical events, providing evidence for domain-specific physical prediction error. Multiple demand regions responded more to unexpected events regardless of domain, providing evidence for domain-general goal-directed attention. Early visual regions responded equally to unexpected and expected events, providing evidence against stimulus-driven prediction error. Thus, in adults, VOE involves domain-specific, and high-level, domain-general computations.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inproceedings}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n No evidence for familiarity preferences after limited exposure to visual concepts in preschoolers and infants.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Raz, G.; Cao, A.; Bui, M. K.; Frank, M. C.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, volume 45, 2023. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"No$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inproceedings{nokey,\ntitle = {No evidence for familiarity preferences after limited exposure to visual concepts in preschoolers and infants},\nauthor = {Gal Raz and Anjie Cao and Minh Khong Bui and Michael C. Frank and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:L1USKYWJimsC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/cao_raz_proceedings2022.pdf, pdf},\nyear  = {2023},\ndate = {2023-01-01},\nurldate = {2023-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\njournal = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\nvolume = {45},\nissue = {45},\nabstract = {From birth, humans make decisions about what to look at and for how long. A classic framework proposes encoding as a key driver of looking behavior in development - in early stages of encoding, infants and young children prefer to engage with familiar stimuli, while at later stages of encoding they prefer novel stimuli. Though this framework is often invoked when interpreting looking time studies, it is rarely validated empirically. Here, we test these predictions by explicitly manipulating exposure durations within-subjects. While we found robust evidence for habituation and novelty preferences, limiting exposure to visual concepts did not result in familiarity preferences in any age group. Our findings suggest that limited exposure does not generically lead to familiarity preferences, and that interpretations of observed familiarity preferences should be made with care. We argue for the development of formal frameworks which link the learning problem faced by participants to their attentional preferences.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inproceedings}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2022\n \n \n (12)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Early concepts of intimacy: Young humans use saliva sharing to infer close relationships.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Thomas, A. J.; Woo, B.; Nettle, D.; Spelke, E.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Science, 375: 311-315. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Early$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{321,\ntitle = {Early concepts of intimacy: Young humans use saliva sharing to infer close relationships},\nauthor = {Ashley J. Thomas and Brandon Woo and Daniel Nettle and Elizabeth Spelke and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.abh1054\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/science.abh1054.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Early%2Bconcepts%2Bof%2Bintimacy%3A%2BYoung%2Bhumans%2Buse%2Bsaliva%2Bsharing%2Bto%2Binfer%2Bclose%2Brelationships%22&as_sauthors=Thomas&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/321.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {10.1126/science.abh1054},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-01-01},\nurldate = {2022-01-01},\njournal = {Science},\nvolume = {375},\npages = {311-315},\nabstract = {Across human societies, people form “thick” relationships characterized by strong attachments, obligations, and mutual responsiveness. People in thick relationships share food utensils, kiss, or engage in other distinctive interactions that involve sharing saliva. We found that children, toddlers, and infants infer that dyads who share saliva (as opposed to other positive social interactions) have a distinct relationship. Children expect saliva sharing to happen in nuclear families. Toddlers and infants expect that people who share saliva will respond to one another in distress. Parents confirm that saliva sharing is a valid cue of relationship thickness in their children&rsquo;s social environments. The ability to use distinctive interactions to infer categories of relationships thus emerges early in life, without explicit teaching; this enables young humans to rapidly identify close relationships, both within and beyond families. Young humans are remarkably helpless, relying entirely on the adult humans around them for survival. However, not all adults are as invested in the care of a particular child, and there is benefit in being able to determine from a very young age which relationships are close. Thomas et al. tested young children and infants to determine whether they were able to identify close, or “thick, ” relationships based on whether individuals participated in activities that involve sharing saliva, such as eating, kissing, or sharing utensils (see the Perspective by Fawcett). The children expected relationships like these to be closer than other relationships, indicating that they can distinguish closeness very early in life. Children, toddlers, and infants infer that people who share saliva, for example, by kissing or sharing food utensils, are in distinctive, close social relationships.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Infants infer potential social partners by observing the interactions of their parent with unknown others.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Thomas, A. J.; Saxe, R.; and Spelke, E. S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119: e2121390119. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Infants$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{328,\ntitle = {Infants infer potential social partners by observing the interactions of their parent with unknown others},\nauthor = {Ashley J. Thomas and Rebecca Saxe and Elizabeth S. Spelke},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/pnas.2121390119.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Infants%2Binfer%2Bpotential%2Bsocial%2Bpartners%2Bby%2Bobserving%2Bthe%2Binteractions%2Bof%2Btheir%2Bparent%2Bwith%2Bunknown%2Bothers%22&as_sauthors=Thomas&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/328.rtf, RTF},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-01-01},\nurldate = {2022-01-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {119},\npages = {e2121390119},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Using child-friendly movie stimuli to study the development of face, place, and object regions from age 3 to 12 years.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kamps, F. S.; Richardson, H.; Murty, N. A. R.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Human Brain Mapping, 43: 2782-2800. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Using$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{329,\ntitle = {Using child-friendly movie stimuli to study the development of face, place, and object regions from age 3 to 12 years},\nauthor = {Frederik S. Kamps and Hilary Richardson and N. Apurva Ratan Murty and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Human-Brain-Mapping-2022-Kamps-Using-child‐friendly-movie-stimuli-to-study-the-development-of-face-place-and-object.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Using%2Bchild-friendly%2Bmovie%2Bstimuli%2Bto%2Bstudy%2Bthe%2Bdevelopment%2Bof%2Bface%2C%2Bplace%2C%2Band%2Bobject%2Bregions%2Bfrom%2Bage%2B3%2Bto%2B12%2Byears%22&as_sauthors=Kamps&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/329.rtf, RTF},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-01-01},\nurldate = {2022-01-01},\njournal = {Human Brain Mapping},\nvolume = {43},\npages = {2782-2800},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Planning with Theory of Mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ho, M. K.; Saxe, R.; and Cushman, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Planning$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{331,\ntitle = {Planning with Theory of Mind},\nauthor = {Mark K. Ho and Rebecca Saxe and Fiery Cushman},\nurl = {http://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Planning%2Bwith%2BTheory%2Bof%2BMind%22&as_sauthors=Ho&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/HoSaxeCushman2022.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/331.rtf, RTF\n\n},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-09-08},\njournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\nkeywords = {Cognitive Development},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Advantages and limitations of representing groups in terms of recursive utilities.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Radkani, S.; Thomas, A. J; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45: 44-45. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Advantages$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{332,\ntitle = {Advantages and limitations of representing groups in terms of recursive utilities},\nauthor = {Setayesh Radkani and Ashley J Thomas and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/toward-a-computational-theory-of-social-groups-a-finite-set-of-cognitive-primitives-for-representing-any-and-all-social-groups-in-the-context-of-conflict.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Advantages%2Band%2Blimitations%2Bof%2Brepresenting%2Bgroups%2Bin%2Bterms%2Bof%2Brecursive%2Butilities%22&as_sauthors=Radkani&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/332.rtf, RTF\n},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-01-01},\nurldate = {2022-01-01},\njournal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},\nvolume = {45},\npages = {44-45},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Perceiving and pursuing legitimate power.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Perceiving$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{333,\ntitle = {Perceiving and pursuing legitimate power},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Saxe2022.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Planning%2Bwith%2BTheory%2Bof%2BMind%22&as_sauthors=Ho&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\n},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-09-22},\njournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\nkeywords = {Theory of Mind},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Planning with theory of mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ho, M. K; Saxe, R.; and Cushman, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 26: 959-971. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Planning$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Planning with theory of mind},\nauthor = {Mark K Ho and Rebecca Saxe and Fiery Cushman},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:LdasjJ6CEcoC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/planning_tom2022.pdf, pdf},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.tics.2022.08.003},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-11-01},\njournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\nvolume = {26},\nissue = {11},\npages = {959-971},\nabstract = {Understanding Theory of Mind should begin with an analysis of the problems it solves. The traditional answer is that Theory of Mind is used for predicting others' thoughts and actions. However, the same Theory of Mind is also used for planning to change others' thoughts and actions. Planning requires that Theory of Mind consists of abstract structured causal representations and supports efficient search and selection from innumerable possible actions. Theory of Mind contrasts with less cognitively demanding alternatives: statistical predictive models of other people's actions, or model-free reinforcement of actions by their effects on other people. Theory of Mind is likely used to plan novel interventions and predict their effects, for example, in pedagogy, emotion regulation, and impression management.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Perceiving and pursuing legitimate power.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 26(12). 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Perceiving$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Perceiving and pursuing legitimate power},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe },\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:7Hz3ACDFbsoC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/saxe_trends2022.pdf, pdf},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.08.008},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-09-20},\nurldate = {2022-09-20},\njournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\nvolume = {26},\nnumber = {12},\nabstract = {How do people perceive and pursue legitimate power? For the social sciences, this question is venerable. Yet, for cognitive science, it offers fresh and generative opportunities to explore how adults evaluate legitimacy, how children learn to do so, and what difference legitimate power makes for people’s thoughts, feelings, and actions.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Infants infer potential social partners by observing the interactions of their parent with unknown others.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Thomas, A. J.; Saxe, R.; and Spelke, E. S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119: e2121390119. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Infants$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = { Infants infer potential social partners by observing the interactions of their parent with unknown others},\nauthor = {Ashley J. Thomas and Rebecca Saxe and Elizabeth S. Spelke},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=20&pagesize=80&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:kVjdVfd2voEC, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/ajt2022.pdf, pdf},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2121390119},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-05-24},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {119},\nissue = {32},\npages = {e2121390119},\nabstract = {Infants are born into networks of individuals who are socially connected. How do infants begin learning which individuals are their own potential social partners? Using digitally edited videos, we showed 12-mo-old infants’ social interactions between unknown individuals and their own parents. In studies 1 to 4, after their parent showed affiliation toward one puppet, infants expected that puppet to engage with them. In study 5, infants made the reverse inference; after a puppet engaged with them, the infants expected that puppet to respond to their parent. In each study, infants’ inferences were specific to social interactions that involved their own parent as opposed to another infant’s parent. Thus, infants combine observation of social interactions with knowledge of their preexisting relationship with their parent to discover which newly encountered individuals are potential social partners for themselves and their families.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Using child‐friendly movie stimuli to study the development of face, place, and object regions from age 3 to 12 years.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kamps, F. S.; Richardson, H.; Murty, N. A. R.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Human Brain Mapping, 43: 2782-2800. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Using$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Using child‐friendly movie stimuli to study the development of face, place, and object regions from age 3 to 12 years},\nauthor = {Frederik S. Kamps and Hilary Richardson and N. Apurva Ratan Murty and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=20&pagesize=80&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:lvd772isFD0C, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Human-Brain-Mapping-2022-Kamps.pdf, pdf\n},\ndoi = {10.1002/hbm.25815},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-03-11},\nurldate = {2022-03-11},\njournal = {Human Brain Mapping},\nvolume = {43},\nissue = {9},\npages = {2782-2800},\nabstract = {Scanning young children while they watch short, engaging, commercially-produced movies has emerged as a promising approach for increasing data retention and quality. Movie stimuli also evoke a richer variety of cognitive processes than traditional experiments, allowing the study of multiple aspects of brain development simultaneously. However, because these stimuli are uncontrolled, it is unclear how effectively distinct profiles of brain activity can be distinguished from the resulting data. Here we develop an approach for identifying multiple distinct subject-specific Regions of Interest (ssROIs) using fMRI data collected during movie-viewing. We focused on the test case of higher-level visual regions selective for faces, scenes, and objects. Adults (N = 13) were scanned while viewing a 5.6-min child-friendly movie, as well as a traditional localizer experiment with blocks of faces, scenes, and objects. We found that just 2.7 min of movie data could identify subject-specific face, scene, and object regions. While successful, movie-defined ssROIS still showed weaker domain selectivity than traditional ssROIs. Having validated our approach in adults, we then used the same methods on movie data collected from 3 to 12-year-old children (N = 122). Movie response timecourses in 3-year-old children's face, scene, and object regions were already significantly and specifically predicted by timecourses from the corresponding regions in adults. We also found evidence of continued developmental change, particularly in the face-selective posterior superior temporal sulcus. Taken together, our results reveal both early maturity and functional change in face, scene, and object regions, and more broadly highlight the promise of short, child-friendly movies for developmental cognitive neuroscience.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Selective responses to faces, scenes, and bodies in the ventral visual pathway of infants.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kosakowski, H. L.; Cohen, M. A.; Takahashi, A.; Keil, B.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Biology,265–274. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Selective$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{nokey,\ntitle = {Selective responses to faces, scenes, and bodies in the ventral visual pathway of infants},\nauthor = {Heather L. Kosakowski and Michael A. Cohen and Atsushi Takahashi and Boris Keil and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Selective%2Bresponses%2Bto%2Bfaces%2C%2Bscenes%2C%2Band%2Bbodies%2Bin%2Bthe%2Bventral%2Bvisual%2Bpathway%2Bof%2Binfants%22&as_sauthors=Kosakowski&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Kosakowski-et-al-CB2022.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/320.rtf, RTF\n},\ndoi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2021.10.064},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-01-24},\nurldate = {2022-01-24},\njournal = {Current Biology},\nissue = {32},\npages = {265–274},\nkeywords = {Cognitive Development},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Reasoning about the antecedents of emotions: Bayesian causal inference over an intuitive theory of mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Houlihan, S. D.; Ong, D. C.; Cusimano, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 44th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, volume 44, pages 854-861, 2022. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Reasoning$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inproceedings{houlihan2022emotionreasoning,\ntitle = {Reasoning about the antecedents of emotions: Bayesian causal inference over an intuitive theory of mind},\nauthor = {Sean Dae Houlihan and Desmond C. Ong and Maddie Cusimano and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7sn3w3n2, eScholarship\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/houlihan2022emotionreasoning.pdf, pdf},\nyear  = {2022},\ndate = {2022-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 44th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society},\njournal = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\nvolume = {44},\npages = {854-861},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inproceedings}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2021\n \n \n (7)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Leveraging facial expressions and contextual information to investigate opaque representations of emotions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Anzellotti, S.; Houlihan, S. D.; Liburd-Jr., S.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Emotion, 21(1): 96-107. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Leveraging$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{219,\ntitle = {Leveraging facial expressions and contextual information to investigate opaque representations of emotions},\nauthor = {Stefano Anzellotti and Sean Dae Houlihan and Samuel Liburd-Jr. and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-58384-001, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/opaque_representations_emotions.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1037/emo0000685},\nissn = {1528-3542},\nyear  = {2021},\ndate = {2021-01-01},\nurldate = {2021-01-01},\njournal = {Emotion},\nvolume = {21},\nnumber = {1},\npages = {96-107},\nabstract = {Observers attribute emotions to others relying on multiple cues, including facial expressions and information about the situation. Recent research has used Bayesian models to study how these cues are integrated. Existing studies have used a variety of tasks to probe emotion inferences, but limited attention has been devoted to the possibility that different decision processes might be involved depending on the task. If this is the case, understanding emotion representations might require understanding the decision processes through which they give rise to judgments. This article 1) shows that the different tasks that have been used in the literature yield very different results, 2) proposes an account of the decision processes involved that explain the differences, and 3) tests novel predictions of this account. The results offer new insights into how emotions are represented, and more broadly demonstrate the importance of taking decision processes into account in Bayesian models of cognition.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Why has the COVID-19 pandemic increased support for Universal Basic Income?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Nettle, D.; Johnson, E.; Johnson, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Humanities and Social Science Communications, 8: 1-12. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Why$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{296,\ntitle = {Why has the COVID-19 pandemic increased support for Universal Basic Income?},\nauthor = {Daniel Nettle and Elliott Johnson and Matthew Johnson and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00760-7.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Nature_UBI.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Why%2Bhas%2Bthe%2BCOVID-19%2Bpandemic%2Bincreased%2Bsupport%2Bfor%2BUniversal%2BBasic%2BIncome%3F%22&as_sauthors=Nettle&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/296.rtf, RTF\n},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00760-7},\nyear  = {2021},\ndate = {2021-01-01},\nurldate = {2021-01-01},\njournal = {Humanities and Social Science Communications},\nvolume = {8},\npages = {1-12},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The neuroscience of unmet social needs.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tomova, L.; Tye, K.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Neuroscience, 16: 221-231. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{312,\ntitle = {The neuroscience of unmet social needs},\nauthor = {Livia Tomova and Kay Tye and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2019.1694580\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Tomova-et-al-2021.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22The%2Bneuroscience%2Bof%2Bunmet%2Bsocial%2Bneeds%22&as_sauthors=Tomova&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/312.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {10.1080/17470919.2019.1694580},\nissn = {1747-0919},\nyear  = {2021},\ndate = {2021-05-01},\nurldate = {2021-05-01},\njournal = {Social Neuroscience},\nvolume = {16},\npages = {221-231},\nchapter = {221},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Barrett, H. C.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 376. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Are$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{314,\ntitle = {Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?},\nauthor = {H. Clark Barrett and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Barrett-and-Saxe-2021.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Are%2Bsome%2Bcultures%2Bmore%2Bmind-minded%2Bin%2Btheir%2Bmoral%2Bjudgements%2Bthan%2Bothers%3F%22&as_sauthors=Barrett&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/314.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0288},\nyear  = {2021},\ndate = {2021-11-01},\nurldate = {2021-11-01},\njournal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B},\nvolume = {376},\nchapter = {20200288},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A size-adaptive 32-channel array coil for awake infant neuroimaging at 3 Tesla MRI.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ghotra, A.; Kosakowski, H. L.; Takahashi, A.; Etzel, R.; May, M. W.; Scholz, A.; Jansen, A.; Wald, L. L.; Kanwisher, N.; Saxe, R.; and Keil, B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, 86: 1773-1785. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"A$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{315,\ntitle = {A size-adaptive 32-channel array coil for awake infant neuroimaging at 3 Tesla MRI},\nauthor = {Anpreeet Ghotra and Heather L. Kosakowski and Atsushi Takahashi and Robin Etzel and Markus W. May and Alina Scholz and Andreas Jansen and Lawrence L. Wald and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe and Boris Keil},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Ghotra-et-al-2021_0.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22A%2Bsize-adaptive%2B32-channel%2Barray%2Bcoil%2Bfor%2Bawake%2Binfant%2Bneuroimaging%2Bat%2B3%2BTesla%2BMRI%22&as_sauthors=Ghotra&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/315.rtf, RTF},\nyear  = {2021},\ndate = {2021-01-01},\nurldate = {2021-01-01},\njournal = {Magnetic Resonance in Medicine},\nvolume = {86},\npages = {1773-1785},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Single-neuronal predictions of others’ beliefs in humans.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Jamali, M.; Grannan, B. L.; Fedorenko, E.; Saxe, R.; Báez-Mendoza, R.; and Williams, Z. M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature, 591: 610-614. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Single-neuronal$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{316,\ntitle = {Single-neuronal predictions of others’ beliefs in humans},\nauthor = {Mohsen Jamali and Benjamin L. Grannan and Evelina Fedorenko and Rebecca Saxe and Raymundo Báez-Mendoza and Ziv M. Williams},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Jamali-et-al-2021.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Single-neuronal%2Bpredictions%2Bof%2Bothers%E2%80%99%2Bbeliefs%2Bin%2Bhumans%22&as_sauthors=Jamali&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/316.rtf, RTF\n},\ndoi = {10.1038/s41586-021-03184-0},\nyear  = {2021},\ndate = {2021-01-01},\nurldate = {2021-01-01},\njournal = {Nature},\nvolume = {591},\npages = {610-614},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Houlihan, S. D.; Tenenbaum, J. B.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linking Models of Theory of Mind and Measures of Human Brain Activity, pages 209-235. Gilead, M.; and Ochsner, K. N., editor(s). Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Linking$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inbook{houlihan2021linking,\ntitle = {Linking Models of Theory of Mind and Measures of Human Brain Activity},\nauthor = {Sean Dae Houlihan and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Rebecca Saxe},\neditor = {Michael Gilead and Kevin N. Ochsner},\nurl = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-51890-5_11, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/318.rtf, RTF\n},\ndoi = {10.1007/978-3-030-51890-5_11},\nisbn = {978-3-030-51890-5},\nyear  = {2021},\ndate = {2021-01-01},\nurldate = {2021-01-01},\nbooktitle = {The Neural Basis of Mentalizing},\npages = {209-235},\npublisher = {Springer International Publishing},\naddress = {Cham},\norganization = {Springer},\nabstract = {Humans employ a richly structured intuitive theory of psychology to reason about others’ unobserved mental states, a faculty called “Theory of Mind”. Advances in behavioral modeling have begun to capture aspects of the flexible and nuanced reasoning people exhibit when inferring the contents of others’ minds. In parallel, advances in neuroimaging have begun to illuminate the structure of neural responses evoked when representing others’ minds. Bringing these lines of work together will require precise and testable linking hypotheses about how computations over a causal generative model are implemented by the brain, and how these models are acquired during development. We consider how computational modeling and neuroimaging of Theory of Mind can mutually constrain the space of linking hypotheses.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2020\n \n \n (9)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Preferences for redistribution are sensitive to perceived luck, social homogeneity, war and scarcity.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Nettle, D.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 198: 104234. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Preferences$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{222,\ntitle = {Preferences for redistribution are sensitive to perceived luck, social homogeneity, war and scarcity},\nauthor = {Daniel Nettle and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027720300536\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/1-s2.0-S0010027720300536-main.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Preferences%2Bfor%2Bredistribution%2Bare%2Bsensitive%2Bto%2Bperceived%2Bluck%2C%2Bsocial%2Bhomogeneity%2C%2Bwar%2Band%2Bscarcity%22&as_sauthors=Nettle&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/222.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104234},\nissn = {00100277},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-05-01},\nurldate = {2020-05-01},\njournal = {Cognition},\nvolume = {198},\npages = {104234},\nabstract = {Many human societies feature institutions for redistributing resources from some individuals to others, but preferred levels of redistribution vary greatly within and between populations. We postulate that support for redistribution is the output of a structured cognitive system that is sensitive to features of the social situation. We developed an experimental approach in which participants prescribe appropriate redistribution for hypothetical villages whose features vary. Over seven experiments involving 2400 adults from the UK, we show that participants shift their redistribution preferences systematically as situational features change. Higher levels of re-distribution are favoured when luck is more important in the initial distribution of resources; when social groups are more homogeneous; when the group is at war; and when resources are abundant rather than scarce.Judgements about the right level of redistribution carry moderate or high levels of moral conviction. Participants have systematic intuitions about when the implementation of redistribution will prove problematic, distinct from their intuitions about when it is desirable. Individuals are only weakly consistent in the level of redistribution they prefer, and political orientation explains rather little variation in preferred redistribution for a given situation. We argue that people have divergent views on redistribution at least in part because they have different appraisals of the features of their societies. Understanding the operating principles of the psychology of redistribution may help explain variation and change in support for, and hence existence of, redistributive institutions across societies and over time.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Political preferences and threat perception: opportunities for neuroimaging and developmental research.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Landau-Wells, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 34: 58-63. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Political$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{231,\ntitle = {Political preferences and threat perception: opportunities for neuroimaging and developmental research},\nauthor = {Marika Landau-Wells and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2352154619301330\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Landau-Wells-and-Saxe_2020_Threat-Perception_Political-Prefs_Opportunities.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/231.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.12.002},\nissn = {23521546},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-08-01},\nurldate = {2020-08-01},\njournal = {Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences},\nvolume = {34},\npages = {58-63},\nabstract = {People have preferences for how their social environment is organized and governed. One influential explanation of variation in these preferences focuses on individual differences in sensitivity to threats. Recent research demonstrates that this relationship is a function not only of the degree of sensitivity (greater or lesser), but also of the danger in question (i.e. immigration or climate change) and the kind of potential harm it poses (i.e. physical pain or contamination). Since many political issues are not unambiguously of one kind, the structure of an individual&rsquo;s reactions to perceived political threats is also uncertain. We argue that future research should (i) use functional neuroimaging to test these structures and (ii) investigate the role of social learning in their transmission.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Reduced Neural Selectivity for Mental States in Deaf Children with Delayed Exposure to Sign Language.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H; Koster-Hale, J; Caselli, N; Magid, R; Benedict, R; Olson, H; Pyers, J; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature Communications, 11: 3246. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Reduced$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{238,\ntitle = {Reduced Neural Selectivity for Mental States in Deaf Children with Delayed Exposure to Sign Language},\nauthor = {H Richardson and J Koster-Hale and N Caselli and R Magid and R Benedict and H Olson and J Pyers and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17004-y\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/s41467-020-17004-y_2.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Reduced%2BNeural%2BSelectivity%2Bfor%2BMental%2BStates%2Bin%2BDeaf%2BChildren%2Bwith%2BDelayed%2BExposure%2Bto%2BSign%2BLanguage%22&as_sauthors=Richardson&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1. Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/238.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17004-y},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-06-01},\nurldate = {2020-06-01},\njournal = {Nature Communications},\nvolume = {11},\npages = {3246},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Response Patterns in the Developing Social Brain are Organized by Social and Emotion Features and Disrupted in Children Diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H; Gweon, H; Dodell-Feder, D; Malloy, C; Pelton, H; Keil, B; Kanwisher, N; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cortex, 125: 12-29. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Response$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{241,\ntitle = {Response Patterns in the Developing Social Brain are Organized by Social and Emotion Features and Disrupted in Children Diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder},\nauthor = {H Richardson and H Gweon and D Dodell-Feder and C Malloy and H Pelton and B Keil and N Kanwisher and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010945219304071\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/1-s2.0-S0010945219304071-main_1.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Response%2BPatterns%2Bin%2Bthe%2BDeveloping%2BSocial%2BBrain%2Bare%2BOrganized%2Bby%2BSocial%2Band%2BEmotion%2BFeatures%2Band%2BDisrupted%2Bin%2BChildren%2BDiagnosed%2Bwith%2BAutism%2BSpectrum%2BDisorder%22&as_sauthors=Richardson&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/241.rtf, RTF\nhttps://osf.io/cbw6f/, OSF},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2019.11.021},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-04-01},\nurldate = {2020-04-01},\njournal = {Cortex},\nvolume = {125},\npages = {12-29},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n 21.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Volume 2 . Early Signatures and Developmental Change in Brain Regions for Theory of Mind, pages 467-484. Second Edition edition, 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Early$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inbook{242,\ntitle = {Early Signatures and Developmental Change in Brain Regions for Theory of Mind},\nauthor = {H Richardson and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128144114000214\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RichardsonSaxe_NCCD.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Early%2BSignatures%2Band%2BDevelopmental%2BChange%2Bin%2BBrain%2BRegions%2Bfor%2BTheory%2Bof%2BMind%22&as_sauthors=Richardson&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/242.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-814411-4.00021-4},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-01-01},\nurldate = {2020-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Neural Circuit and Cognitive Development},\nvolume = {2},\npages = {467-484},\nedition = {Second Edition},\nchapter = {21},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Processing communicative facial and vocal cues in the superior temporal sulcus.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Deen, B; Saxe, R; and Kanwisher, N\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 221: 117191. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Processing$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{244,\ntitle = {Processing communicative facial and vocal cues in the superior temporal sulcus},\nauthor = {B Deen and R Saxe and N Kanwisher},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811920306777\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/1-s2.0-S1053811920306777-main.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Processing%2Bcommunicative%2Bfacial%2Band%2Bvocal%2Bcues%2Bin%2Bthe%2Bsuperior%2Btemporal%2Bsulcus%22&as_sauthors=Deen&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/244.rtf, RTF\n},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.117191},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-11-01},\nurldate = {2020-11-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {221},\npages = {117191},\nabstract = {Facial and vocal cues provide critical social information about other humans, including their emotional and attentional states and the content of their speech. Recent work has shown that the face-responsive region of posterior superior temporal sulcus (textquotedblleftfSTStextquotedblright) also responds strongly to vocal sounds. Here, we investigate the functional role of this region and the broader STS by measuring responses to a range of face movements, vocal sounds, and hand movements using fMRI. We find that the fSTS responds broadly to different types of audio and visual face action, including both richly social communicative actions, as well as minimally social noncommunicative actions, ruling out hypotheses of specialization for processing speech signals, or communicative signals more generally. Strikingly, however, responses to hand movements were very low, whether communicative or not, indicating a specific role in the analysis of face actions (facial and vocal), not a general role in the perception of any human action. Furthermore, spatial patterns of response in this region were able to decode communicative from noncommunicative face actions, both within and across modality (facial/vocal cues), indicating sensitivity to an abstract social dimension. These functional properties of the fSTS contrast with a region of middle STS that has a selective, largely unimodal auditory response to speech sounds over both communicative and noncommunicative vocal nonspeech sounds, and nonvocal sounds. Region of interest analyses were corroborated by a data-driven independent component analysis, identifying face-voice and auditory speech responses as dominant sources of voxelwise variance across the STS. These results suggest that the STS contains separate processing streams for the audiovisual analysis of face actions and auditory speech processing.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Acute stress alters neural patterns of value representation for others.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tomova, L; Saxe, R; Klöbl, M; Lanzenberger, R; and Lamm, C\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 209: 116497. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Acute$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{245,\ntitle = {Acute stress alters neural patterns of value representation for others},\nauthor = {L Tomova and R Saxe and M Klöbl and R Lanzenberger and C Lamm},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811919310882\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/1-s2.0-S1053811919310882-main.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Acute%2Bstress%2Balters%2Bneural%2Bpatterns%2Bof%2Bvalue%2Brepresentation%2Bfor%2Bothers%22&as_sauthors=Tomova&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/245.rtf, RTF},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116497},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-04-01},\nurldate = {2020-04-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {209},\npages = {116497},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Acute stress is often evoked during social interactions, by feelings of threat or negative evaluation by other people. We also constantly interact with others while under stress - in the workplace or in private alike. However, it is not clear how stress affects social interactions. For one, individuals could become more selfish and focused on their own goals. On the other hand, individuals might also become more focused on affiliating with potential social partners, in order to secure their support. There is, indeed, accumulating behavioral evidence that prosocial behaviors increase rather than decrease under stress. Here, we tested the underlying brain processes of such findings, by assessing the effects of stress on the neural representations of (monetary) value for self and other. Participants (N = 30; male, 18-40 years) played a gambling task for themselves and for another participant while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Each participant played the gambling task twice: once immediately following acute stress induction, and once in a control session. We compared neural patterns of value representation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and striatum using representational similarity analysis (RSA). We found that under stress, dmPFC and striatum showed higher dissimilarity between neural patterns underlying high and low value for the other. Dissimilarity of neural patterns underlying high and low value for the self was unaffected by stress. These findings suggest that participants track the magnitude of possible rewards for others more under stress, suggesting increased prosocial orientation.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Learning in infancy is active, endogenously motivated, and depends on the prefrontal cortices.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Raz, G; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 2: 247-268. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Learning$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{294,\ntitle = {Learning in infancy is active, endogenously motivated, and depends on the prefrontal cortices},\nauthor = {G Raz and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/citedby/10.1146/annurev-devpsych-121318-084841\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/annurev-devpsych-121318-084841.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-devpsych-121318-084841},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-01-01},\nurldate = {2020-01-01},\njournal = {Annual Review of Developmental Psychology},\nvolume = {2},\npages = {247-268},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;A common view of learning in infancy emphasizes the role of incidental sensory experiences from which increasingly abstract statistical regularities are extracted. In this view, infant brains initially support basic sensory and motor functions, followed by maturation of higher-level association cortex. Here, we critique this view and posit that, by contrast and more like adults, infants are active, endogenously motivated learners who structure their own learning through flexible selection of attentional targets and active interventions on their environment. We further argue that the infant brain, and particularly the prefrontal cortex (PFC), is well equipped to support these learning behaviors. We review recent progress in characterizing the function of the infant PFC, which suggests that, as in adults, the PFC is functionally specialized and highly connected. Together, we present an integrative account of infant minds and brains, in which the infant PFC represents multiple intrinsic motivations, which are leveraged for active learning.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Acute social isolation evokes midbrain craving responses similar to hunger.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tomova, L.; Wang, K. L.; Thompson, T.; Matthews, G. A.; Takahashi, A.; Tye, K. M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature Neuroscience, 23: 1597-1605. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Acute$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{319,\ntitle = {Acute social isolation evokes midbrain craving responses similar to hunger},\nauthor = {Livia Tomova and Kimberly L. Wang and Todd Thompson and Gillian A. Matthews and Atsushi Takahashi and Kay M. Tye and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Tomova-et-al-2020.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1038/s41593-020-00742-z},\nyear  = {2020},\ndate = {2020-01-01},\nurldate = {2020-01-01},\njournal = {Nature Neuroscience},\nvolume = {23},\npages = {1597-1605},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2019\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Parts-based representations of perceived face movements in the superior temporal sulcus.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Deen, B.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Human Brain Mapping. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Parts-based$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{209,\ntitle = {Parts-based representations of perceived face movements in the superior temporal sulcus},\nauthor = {Ben Deen and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/hbm.24540\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Deen_et_al-2019-Human_Brain_Mapping.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1002/hbm.24540},\nyear  = {2019},\ndate = {2019-02-01},\nurldate = {2019-02-01},\njournal = {Human Brain Mapping},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Facial motion is a primary source of social information about other humans. Prior fMRI studies&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;have identified regions of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) that respond specifically to perceived&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;face movements (termed fSTS), but little is known about the nature of motion representations&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;in these regions. Here we use fMRI and multivoxel pattern analysis to characterize the&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;representational content of the fSTS. Participants viewed a set of specific eye and mouth movements,&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;as well as combined eye and mouth movements. Our results demonstrate that fSTS&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;response patterns contain information about face movements, including subtle distinctions&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;between types of eye and mouth movements. These representations generalize across the actor&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;performing the movement, and across small differences in visual position. Critically, patterns of&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;response to combined movements could be well predicted by linear combinations of responses&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;to individual eye and mouth movements, pointing to a parts-based representation of complex&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;face movements. These results indicate that the fSTS plays an intermediate role in the process&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;of inferring social content from visually perceived face movements, containing a representation&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;that is sufficiently abstract to generalize across low-level visual details, but still tied to the kinematics&lt;/p&gt; \n&lt;p&gt;of face part movements.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n There’s more to “sparkle” than meets the eye: Knowledge of vision and light verbs among congenitally blind and sighted individuals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M.; Koster-Hale, J.; Elli, G.; Yazzolino, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 189: 105 - 115. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"There’s$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{211,\ntitle = {There’s more to “sparkle” than meets the eye: Knowledge of vision and light verbs among congenitally blind and sighted individuals},\nauthor = {Marina Bedny and Jorie Koster-Hale and Giulia Elli and Lindsay Yazzolino and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027719300721\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Bedny_etal_SightVerbs.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.03.017},\nissn = {00100277},\nyear  = {2019},\ndate = {2019-03-01},\nurldate = {2019-03-01},\njournal = {Cognition},\nvolume = {189},\npages = {105 - 115},\nabstract = {&lt;div title="Page 1"&gt; \n&lt;div&gt; \n&lt;div&gt; &lt;p&gt;We examined the contribution of first-person sensory experience to concepts by comparing the meanings of perception (visual/tactile) and emission (light/sound) verbs among congenitally blind (N = 25) and sighted speakers (N = 22). Participants judged semantic similarity for pairs of verbs referring to events of visual (e.g. to peek), tactile (e.g. to feel) and amodal perception (e.g. to perceive) as well as light (e.g. to shimmer) and sound (e.g. to boom) emission and manner of motion (to roll) (total word pairs},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Development of Predictive Responses in Theory of Mind Brain Regions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Developmental Science,e12863. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Development$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{213,\ntitle = {Development of Predictive Responses in Theory of Mind Brain Regions},\nauthor = {Hilary Richardson and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/desc.12863\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Richardson_et_al-2019-Developmental_Science.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1111/desc.12863},\nissn = {1363-755X},\nyear  = {2019},\ndate = {2019-05-01},\nurldate = {2019-05-01},\njournal = {Developmental Science},\npages = {e12863},\nabstract = {&lt;div title="Page 1"&gt; \n&lt;div&gt; \n&lt;div&gt; \n&lt;div&gt; &lt;p&gt;When we watch movies, we consider the characters&rsquo; mental states in order to understand and predict the narrative. Recent work in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) uses movie-viewing paradigms to measure functional responses in brain regions recruited for such mental state reasoning (the theory of mind [“ToM”] network). Here, two groups of young children (n = 30 3-4 years old},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The neuroscience of unmet social needs.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tomova, L.; Tye, K.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Neuroscience,1 - 11. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{221,\ntitle = {The neuroscience of unmet social needs},\nauthor = {Livia Tomova and Kay Tye and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17470919.2019.1694580\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/TomovaTyeSaxe-The-neuroscience-of-unmet-social-needs.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1080/17470919.2019.1694580},\nissn = {1747-0919},\nyear  = {2019},\ndate = {2019-11-01},\nurldate = {2019-11-01},\njournal = {Social Neuroscience},\npages = {1 - 11},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;John Cacioppo has compared loneliness to hunger or thirst in that it signals that one needs to act and repair what is lacking. This paper reviews Cacioppo&rsquo;s and others&rsquo; contributions to our understanding of neural mechanisms underlying social motivation in humans and in other social species. We focus particularly on the dopaminergic reward system and try to integrate evidence from animal models and human research. In rodents, objective social isolation leads to increased social motivation, mediated by the brains&rsquo; mesolimbic dopamine system. In humans, social rejection can lead to either increased or decreased social motivation, and is associated with activity in the insular cortex; while chronic loneliness is typically associated with decreased social motivation but has been associated with altered dopaminergic responses in the striatum. This mixed pattern of cross-species similarities and differences may arise from the substantially different methods used to study unmet social needs across species, and suggests the need for more direct and deliberate cross-species comparative research in this critically important domain.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2018\n \n \n (8)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Denying humanity: The distinct neural correlates of blatant dehumanization.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E.; Jacoby, N.; Kteily, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147: 1078 - 1093. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Denying$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{7,\ntitle = {Denying humanity: The distinct neural correlates of blatant dehumanization},\nauthor = {Emile Bruneau and Nir Jacoby and Nour Kteily and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000417\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Bruneau_etal_2018.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1037/xge0000417},\nissn = {0096-3445},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-07-01},\nurldate = {2018-07-01},\njournal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},\nvolume = {147},\npages = {1078 - 1093},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Recent behavioral work demonstrates that many people view low-status groups as less “evolved and civilized” than high-status groups. Are these people using blatant expressions of dehumanization simply to express strong dislike toward other groups? Or is blatant dehumanization a process distinct from other negative assessments? We tested these competing hypotheses using functional neuroimaging. Participants judged 10 groups (e.g., Europeans, Muslims, rats) on four scales: blatant dehumanization, dislike, dissimilarity and perceived within-group homogeneity. Consistent with expectations, neural responses when making ratings of dehumanization diverged from those when judging the same targets on the other related dimensions. Specifically, we found regions in the left inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and left inferior frontal cortex (IFC) that were selectively parametrically modulated by dehumanization ratings. The pattern of responses in the left IFC was also consistent with animalistic dehumanization: high responses to low-status human groups and animals, and lower responses to high-status human groups. By contrast, a region in the posterior cingulate cortex was parametrically sensitive specifically to liking. We therefore demonstrate a double dissociation between brain activity associated with judgments of blatant dehumanization and judgments of dislike.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {blatant dehumanization, dehumanization, fMRI, prejudice, social cognition},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Development of the social brain from age three to twelve years.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H.; Lisandrelli, G.; Riobueno-Naylor, A.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature Communications. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Development$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{9,\ntitle = {Development of the social brain from age three to twelve years},\nauthor = {Hilary Richardson and Grace Lisandrelli and Alexa Riobueno-Naylor and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-03399-2\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Richardson_Lisandrelli_Riobueno-Naylor_Saxe_2018.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1038/s41467-018-03399-2},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-12-01},\nurldate = {2018-12-01},\njournal = {Nature Communications},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Human adults recruit distinct networks of brain regions to think about the bodies and minds of others. This study characterizes the development of these networks, and tests for relationships between neural development and behavioral changes in reasoning about others&rsquo; minds (&lsquo;theory of mind&rsquo;, ToM). A large sample of children (n = 122, 3-12 years), and adults (n = 33), watched a short movie while undergoing fMRI. The movie highlights the characters&rsquo; bodily sensations (often pain) and mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions), and is a feasible experiment for young children. Here we report three main findings: (1) ToM and pain networks are functionally distinct by age 3 years, (2) functional specialization increases throughout childhood, and (3) functional maturity of each network is related to increasingly anti-correlated responses between the networks. Furthermore, the most studied milestone in ToM development, passing explicit false-belief tasks, does not correspond to discontinuities in the development of the social brain.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Social Origins of Cortical Face Areas.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Powell, L. J.; Kosakowski, H. L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Social$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{56,\ntitle = {Social Origins of Cortical Face Areas},\nauthor = {Lindsey J. Powell and Heather L. Kosakowski and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Social-Origins-of-Cortical-Face-Areas.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.tics.2018.06.009},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-09-01},\nurldate = {2018-09-01},\njournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Recently acquired fMRI data from human and macaque infants provide novel insights into the origins of cortical networks specialized for perceiving faces. Data from both species converge: cortical regions responding preferentially to faces are present and spatially organized early in infancy, although fully selective face areas emerge much later. What explains the earliest cortical responses to faces? We review two proposed mechanisms: proto-organization for simple shapes in visual cortex, and an innate subcortical schematic face template. In addition, we propose a third mechanism: infants choose to look at faces to engage in positively valenced, contingent social interactions. Activity in medial prefrontal cortex during social interactions may, directly or indirectly, guide the organization of cortical face areas.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Seeing Other Minds in 3D.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22: 193 - 195. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Seeing$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{57,\ntitle = {Seeing Other Minds in 3D},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661318300147\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe_2018.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.003},\nissn = {13646613},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-03-01},\nurldate = {2018-03-01},\njournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\nvolume = {22},\npages = {193 - 195},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cortical responses to dynamic emotional facial expressions generalize across stimuli, and are sensitive to task-relevance, in adults with and without Autism.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kliemann, D.; Richardson, H.; Anzellotti, S.; Ayyash, D.; Haskins, A. J.; Gabrieli, J. D. E.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cortex, 103: 24 - 43. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Cortical$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{58,\ntitle = {Cortical responses to dynamic emotional facial expressions generalize across stimuli, and are sensitive to task-relevance, in adults with and without Autism},\nauthor = {Dorit Kliemann and Hilary Richardson and Stefano Anzellotti and Dima Ayyash and Amanda J. Haskins and John D. E. Gabrieli and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010945218300443\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Kliemann_Richardson_Anzellotti_Ayyash_Haskins_Gabrieli_Saxe_2018.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cortex.2018.02.006},\nissn = {00109452},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-02-01},\nurldate = {2018-02-01},\njournal = {Cortex},\nvolume = {103},\npages = {24 - 43},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) report difficulties extracting meaningful information from dynamic and complex social cues, like facial expressions. The nature and mechanisms of these difficulties remain unclear. Here we tested whether that difficulty can be traced to the pattern of activity in “social brain” regions, when viewing dynamic facial expressions. In two studies, adult participants (male and female) watched brief videos of a range of positive and negative facial expressions, while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (Study 1: ASD n &frac14; 16, control n &frac14; 21; Study 2: ASD n &frac14; 22, control n &frac14; 30). Patterns of hemodynamic activity differentiated among facial emotional expressions in left and right superior temporal sulcus, fusiform gyrus, and parts of medial prefrontal cortex. In both control participants and high-functioning individuals with ASD, we observed (i) similar responses to emotional valence that generalized across facial expressions and animated social events; (ii) similar flexibility of responses to emotional valence, when manipulating the task-relevance of perceived emotions; and (iii) similar responses to a range of emotions within valence. Altogether, the data indicate that there was little or no group difference in cortical responses to isolated dynamic emotional facial expressions, as measured with fMRI. Difficulties with real-world social communication and social interaction in ASD may instead reflect differences in initiating and maintaining contingent interactions, or in integrating social information over time or context.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n “Affective Theory of Mind” and the Function of the Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kosakowski, H. L; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 31: 36-37. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"“Affective$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{59,\ntitle = {“Affective Theory of Mind” and the Function of the Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex},\nauthor = {Heather L Kosakowski and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Kosakowski_Saxe.2018.pdf, PDF\nhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22%E2%80%9CAffective%2BTheory%2Bof%2BMind%E2%80%9D%2Band%2Bthe%2BFunction%2Bof%2Bthe%2BVentral%2BMedial%2BPrefrontal%2BCortex%22&as_sauthors=Kosakowski&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/59.rtf, RTF},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-03-01},\nurldate = {2018-03-01},\njournal = {Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology},\nvolume = {31},\npages = {36-37},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Other and Me: Effects of oxytocin on self-other distinction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tomova, L; Heinrichs, M; and Lamm, C\n\n\n \n\n\n\n International Journal of Psychophysiology. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{61,\ntitle = {The Other and Me: Effects of oxytocin on self-other distinction},\nauthor = {L Tomova and M Heinrichs and C Lamm},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167876017302544\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Tomova_2018.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2018.03.008},\nissn = {01678760},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-03-01},\nurldate = {2018-03-01},\njournal = {International Journal of Psychophysiology},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Distinguishing self- from other-related representations plays an important role in social interactions. The &lt;a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/neuropeptide" title="Learn more about Neuropeptide"&gt;neuropeptide&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/oxytocin" title="Learn more about Oxytocin"&gt;oxytocin&lt;/a&gt; has been shown to modulate &lt;a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/social-behavior" title="Learn more about Social Behavior"&gt;social behavior&lt;/a&gt; as well as underlying &lt;a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/social-cognition" title="Learn more about Social cognition"&gt;social cognitions&lt;/a&gt; and emotions. However, how exactly oxytocin modulates representations of self and other is still unclear. The present study therefore aimed to assess effects of oxytocin on self-other distinction on two different processing levels (i.e., lower-level imitation-inhibition and higher-level perspective taking) in a male sample (n = 56) by performing a double-blind, placebo-controlled oxytocin administration study. Oxytocin improved visual perspective-taking and thus affected self-other distinction on the cognitive level, but had no effects on self-other distinction on the perceptual-motor level nor on a control task measuring attention reorientation. Thus, our findings suggest that oxytocin reduces ambiguity during perspective-taking in social interactions, which in turn may encourage social approach motivation and affiliative behavior.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Development of brain networks for social functions: Confirmatory analyses in a large open source dataset.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Development$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{208,\ntitle = {Development of brain networks for social functions: Confirmatory analyses in a large open source dataset},\nauthor = {Hilary Richardson},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1878929318301750\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/1-s2.0-S1878929318301750-main.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.dcn.2018.11.002},\nissn = {18789293},\nyear  = {2018},\ndate = {2018-11-01},\nurldate = {2018-11-01},\njournal = {Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Human observers show robust activity in distinct brain networks during movie-viewing. For example, scenes that emphasize characters&rsquo; thoughts evoke activity in the “Theory of Mind” (ToM) network, whereas scenes that emphasize characters&rsquo; bodily sensations evoke activity in the “Pain Matrix.” A prior exploratory fMRI study used a naturalistic movie-viewing stimulus to study the developmental origins of this functional dissociation, and the links between cortical and cognitive changes in children&rsquo;s social development (Richardson et al., 2018). To replicate and extend this work, the current study utilized a large publicly available dataset (n = 241, ages 5-20 years) (Alexander et al., 2017) who viewed “The Present” (Frey, 2014) and completed a resting state scan (n = 200) while undergoing fMRI. This study provides confirmatory evidence that 1) ToM and pain networks are functionally dissociated early in development, 2) selectivity increases with age, and in ToM regions, with a behavioral index of social reasoning. Additionally, while inter-region correlations are similar when measured during the movie and at rest, only inter-region correlations measured during movie-viewing correlated with functional maturity. This study demonstrates the scientific benefits of open source data in developmental cognitive neuroscience, and provides insight into the relationship between functional and intrinsic properties of the developing brain.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2017\n \n \n (12)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Parochial Empathy Predicts Reduced Altruism and the Endorsement of Passive Harm.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E. G.; Cikara, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Psychological and Personality Science,934 - 942. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Parochial$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{10,\ntitle = {Parochial Empathy Predicts Reduced Altruism and the Endorsement of Passive Harm},\nauthor = {Emile G. Bruneau and Mina Cikara and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1948550617693064\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BruneauCikaraSaxe_2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1177/1948550617693064},\nissn = {1948-5506},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-11-01},\nurldate = {2017-11-01},\njournal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},\npages = {934 - 942},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Empathic failures are common in hostile intergroup contexts; repairing empathy is therefore a major focus of peacebuilding efforts. However, it is unclear which aspect of empathy is most relevant to intergroup conflict. Although trait empathic concern predicts prosociality in interpersonal settings, we hypothesized that the best predictor of meaningful intergroup attitudes and behaviors might not be the general capacity for empathy (i.e., trait empathy), but the difference in empathy felt for the in-group versus the out-group, or “parochial empathy.” Specifically, we predicted that out-group empathy would inhibit intergroup harm and promote intergroup helping, whereas in-group empathy would have the opposite effect. In three intergroup contexts&mdash; Americans regarding Arabs, Hungarians regarding refugees, Greeks regarding Germans&mdash;we found support for this hypothesis. In all samples, in-group and out-group empathy had independent, significant, and opposite effects on intergroup outcomes, controlling for trait empathic concern.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Using individual functional channels of interest to study cortical development with fNIRS.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Powell, L. J.; Deen, B.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Developmental Science,e12595. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Using$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{12,\ntitle = {Using individual functional channels of interest to study cortical development with fNIRS},\nauthor = {Lindsey J. Powell and Ben Deen and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/desc.12595\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PowellDeenSaxe_2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1111/desc.12595},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-07-01},\nurldate = {2017-07-01},\njournal = {Developmental Science},\npages = {e12595},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a noninvasive neuroimaging technique that could be uniquely effective for investigating cortical function in human infants. However, prior efforts have been hampered by the difficulty of aligning arrays of fNIRS optodes placed on the scalp to anatomical or functional regions of underlying cortex. This challenge can be addressed by identifying channels of interest in individual participants, and then testing the reliability of those channels&rsquo; response profiles in independent data. Using this approach, cortical regions with preferential responses to faces versus scenes, and to scenes versus faces, were observed reliably in both adults and infants. By contrast, standard analysis techniques did not reliably identify significant responses to both categories in either age group. These results reveal sceneresponsive regions, and confirm face-responsive regions, in preverbal infants. More generally, the analysis approach will be a robust and sensitive tool for future characterization of the early functional development of the human brain.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Organization of high-level visual cortex in human infants.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Deen, B.; Richardson, H.; Dilks, D. D.; Takahashi, A.; Keil, B.; Wald, L. L.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature Communications, 8: 13995. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Organization$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{13,\ntitle = {Organization of high-level visual cortex in human infants},\nauthor = {Ben Deen and Hilary Richardson and Daniel D. Dilks and Atsushi Takahashi and Boris Keil and Lawrence L. Wald and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/ncomms13995\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/deen.etal_.2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1038/ncomms13995},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-01-01},\nurldate = {2017-01-01},\njournal = {Nature Communications},\nvolume = {8},\npages = {13995},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;How much of the structure of the human mind and brain is already specified at birth, and how much arises from experience? In this article, we consider the test case of extrastriate visual cortex, where a highly systematic functional organization is present in virtually every normal adult, including regions preferring behaviourally significant stimulus categories, such as faces, bodies, and scenes. Novel methods were developed to scan awake infants with fMRI, while they viewed multiple categories of visual stimuli. Here we report that the visual cortex of 4-6-month-old infants contains regions that respond preferentially to abstract categories (faces and scenes), with a spatial organization similar to adults. However, precise response profiles and patterns of activity across multiple visual categories differ between infants and adults. These results demonstrate that the large-scale organization of category preferences in visual cortex is adult-like within a few months after birth, but is subsequently refined through development.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Replications of implicit theory of mind tasks with varying representational demands.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Powell, L. J.; Hobbs, K.; Bardis, A.; Carey, S.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive Development, 46: 40 - 50. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Replications$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{60,\ntitle = {Replications of implicit theory of mind tasks with varying representational demands},\nauthor = {Lindsey J. Powell and Kathryn Hobbs and Alexandros Bardis and Susan Carey and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0885201417300461\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Powell_Hobbs_Bardis_Carey_Saxe_2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.10.004},\nissn = {08852014},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-04-01},\nurldate = {2017-04-01},\njournal = {Cognitive Development},\nvolume = {46},\npages = {40 - 50},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;We attempted to reproduce three tests of theory of mind in infants using implicit tasks that have been previously reported in the literature. These efforts were intended as initial steps in larger projects aimed at building on past research to better understand infants&rsquo; theory of mind capacities and their relationship to preschoolers&rsquo; explicit theory of mind. One task fully replicated evidence of 2-year-old children&rsquo;s sensitivity to others&rsquo; ignorance. The results of another task testing for similar capacities in 18-month-old infants also elicited behavior similar to the original findings, although in that case we only conducted one of two conditions critical for demonstrating that performance depended upon theory of mind capacities. In contrast, our violation of expectation tasks failed to reproduce evidence that, by 18 months of age, infants form specific expectations about the actions an agent will engage in on the basis of false beliefs. Instead, looking times were consistent with infants having no clear prediction about the agent&$#$39;s actions under conditions of false belief. We discuss factors that might account for our failure to reproduce the previously reported violation of expectation results on which we were attempting to build. However, we also discuss the consistency of our data with other findings and hypotheses regarding early-developing theory of mind, and consider the possibility that they reflect the veridical abilities of 18-month-old infants, who may track others&rsquo; knowledge and ignorance but may not consistently represent the contents of others&rsquo; beliefs.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Mentalizing regions represent distributed, continuous, and abstract dimensions of others’ beliefs.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Koster-Hale, J.; Richardson, H.; Velez, N.; Asaba, M.; Young, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 161: 9 - 18. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Mentalizing$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{62,\ntitle = {Mentalizing regions represent distributed, continuous, and abstract dimensions of others’ beliefs},\nauthor = {Jorie Koster-Hale and Hilary Richardson and Natalia Velez and Mika Asaba and Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811917306730, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Koster-HaleRichardson_2017.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Koster-Hale_Richardson_stimuli.zip, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.08.026},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-08-01},\nurldate = {2017-08-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {161},\npages = {9 - 18},\nabstract = {The human capacity to reason about others' minds includes making causal inferences about intentions, beliefs, values, and goals. Previous fMRI research has suggested that a network of brain regions, including bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and medial prefrontal-cortex (MPFC), are reliably recruited for mental state reasoning. Here, in two fMRI experiments, we investigate the representational content of these regions. Building on existing computational and neural evidence, we hypothesized that social brain regions contain at least two functionally and spatially distinct components: one that represents information related to others' motivations and values, and another that represents information about others' beliefs and knowledge. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis, we find evidence that motivational versus epistemic features are independently represented by theory of mind (ToM) regions: RTPJ contains information about the justification of the belief, bilateral TPJ represents the modality of the source of knowledge, and VMPFC represents the valence of the resulting emotion. These representations are found only in regions implicated in social cognition and predict behavioral responses at the level of single items. We argue that cortical regions implicated in mental state inference contain complementary, but distinct, representations of epistemic and motivational features of others' beliefs, and that, mirroring the processes observed in sensory systems, social stimuli are represented in distinct and distributed formats across the human brain.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n High-resolution magnetic resonance imaging reveals nuclei of the human amygdala: manual segmentation to automatic atlas.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saygin, Z.; Kliemann, D; Iglesias, J.; Kouwe, A.; Boyd, E; Reuter, M; Stevens, A; Leemput, K V.; McKee, A; Frosch, M.; Fischl, B; and Augustinack, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 155: 370 - 382. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"High-resolution$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{63,\ntitle = {High-resolution magnetic resonance imaging reveals nuclei of the human amygdala: manual segmentation to automatic atlas},\nauthor = {ZM Saygin and D Kliemann and JE Iglesias and AJW Kouwe and E Boyd and M Reuter and A Stevens and K Van Leemput and A McKee and MP Frosch and B Fischl and JC Augustinack},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811917303427\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SayginKliemannetal2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.04.046},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-04-01},\nurldate = {2017-04-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {155},\npages = {370 - 382},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;The amygdala is composed of multiple nuclei with unique functions and connections in the limbic system and to the rest of the brain. However, standard in vivo neuroimaging tools to automatically delineate the amygdala into its multiple nuclei are still rare. By scanning postmortem specimens at high resolution (100-150 &micro;m) at 7 T field strength (n = 10), we were able to visualize and label nine amygdala nuclei (anterior amygdaloid, corticoamygdaloid transition area; basal, lateral, accessory basal, central, cortical medial, paralaminar nuclei). We created an atlas from these labels using a recently developed atlas building algorithm based on Bayesian inference. This atlas, which will be released as part of FreeSurfer, can be used to automatically segment nine amygdala nuclei from a standard resolution structural MR image. We applied this atlas to two publicly available datasets (ADNI and ABIDE) with standard resolution T1 data, used individual volumetric data of the amygdala nuclei as the measure and found that our atlas i) discriminates between Alzheimer&$#$39;s disease participants and age-matched control participants with 84% accuracy (AUC=0.915), and ii) discriminates between individuals with autism and age-, sex- and IQ-matched neurotypically developed control participants with 59.5% accuracy (AUC=0.59). For both datasets, the new ex vivo atlas significantly outperformed (all p &lt; .05) estimations of the whole amygdala derived from the segmentation in FreeSurfer 5.1 (ADNI: 75%, ABIDE: 54% accuracy), as well as classification based on whole amygdala volume (using the sum of all amygdala nuclei volumes; ADNI: 81%, ABIDE: 55% accuracy). This new atlas and the segmentation tools that utilize it will provide neuroimaging researchers with the ability to explore the function and connectivity of the human amygdala nuclei with unprecedented detail in healthy adults as well as those with neurodevelopmental and neurodegenerative disorders.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Anterior temporal lobe and the representation of knowledge about people.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Anzellotti, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114: 4042 - 4044. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Anterior$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{64,\ntitle = {Anterior temporal lobe and the representation of knowledge about people},\nauthor = {Stefano Anzellotti},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1703438114\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Anzellotti_2017_PNAS.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1703438114},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-04-01},\nurldate = {2017-04-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {114},\npages = {4042 - 4044},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Learning a commonsense moral theory.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kleiman-Weiner, M.; Saxe, R.; and Tenenbaum, J. B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 167: 107 - 123. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Learning$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{65,\ntitle = {Learning a commonsense moral theory},\nauthor = {Max Kleiman-Weiner and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua B. Tenenbaum},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027717300707\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Kleiman-Weiner.etal_.2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005},\nissn = {00100277},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-03-01},\nurldate = {2017-03-01},\njournal = {Cognition},\nvolume = {167},\npages = {107 - 123},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one&rsquo;s own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Baker, C. L.; Jara-Ettinger, J.; Saxe, R.; and Tenenbaum, J. B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature Human Behaviour. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Rational$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{67,\ntitle = {Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing},\nauthor = {Chris L. Baker and Julian Jara-Ettinger and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua B. Tenenbaum},\nurl = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0064\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Baker.etal_.2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1038/s41562-017-0064},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-03-01},\nurldate = {2017-03-01},\njournal = {Nature Human Behaviour},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Social cognition depends on our capacity for &lsquo;mentalizing&rsquo;, or explaining an agent&rsquo;s behaviour in terms of their mental states. The development and neural substrates of mentalizing are well-studied, but its computational basis is only beginning to be probed. Here we present a model of core mentalizing computations: inferring jointly an actor&rsquo;s beliefs, desires and percepts from how they move in the local spatial environment. Our Bayesian theory of mind (BToM) model is based on probabilistically inverting artificial-intelligence approaches to rational planning and state estimation, which extend classical expected-utility agent models to sequential actions in complex, partially observable domains. The model accurately captures the quantitative mental-state judgements of human participants in two experiments, each varying multiple stimulus dimensions across a large number of stimuli. Comparative model fits with both simpler &lsquo;lesioned&rsquo; BToM models and a family of simpler non-mentalistic motion features reveal the value contributed by each component of our model.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Directed network discovery with dynamic network modelling.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Anzellotti, S.; Kliemann, D.; Jacoby, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuropsychologia, 99: 1 - 11. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Directed$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{68,\ntitle = {Directed network discovery with dynamic network modelling},\nauthor = {Stefano Anzellotti and Dorit Kliemann and Nir Jacoby and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393217300520\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/AnzellottiKliemannJacobySaxe2016.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.02.006},\nissn = {00283932},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-02-01},\nurldate = {2017-02-01},\njournal = {Neuropsychologia},\nvolume = {99},\npages = {1 - 11},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Cognitive tasks recruit multiple brain regions. Understanding how these regions influence each other (the network structure) is an important step to characterize the neural basis of cognitive processes. Often, limited evidence is available to restrict the range of hypotheses a priori, and techniques that sift efficiently through a large number of possible network structures are needed (network discovery). This article introduces a novel modelling technique for network discovery (Dynamic Network Modelling or DNM) that builds on ideas from Granger Causality and Dynamic Causal Modelling introducing three key changes: (1) efficient network discovery is implemented with statistical tests on the consistency of model parameters across participants, (2) the tests take into account the magnitude and sign of each influence, and (3) variance explained in independent data is used as an absolute (rather than relative) measure of the quality of the network model. In this article, we outline the functioning of DNM, we validate DNM in simulated data for which the ground truth is known, and we report an example of its application to the investigation of influences between regions during emotion recognition, revealing top-down influences from brain regions encoding abstract representations of emotions (medial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus) onto regions engaged in the perceptual analysis of facial expressions (occipital face area and fusiform face area) when participants are asked to switch between reporting the emotional valence and the age of a face.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Multivariate pattern dependence.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Anzellotti, S.; Caramazza, A.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLOS Computational Biology, 13: e1005799. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Multivariate$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{70,\ntitle = {Multivariate pattern dependence},\nauthor = {Stefano Anzellotti and Alfonso Caramazza and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005799\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/journal.pcbi_.1005799.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.100579910.1371},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-11-01},\nurldate = {2017-11-01},\njournal = {PLOS Computational Biology},\nvolume = {13},\npages = {e1005799},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;When we perform a cognitive task, multiple brain regions are engaged. Understanding how these regions interact is a fundamental step to uncover the neural bases of behavior. Most research on the interactions between brain regions has focused on the univariate responses in the regions. However, fine grained patterns of response encode important information, as shown by multivariate pattern analysis. In the present article, we introduce and apply multivariate pattern dependence (MVPD): a technique to study the statistical dependence between brain regions in humans in terms of the multivariate relations between their patterns of responses. MVPD characterizes the responses in each brain region as trajectories in region-specific multidimensional spaces, and models the multivariate relationship between these trajectories. We applied MVPD to the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and to the fusiform face area (FFA), using a searchlight approach to reveal interactions between these seed regions and the rest of the brain. Across two different experiments, MVPD identified significant statistical dependence not detected by standard functional connectivity. Additionally, MVPD outperformed univariate connectivity in its ability to explain independent variance in the responses of individual voxels. In the end, MVPD uncovered different connectivity profiles associated with different representational subspaces of FFA: the first principal component of FFA shows differential connectivity with occipital and parietal regions implicated in the processing of low-level properties of faces, while the second and third components show differential connectivity with anterior temporal regions implicated in the processing of invariant representations of face identity.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Formalizing emotion concepts within a Bayesian model of theory of mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; and Houlihan, S. D.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, volume 44, pages 854–861, 2017. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Formalizing$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inproceedings{houlihan2022emotionreasoning,\ntitle = {Formalizing emotion concepts within a Bayesian model of theory of mind},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Sean Dae Houlihan},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2352250X17300283\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe.Houlihan.EmotionConcepts.2017.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.019},\nissn = {2352250X},\nyear  = {2017},\ndate = {2017-10-01},\nurldate = {2017-10-01},\nbooktitle = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\nvolume = {44},\npages = {854--861},\nabstract = {It is commonly believed that expressions visually signal rich diagnostic information to human observers. We studied how observers interpret the dynamic expressions that people spontaneously produced during a real-life high-stakes televised game. We find that human observers are remarkably poor at recovering what events elicited others’ facial and bodily expressions. Beyond simple inaccuracy, people’s causal reasoning exhibits systematic model-based patterns of errors. We show that latent emotion representations can explain people’s reasoning about the unseen causes of expressions. A hierarchical Bayesian model simulates which events people infer to be the cause of others’ expressions by comparing the emotions inferred from the expressions against the emotions people were predicted to experience in various situations. This causal model provides a close, parameter-free fit to human causal judgments, suggesting that humans interpret expressions in the context of emotion predictions generated by a causally-structured mental model of other minds.},\nhowpublished = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7sn3w3n2},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inproceedings}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2016\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Decoding task and stimulus representations in face-responsive cortex.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kliemann, D.; Jacoby, N.; Anzellotti, S.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive Neuropsychology, 33: 362 - 377. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Decoding$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{14,\ntitle = {Decoding task and stimulus representations in face-responsive cortex},\nauthor = {Dorit Kliemann and Nir Jacoby and Stefano Anzellotti and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02643294.2016.1256873\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/KliemannJacobyAnzellottiSaxe2016.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1080/02643294.2016.1256873},\nissn = {0264-3294},\nyear  = {2016},\ndate = {2016-11-01},\nurldate = {2016-11-01},\njournal = {Cognitive Neuropsychology},\nvolume = {33},\npages = {362 - 377},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Observers can deliberately attend to some aspects of a face (e.g. emotional expression) while ignoring others. How do internal goals influence representational geometry in face-responsive cortex? Participants watched videos of naturalistic dynamic faces during MRI scanning. We measured multivariate neural response patterns while participants formed an intention to attend to a facial aspect (age, or emotional valence), and then attended to that aspect, and responses to the face&$#$39;s emotional valence, independent of attention. Distinct patterns of response to the two tasks were found while forming the intention, in left fronto-lateral but not face-responsive regions, and while attending to the face, in almost all face-responsive regions. Emotional valence was represented in right posterior superior temporal sulcus and medial prefrontal cortex, but could not be decoded when unattended. Shifting the focus of attention thus alters cortical representation of social information, probably reflecting neural flexibility to optimally integrate goals and perceptual input.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Measuring and Modeling Transformations of Information Between Brain Regions with fMRI.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Anzellotti, S.; Fedorenko, E.; Caramazza, A.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n bioRxiv. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Measuring$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{15,\ntitle = {Measuring and Modeling Transformations of Information Between Brain Regions with fMRI},\nauthor = {Stefano Anzellotti and Evelina Fedorenko and Alfonso Caramazza and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/AnzellottiFedorenkoCaramazzaSaxe2016.pdf, PDF},\nyear  = {2016},\ndate = {2016-10-01},\nurldate = {2016-10-01},\njournal = {bioRxiv},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Investigating how information is transformed from brain region to brain region is a crucial step to understand the neural foundations of cognitive processes. This investigation requires a characterization of the representations encoded in different regions, and models of how they are transformed that can match the complexity of neural processes. We introduce an approach in which representations are characterized as points in multidimensional spaces, and processes transforming representations from region to region are modeled as nonlinear functions using artificial neural networks. Across multiple experiments with different stimuli and tasks, we show that this approach reveals functionally relevant network structure and outperforms comparable linear models at predicting independent data.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n When minds matter for moral judgment: intent information is neurally encoded for harmful but not impure acts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chakroff, A.; Dungan, J.; Koster-Hale, J.; Brown, A.; Saxe, R.; and Young, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1120: 476 - 484. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"When$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{17,\ntitle = {When minds matter for moral judgment: intent information is neurally encoded for harmful but not impure acts},\nauthor = {Alek Chakroff and James Dungan and Jorie Koster-Hale and Amelia Brown and Rebecca Saxe and Liane Young},\nurl = {https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/scan/nsv131\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe2016.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1093/scan/nsv131},\nissn = {1749-5016},\nyear  = {2016},\ndate = {2016-03-01},\nurldate = {2016-03-01},\njournal = {Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience},\nvolume = {1120},\npages = {476 - 484},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Recent behavioral evidence indicates a key role for intent in moral judgments of harmful acts (e.g. assault) but not impure acts (e.g. incest). We tested whether the neural responses in regions for mental state reasoning, including the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), are greater when people evaluate harmful vs impure violations. In addition, using multivoxel pattern analysis, we investigated whether the voxel-wise pattern in these regions distinguishes intentional from accidental actions, for either kind of violation. The RTPJ was preferentially recruited in response to harmful vs impure acts. Moreover, although its response was equally high for intentional and accidental acts, the voxel-wise pattern in the RTPJ distinguished intentional from accidental acts in the harm domain but not the purity domain. Finally, we found that the degree to which the RTPJ discriminated between intentional and accidental acts predicted the impact of intent information on moral judgments but again only in the harm domain. These findings reveal intent to be a uniquely critical factor for moral evaluations of harmful vs impure acts and shed light on the neural computations for mental state reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Moral status of accidents.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113: 4555 - 4557. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Moral$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{69,\ntitle = {Moral status of accidents},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1604154113\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe2016.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1604154113},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2016},\ndate = {2016-04-01},\nurldate = {2016-04-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {113},\npages = {4555 - 4557},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n .\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Richardson, H.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Using MRI to Study Developmental Change in Theory of Mind, pages 210. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inbook{295,\ntitle = {Using MRI to Study Developmental Change in Theory of Mind},\nauthor = {Hilary Richardson and Rebecca Saxe},\ndoi = {10.17583/rasp.2017.2728},\nyear  = {2016},\ndate = {2016-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Social Cognition: Development Across the Life Span},\npages = {210},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2015\n \n \n (9)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n “Visual” Cortex Responds to Spoken Language in Blind Children.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M.; Richardson, H.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The Journal of Neuroscience, 35: 11674 - 11681. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"“Visual”$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{20,\ntitle = {“Visual” Cortex Responds to Spoken Language in Blind Children},\nauthor = {Marina Bedny and Hilary Richardson and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.jneurosci.org/lookup/doi/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0634-15.2015\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BednyRichardsonSaxe2015.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0634-15.2015},\nissn = {0270-6474},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-08-01},\nurldate = {2015-08-01},\njournal = {The Journal of Neuroscience},\nvolume = {35},\npages = {11674 - 11681},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Plasticity inthe visual cortex of blind individuals provides a rare window intothe mechanisms of cortical specialization. Inthe absence of visual input, occipital (“visual”) brain regions respond to sound and spoken language. Here, we examined the time course and developmental mechanism of this plasticity in blind children. Nineteen blind and 40 sighted children and adolescents (4 -17 years old) listened to stories and two auditory control conditions (unfamiliar foreign speech, and music). We find that “visual” cortices of young blind (but not sighted) children respond to sound. Responses to nonlanguage sounds increased between the ages of 4 and 17. By contrast, occipital responses to spoken language were maximal by age 4 and were not related to Braille learning. These findings suggest that occipital plasticity for spoken language is independent of plasticity for Braille and for sound. We conclude that in the absence of visual input, spoken language colonizes the visual system during brain development. Our findings suggest that early in life, human cortex has a remarkably broad computational capacity. The same cortical tissue can take on visual perception and language functions.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Neural Representations of Emotion Are Organized around Abstract Event Features.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Skerry, E; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Biology, 25: 1945 - 1954. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Neural$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{21,\ntitle = {Neural Representations of Emotion Are Organized around Abstract Event Features},\nauthor = {E Skerry and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982215006740https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0960982215006740?httpAccept=text/xmlhttps://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0960982215006740?httpAccept=text/plain\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SkerrySaxe2015.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/stimRatings.zip, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cub.2015.06.009},\nissn = {09609822},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-08-01},\nurldate = {2015-08-01},\njournal = {Current Biology},\nvolume = {25},\npages = {1945 - 1954},\nabstract = {Research on emotion attribution has tended to focus on the perception of overt expressions of at most five or six basic emotions. However, our ability to identify others’ emotional states is not limited to perception of these canonical expressions. Instead, we make fine-grained inferences about what others feel based on the situations they encounter, relying on knowledge of the eliciting conditions for different emotions. In the present research, we provide convergent behavioral and neural evidence concerning the representations underlying these concepts. First, we find that patterns of activity in mentalizing regions contain information about subtle emotional distinctions conveyed through verbal descriptions of eliciting situations. Second, we identify a space of abstract situation features that well captures the emotion discriminations subjects make behaviorally and show that this feature space outperforms competing models in capturing the similarity space of neural patterns in these regions. Together, the data suggest that our knowledge of others’ emotions is abstract and high dimensional, that brain regions selective for mental state reasoning support relatively subtle distinctions between emotion concepts, and that the neural representations in these regions are not reducible to more primitive affective dimensions such as valence and arousal.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Localizing Pain Matrix and Theory of Mind networks with both verbal and non-verbal stimuli.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Jacoby, N.; Bruneau, E.; Koster-Hale, J.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 126: 39 - 48. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Localizing$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{71,\ntitle = {Localizing Pain Matrix and Theory of Mind networks with both verbal and non-verbal stimuli},\nauthor = {Nir Jacoby and Emile Bruneau and Jorie Koster-Hale and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811915010472\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/JacobyBruneauKosterHaleSaxe2015.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.11.025},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-11-01},\nurldate = {2015-11-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {126},\npages = {39 - 48},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Functional localizer tasks allow researchers to identify brain regions in each individual&$#$39;s brain, using a combination of anatomical and functional constraints. In this study, we compare three social cognitive localizer tasks, designed to efficiently identify regions in the “Pain Matrix,” recruited in response to a person&$#$39;s physical pain, and the “Theory of Mind network,” recruited in response to a person&$#$39;s mental states (i.e. beliefs and emotions). Participants performed three tasks: first, the verbal false-belief stories task; second, a verbal task including stories describing physical pain versus emotional suffering; and third, passively viewing a non-verbal animated movie, which included segments depicting physical pain and beliefs and emotions. All three localizers were efficient in identifying replicable, stable networks in individual subjects. The consistency across tasks makes all three tasks viable localizers. Nevertheless, there were small reliable differences in the location of the regions and the pattern of activity within regions, hinting at more specific representations. The new localizers go beyond those currently available: first, they simultaneously identify two functional networks with no additional scan time, and second, the non-verbal task extends the populations in whom functional localizers can be applied. These localizers will be made publicly available.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Functional Organization of Social Perception and Cognition in the Superior Temporal Sulcus.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Deen, B.; Koldewyn, K.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cerebral Cortex, 25: 4596 - 4609. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Functional$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{72,\ntitle = {Functional Organization of Social Perception and Cognition in the Superior Temporal Sulcus},\nauthor = {Ben Deen and Kami Koldewyn and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://academic.oup.com/cercor/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/cercor/bhv111\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DeenKoldewynKanwisherSaxe2015.pdf, PDF\nhttps://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/vk2yq5sa2pqa8dxkhqi57/Deen2015_megascan_stories.zip?rlkey=i5035rw4vbnmz6yt6nu8nqlgo&e=1&dl=0, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1093/cercor/bhv111},\nissn = {1047-3211},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-11-01},\nurldate = {2015-11-01},\njournal = {Cerebral Cortex},\nvolume = {25},\npages = {4596 - 4609},\nabstract = {The superior temporal sulcus (STS) is considered a hub for social perception and cognition, including the perception of faces and human motion, as well as understanding others&rsquo; actions, mental states, and language. However, the functional organization of the STS remains debated: Is this broad region composed of multiple functionally distinct modules, each specialized for a different process, or are STS subregions multifunctional, contributing to multiple processes? Is the STS spatially organized, and if so, what are the dominant features of this organization? We address these questions by measuring STS responses to a range of social and linguistic stimuli in the same set of human participants, using fMRI. We find a number of STS subregions that respond selectively to certain types of social input, organized along a posterior-to-anterior axis. We also identify regions of overlapping response to multiple contrasts, including regions responsive to both language and theory of mind, faces and voices, and faces and biological motion. Thus, the human STS contains both relatively domain-specific areas, and regions that respond to multiple types of social information.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Empathic control through coordinated interaction of amygdala, theory of mind and extended pain matrix brain regions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E. G.; Jacoby, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 114: 105 - 119. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Empathic$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{73,\ntitle = {Empathic control through coordinated interaction of amygdala, theory of mind and extended pain matrix brain regions},\nauthor = {Emile G. Bruneau and Nir Jacoby and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811915003250\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Bruneau_etal_2015.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.04.034},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-07-01},\nurldate = {2015-07-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {114},\npages = {105 - 119},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Brain regions in the “pain matrix”, can be activated by observing or reading about others in physical pain. In previous research, we found that reading stories about others&$#$39; emotional suffering, by contrast, recruits a different group of brain regions mostly associated with thinking about others&$#$39; minds. In the current study, we examined the neural circuits responsible for deliberately regulating empathic responses to others&$#$39; pain and suffering. In Study 1, a sample of college-aged participants (n = 18) read stories about physically painful and emotionally distressing events during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), while either actively empathizing with the main character or trying to remain objective. In Study 2, the same experiment was performed with professional social workers, who are chronically exposed to human suffering (n = 21). Across both studies activity in the amygdala was associated with empathic regulation towards others&$#$39; emotional pain, but not their physical pain. In addition, psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis and Granger causal modeling (GCM) showed that amygdala activity while reading about others&$#$39; emotional pain was preceded by and positively coupled with activity in the theory of mind brain regions, and followed by and negatively coupled with activity in regions associated with physical pain and bodily sensations. Previous work has shown that the amygdala is critically involved in the deliberate control of self-focused distress &mdash; the current results extend the central importance of amygdala activity to the control of other-focused empathy, but only when considering others&$#$39; emotional pain.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Spunt, R. P.; Elison, J. T.; Dufour, N.; Hurlemann, &.; Saxe, R.; and Adolphs, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112153: 4827 - 4832. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Amygdala$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{74,\ntitle = {Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning},\nauthor = {Robert P. Spunt and Jed T. Elison and Nicholas Dufour and &#039;e Hurlemann and Rebecca Saxe and Ralph Adolphs},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1422679112\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/spunt_etal_2015.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1422679112},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-02-01},\nurldate = {2015-02-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {112153},\npages = {4827 - 4832},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;The amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people&rsquo;s mental states as distinct from one&rsquo;s own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM&mdash;false-belief reasoning&mdash;suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Occipital Cortex of Blind Individuals Is Functionally Coupled with Executive Control Areas of Frontal Cortex.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Deen, B.; Saxe, R.; and Bedny, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 27: 1633 - 1647. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Occipital$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{75,\ntitle = {Occipital Cortex of Blind Individuals Is Functionally Coupled with Executive Control Areas of Frontal Cortex},\nauthor = {Ben Deen and Rebecca Saxe and Marina Bedny},\nurl = {http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/jocn_a_00807\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DeenSaxeBedny2015.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1162/jocn_a_00807},\nissn = {0898-929X},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-08-01},\nurldate = {2015-08-01},\njournal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},\nvolume = {27},\npages = {1633 - 1647},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;In congenital blindness, the occipital cortex responds to a range of nonvisual inputs, including tactile, auditory, and linguistic stimuli. Are these changes in functional responses to stimuli accompanied by altered interactions with nonvisual functional networks? To answer this question, we introduce a data-driven method that searches across cortex for functional connectivity differences across groups. Replicating prior work, we find increased fronto-occipital functional connectivity in congenitally blind relative to blindfolded sighted participants. We demonstrate that this heightened connectivity extends over most of occipital cortex but is specific to a subset of regions in the inferior, dorsal, and medial frontal lobe. To assess the functional profile of these frontal areas, we used an n-back working memory task and a sentence comprehension task. We find that, among prefrontal areas with overconnectivity to occipital cortex, one left inferior frontal region responds to language over music. By contrast, the majority of these regions responded to working memory load but not language. These results suggest that in blindness occipital cortex interacts more with working memory systems and raise new questions about the function and mechanism of occipital plasticity.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Structural Connectivity Fingerprints Predict Cortical Selectivity for Multiple Visual Categories across Cortex.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Osher, D. E.; Saxe, R. R.; Koldewyn, K.; Gabrieli, J. D. E.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saygin, Z. M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cerebral Cortex, 26: 1668 - 1683. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Structural$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{76,\ntitle = {Structural Connectivity Fingerprints Predict Cortical Selectivity for Multiple Visual Categories across Cortex},\nauthor = {David E. Osher and Rebecca R. Saxe and Kami Koldewyn and John D. E. Gabrieli and Nancy Kanwisher and Zeynep M. Saygin},\nurl = {https://academic.oup.com/cercor/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/cercor/bhu303\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Osher_etal_2015.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1093/cercor/bhu303},\nissn = {1047-3211},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-04-01},\nurldate = {2015-04-01},\njournal = {Cerebral Cortex},\nvolume = {26},\npages = {1668 - 1683},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;A fundamental and largely unanswered question in neuroscience is whether extrinsic connectivity and function are closely related at a fine spatial grain across the human brain. Using a novel approach, we found that the anatomical connectivity of individual gray-matter voxels (determined via diffusion-weighted imaging) alone can predict functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) responses to 4 visual categories (faces, objects, scenes, and bodies) in individual subjects, thus accounting for both functional differentiation across the cortex and individual variation therein. Furthermore, this approach identified the particular anatomical links between voxels that most strongly predict, and therefore plausibly define, the neural networks underlying specific functions. These results provide the strongest evidence to date for a precise and fine-grained relationship between connectivity and function in the human brain, raise the possibility that early-developing connectivity patterns may determine later functional organization, and offer a method for predicting fine-grained functional organization in populations who cannot be functionally scanned.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Phillips, J.; Ong, D. C.; Surtees, A. D. R.; Xin, Y.; Williams, S.; Saxe, R.; and Frank, M. C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Psychological Science, 26: 1353 - 1367. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"A$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{78,\ntitle = {A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind},\nauthor = {Jonathan Phillips and Desmond C. Ong and Andrew D. R. Surtees and Yijing Xin and Samantha Williams and Rebecca Saxe and Michael C. Frank},\nurl = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797614558717\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/phillips-2015-psychsci.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1177/0956797614558717},\nissn = {0956-7976},\nyear  = {2015},\ndate = {2015-08-01},\nurldate = {2015-08-01},\njournal = {Psychological Science},\nvolume = {26},\npages = {1353 - 1367},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;In recent work, Kov&aacute;cs, T&eacute;gl&aacute;s, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents&rsquo; beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm. In particular, the critical findings demonstrating automatic belief computation were driven by inconsistencies in the timing of an attention check, and thus do not provide evidence for automatic theory of mind in adults.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n 2014\n \n \n (6)\n \n \n

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\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Differences in the right inferior longitudinal fasciculus but no general disruption of white matter tracts in children with autism spectrum disorder.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Koldewyn, K.; Yendiki, A.; Weigelt, S.; Gweon, H.; Julian, J.; Richardson, H.; Malloy, C.; Saxe, R.; Fischl, B.; and Kanwisher, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111: 1981 - 1986. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Differences$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{23,\ntitle = {Differences in the right inferior longitudinal fasciculus but no general disruption of white matter tracts in children with autism spectrum disorder},\nauthor = {Kami Koldewyn and Anastasia Yendiki and Sarah Weigelt and Hyowon Gweon and Joshua Julian and Hilary Richardson and Caitlin Malloy and Rebecca Saxe and Bruce Fischl and Nancy Kanwisher},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1324037111\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PNAS_2014_Koldewyn.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1324037111},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2014},\ndate = {2014-02-01},\nurldate = {2014-02-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {111},\npages = {1981 - 1986},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;One of the most widely cited features of the neural phenotype of autism is reduced “integrity” of long-range white matter tracts, a claim based primarily on diffusion imaging studies. However, many prior studies have small sample sizes and/or fail to address differences in data quality between those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typical participants, and there is little consensus on which tracts are affected. To overcome these problems, we scanned a large sample of children with autism (n = 52) and typically developing children (n = 73). Data quality was variable, and worse in the ASD group, with some scans unusable because of head motion artifacts. When we follow standard data analysis practices (i.e., without matching head motion between groups), we replicate the finding of lower fractional anisotropy (FA) in multiple white matter tracts. However, when we carefully match data quality between groups, all these effects disappear except in one tract, the right inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF). Additional analyses showed the expected developmental increases in the FA of fiber tracts within ASD and typical groups individually, demonstrating that we had sufficient statistical power to detect known group differences. Our data challenge the widely claimed general disruption of white matter tracts in autism, instead implicating only one tract, the right ILF, in the ASD phenotype.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Common Neural Code for Perceived and Inferred Emotion.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Skerry, A E; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Neuroscience, 34: 15997 - 16008. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"A$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{77,\ntitle = {A Common Neural Code for Perceived and Inferred Emotion},\nauthor = {A E Skerry and R Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/doi/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1676-14.2014\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SkerryandSaxe2014.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1676-14.2014},\nissn = {0270-6474},\nyear  = {2014},\ndate = {2014-11-01},\nurldate = {2014-11-01},\njournal = {Journal of Neuroscience},\nvolume = {34},\npages = {15997 - 16008},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Although the emotions of other people can often be perceived from overt reactions (e.g., facial or vocal expressions), they can also be inferred from situational information in the absence of observable expressions. How does the human brain make use of these diverse forms of evidence to generate a common representation of a target&rsquo;s emotional state? In the present research, we identify neural patterns that correspond to emotions inferred from contextual information and find that these patterns generalize across different cues from which an emotion can be attributed. Specifically, we use functional neuroimaging to measure neural responses to dynamic facial expressions with positive and negative valence and to short animations in which the valence of a character&rsquo;s emotion could be identified only from the situation. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we test for regions that contain information about the target&rsquo;s emotional state, identifying representations specific to a single stimulus type and representations that generalize across stimulus types. In regions of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), a classifiertrainedto discriminate emotional valence for one stimulus (e.g., animated situations) could successfully discriminate valence for the remaining stimulus (e.g., facial expressions), indicating a representation of valence that abstracts away from perceptual features and generalizes across different forms of evidence. Moreover, in a subregion of MPFC, this neural representation generalized to trials involving subjectively experienced emotional events, suggesting partial overlap in neural responses to attributed and experienced emotions. These data provide a step toward understanding how the brain transforms stimulus-bound inputs into abstract representations of emotion.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Jenkins, A. C.; Dodell-Feder, D.; Saxe, R.; and Knobe, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLoS ONE, 9: e105341. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{79,\ntitle = {The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents},\nauthor = {Adrianna C. Jenkins and David Dodell-Feder and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua Knobe},\neditor = {Allan Siegel},\nurl = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105341\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Jenkins_etal_2014.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1371/journal.pone.010534110.1371},\nyear  = {2014},\ndate = {2014-08-01},\nurldate = {2014-08-01},\njournal = {PLoS ONE},\nvolume = {9},\npages = {e105341},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the &lsquo;mind&rsquo; of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals&mdash;i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus&mdash;does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets&rsquo; mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Their pain gives us pleasure: How intergroup dynamics shape empathic failures and counter-empathic responses.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cikara, M; Bruneau, E; Bavel, J. V.; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 55: 110 - 125. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Their$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{80,\ntitle = {Their pain gives us pleasure: How intergroup dynamics shape empathic failures and counter-empathic responses},\nauthor = {M Cikara and E Bruneau and JJ Van Bavel and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S002210311400095X\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cikara_etal_2014.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2014.06.007},\nissn = {00221031},\nyear  = {2014},\ndate = {2014-11-01},\nurldate = {2014-11-01},\njournal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},\nvolume = {55},\npages = {110 - 125},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Despite its early origins and adaptive functions, empathy is not inevitable; people routinely fail to empathize with others, especially members of different social or cultural groups. In five experiments, we systematically explore how social identity, functional relations between groups, competitive threat, and perceived entitativity contribute to intergroup empathy bias: the tendency not only to empathize less with out-group relative to in-group members, but also to feel pleasure in response to their pain (and pain in response to their pleasure). When teams are set in direct competition, affective responses to competition-irrelevant events are characterized not only by less empathy toward out-group relative to in-group members, but also by increased counter-empathic responses: Schadenfreude and Gl&uuml;ckschmerz (Experiment 1). Comparing responses to in-group and out-group targets against responses to unaffiliated targets in this competitive context suggests that intergroup empathy bias may be better characterized by out-group antipathy rather than extraordinary in-group empathy (Experiment 2). We also find that intergroup empathy bias is robust to changes in relative group standing&mdash;feedback indicating that the out-group has fallen behind (Experiment 3a) or is no longer a competitive threat (Experiment 3b) does not reduce the bias. However, reducing perceived in-group and out-group entitativity can significantly attenuate intergroup empathy bias (Experiment 4). This research establishes the boundary conditions of intergroup empathy bias and provides initial support for a more integrative framework of group-based empathy.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Thinking about seeing: Perceptual sources of knowledge are encoded in the theory of mind brain regions of sighted and blind adults.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Koster-Hale, J.; Bedny, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 133: 65 - 78. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Thinking$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{81,\ntitle = {Thinking about seeing: Perceptual sources of knowledge are encoded in the theory of mind brain regions of sighted and blind adults},\nauthor = {Jorie Koster-Hale and Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027714000675\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/KosterHale_2014.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2014.04.006},\nissn = {00100277},\nyear  = {2014},\ndate = {2014-04-01},\nurldate = {2014-04-01},\njournal = {Cognition},\nvolume = {133},\npages = {65 - 78},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Blind people&rsquo;s inferences about how other people see provide a window into fundamental questions about the human capacity to think about one another&rsquo;s thoughts. By working with blind individuals, we can ask both what kinds of representations people form about others&rsquo; minds, and how much these representations depend on the observer having had similar mental states themselves. Thinking about others&rsquo; mental states depends on a specific group of brain regions, including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). We investigated the representations of others&rsquo; mental states in these brain regions, using multivoxel pattern analyses (MVPA). We found that, first, in the RTPJ of sighted adults, the pattern of neural response distinguished the source of the mental state (did the protagonist see or hear something?) but not the valence (did the protagonist feel good or bad?). Second, these neural representations were preserved in congenitally blind adults. These results suggest that the temporo-parietal junction contains explicit, abstract representations of features of others&rsquo; mental states, including the perceptual source. The persistence of these representations in congenitally blind adults, who have no first-person experience with sight, provides evidence that these representations emerge even in the absence of relevant first-person perceptual experiences.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Reduced self-referential neural response during intergroup competition predicts competitor harm.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cikara, M; Jenkins, A.; Dufour, N; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 96: 36 - 43. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Reduced$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{82,\ntitle = {Reduced self-referential neural response during intergroup competition predicts competitor harm},\nauthor = {M Cikara and AC Jenkins and N Dufour and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811914002420\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cikara_2014.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.03.080},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2014},\ndate = {2014-03-01},\nurldate = {2014-03-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {96},\npages = {36 - 43},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Why do interactions become more hostile when social relations shift from “me versus you” to “us versus them”? One possibility is that acting with a group can reduce spontaneous self-referential processing in the moral domain and, in turn, facilitate competitor harm. We tested this hypothesis in an fMRI experiment in which (i) participants performed a competitive task once alone and once with a group; (ii) spontaneous self-referential processing during competition was indexed unobtrusively by activation in an independently localized region of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) associated with self-reference; and (iii) we assessed participants&$#$39; willingness to harm competitors versus teammates. As predicted, participants who showed reduced mPFC activation in response to descriptions of their own moral behaviors while competing in a group were more willing to harm competitors. These results suggest that intergroup competition (above and beyond inter-personal competition) can reduce self-referential processing of moral information, enabling harmful behaviors towards members of a competitive group.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2013\n \n \n (9)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n 20.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Gweon, H; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Volume 3 . Neural Circuit Development and Function in the Brain, pages 367 - 377. Elsevier, 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Neural$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inbook{83,\ntitle = {Neural Circuit Development and Function in the Brain},\nauthor = {H Gweon and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/B9780123972675000571\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Gweon_Saxe_2013_0.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-397267-5.00057-1},\nisbn = {9780123972675},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-01-01},\nurldate = {2013-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience of Theory of Mind},\nvolume = {3},\npages = {367 - 377},\npublisher = {Elsevier},\nchapter = {20},\norganization = {Elsevier},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Similar Brain Activation during False Belief Tasks in a Large Sample of Adults with and without Autism.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dufour, N.; Redcay, E.; Young, L.; Mavros, P. L.; Moran, J. M.; Triantafyllou, C.; Gabrieli, J. D. E.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLoS ONE, 8: e75468. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Similar$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{84,\ntitle = {Similar Brain Activation during False Belief Tasks in a Large Sample of Adults with and without Autism},\nauthor = {Nicholas Dufour and Elizabeth Redcay and Liane Young and Penelope L. Mavros and Joseph M. Moran and Christina Triantafyllou and John D. E. Gabrieli and Rebecca Saxe},\neditor = {Sam Gilbert},\nurl = {http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0075468\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Dufour_2013.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1371/journal.pone.007546810.1371},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-09-01},\nurldate = {2013-09-01},\njournal = {PLoS ONE},\nvolume = {8},\npages = {e75468},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Reading about another person&rsquo;s beliefs engages &lsquo;Theory of Mind&rsquo; processes and elicits highly reliable brain activation across individuals and experimental paradigms. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined activation during a story task designed to elicit Theory of Mind processing in a very large sample of neurotypical (N = 462) individuals, and a group of high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders (N = 31), using both region-of-interest and wholebrain analyses. This large sample allowed us to investigate group differences in brain activation to Theory of Mind tasks with unusually high sensitivity. There were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. These results imply that the social cognitive impairments typical of autism spectrum disorder can occur without measurable changes in the size, location or response magnitude of activity during explicit Theory of Mind tasks administered to adults.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Koster-Hale, J.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuron, 79: 836 - 848. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Theory$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{85,\ntitle = {Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem},\nauthor = {Jorie Koster-Hale and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S089662731300754X, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Koster-Hale.Saxe_2013.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuron.2013.08.020},\nissn = {08966273},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-09-01},\nurldate = {2013-09-01},\njournal = {Neuron},\nvolume = {79},\npages = {836 - 848},\nabstract = {Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others' goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n People can understand descriptions of motion without activating visual motion brain regions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dravida, S.; Saxe, R.; and Bedny, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Psychology, 4: 537. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"People$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{86,\ntitle = {People can understand descriptions of motion without activating visual motion brain regions},\nauthor = {Swethasri Dravida and Rebecca Saxe and Marina Bedny},\nurl = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00537/abstract, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Dravida_2013.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00537},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-08-01},\nurldate = {2013-08-01},\njournal = {Frontiers in Psychology},\nvolume = {4},\npages = {537},\nabstract = {What is the relationship between our perceptual and linguistic neural representations of the same event? We approached this question by asking whether visual perception of motion and understanding linguistic depictions of motion rely on the same neural architecture. The same group of participants took part in two language tasks and one visual task. In task 1, participants made semantic similarity judgments with high motion (e.g., “to bounce”) and low motion (e.g., “to look”) words. In task 2, participants made plausibility judgments for passages describing movement (“A centaur hurled a spear … ”) or cognitive events (“A gentleman loved cheese …”). Task 3 was a visual motion localizer in which participants viewed animations of point-light walkers, randomly moving dots, and stationary dots changing in luminance. Based on the visual motion localizer we identified classic visual motion areas of the temporal (MT/MST and STS) and parietal cortex (inferior and superior parietal lobules). We find that these visual cortical areas are largely distinct from neural responses to linguistic depictions of motion. Motion words did not activate any part of the visual motion system. Motion passages produced a small response in the right superior parietal lobule, but none of the temporal motion regions. These results suggest that (1) as compared to words, rich language stimuli such as passages are more likely to evoke mental imagery and more likely to affect perceptual circuits and (2) effects of language on the visual system are more likely in secondary perceptual areas as compared to early sensory areas. We conclude that language and visual perception constitute distinct but interacting systems.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n 9.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Koster-Hale, J.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Functional neuroimaging of theory of mind. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Functional$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@inbook{87,\ntitle = {Functional neuroimaging of theory of mind},\nauthor = {Jorie Koster-Hale and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Koster-Hale_Saxe_UOM.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692972.001.0001},\nisbn = {9780199692972},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-01-01},\nurldate = {2013-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience},\nchapter = {9},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n 2.7.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The new puzzle of Theory of Mind development. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@inbook{88,\ntitle = {The new puzzle of Theory of Mind development},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe.SocialDevelopment.Chapter.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890712.001.0001},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-01-01},\nurldate = {2013-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Navigating the Social World: What Infants, Children, and Other Species Can Teach Us},\nchapter = {2.7},\nabstract = {Navigating the Social World: What Infants, Children, and Other Species Can Teach Us.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n How We Know It Hurts: Item Analysis of Written Narratives Reveals Distinct Neural Responses to Others’ Physical Pain and Emotional Suffering.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E.; Dufour, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLoS ONE, 8: e63085. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"How$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{89,\ntitle = {How We Know It Hurts: Item Analysis of Written Narratives Reveals Distinct Neural Responses to Others’ Physical Pain and Emotional Suffering},\nauthor = {Emile Bruneau and Nicholas Dufour and Rebecca Saxe},\neditor = {Katsumi Watanabe},\nurl = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0063085, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BruneauDufourSaxe_2013.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1371/journal.pone.006308510.1371},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-04-01},\nurldate = {2013-04-01},\njournal = {PLoS ONE},\nvolume = {8},\npages = {e63085},\nabstract = {People are often called upon to witness, and to empathize with, the pain and suffering of others. In the current study, we directly compared neural responses to others' physical pain and emotional suffering by presenting participants (n = 41) with 96 verbal stories, each describing a protagonist's physical and/or emotional experience, ranging from neutral to extremely negative. A separate group of participants rated “how much physical pain”, and “how much emotional suffering” the protagonist experienced in each story, as well as how “vivid and movie-like” the story was. Although ratings of Pain, Suffering and Vividness were positively correlated with each other across stories, item-analyses revealed that each scale was correlated with activity in distinct brain regions. Even within regions of the “Shared Pain network” identified using a separate data set, responses to others' physical pain and emotional suffering were distinct. More broadly, item analyses with continuous predictors provided a high-powered method for identifying brain regions associated with specific aspects of complex stimuli – like verbal descriptions of physical and emotional events.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Noisy-Channel Account of Crosslinguistic Word-Order Variation.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Gibson, E.; Piantadosi, S. T.; Brink, K.; Bergen, L.; Lim, E.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Psychological Science, 24: 1079 - 1088. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"A$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{90,\ntitle = {A Noisy-Channel Account of Crosslinguistic Word-Order Variation},\nauthor = {Edward Gibson and Steven T. Piantadosi and Kimberly Brink and Leon Bergen and Eunice Lim and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797612463705, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/10.1.1.906.4931.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1177/0956797612463705},\nissn = {0956-7976},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-07-01},\nurldate = {2013-07-01},\njournal = {Psychological Science},\nvolume = {24},\npages = {1079 - 1088},\nabstract = {The distribution of word orders across languages is highly nonuniform, with subject-verb-object (SVO) and subjectobject-verb (SOV) orders being prevalent. Recent work suggests that the SOV order may be the default in human language. Why, then, is SVO order so common? We hypothesize that SOV/SVO variation can be explained by language users&rsquo; sensitivity to the possibility of noise corrupting the linguistic signal. In particular, the noisy-channel hypothesis predicts a shift from the default SOV order to SVO order for semantically reversible events, for which potential ambiguity arises in SOV order because two plausible agents appear on the same side of the verb. We found support for this prediction in three languages (English, Japanese, and Korean) by using a gesture-production task, which reflects word-order preferences largely independent of native language. Other patterns of crosslinguistic variation (e.g., the prevalence of case marking in SOV languages and its relative absence in SVO languages) also straightforwardly follow from the noisy-channel hypothesis.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Koster-Hale, J; Saxe, R; Dungan, J; and Young, L L\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,5648 - 5653. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Decoding$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{91,\ntitle = {Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions},\nauthor = {J Koster-Hale and R Saxe and J Dungan and L L Young},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1207992110, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PNAS-2013-Koster-Hale-1207992110.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1207992110},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2013},\ndate = {2013-02-01},\nurldate = {2013-02-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\npages = {5648 - 5653},\nabstract = {Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders make moral judgments based less on intent information than neurotypical participants. Three experiments, using multivoxel pattern analysis, find that (i) in neurotypical adults, the RTPJ shows reliable and distinct spatial patterns of responses across voxels for intentional vs. accidental harms, and (ii) individual differences in this neural pattern predict differences in participants&rsquo; moral judgments. These effects are specific to RTPJ. By contrast, (iii) this distinction was absent in adults with autism spectrum disorders. We conclude that multivoxel pattern analysis can detect features of mental state representations (e.g., intent), and that the corresponding neural patterns are behaviorally and clinically relevant.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n

\n \n 2012\n \n \n (12)\n \n \n

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\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dungan, J.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive Science, 36: 1148 - 1156. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Matched$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{25,\ntitle = {Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference},\nauthor = {James Dungan and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-08-01},\nurldate = {2012-08-01},\njournal = {Cognitive Science},\nvolume = {36},\npages = {1148 - 1156},\nabstract = {Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false‐belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false‐belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Insights into the origins of knowledge from the cognitive neuroscience of blindness.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive Neuropsychology, 29: 56 - 84. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Insights$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{96,\ntitle = {Insights into the origins of knowledge from the cognitive neuroscience of blindness},\nauthor = {Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02643294.2012.713342, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Insights-into-the-origins-of-knowledge-from-the-cognitive-neuroscience-of-blindness.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1080/02643294.2012.713342},\nissn = {0264-3294},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-03-01},\nurldate = {2012-03-01},\njournal = {Cognitive Neuropsychology},\nvolume = {29},\npages = {56 - 84},\nabstract = {Children learn about the world through senses such as touch, smell, vision, and audition, but they conceive of the world in terms of objects, events, agents, and their mental states. A fundamental question in cognitive science is how nature and nurture contribute to the development of such conceptual categories. What innate mechanisms do children bring to the learning problem? How does experience contribute to development? In this article we discuss insights into these longstanding questions from cognitive neuroscience studies of blindness. Despite drastically different sensory experiences, behavioural and neuroscientific work suggests that blind children acquire typical concepts of objects, actions, and mental states. Blind people think and talk about these categories in ways that are similar to sighted people. Neuroimaging reveals that blind people make such judgements relying on the same neural mechanisms as sighted people. One way to interpret these findings is that neurocognitive development is largely hardwired, and so differences in experience have little consequence. Contrary to this interpretation, neuroimaging studies also show that blindness profoundly reorganizes the visual system. Most strikingly, developmental blindness enables “visual” circuits to participate in high-level cognitive functions, including language processing. Thus, blindness qualitatively changes sensory representations, but leaves conceptual representations largely unchanged. The effect of sensory experience on concepts is modest, despite the brain's potential for neuroplasticity.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Teaching Replication.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Frank, M. C; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7: 600 - 604. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Teaching$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{97,\ntitle = {Teaching Replication},\nauthor = {Michael C Frank and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1745691612460686, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FrankSaxe_2012.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1177/1745691612460686},\nissn = {1745-6916},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-11-01},\nurldate = {2012-11-01},\njournal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},\nvolume = {7},\npages = {600 - 604},\nabstract = {Replication is held as the gold standard for ensuring the reliability of published scientific literature. But conducting direct replications is expensive, time-consuming, and unrewarded under current publication practices. So who will do them? The authors argue that students in laboratory classes should replicate recent findings as part of their training in experimental methods. In their own courses, the authors have found that replicating cutting-edge results is exciting and fun; it gives students the opportunity to make real scientific contributions (provided supervision is appropriate); and it provides object lessons about the scientific process, the importance of reporting standards, and the value of openness.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Typical Neural Representations of Action Verbs Develop without Vision.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M; Caramazza, A; Pascual-Leone, A; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cerebral Cortex, 22: 286 - 293. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Typical$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{135,\ntitle = {Typical Neural Representations of Action Verbs Develop without Vision},\nauthor = {M Bedny and A Caramazza and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},\nurl = {https://academic.oup.com/cercor/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/cercor/bhr081\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bhr081.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1093/cercor/bhr081},\nissn = {1047-3211},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-02-01},\nurldate = {2012-02-01},\njournal = {Cerebral Cortex},\nvolume = {22},\npages = {286 - 293},\nabstract = {Many empiricist theories hold that concepts are composed of sensory–motor primitives. For example, the meaning of the word “run” is in part a visual image of running. If action concepts are partly visual, then the concepts of congenitally blind individuals should be altered in that they lack these visual features. We compared semantic judgments and neural activity during action verb comprehension in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Participants made similarity judgments about pairs of nouns and verbs that varied in the visual motion they conveyed. Blind adults showed the same pattern of similarity judgments as sighted adults. We identified the left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG) brain region that putatively stores visual–motion features relevant to action verbs. The functional profile and location of this region was identical in sighted and congenitally blind individuals. Furthermore, the lMTG was more active for all verbs than nouns, irrespective of visual–motion features. We conclude that the lMTG contains abstract representations of verb meanings rather than visual–motion images. Our data suggest that conceptual brain regions are not altered by the sensory modality of learning.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Verbal interference suppresses exact numerical representation.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Frank, M. C; Fedorenko, E.; Lai, P.; Saxe, R.; and Gibson, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognitive Psychology, 64: 74 - 92. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Verbal$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{136,\ntitle = {Verbal interference suppresses exact numerical representation},\nauthor = {Michael C Frank and Evelina Fedorenko and Peter Lai and Rebecca Saxe and Edward Gibson},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010028511000880, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FFLSG-cogpsych-inpress.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.10.004},\nissn = {00100285},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-02-01},\nurldate = {2012-02-01},\njournal = {Cognitive Psychology},\nvolume = {64},\npages = {74 - 92},\nabstract = {Language for number is an important case study of the relationship between language and cognition because the mechanisms of nonverbal numerical cognition are well-understood. When the Pirahã (an Amazonian hunter-gatherer tribe who have no exact number words) are tested in non-verbal numerical tasks, they are able to perform one-to-one matching tasks but make errors in more difficult tasks. Their pattern of errors suggests that they are using analog magnitude estimation, an evolutionarily- and developmentally-conserved mechanism for estimating quantities. Here we show that English-speaking participants rely on the same mechanisms when verbal number representations are unavailable due to verbal interference. Followup experiments demonstrate that the effects of verbal interference are primarily manifest during encoding of quantity information, and&mdash;using a new procedure for matching difficulty of interference tasks for individual participants—that the effects are restricted to verbal interference. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that number words are used online to encode, store, and manipulate numerical information. This linguistic strategy complements, rather than altering or replacing, non-verbal representations.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Thin-slice perception develops slowly.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Balas, B.; Kanwisher, N.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 112: 257 - 264. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Thin-slice$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{137,\ntitle = {Thin-slice perception develops slowly},\nauthor = {Benjamin Balas and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022096512000045, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms363806.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2012.01.002},\nissn = {00220965},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-06-01},\nurldate = {2012-06-01},\njournal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},\nvolume = {112},\npages = {257 - 264},\nabstract = {Body language and facial gesture provide sufficient visual information to support high-level social inferences from “thin slices” of behavior. Given short movies of non-verbal behavior, adults make reliable judgments in a large number of tasks. Here we find that the high precision of adult’s non-verbal social perception depends on the slow development, over childhood, of sensitivity to subtle visual cues. Children and adult participants watched short silent clips in which a target child played with Legos, either in the (off-screen) presence of an adult or alone. Participants judged whether the target was playing alone or not, that is, they detected the presence of a social interaction (from the behavior of one participant in that interaction). This task allowed us to compare performance across ages to the true answer. Children did not reach adult levels of performance on this task until age 9 or 10 years and we observed an interaction between age and video reversal. Adults and older children benefitted from the videos being played in temporal sequence, rather than reversed, suggesting that adults (but not young children) are sensitive to natural movement in social interactions.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Atypical brain activation patterns during a face-to-face joint attention game in adults with autism spectrum disorder.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Redcay, E.; Dodell-Feder, D.; Mavros, P. L; Kleiner, M.; Pearrow, M. J; Triantafyllou, C.; Gabrieli, J. D; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Human Brain Mapping, 34: 2511 - 2523. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Atypical$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{138,\ntitle = {Atypical brain activation patterns during a face-to-face joint attention game in adults with autism spectrum disorder},\nauthor = {Elizabeth Redcay and David Dodell-Feder and Penelope L Mavros and Mario Kleiner and Mark J Pearrow and Christina Triantafyllou and John D Gabrieli and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/hbm.v34.10, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/b171dc1d6dcf3fbac78c87f5f756f429bbbc.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1002/hbm.v34.1010.1002/hbm.22086},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-10-01},\nurldate = {2012-10-01},\njournal = {Human Brain Mapping},\nvolume = {34},\npages = {2511 - 2523},\nabstract = {Joint attention behaviors include initiating one's own and responding to another's bid for joint attention to an object, person, or topic. Joint attention abilities in autism are pervasively atypical, correlate with development of language and social abilities, and discriminate children with autism from other developmental disorders. Despite the importance of these behaviors, the neural correlates of joint attention in individuals with autism remain unclear. This paucity of data is likely due to the inherent challenge of acquiring data during a real-time social interaction. We used a novel experimental set-up in which participants engaged with an experimenter in an interactive face-to-face joint attention game during fMRI data acquisition. Both initiating and responding to joint attention behaviors were examined as well as a solo attention (SA) control condition. Participants included adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (n = 13), a mean age- and sex-matched neurotypical group (n = 14), and a separate group of neurotypical adults (n = 22). Significant differences were found between groups within social-cognitive brain regions, including dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), during the RJA as compared to SA conditions. Region-of-interest analyses revealed a lack of signal differentiation between joint attention and control conditions within left pSTS and dMPFC in individuals with ASD. Within the pSTS, this lack of differentiation was characterized by reduced activation during joint attention and relative hyper-activation during SA. These findings suggest a possible failure of developmental neural specialization within the STS and dMPFC to joint attention in ASD.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Look at this: the neural correlates of initiating and responding to bids for joint attention.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Redcay, E.; Kleiner, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6: 169. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Look$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{139,\ntitle = {Look at this: the neural correlates of initiating and responding to bids for joint attention},\nauthor = {Elizabeth Redcay and Mario Kleiner and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00169/abstract, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/fnhum-06-00169.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.3389/fnhum.2012.00169},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-06-01},\nurldate = {2012-06-01},\njournal = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience},\nvolume = {6},\npages = {169},\nabstract = {When engaging in joint attention, one person directs another person&rsquo;s attention to an object (Initiating Joint Attention, IJA), and the second person&rsquo;s attention follows (Responding to Joint Attention, RJA). As such, joint attention must occur within the context of a social interaction. This ability is critical to language and social development; yet the neural bases for this pivotal skill remain understudied. This paucity of research is likely due to the challenge in acquiring functional MRI data during a naturalistic, contingent social interaction. To examine the neural bases of both IJA and RJA we implemented a dual-video set-up that allowed for a face-to-face interaction between subject and experimenter via video during fMRI data collection. In each trial, participants either followed the experimenter&rsquo;s gaze to a target (RJA) or cued the experimenter to look at the target (IJA). A control condition, solo attention (SA), was included in which the subject shifted gaze to a target while the experimenter closed her eyes. Block and event-related analyses were conducted and revealed common and distinct regions for IJA and RJA. Distinct regions included the ventromedial prefrontal cortex for RJA and intraparietal sulcus and middle frontal gyrus for IJA (as compared to SA). Conjunction analyses revealed overlap in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) for IJA and RJA (as compared to SA) for the event analyses. Functional connectivity analyses during a resting baseline suggest joint attention processes recruit distinct but interacting networks, including social-cognitive, voluntary attention orienting, and visual networks. This novel experimental set-up allowed for the identification of the neural bases of joint attention during a real-time interaction and findings suggest that whether one is the initiator or responder, the dMPFC and right pSTS, are selectively recruited during periods of joint attention.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n

\n When engaging in joint attention, one person directs another person’s attention to an object (Initiating Joint Attention, IJA), and the second person’s attention follows (Responding to Joint Attention, RJA). As such, joint attention must occur within the context of a social interaction. This ability is critical to language and social development; yet the neural bases for this pivotal skill remain understudied. This paucity of research is likely due to the challenge in acquiring functional MRI data during a naturalistic, contingent social interaction. To examine the neural bases of both IJA and RJA we implemented a dual-video set-up that allowed for a face-to-face interaction between subject and experimenter via video during fMRI data collection. In each trial, participants either followed the experimenter’s gaze to a target (RJA) or cued the experimenter to look at the target (IJA). A control condition, solo attention (SA), was included in which the subject shifted gaze to a target while the experimenter closed her eyes. Block and event-related analyses were conducted and revealed common and distinct regions for IJA and RJA. Distinct regions included the ventromedial prefrontal cortex for RJA and intraparietal sulcus and middle frontal gyrus for IJA (as compared to SA). Conjunction analyses revealed overlap in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) for IJA and RJA (as compared to SA) for the event analyses. Functional connectivity analyses during a resting baseline suggest joint attention processes recruit distinct but interacting networks, including social-cognitive, voluntary attention orienting, and visual networks. This novel experimental set-up allowed for the identification of the neural bases of joint attention during a real-time interaction and findings suggest that whether one is the initiator or responder, the dMPFC and right pSTS, are selectively recruited during periods of joint attention.\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Theory of Mind Performance in Children Correlates With Functional Specialization of a Brain Region for Thinking About Thoughts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Gweon, H.; Dodell-Feder, D.; Bedny, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Child Development,1853 - 1868. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Theory$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{140,\ntitle = {Theory of Mind Performance in Children Correlates With Functional Specialization of a Brain Region for Thinking About Thoughts},\nauthor = {Hyowon Gweon and David Dodell-Feder and Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/cdev.2012.83.issue-6, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/j.1467-8624.2012.01829.x.pdf, PDF\nhttps://osf.io/g5zpv/, OSF},\ndoi = {10.1111/cdev.2012.83.issue-610.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01829.x},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-11-01},\nurldate = {2012-11-01},\njournal = {Child Development},\npages = {1853 - 1868},\nabstract = {Thinking about other people’s thoughts recruits a specific group of brain regions, including the temporo‐parietal junctions (TPJ), precuneus (PC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). The same brain regions were recruited when children (N=20, 5–11 years) and adults (N=8) listened to descriptions of characters’ mental states, compared to descriptions of physical events. Between ages 5 and 11 years, responses in the bilateral TPJ became increasingly specific to stories describing mental states as opposed to people’s appearance and social relationships. Functional activity in the right TPJ was related to children’s performance on a high level theory of mind task. These findings provide insights into the origin of neural mechanisms of theory of mind, and how behavioral and neural changes can be related in development.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The power of being heard: The benefits of ‘perspective-giving’ in the context of intergroup conflict.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E. G; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48: 855 - 866. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{141,\ntitle = {The power of being heard: The benefits of ‘perspective-giving’ in the context of intergroup conflict},\nauthor = {Emile G Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022103112000297, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2012JESP.pdf, PDF\nhttps://osf.io/9gpju/, OSF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.017},\nissn = {00221031},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-07-01},\nurldate = {2012-07-01},\njournal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},\nvolume = {48},\npages = {855 - 866},\nabstract = {Although hundreds of dialogue programs geared towards conflict resolution are offered every year, there have been few scientific studies of their effectiveness. Across 2 studies we examined the effect of controlled, dyadic interactions on attitudes towards the ‘other’ in members of groups involved in ideological conflict. Study 1 involved Mexican immigrants and White Americans in Arizona, and Study 2 involved Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. Cross-group dyads interacted via video and text in a brief, structured, face-to-face exchange: one person was assigned to write about the difficulties of life in their society (‘perspective-giving’), and the second person was assigned to accurately summarize the statement of the first person (‘perspective-taking’). Positive changes in attitudes towards the outgroup were greater for Mexican immigrants and Palestinians after perspective-giving and for White Americans and Israelis after perspective-taking. For Palestinians, perspective-giving to an Israeli effectively changed attitudes towards Israelis, while a control condition in which they wrote an essay on the same topic without interacting had no effect on attitudes, illustrating the critical role of being heard. Thus, the effects of dialogue for conflict resolution depend on an interaction between dialogue condition and participants' group membership, which may reflect power asymmetries.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Distinct roles of the ‘Shared Pain’ and ‘Theory of Mind’ networks in processing others’ emotional suffering.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E. G; Pluta, A.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuropsychologia, 50: 219 - 231. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Distinct$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{142,\ntitle = {Distinct roles of the ‘Shared Pain’ and ‘Theory of Mind’ networks in processing others’ emotional suffering},\nauthor = {Emile G Bruneau and Agnieszka Pluta and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393211005082, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bruneau_saxe_1.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/BruneauPlutaSaxe2011_Stimuli_0.pdf, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.11.008},\nissn = {00283932},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-01-01},\nurldate = {2012-01-01},\njournal = {Neuropsychologia},\nvolume = {50},\npages = {219 - 231},\nabstract = {The brain mechanisms involved in processing another&rsquo;s physical pain have been extensively studied in recent years. The link between understanding others&rsquo; physical pain and emotional suffering is less well understood. Using whole brain analysis and two separate functional localizers, we characterized the neural response profiles of narrative scenarios involving physical pain (PP), and scenarios involving emotional pain (EP) with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Whole brain analyses revealed that PP narratives activated the Shared Pain network, and that the brain regions responsible for processing EP overlapped substantially with brain regions involved in Theory of Mind. Region of interest (ROI) analysis provided a finer-grained view. Some regions responded to stories involving physical states, regardless of painful content (secondary sensory regions), some selectively responded to both emotionally and physically painful events (bilateral anterior thalamus and anterior middle cingulate cortex), one brain region responded selectively to physical pain (left insula), and one brain region responded selectively to emotional pain (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex). These results replicated in two groups of participants given different explicit tasks. Together, these results clarify the distinct roles of multiple brain regions in responding to others who are in physical or emotional pain.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Social cognition in members of conflict groups: behavioural and neural responses in Arabs, Israelis and South Americans to each other’s misfortunes.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E G; Dufour, N; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367: 717 - 730. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Social$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{144,\ntitle = {Social cognition in members of conflict groups: behavioural and neural responses in Arabs, Israelis and South Americans to each other’s misfortunes},\nauthor = {E G Bruneau and N Dufour and R Saxe},\nurl = {http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/cgi/doi/10.1098/rstb.2011.0293, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/717.full_.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1098/rstb.2011.0293},\nissn = {0962-8436},\nyear  = {2012},\ndate = {2012-02-01},\nurldate = {2012-02-01},\njournal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},\nvolume = {367},\npages = {717 - 730},\nabstract = {In contexts of cultural conflict, people delegitimize the other group's perspective and lose compassion for the other group's suffering. These psychological biases have been empirically characterized in intergroup settings, but rarely in groups involved in active conflict. Similarly, the basic brain networks involved in recognizing others' narratives and misfortunes have been identified, but how these brain networks are modulated by intergroup conflict is largely untested. In the present study, we examined behavioural and neural responses in Arab, Israeli and South American participants while they considered the pain and suffering of individuals from each group. Arabs and Israelis reported feeling significantly less compassion for each other's pain and suffering (the ‘conflict outgroup’), but did not show an ingroup bias relative to South Americans (the ‘distant outgroup’). In contrast, the brain regions that respond to others' tragedies showed an ingroup bias relative to the distant outgroup but not the conflict outgroup, particularly for descriptions of emotional suffering. Over all, neural responses to conflict group members were qualitatively different from neural responses to distant group members. This is the first neuroimaging study to examine brain responses to others' suffering across both distant and conflict groups, and provides a first step towards building a foundation for the biological basis of conflict.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n 2011\n \n \n (10)\n \n \n

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\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Differential selectivity for dynamic versus static information in face-selective cortical regions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Pitcher, D.; Dilks, D. D.; Saxe, R. R.; Triantafyllou, C.; and Kanwisher, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 56: 2356 - 2363. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Differential$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{26,\ntitle = {Differential selectivity for dynamic versus static information in face-selective cortical regions},\nauthor = {David Pitcher and Daniel D. Dilks and Rebecca R. Saxe and Christina Triantafyllou and Nancy Kanwisher},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811911003466, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S1053811911003466-main.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.067},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-06-01},\nurldate = {2011-06-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {56},\npages = {2356 - 2363},\nabstract = {Neuroimaging studies have identified multiple face-selective regions in human cortex but the functional division of labor between these regions is not yet clear. A central hypothesis, with some empirical support, is that face-selective regions in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) are particularly responsive to dynamic information in faces, whereas the fusiform face area (FFA) computes the static or invariant properties of faces. Here we directly tested this hypothesis by measuring the magnitude of response in each region to both dynamic and static stimuli. Consistent with the hypothesis, we found that the response to movies of faces was not significantly different from the response to static images of faces from these same movies in the right FFA and right occipital face area (OFA). By contrast the face-selective region in the right posterior STS (pSTS) responded nearly three times as strongly to dynamic faces as to static faces, and a face-selective region in the right anterior STS (aSTS) responded to dynamic faces only. Both of these regions also responded more strongly to moving faces than to moving bodies, indicating that they are preferentially engaged in processing dynamic information from faces, not in more general processing of any dynamic social stimuli. The response to dynamic and static faces was not significantly different in a third face-selective region in the posterior continuation of the STS (pcSTS). The strong selectivity of face-selective regions in the pSTS and aSTS, but not the FFA, OFA or pcSTS, for dynamic face information demonstrates a clear functional dissociation between different face-selective regions, and provides further clues into their function.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A sensitive period for language in the visual cortex: Distinct patterns of plasticity in congenitally versus late blind adults.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M.; Pascual-Leone, A.; Dravida, S.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Brain and Language, 122: 162 - 170. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"A$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{145,\ntitle = {A sensitive period for language in the visual cortex: Distinct patterns of plasticity in congenitally versus late blind adults},\nauthor = {Marina Bedny and Alvaro Pascual-Leone and Swethasri Dravida and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0093934X11001799, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms-337975.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.bandl.2011.10.005},\nissn = {0093934X},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-09-01},\nurldate = {2011-09-01},\njournal = {Brain and Language},\nvolume = {122},\npages = {162 - 170},\nabstract = {Recent evidence suggests that blindness enables visual circuits to contribute to language processing. We examined whether this dramatic functional plasticity has a sensitive period. BOLD fMRI signal was measured in congenitally blind, late blind (blindness onset 9-years-old or later) and sighted participants while they performed a sentence comprehension task. In a control condition, participants listened to backwards speech and made match/non-match to sample judgments. In both, congenitally and late blind participants BOLD signal increased in bilateral foveal-pericalcarine cortex during response preparation, irrespective of whether the stimulus was a sentence or backwards speech. However, only in congenitally blind people left occipital areas (pericalcarine, extrastriate, fusiform and lateral) responded more to sentences than backwards speech. We conclude that age of blindness onset constrains the non-visual functions of occipital cortex: while plasticity is present in both congenitally and late blind individuals, recruitment of visual circuits for language depends on blindness during childhood.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Anatomical connectivity patterns predict face selectivity in the fusiform gyrus.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saygin, Z. M; Osher, D. E; Koldewyn, K.; Reynolds, G.; Gabrieli, J. D E; and Saxe, R. R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Nature Neuroscience, 15: 321 - 327. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Anatomical$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{146,\ntitle = {Anatomical connectivity patterns predict face selectivity in the fusiform gyrus},\nauthor = {Zeynep M Saygin and David E Osher and Kami Koldewyn and Gretchen Reynolds and John D E Gabrieli and Rebecca R Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.nature.com/articles/nn.3001, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nn.3001.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1038/nn.3001},\nissn = {1097-6256},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-02-01},\nurldate = {2011-02-01},\njournal = {Nature Neuroscience},\nvolume = {15},\npages = {321 - 327},\nabstract = {A fundamental assumption in neuroscience is that brain structure determines function. Accordingly, functionally distinct regions of cortex should be structurally distinct in their connections to other areas. We tested this hypothesis in relation to face selectivity in the fusiform gyrus. By using only structural connectivity, as measured through diffusion-weighted imaging, we were able to predict functional activation to faces in the fusiform gyrus. These predictions outperformed two control models and a standard group-average benchmark. The structure—function relationship discovered from the initial participants was highly robust in predicting activation in a second group of participants, despite differences in acquisition parameters and stimuli. This approach can thus reliably estimate activation in participants who cannot perform functional imaging tasks and is an alternative to group-activation maps. Additionally, we identified cortical regions whose connectivity was highly influential in predicting face selectivity within the fusiform, suggesting a possible mechanistic architecture underlying face processing in humans.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Us and Them: Intergroup Failures of Empathy.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cikara, M.; Bruneau, E. G; and Saxe, R. R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20: 149 - 153. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Us$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{148,\ntitle = {Us and Them: Intergroup Failures of Empathy},\nauthor = {Mina Cikara and Emile G Bruneau and Rebecca R Saxe},\nurl = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0963721411408713, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/70034.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1177/0963721411408713},\nissn = {0963-7214},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-06-01},\nurldate = {2011-06-01},\njournal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},\nvolume = {20},\npages = {149 - 153},\nabstract = {People are often motivated to increase others&rsquo; positive experiences and to alleviate others&rsquo; suffering. These tendencies to care about and help one another form the foundation of human society. When the target is an outgroup member, however, people may have powerful motivations not to care about or help "the other". From this perspective, empathic responses are rare and fragile; it is easy to disrupt the chain from perception of suffering, to motivation to alleviate the suffering, to actual helping. We highlight recent interdisciplinary research demonstrating that outgroup members&rsquo; suffering elicits dampened empathic responses as compared to ingroup members' suffering. We consider an alternative to empathy in the context of intergroup competition: Schadenfreude&mdash;pleasure at the other's pain. Finally, we review recent investigations of intergroup conflict interventions that attempt to increase empathy for outgroups. We propose that researchers across the range of psychological sciences stand to gain a better understanding of the foundations of empathy by studying its limitations.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 120: 202 - 214. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"When$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{150,\ntitle = {When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains},\nauthor = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027711001107, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/YoungSaxe_2011_Cognition.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Young_Saxe_stimuli_2011.pdf, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.005},\nissn = {00100277},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-08-01},\nurldate = {2011-08-01},\njournal = {Cognition},\nvolume = {120},\npages = {202 - 214},\nabstract = {A key factor in legal and moral judgments is intent. Intent differentiates, for instance, murder from manslaughter. Is this true for all moral judgments? People deliver moral judgments of many kinds of actions, including harmful actions (e.g., assault) and purity violations (e.g., incest, consuming taboo substances). We show that intent is a key factor for moral judgments of harm, but less of a factor for purity violations. Based on the agent’s innocent intent, participants judged accidental harms less morally wrong than accidental incest; based on the agent’s guilty intent, participants judged failed attempts to harm more morally wrong than failed attempts to commit incest. These patterns were specific to moral judgments versus judgments of the agent’s control, knowledge, or intent, the action’s overall emotional salience, or participants’ ratings of disgust. The current results therefore reveal distinct cognitive signatures of distinct moral domains, and may inform the distinct functional roles of moral norms.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Associations and dissociations between default and self-reference networks in the human brain.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Whitfield-Gabrieli, S.; Moran, J. M; Nieto-Castañ'on, A.; Triantafyllou, C.; Saxe, R.; and Gabrieli, J. D E\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 55: 225 - 232. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Associations$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{152,\ntitle = {Associations and dissociations between default and self-reference networks in the human brain},\nauthor = {Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli and Joseph M Moran and Alfonso Nieto-Castañ'on and Christina Triantafyllou and Rebecca Saxe and John D E Gabrieli},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910015260, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/NeuroImage-2011-Whitfield-Gabrieli.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.048},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-03-01},\nurldate = {2011-03-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {55},\npages = {225 - 232},\nabstract = {Neuroimaging has revealed consistent activations in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) extending to precuneus both during explicit self-reference tasks and during rest, a period during which some form of self-reference is assumed to occur in the default mode of brain function. The similarity between these two patterns of midline cortical activation may reflect a common neural system for explicit and default-mode self-reference, but there is little direct evidence about the similarities and differences between the neural systems that mediate explicit self-reference versus default-mode self-reference during rest. In two experiments, we compared directly the brain regions activated by explicit self-reference during judgments about trait adjectives and by rest conditions relative to a semantic task without self-reference. Explicit self-reference preferentially engaged dorsal MPFC, rest preferentially engaged precuneus, and both self-reference and rest commonly engaged ventral MPFC and PCC. These findings indicate that there are both associations (shared components) and dissociations between the neural systems underlying explicit self-reference and the default mode of brain function.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Language processing in the occipital cortex of congenitally blind adults.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M; Pascual-Leone, A; Dodell-Feder, D; Fedorenko, E; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108: 4429 - 4434. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Language$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{153,\ntitle = {Language processing in the occipital cortex of congenitally blind adults},\nauthor = {M Bedny and A Pascual-Leone and D Dodell-Feder and E Fedorenko and R Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1014818108, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2011-Bedny.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1014818108},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-03-01},\nurldate = {2011-03-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {108},\npages = {4429 - 4434},\nabstract = {Humans are thought to have evolved brain regions in the left frontal and temporal cortex that are uniquely capable of language processing. However, congenitally blind individuals also activate the visual cortex in some verbal tasks. We provide evidence that this visual cortex activity in fact reflects language processing. We find that in congenitally blind individuals, the left visual cortex behaves similarly to classic language regions: (i) BOLD signal is higher during sentence comprehension than during linguistically degraded control conditions that are more difficult; (ii) BOLD signal is modulated by phonological information, lexical semantic information, and sentence-level combinatorial structure; and (iii) functional connectivity with language regions in the left prefrontal cortex and thalamus are increased relative to sighted individuals. We conclude that brain regions that are thought to have evolved for vision can take on language processing as a result of early experience. Innate microcircuit properties are not necessary for a brain region to become involved in language processing.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; Scholz, J.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Neuroscience, 6: 302 - 315. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Neural$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{154,\ntitle = {Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts},\nauthor = {Liane Young and Jonathan Scholz and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470919.2010.529712, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ba449f81abd346189c4657c64c5f1c242ca1.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1080/17470919.2010.529712},\nissn = {1747-0919},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-06-01},\nurldate = {2011-06-01},\njournal = {Social Neuroscience},\nvolume = {6},\npages = {302 - 315},\nabstract = {Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent&rsquo;s intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n fMRI item analysis in a theory of mind task.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dodell-Feder, D.; Koster-Hale, J.; Bedny, M.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 55: 705 - 712. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"fMRI$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{157,\ntitle = {fMRI item analysis in a theory of mind task},\nauthor = {David Dodell-Feder and Jorie Koster-Hale and Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910016241, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S1053811910016241-main.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.040},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-03-01},\nurldate = {2011-03-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {55},\npages = {705 - 712},\nabstract = {Conventional analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data compare the brain's response to stimulus categories (e.g., pictures of faces, stories about beliefs) across participants. In order to infer that effects observed with the specific items (a particular set of pictures or stories) are generalizable to the entire population (all faces, or all stories about beliefs), it is necessary to perform an “item analysis.” Item analyses may also reveal relationships between secondary (non-hypothesized) features of the items and functional activity. Here, we perform an item analysis on a set of stories commonly used for localizing brain regions putatively involved in Theory of Mind (ToM): right and left temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ/LTPJ), precuneus (PC), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). We address the following questions: Do brain regions that comprise the ToM network respond reliably across items (i.e. different stories about beliefs)? Do these brain regions demonstrate reliable preferences for items within the category? Can we predict any region's response to individual items, by using other features of the stimuli? We find that the ToM network responds reliably to stories about beliefs, generalizing across items as well as subjects. In addition, several regions in the ToM network have reliable preferences for individual items. Linguistic features of the stimuli did not predict these item preferences.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Moran, J M; Young, L; Saxe, R; Lee, S M; O’Young, D; Mavros, P L; and Gabrieli, J D\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108: 2688 - 2692. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Impaired$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{151c,\ntitle = {Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism},\nauthor = {J M Moran and L Young and R Saxe and S M Lee and D O’Young and P L Mavros and J D Gabrieli},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1011734108, Pulisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/2011-Moran.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1011734108},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2011},\ndate = {2011-02-01},\nurldate = {2011-02-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {108},\npages = {2688 - 2692},\nabstract = {High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person's beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person's actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) x 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person's innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action's negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n 2010\n \n \n (9)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L; Camprodon, J A; Hauser, M; Pascual-Leone, A; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107: 6753 - 6758. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Disruption$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{27,\ntitle = {Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments},\nauthor = {L Young and J A Camprodon and M Hauser and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0914826107, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young_2010_PNAS.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.0914826107},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-04-01},\nurldate = {2010-04-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {107},\npages = {6753 - 6758},\nabstract = {When we judge an action as morally right or wrong, we rely on our capacity to infer the actor's mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions). Here, we test the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), an area involved in mental state reasoning, is necessary for making moral judgments. In two experiments, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt neural activity in the RTPJ transiently before moral judgment (experiment 1, offline stimulation) and during moral judgment (experiment 2, online stimulation). In both experiments, TMS to the RTPJ led participants to rely less on the actor's mental states. A particularly striking effect occurred for attempted harms (e.g., actors who intended but failed to do harm): Relative to TMS to a control site, TMS to the RTPJ caused participants to judge attempted harms as less morally forbidden and more morally permissible. Thus, interfering with activity in the RTPJ disrupts the capacity to use mental states in moral judgment, especially in the case of attempted harms.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The right temporo-parietal junction: a specific brain region for thinking about thoughts, pages 1-35. Taylor & Francis, 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inbook{155,\ntitle = {The right temporo-parietal junction: a specific brain region for thinking about thoughts},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Saxe_RTPJChapter.pdf, PDF},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-01-01},\nurldate = {2010-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Handbook of Theory of Mind},\npages = {1-35},\npublisher = {Taylor & Francis},\nabstract = {It is easy to miss an extraordinary moment while it is happening. In the early 2000s, access to non-invasive human neuroimaging was spreading, and researchers were gaining the confidence to take these tools beyond the range of traditional neuroscience. Until then, neuroimaging had mostly been used to visualize brain functions that were already known from neuropsychology or animal studies: motor cortex (Puce et al., 1995), early visual cortex (Engel, Glover & Wandell, 1997; Engel et al., 1994), the motion perception response in MT+(Smith, Greenlee, Singh, Kraemer & Hennig, 1998; Tootell et al., 1995), left lateralized language regions (Binder et al., 1997; Binder et al., 1996; Pujol, Deus, Losilla & Capdevila, 1999), and so on. Around 2000, though, beginning in London (Castelli, Happe, Frith & Frith, 2000; Fletcher et al., 1995b; Gallagher et al., 2000) and then spreading around the world (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé & Decety, 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2001), cognitive neuroscientists leapt into a new domain: Theory of Mind (ToM), or the ability to think about thoughts. },\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Sensitive Period for a Multimodal Response in Human Visual Motion Area MT/MST.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M.; Konkle, T.; Pelphrey, K.; Saxe, R.; and Pascual-Leone, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Biology, 20: 1900 - 1906. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Sensitive$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{156,\ntitle = {Sensitive Period for a Multimodal Response in Human Visual Motion Area MT/MST},\nauthor = {Marina Bedny and Talia Konkle and Kevin Pelphrey and Rebecca Saxe and Alvaro Pascual-Leone},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982210011620, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms238983.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/motion_sounds.zip, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cub.2010.09.044},\nissn = {09609822},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-11-01},\nurldate = {2010-11-01},\njournal = {Current Biology},\nvolume = {20},\npages = {1900 - 1906},\nabstract = {The middle temporal complex (MT/MST) is a brain region specialized for the perception of motion in the visual modality [1, 2, 3, 4]. However, this specialization is modified by visual experience: after long-standing blindness, MT/MST responds to sound [5]. Recent evidence also suggests that the auditory response of MT/MST is selective for motion [6, 7]. The developmental time course of this plasticity is not known. To test for a sensitive period in MT/MST development, we used fMRI to compare MT/MST function in congenitally blind, late-blind, and sighted adults. MT/MST responded to sound in congenitally blind adults, but not in late-blind or sighted adults, and not in an individual who lost his vision between ages of 2 and 3 years. All blind adults had reduced functional connectivity between MT/MST and other visual regions. Functional connectivity was increased between MT/MST and lateral prefrontal areas in congenitally blind relative to sighted and late-blind adults. These data suggest that early blindness affects the function of feedback projections from prefrontal cortex to MT/MST. We conclude that there is a sensitive period for visual specialization in MT/MST. During typical development, early visual experience either maintains or creates a vision-dominated response. Once established, this response profile is not altered by long-standing blindness.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Attitudes towards the outgroup are predicted by activity in the precuneus in Arabs and Israelis.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bruneau, E. G; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 52: 1704 - 1711. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Attitudes$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{158,\ntitle = {Attitudes towards the outgroup are predicted by activity in the precuneus in Arabs and Israelis},\nauthor = {Emile G Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910007901, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Attitudes_towards_the_outgroup.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.05.057},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-10-01},\nurldate = {2010-10-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {52},\npages = {1704 - 1711},\nabstract = {The modern socio-political climate is defined by conflict between ethnic, religious and political groups: Bosnians and Serbs, Tamils and Singhalese, Irish Catholics and Protestants, Israelis and Arabs. One impediment to the resolution of these conflicts is the psychological bias that members of each group harbor towards each other. These biases, and their neural bases, are likely different from the commonly studied biases towards racial outgroups. We presented Arab, Israeli and control individuals with statements about the Middle East from the perspective of the ingroup or the outgroup. Subjects rated how "reasonable" each statement was, during fMRI imaging. Increased activation in the precuneus (PC) while reading pro-outgroup vs. pro-ingroup statements correlated strongly with both explicit and implicit measures of negative attitudes towards the outgroup; other brain regions that were involved in reasoning about emotionally-laden information did not show this pattern.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What gets the attention of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of attention and theory of mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; Dodell-Feder, D.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuropsychologia, 48: 2658 - 2664. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"What$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{159,\ntitle = {What gets the attention of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of attention and theory of mind},\nauthor = {Liane Young and David Dodell-Feder and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393210001934, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young_2010_Neuropsychologia.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Young-Dodell-Feder-Saxe-2010_Stimuli.pdf, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.012},\nissn = {00283932},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-07-01},\nurldate = {2010-07-01},\njournal = {Neuropsychologia},\nvolume = {48},\npages = {2658 - 2664},\nabstract = {Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated a critical role for a cortical region in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) in “theory of mind” (ToM), or mental state reasoning. In other research, the RTPJ has been implicated in the deployment of attention to an unexpected stimulus. One hypothesis (“attention hypothesis”) is that patterns of RTPJ activation in ToM tasks can be fully explained by appeal to attention: stimuli that apparently manipulate aspects of ToM are in fact manipulating aspects of attention. On an alternative hypothesis (“ToM hypothesis”), functional regions identified by ToM tasks are selective for ToM, and not just for any unexpected stimulus. Here, we used fMRI to test these competing hypotheses: are brain regions implicated in ToM, including the RTPJ, LTPJ, and precuneus, recruited specifically for mental states, or for any unexpected stimulus? We first identified brain regions implicated in ToM, using a standard paradigm: participants read stories about false beliefs and false physical representations (e.g., outdated photographs). Participants also read a new set of stories describing mental or physical states, which were unexpected or expected. Regions of interest analyses revealed a higher response in the RTPJ, LTPJ, and precuneus, for mental versus physical stories, but no difference for unexpected and expected stories. Whole-brain random effects analyses also revealed higher activation in these regions for mental versus physical stories. This pattern provides evidence for the ToM hypothesis: the response in these functional regions is selective for mental state content, whether that content is unexpected or expected.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n It’s Not Just What You Do, but What’s on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Experiments in Ethics”.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuroethics, 31: 201 - 207. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"It’s$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{160,\ntitle = {It’s Not Just What You Do, but What’s on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Experiments in Ethics”},\nauthor = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12152-010-9066-4, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young_Saxe_review_Appiah.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1007/s12152-010-9066-4},\nissn = {1874-5490},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-11-01},\nurldate = {2010-11-01},\njournal = {Neuroethics},\nvolume = {31},\npages = {201 - 207},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; Nichols, S.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11: 333 - 349. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Investigating$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{161,\ntitle = {Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know},\nauthor = {Liane Young and Shaun Nichols and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-010-0027-y, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/YOUNG_LUCK_RPP_2010.pdf, PDF\n},\ndoi = {10.1007/s13164-010-0027-y},\nissn = {1878-5158},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-09-01},\nurldate = {2010-09-01},\njournal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},\nvolume = {11},\npages = {333 - 349},\nabstract = {Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants’ judgments of the agent’s beliefs. In “moral luck” scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Live face-to-face interaction during fMRI: A new tool for social cognitive neuroscience.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Redcay, E.; Dodell-Feder, D.; Pearrow, M. J; Mavros, P. L; Kleiner, M.; Gabrieli, J. D E; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 50: 1639 - 1647. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Live$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{163,\ntitle = {Live face-to-face interaction during fMRI: A new tool for social cognitive neuroscience},\nauthor = {Elizabeth Redcay and David Dodell-Feder and Mark J Pearrow and Penelope L Mavros and Mario Kleiner and John D E Gabrieli and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910000741, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Redcay-E.-Dodell-Feder-D.-Pearrow-M.-J.-2010.-Live-face-to-face-interaction-during-fMRI-NeuroImage.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.01.052},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-05-01},\nurldate = {2010-05-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {50},\npages = {1639 - 1647},\nabstract = {Cooperative social interaction is critical for human social development and learning. Despite the importance of social interaction, previous neuroimaging studies lack two fundamental components of everyday face-to-face interactions: contingent responding and joint attention. In the current studies, functional MRI data were collected while participants interacted with a human experimenter face-to-face via live video feed as they engaged in simple cooperative games. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in a live interaction with the experimenter (“Live”) or watched a video of the same interaction (“Recorded”). During the “Live” interaction, as compared to the Recorded conditions, greater activation was seen in brain regions involved in social cognition and reward, including the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), right superior temporal sulcus (rSTS), ventral striatum, and amygdala. Experiment 2 isolated joint attention, a critical component of social interaction. Participants either followed the gaze of the live experimenter to a shared target of attention (“Joint Attention”) or found the target of attention alone while the experimenter was visible but not sharing attention (“Solo Attention”). The right temporo-parietal junction and right posterior STS were differentially recruited during Joint, as compared to Solo, attention. These findings suggest the rpSTS and rTPJ are key regions for both social interaction and joint attention. This method of allowing online, contingent social interactions in the scanner could open up new avenues of research in social cognitive neuroscience, both in typical and atypical populations.\n},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bonawitz, E. B.; Ferranti, D.; Saxe, R.; Gopnik, A.; Meltzoff, A. N; Woodward, J.; and Schulz, L. E\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 115: 104 - 117. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Just$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{164,\ntitle = {Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences},\nauthor = {Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz and Darlene Ferranti and Rebecca Saxe and Alison Gopnik and Andrew N Meltzoff and James Woodward and Laura E Schulz},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027709002947, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/COGNIT2075.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.12.001},\nissn = {00100277},\nyear  = {2010},\ndate = {2010-04-01},\nurldate = {2010-04-01},\njournal = {Cognition},\nvolume = {115},\npages = {104 - 117},\nabstract = {Adults' causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do; Experiments 1 and 2). Toddlers succeed only when the events are initiated by a dispositional agent (Experiment 3), when the events involve direct contact between objects (Experiment 4), or when the events are described using causal language (Experiment 5). This suggests that causal language may help children extend their initial causal representations beyond agent-initiated and direct contact events.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n

\n \n 2009\n \n \n (10)\n \n \n

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\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M; Pascual-Leone, A; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106: 11312 - 11317. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Growing$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{28,\ntitle = {Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind},\nauthor = {M Bedny and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0900010106, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Bedny-M.-Pascual-Leone-A.-Saxe-R.-2009.-Growing-up-blind-does-not-change-the-neural-bases-of-theory-of-mind-PNAS_0.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.0900010106},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-07-01},\nurldate = {2009-07-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {106},\npages = {11312 - 11317},\nabstract = {Humans reason about the mental states of others; this capacity is called Theory of Mind (ToM). In typically developing adults, ToM is supported by a consistent group of brain regions: the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus (PC), and anterior temporal sulci (aSTS). How experience and intrinsic biological factors interact to produce this adult functional profile is not known. In the current study we investigate the role of visual experience in the development of the ToM network by studying congenitally blind adults. In experiment 1, participants listened to stories and answered true/false questions about them. The stories were either about mental or physical representations of reality (e.g., photographs). In experiment 2, participants listened to stories about people's beliefs based on seeing or hearing; people's bodily sensations (e.g., hunger); and control stories without people. Participants judged whether each story had positive or negative valance. We find that ToM brain regions of sighted and congenitally blind adults are similarly localized and functionally specific. In congenitally blind adults, reasoning about mental states leads to activity in bilateral TPJ, MPFC, PC, and aSTS. These brain regions responded more to passages about beliefs than passages about nonbelief representations or passages about bodily sensations. Reasoning about mental states that are based on seeing is furthermore similar in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Despite their different developmental experience, congenitally blind adults have a typical ToM network. We conclude that the development of neural mechanisms for ToM depends on innate factors and on experiences represented at an abstract level, amodally.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theory of Mind (Neural Basis). 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Theory$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inbook{165,\ntitle = {Theory of Mind (Neural Basis)},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-in-press.-Theory-of-mind-neural-basis-Encyclopedia-of-Consciousness.pdf, PDF},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-01-01},\nurldate = {2009-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Encyclopedia of Consciousness},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Action understanding as inverse planning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Baker, C. L; Saxe, R.; and Tenenbaum, J. B\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 113: 329 - 349. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Action$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{166,\ntitle = {Action understanding as inverse planning},\nauthor = {Chris L Baker and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua B Tenenbaum},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027709001607, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S0010027709001607-main.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.005},\nissn = {00100277},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-12-01},\nurldate = {2009-12-01},\njournal = {Cognition},\nvolume = {113},\npages = {329 - 349},\nabstract = {Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent's behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165–193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Philosophical Studies, 144: 447 - 456. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{168,\ntitle = {The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-009-9353-2, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2009.-The-neural-evidence-for-simulation-is-weaker-than-I-think-you-think-it-is-Philosophical-Studies.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1007/s11098-009-9353-2},\nissn = {0031-8116},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-06-01},\nurldate = {2009-06-01},\njournal = {Philosophical Studies},\nvolume = {144},\npages = {447 - 456},\nabstract = {Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I argue that there is substantial evidence for co-opted mechanisms, leading from one individual&rsquo;s mental state to a matching state in an observer, but there is no evidence that the output of these co-opted mechanisms serve as the basis for mental state attributions. There is also substantial evidence for attribution mechanisms that serve as the basis for mental state attributions, but there is no evidence that these mechanisms receive their input from co-opted mechanisms.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The happiness of the fish: Evidence for a common theory of one’s own and others’ actions, pages 257-265. Psychology Press, New York, 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inbook{169,\ntitle = {The happiness of the fish: Evidence for a common theory of one’s own and others’ actions},\nauthor = {R Saxe},\nurl = {http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-07500-017\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2009.-The-happiness-of-the-fish-Evidence-for-a-common-theory-of-ones-own-and-others-actions-Handbook-of-Imagination-and-Mental-Simulation.pdf, PDF},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-01-01},\nurldate = {2009-01-01},\nbooktitle = {Handbook of imagination and mental simulation},\npages = {257-265},\npublisher = {Psychology Press},\naddress = {New York},\norganization = {Psychology Press},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {inbook}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Introduction to a Special Section of Developmental Social Cognitive Neuroscience.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R. R; and Pelphrey, K. A\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Child Development, 80: 946 - 951. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Introduction$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{170,\ntitle = {Introduction to a Special Section of Developmental Social Cognitive Neuroscience},\nauthor = {Rebecca R Saxe and Kevin A Pelphrey},\nurl = {http://blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-4, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe_et_al-2009-Child_Development.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-410.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01309.x},\nissn = {00093920},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-07-01},\nurldate = {2009-07-01},\njournal = {Child Development},\nvolume = {80},\npages = {946 - 951},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Brain Regions for Perceiving and Reasoning About Other People in School-Aged Children.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R. R; Whitfield-Gabrieli, S.; Scholz, J.; and Pelphrey, K. A\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Child Development, 80: 1197 - 1209. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Brain$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{171,\ntitle = {Brain Regions for Perceiving and Reasoning About Other People in School-Aged Children},\nauthor = {Rebecca R Saxe and Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli and Jonathan Scholz and Kevin A Pelphrey},\nurl = {http://blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-4, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe_etal_2009.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SaxeWhitfield-GabrieliScholzPelphrey2009.zip, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-410.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01325.x},\nissn = {00093920},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-07-01},\nurldate = {2009-07-01},\njournal = {Child Development},\nvolume = {80},\npages = {1197 - 1209},\nabstract = {Neuroimaging studies with adults have identified cortical regions recruited when people think about other people’s thoughts (theory of mind): temporo‐parietal junction, posterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex. These same regions were recruited in 13 children aged 6–11 years when they listened to sections of a story describing a character’s thoughts compared to sections of the same story that described the physical context. A distinct region in the posterior superior temporal sulcus was implicated in the perception of biological motion. Change in response selectivity with age was observed in just one region. The right temporo–parietal junction was recruited equally for mental and physical facts about people in younger children, but only for mental facts in older children.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Distinct Regions of Right Temporo-Parietal Junction Are Selective for Theory of Mind and Exogenous Attention.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Scholz, J.; Triantafyllou, C.; Whitfield-Gabrieli, S.; Brown, E. N; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLoS ONE, 4: e4869. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Distinct$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{172,\ntitle = {Distinct Regions of Right Temporo-Parietal Junction Are Selective for Theory of Mind and Exogenous Attention},\nauthor = {Jonathan Scholz and Christina Triantafyllou and Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli and Emery N Brown and Rebecca Saxe},\neditor = {Jan Lauwereyns},\nurl = {http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004869, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Scholz-J.-Triantafyllou-C.-Whitfield-Gabrieli-S.-Brown-E.-N.-Saxe-R.-2009.-Distinct-regions-of-right-temporo-parietal-junction-are-selective-for-theory-of-mind-and-exogenous-attention-PLoS-ONE.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1371/journal.pone.000486910.1371},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-03-01},\nurldate = {2009-03-01},\njournal = {PLoS ONE},\nvolume = {4},\npages = {e4869},\nabstract = {In functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, a cortical region in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) is recruited when participants read stories about people's thoughts (‘Theory of Mind’). Both fMRI and lesion studies suggest that a region near the RTPJ is associated with attentional reorienting in response to an unexpected stimulus. Do Theory of Mind and attentional reorienting recruit a single population of neurons, or are there two neighboring but distinct neural populations in the RTPJ? One recent study compared these activations, and found evidence consistent with a single common region. However, the apparent overlap may have been due to the low resolution of the previous technique. We tested this hypothesis using a high-resolution protocol, within-subjects analyses, and more powerful statistical methods. Strict conjunction analyses revealed that the area of overlap was small and on the periphery of each activation. In addition, a bootstrap analysis identified a reliable 6–10 mm spatial displacement between the peak activations of the two tasks; the same magnitude and direction of displacement was observed in within-subjects comparisons. In all, these results suggest that there are neighboring but distinct regions within the RTPJ implicated in Theory of Mind and orienting attention.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity*.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuropsychologia, 47: 2065 - 2072. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Innocent$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{173,\ntitle = {Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity*},\nauthor = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393209001560, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S0028393209001560-main.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Young-Saxe-2009_Stimuli.pdf, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.03.020},\nissn = {00283932},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-08-01},\nurldate = {2009-08-01},\njournal = {Neuropsychologia},\nvolume = {47},\npages = {2065 - 2072},\nabstract = {Contemporary moral psychology often emphasizes the universality of moral judgments. Across age, gender, religion and ethnicity, people's judgments on classic dilemmas are sensitive to the same moral principles. In many cases, moral judgments depend not only on the outcome of the action, but on the agent's beliefs and intentions at the time of action. For example, we blame agents who attempt but fail to harm others, while generally forgiving agents who harm others accidentally and unknowingly. Nevertheless, as we report here, there are individual differences in the extent to which observers exculpate agents for accidental harms. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which innocent intentions are taken to mitigate blame for accidental harms is correlated with activation in a specific brain region during moral judgment. This brain region, the right temporo-parietal junction, has been previously implicated in reasoning about other people's thoughts, beliefs, and intentions in moral and non-moral contexts.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21: 1396 - 1405. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"An$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{174,\ntitle = {An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment},\nauthor = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/jocn.2009.21137, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young-L..-Saxe-R.-2009.-An-fMRI-investigation-of-spontaneous-mental-state-inference-for-moral-judgements-Journal-of-Cognitive-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1162/jocn.2009.21137},\nissn = {0898-929X},\nyear  = {2009},\ndate = {2009-07-01},\nurldate = {2009-07-01},\njournal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},\nvolume = {21},\npages = {1396 - 1405},\nabstract = {Human moral judgment depends critically on “theory of mind,” the capacity to represent the mental states of agents. Recent studies suggest that the right TPJ (RTPJ) and, to lesser extent, the left TPJ (LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), and the medial pFC (MPFC) are robustly recruited when participants read explicit statements of an agent's beliefs and then judge the moral status of the agent's action. Real-world interactions, by contrast, often require social partners to infer each other's mental states. The current study uses fMRI to probe the role of these brain regions in supporting spontaneous mental state inference in the service of moral judgment. Participants read descriptions of a protagonist's action and then either (i) “moral” facts about the action's effect on another person or (ii) “nonmoral” facts about the situation. The RTPJ, PC, and MPFC were recruited selectively for moral over nonmoral facts, suggesting that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference. In a second experiment, participants read the same scenarios, but explicit statements of belief preceded the facts: Protagonists believed their actions would cause harm or not. The response in the RTPJ, PC, and LTPJ was again higher for moral facts but also distinguished between neutral and negative outcomes. Together, the results illuminate two aspects of theory of mind in moral judgment: (1) spontaneous belief inference and (2) stimulus-driven belief integration.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n 2008\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n

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\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Concepts Are More than Percepts: The Case of Action Verbs.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bedny, M; Caramazza, A; Grossman, E; Pascual-Leone, A; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Neuroscience, 28: 11347 - 11353. 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Concepts$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{29,\ntitle = {Concepts Are More than Percepts: The Case of Action Verbs},\nauthor = {M Bedny and A Caramazza and E Grossman and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/doi/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3039-08.2008, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Bedny-M.-Caramazza-A.-Grossman-E.-Pascual-Leone-A.-Saxe-R.-2008.-Concepts-are-more-than-percepts-the-case-of-action-verbs-The-Journal-of-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3039-08.2008},\nissn = {0270-6474},\nyear  = {2008},\ndate = {2008-10-01},\nurldate = {2008-10-01},\njournal = {Journal of Neuroscience},\nvolume = {28},\npages = {11347 - 11353},\nabstract = {Several regions of the posterior-lateral-temporal cortex (PLTC) are reliably recruited when participants read or listen to action verbs, relative to other word and nonword types. This PLTC activation is generally interpreted as reflecting the retrieval of visual-motion features of actions. This interpretation supports the broader theory, that concepts are comprised of sensory-motor features. We investigated an alternative interpretation of the same activations: PLTC activity for action verbs reflects the retrieval of modality-independent representations of event concepts, or the grammatical types associated with them, i.e., verbs. During a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan, participants made semantic-relatedness judgments on word pairs varying in amount of visual-motion information. Replicating previous results, several PLTC regions showed higher responses to words that describe actions versus objects. However, we found that these PLTC regions did not overlap with visual-motion regions. Moreover, their response was higher for verbs than nouns, regardless of visual-motion features. For example, the response of the PLTC is equally high to action verbs (e.g., to run) and mental verbs (e.g., to think), and equally low to animal nouns (e.g., the cat) and inanimate natural kind nouns (e.g., the rock). Thus, PLTC activity for action verbs might reflect the retrieval of event concepts, or the grammatical information associated with verbs. We conclude that concepts are abstracted away from sensory-motor experience and organized according to conceptual properties.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The influence of prior record on moral judgment.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kliemann, D.; Young, L.; Scholz, J.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuropsychologia, 46: 2949 - 2957. 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{176,\ntitle = {The influence of prior record on moral judgment},\nauthor = {Dorit Kliemann and Liane Young and Jonathan Scholz and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393208002613, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms503631.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.06.010},\nissn = {00283932},\nyear  = {2008},\ndate = {2008-10-01},\nurldate = {2008-10-01},\njournal = {Neuropsychologia},\nvolume = {46},\npages = {2949 - 2957},\nabstract = {Repeat offenders are commonly given more severe sentences than first-time offenders for the same violations. Though this practice makes intuitive sense, the theory behind escalating penalties is disputed in both legal and economic theories. Here we investigate folk intuitions concerning the moral and intentional status of actions performed by people with positive versus negative prior records. We hypothesized that prior record would modulate both moral judgment and mental state reasoning. Subjects first engaged in an economic game with fair (positive prior record) and unfair (negative prior record) competitors and then read descriptions of their competitors’ actions that resulted in either positive or negative outcomes. The descriptions left the competitors’ mental states unstated. We found that subjects judged actions producing negative outcomes as more “intentional” and more “blameworthy” when performed by unfair competitors. Although explicit mental state evaluation was not required, moral judgments in this case were accompanied by increased activation in brain regions associated with mental state reasoning, including predominantly the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). The magnitude of RTPJ activation was correlated with individual subjects’ behavioural responses to unfair play in the game. These results thus provide insight for both legal theory and moral psychology.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L.; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 40: 1912 - 1920. 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{177,\ntitle = {The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment},\nauthor = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811908000876, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S1053811908000876-main.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Young-Saxe-2008_Stimuli.pdf, Stimuli},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.01.057},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2008},\ndate = {2008-05-01},\nurldate = {2008-05-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {40},\npages = {1912 - 1920},\nabstract = {Moral judgment in the mature state depends on “theory of mind”, or the capacity to attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) to moral agents. The current study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the cognitive processes for belief attribution in moral judgment. Participants read vignettes in a 2 × 2 × 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome, based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome or the neutral outcome; presentation of belief information either preceded or followed outcome information. In each case, participants judged the moral permissibility of the action. The results indicate that while the medial prefrontal cortex is recruited for processing belief valence, the temporo-parietal junction and precuneus are recruited for processing beliefs in moral judgment via two distinct component processes: (1) encoding beliefs and (2) integrating beliefs with other relevant features of the action (e.g., the outcome) for moral judgment.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n

\n \n 2007\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n

\n

\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Goal Inference as Inverse Planning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Baker, C. L; Tenenbaum, J B; and Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 29: 779 - 784. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Goal$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{178,\ntitle = {Goal Inference as Inverse Planning},\nauthor = {Chris L Baker and J B Tenenbaum and Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5v06n97q, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/qt5v06n97q.pdf, PDF},\nyear  = {2007},\ndate = {2007-10-01},\nurldate = {2007-10-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},\nvolume = {29},\npages = {779 - 784},\nabstract = {Infants and adults are adept at inferring agents’ goals from incomplete or ambiguous sequences of behavior. We propose a framework for goal inference based on inverse planning, in which observers invert a probabilistic generative model of goal-dependent plans to infer agents’ goals. The inverse planning framework encompasses many specific models and representations; we present several specific models and test them in two behavioral experiments on online and retrospective goal inference.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Knowing who dunnit: Infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; Tzelnic, T.; and Carey, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Developmental Psychology, 43: 149 - 158. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Knowing$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{179,\ntitle = {Knowing who dunnit: Infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction.},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Tania Tzelnic and Susan Carey},\nurl = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.149, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Tzelnic-T.-Carey-S.-2007.-Knowing-who-dunnit-infants-identify-the-causal-agent-in-an-unseen-causal-interaction-Developmental-Psychology_0.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:mVmsd5A6BfQC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.149},\nissn = {0012-1649},\nyear  = {2007},\ndate = {2007-01-01},\nurldate = {2007-01-01},\njournal = {Developmental Psychology},\nvolume = {43},\npages = {149 - 158},\nabstract = {Preverbal infants can represent the causal structure of events, including distinguishing the agentive and receptive roles and categorizing entities according to stable causal dispositions. This study investigated how infants combine these 2 kinds of causal inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 9.5-month-olds used the position of a human hand or a novel puppet (causal agents), but not a toy train (an inert object), to predict the subsequent motion of a beanbag. Conversely, in Experiment 3, 10- and 7-month-olds used the motion of the beanbag to infer the position of a hand but not of a toy block. These data suggest that preverbal infants expect a causal agent as the source of motion of an inert object.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Young, L; Cushman, F; Hauser, M; and Saxe, R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104: 8235 - 8240. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{180,\ntitle = {The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment},\nauthor = {L Young and F Cushman and M Hauser and R Saxe},\nurl = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0701408104, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young-L.-Cushman-F.-Hauser-M.-Saxe-R.-2007-The-neural-basis-of-the-interaction-between-theory-of-mind-and-moral-judgment-PNAS.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.0701408104},\nissn = {0027-8424},\nyear  = {2007},\ndate = {2007-05-01},\nurldate = {2007-05-01},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {104},\npages = {8235 - 8240},\nabstract = {Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent's beliefs and an action's consequences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior developmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differentially to the young child's moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) in belief attribution. Participants read vignettes in a 2 × 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome (“negative” belief) or the neutral outcome (“neutral” belief). The RTPJ showed significant activation above baseline for all four conditions but was modulated by an interaction between belief and outcome. Specifically, the RTPJ response was highest for cases of attempted harm, where protagonists were condemned for actions that they believed would cause harm to others, even though the harm did not occur. The results not only suggest a general role for belief attribution during moral judgment, but also add detail to our understanding of the interaction between these processes at both the neural and behavioral levels.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n

\n \n 2006\n \n \n (9)\n \n \n

\n

\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Divide and conquer: A defense of functional localizers.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; Brett, M.; and Kanwisher, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 30: 1088 - 1096. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Divide$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{31,\ntitle = {Divide and conquer: A defense of functional localizers},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Matthew Brett and Nancy Kanwisher},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811905025796, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Brett-M.-Kanwisher-N.-2006.-Divide-and-Conquer-a-defense-of-functional-localizers-Neuroimage.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:IjCSPb-OGe4C, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.062},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-05-01},\nurldate = {2006-05-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {30},\npages = {1088 - 1096},\nabstract = {Numerous functionally distinct regions of cortex (e.g., V1, MT, the fusiform face area) can be easily identified in any normal human subject in just a few minutes of fMRI scanning. However, the locations of these regions vary across subjects. Investigations of these regions have therefore often used a functional region of interest (fROI) approach in which the region is first identified functionally in each subject individually, before subsequent scans in the same subjects test specific hypotheses concerning that region. This fROI method, which resembled long-established practice in visual neurophysiology, has methodological, statistical, and theoretical advantages over standard alternatives (such as whole-brain analyses of group data): (i) because functional properties are more consistently and robustly associated with fROIs than with locations in stereotaxic space, functional hypotheses concerning fROIs are often the most straightforward to frame, motivate, and test, (ii) because hypotheses are tested in only a handful of fROIs (instead of in tens of thousands of voxels), advance specification of fROIs provides a massive increase in statistical power over whole-brain analyses, and (iii) some fROIs may serve as candidate distinct components of the mind/brain worth investigation as such. Of course fROIs can be productively used in conjunction with other complementary methods. Here, we explain the motivation for and advantages of the fROI approach, and we rebut the criticism of this method offered by Friston et al. (Friston, K., Rotshtein, P., Geng, J., Sterzer, P., Henson, R., in press. A critique of functional localizers. NeuroImage).},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Bayesian models of human action understanding.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Baker, C. L; Tenenbaum, J. B; and Saxe, R. R\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 18: 99 - 106. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Bayesian$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{185,\ntitle = {Bayesian models of human action understanding},\nauthor = {Chris L Baker and Josh B Tenenbaum and Rebecca R Saxe},\nurl = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Baker-C.L.-Tenenbaum-J.B.-Saxe-R.R.-2006.-Bayesian-models-of-human-action-understanding-Advances-in-Neural-Information-Processing-Systems-18.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=300&pagesize=100&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:Zph67rFs4hoC, Google Scholar},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-01-01},\nurldate = {2006-01-01},\njournal = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems},\nvolume = {18},\npages = {99 - 106},\nabstract = {We present a Bayesian framework for explaining how people reason about and predict the actions of an intentional agent, based on observing its behavior. Action-understanding is cast as a problem of inverting a probabilistic generative model, which assumes that agents tend to act rationally in order to achieve their goals given the constraints of their environment. Working in a simple sprite-world domain, we show how this model can be used to infer the goal of an agent and predict how the agent will act in novel situations or when environmental constraints change. The model provides a qualitative account of several kinds of inferences that preverbal infants have been shown to perform, and also fits quantitative predictions that adult observers make in a new experiment.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Uniquely human social cognition.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16: 235 - 239. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Uniquely$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{186,\ntitle = {Uniquely human social cognition},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0959438806000262, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2006.-Uniquely-Human-Social-Cognition-Current-Opinion-in-Neurobiology.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=200&pagesize=100&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:u-x6o8ySG0sC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.001},\nissn = {09594388},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-04-01},\nurldate = {2006-04-01},\njournal = {Current Opinion in Neurobiology},\nvolume = {16},\npages = {235 - 239},\nabstract = {Recent data identify distinct components of social cognition associated with five brain regions. In posterior temporal cortex, the extrastriate body area is associated with perceiving the form of other human bodies. A nearby region in the posterior superior temporal sulcus is involved in interpreting the motions of a human body in terms of goals. A distinct region at the temporo-parietal junction supports the uniquely human ability to reason about the contents of mental states. Medial prefrontal cortex is divided into at least two subregions. Ventral medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in emotional empathy, whereas dorsal medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in the uniquely human representation of triadic relations between two minds and an object, supporting shared attention and collaborative goals.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Brain Research, 1079: 57 - 65. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Why$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{187,\ntitle = {Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0006899306000114, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=200&pagesize=100&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:_kc_bZDykSQC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.001},\nissn = {00068993},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-03-01},\nurldate = {2006-03-01},\njournal = {Brain Research},\nvolume = {1079},\npages = {57 - 65},\nabstract = {&lt;p&gt;Social cognitive neuroscience investigates the psychological and neural basis of perception and reasoning about other people, especially in terms of invisible internal states. This enterprise poses many challenges. The current review describes responses to three such challenges: deriving hypotheses from developmental psychology, using verbal narratives as stimuli, and analysing the results in functionally defined regions of interest.&lt;/p&gt;},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The perception of causality in infancy.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; and Carey, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Acta Psychologica, 123: 144 - 165. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{188,\ntitle = {The perception of causality in infancy},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Susan Carey},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0001691806000710, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Carey-S.-2006.-The-perception-of-Causality-in-Infancy-Acta-Psychologica.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:ULOm3_A8WrAC, Google Scholar\n},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.05.005},\nissn = {00016918},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-09-01},\nurldate = {2006-09-01},\njournal = {Acta Psychologica},\nvolume = {123},\npages = {144 - 165},\nabstract = {Michotte proposed a rationalist theory of the origin of the human capacity to represent causal relations among events. He suggested that the input analyzer that underlies the causal perception in launching, entraining, and expulsion events is innate and is the ultimate source of all causal representations. We review the literature on infant causal representations, providing evidence that launching, entraining and expulsion events are interpreted causally by young infants. However, there is as of yet no good evidence that these representations are innate. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that these representations are not the sole source of the human capacity for causal representation.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n It’s the Thought That Counts: specific brain regions for one component of theory of mind.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; and Powell, L. J\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Psychological Science, 17: 692 - 699. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"It’s$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{189,\ntitle = {It’s the Thought That Counts: specific brain regions for one component of theory of mind},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Lindsey J Powell},\nurl = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01768.x, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Powell-L.-2006.-Its-the-thought-that-counts-Psychological-Science.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Saxe-Powell-2006-Stimuli.pdf, Stimuli\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:2osOgNQ5qMEC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01768.x},\nissn = {0956-7976},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-08-01},\nurldate = {2006-08-01},\njournal = {Psychological Science},\nvolume = {17},\npages = {692 - 699},\nabstract = {Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that representing the contents of other people&rsquo;s thoughts and beliefs depends on a component of reasoning about other minds (theory of mind) that is distinct from the earlier-developing mental-state concepts for goals, perceptions, and feelings. To provide converging evidence, the current study investigated the substrate of the late-developing process in adult brains. Three regions&mdash;the right and left temporo-parietal junction and the posterior cingulate&mdash;responded selectively when subjects read about a protagonist&rsquo;s thoughts, but not when they read about other subjective, internal states or other socially relevant information about a person. By contrast, the medial prefrontal cortex responded equivalently in all of these story conditions, a result consistent with a broader role for medial prefrontal cortex in general social cognition. These data support the hypothesis that the early- and late-developing components of theory of mind rely on separate psychological and neural mechanisms, and that these mechanisms remain distinct into adulthood.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n My Body or Yours? The Effect of Visual Perspective on Cortical Body Representations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; Jamal, N.; and Powell, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cerebral Cortex, 16: 178 - 182. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"My$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{190,\ntitle = {My Body or Yours? The Effect of Visual Perspective on Cortical Body Representations},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Nasheed Jamal and Lindsey Powell},\nurl = {http://academic.oup.com/cercor/article/16/2/178/281499/My-Body-or-Yours-The-Effect-of-Visual-Perspective, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bhi095.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=200&pagesize=100&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:W7OEmFMy1HYC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1093/cercor/bhi095},\nissn = {1047-3211},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-04-01},\nurldate = {2006-04-01},\njournal = {Cerebral Cortex},\nvolume = {16},\npages = {178 - 182},\nabstract = {A human body part, such as a foot, may be observed from an egocentric perspective (consistent with looking at one&rsquo;s own body, e.g. top of the foot, toes pointing up) or from an allocentric perspective (only consistent with looking at someone else, e.g. top of the foot, toes pointing downwards). We found that the right extrastriate body area (EBA) response to images of body parts was enhanced for body parts presented from an allocentric perspective. Other areas of extrastriate cortex which responded robustly to images of bodies, including the right lateral occipital complex, right MT and left EBA, nevertheless did not distinguish between the two perspectives. A region of primary somatosensory cortex showed the reverse selectivity: the blood oxygen level-dependent response to body parts presented from an allocentric perspective was suppressed. These results help to illuminate the integration of visual and tactile information by which the brain identifies seen body parts as belonging to the self or to another person.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Overlapping and non-overlapping brain regions for theory of mind and self reflection in individual subjects.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; Moran, J. M; Scholz, J.; and Gabrieli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 115: 229 - 234. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Overlapping$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{191,\ntitle = {Overlapping and non-overlapping brain regions for theory of mind and self reflection in individual subjects},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Joseph M Moran and Jonathan Scholz and John Gabrieli},\nurl = {https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/scan/nsl034, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Moran-J.-Scholz-J.-Gabrieli-J.-2006-Overlapping-and-non-overlapping-brain-regions-for-theory-of-mind-and-self-reflection-in-individual-subjects-Social-Cognitive-and-Affective-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:eQOLeE2rZwMC, Google Scholar\n},\ndoi = {10.1093/scan/nsl034},\nissn = {1749-5016},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-12-01},\nurldate = {2006-12-01},\njournal = {Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience},\nvolume = {115},\npages = {229 - 234},\nabstract = {When subjects are required to reason about someone's false belief, a consistent pattern of brain regions are recruited including the medial prefrontal cortex, medial precuneus and bilateral temporo-parietal junction. Previous group analyses suggest that the two medial regions, but not the lateral regions, are also recruited when subjects engage in self-reflection. The current study directly compared the results of the ‘false belief’ and ‘self’ tasks in individual subjects. Consistent with previous reports, the medial prefrontal and medial precuneus regions recruited by the two tasks significantly overlap in individual subjects, although there was also evidence for non-overlapping voxels in medial regions. The temporo-parietal regions are only recruited for the ‘theory of mind’ task. Six possible models of the relationship between theory of mind, self-reflection and autobiographical memory, all consistent with both neurobiological and developmental evidence to date, are discussed.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.; Schulz, L. E; and Jiang, Y. V\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Neuroscience, 1: 284 - 298. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Reading$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{192,\ntitle = {Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe and Laura E Schulz and Yuhong V Jiang},\nurl = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470910601000446, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Schulz-L.-Jiang-Y.-2006.-Reading-Minds-versus-Following-Rules-Social-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:WF5omc3nYNoC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1080/17470910601000446},\nissn = {1747-0919},\nyear  = {2006},\ndate = {2006-09-01},\nurldate = {2006-09-01},\njournal = {Social Neuroscience},\nvolume = {1},\npages = {284 - 298},\nabstract = {The false belief task commonly used in the study of theory of mind (ToM) requires participants to select among competing responses and inhibit prepotent responses, giving rise to three possibilities: (1) the false belief tasks might require only executive function abilities and there may be no domain-specific component; (2) executive control might be necessary for the emergence of ToM in development but play no role in adult mental state inferences; and (3) executive control and domain-specific ToM abilities might both be implicated. We used fMRI in healthy adults to dissociate these possibilities. We found that non-overlapping brain regions were implicated selectively in response selection and belief attribution, that belief attribution tasks recruit brain regions associated with response selection as much as well-matched control tasks, and that regions associated with ToM (e.g., the right temporo-parietal junction) were implicated only in the belief attribution tasks. These results suggest that both domain-general and domain-specific cognitive resources are involved in adult ToM.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n

\n \n 2005\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n

\n

\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Dissociation between emotion and personality judgments: Convergent evidence from functional neuroimaging.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heberlein, A. S.; and Saxe, R. R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 28: 770 - 777. 2005.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Dissociation$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{32,\ntitle = {Dissociation between emotion and personality judgments: Convergent evidence from functional neuroimaging},\nauthor = {Andrea S. Heberlein and Rebecca R. Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811905004568, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Heberlein-A.-Saxe-R.-2005.-Dissociation-between-emotion-and-personality-judgments-Convergent-evidence-from-functional-neuroimaging-Neuroimage.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=200&pagesize=100&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:M3ejUd6NZC8C, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.06.064},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2005},\ndate = {2005-12-01},\nurldate = {2005-12-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {28},\npages = {770 - 777},\nabstract = {Cognitive neuroscientists widely agree on the importance of providing convergent evidence from neuroimaging and lesion studies to establish structure–function relationships. However, such convergent evidence is, in practice, rarely provided. A previous lesion study found a striking double dissociation between two superficially similar social judgment processes, emotion recognition and personality attribution, based on the same body movement stimuli (point-light walkers). Damage to left frontal opercular (LFO) cortices was associated with impairments in personality trait attribution, whereas damage to right postcentral/supramarginal cortices was associated with impairments in emotional state attribution. Here, we present convergent evidence from fMRI in support of this double dissociation, with regions of interest (ROIs) defined by the regions of maximal lesion overlap from the previous study.\n\nSubjects learned four emotion words and four trait words, then watched a series of short point-light walker body movement stimuli. After each stimulus, subjects saw either an emotion word or a trait word and rated how well the word described the stimulus. The LFO ROI exhibited greater activity during personality judgments than during emotion judgments. In contrast, the right postcentral/supramarginal ROI exhibited greater activity during emotion judgments than during personality judgments. Follow-up experiments ruled out the possibility that the LFO activation difference was due to word frequency differences. Additionally, we found greater activity in a region of the medial prefrontal cortex previously associated with “theory of mind” tasks when subjects made personality, as compared to emotion judgments.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Against simulation: the argument from error.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9: 174 - 179. 2005.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Against$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{181,\ntitle = {Against simulation: the argument from error},\nauthor = {Rebecca Saxe},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661305000318, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2005.-Against-Simulation-the-Argument-from-Error-Trends-in-Cognitive-Science.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&cstart=200&pagesize=100&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:Y0pCki6q_DkC, Google Scholar\n},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.tics.2005.01.012},\nissn = {13646613},\nyear  = {2005},\ndate = {2005-04-01},\nurldate = {2005-04-01},\njournal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},\nvolume = {9},\npages = {174 - 179},\nabstract = {According to Simulation Theory, to understand what is going on in another person's mind, the observer uses his or her own mind as a model of the other mind. Recently, philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists have proposed that mirror neurones (which fire in response to both executing and observing a goal directed action) provide a plausible neural substrate for simulation, a mechanism for directly perceiving, or ‘resonating' with, the contents of other minds. This article makes the case against Simulation Theory, using evidence from cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and social psychology. In particular, the errors that adults and children make when reasoning about other minds are not consistent with the ‘resonance' versions of Simulation Theory.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R; and Wexler, A\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuropsychologia, 43: 1391 - 1399. 2005.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Making$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{182,\ntitle = {Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction},\nauthor = {R Saxe and A Wexler},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393205001223, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S0028393205001223-main.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Saxe-Wexler-2005-Stimuli.pdf, Stimuli\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:9yKSN-GCB0IC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.02.013},\nissn = {00283932},\nyear  = {2005},\ndate = {2005-01-01},\nurldate = {2005-01-01},\njournal = {Neuropsychologia},\nvolume = {43},\npages = {1391 - 1399},\nabstract = {Human adults conceive of one another as beings with minds, and attribute to one another mental states like perceptions, desires and beliefs. That is, we understand other people using a ‘Theory of Mind’. The current study investigated the contributions of four brain regions to Theory of Mind reasoning. The right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) was recruited selectively for the attribution of mental states, and not for other socially relevant facts about a person, and the response of the RTPJ was modulated by the congruence or incongruence of multiple relevant facts about the target's mind. None of the other three brain regions commonly implicated in Theory of Mind reasoning – the left temporo-parietal junction (LTPJ), posterior cingulate (PC) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) – showed an equally selective profile of response. The implications of these results for an alternative theory of reasoning about other minds – Simulation Theory – are discussed.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Secret Agents: Inferences About Hidden Causes by 10- and 12-Month-Old Infants.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R; Tenenbaum, J B; and Carey, S\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Psychological Science, 16: 995 - 1001. 2005.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{183,\ntitle = {Secret Agents: Inferences About Hidden Causes by 10- and 12-Month-Old Infants},\nauthor = {R Saxe and J B Tenenbaum and S Carey},\nurl = {http://pss.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01649.x, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/secret-agent-05.pdf, PDF},\ndoi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01649.x},\nissn = {0956-7976},\nyear  = {2005},\ndate = {2005-12-01},\nurldate = {2005-12-01},\njournal = {Psychological Science},\nvolume = {16},\npages = {995 - 1001},\nabstract = {Considerable evidence indicates that preverbal infants expect that only physical contact can cause an inanimate object to move. However, very few studies have investigated infants' expectations about the source of causal power. In three experiments, we found that (a) 10- and 12-month-old infants expect a human hand, and not an inanimate object, to be the primary cause of an inanimate object's motion; (b) infants' expectations can lead them to infer a hidden causal agent without any direct perceptual evidence; and (c) infants do not infer a hidden causal agent if the moving object was previously shown to be capable of self-generated motion.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n

\n \n 2004\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n

\n

\n \n \n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R; Carey, S; and Kanwisher, N\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Annual Review of Psychology, 55: 87 - 124. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Understanding$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

\n

@article{33,\ntitle = {Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging},\nauthor = {R Saxe and S Carey and N Kanwisher},\nurl = {http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Carey-S.-Kanwisher-N.-2004.-Understanding-other-minds-linking-developmental-psychology-and-functional-neuroimaging-Annual-Review-of-Psychology.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:d1gkVwhDpl0C, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044},\nissn = {0066-4308},\nyear  = {2004},\ndate = {2004-02-01},\nurldate = {2004-02-01},\njournal = {Annual Review of Psychology},\nvolume = {55},\npages = {87 - 124},\nabstract = {Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that understanding other minds constitutes a special domain of cognition with at least two components: an early-developing system for reasoning about goals, perceptions, and emotions, and a later-developing system for representing the contents of beliefs. Neuroimaging reinforces and elaborates upon this view by providing evidence that (a) domain-specific brain regions exist for representing belief contents, (b) these regions are apparently distinct from other regions engaged in reasoning about goals and actions (suggesting that the two developmental stages reflect the emergence of two distinct systems, rather than the elaboration of a single system), and (c) these regions are distinct from brain regions engaged in inhibitory control and in syntactic processing. The clear neural distinction between these processes is evidence that belief attribution is not dependent on either inhibitory control or syntax, but is subserved by a specialized neural system for theory of mind.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n\n\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n

\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A region of right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R; Xiao, D K; Kovacs, G; Perrett, D I; and Kanwisher, N\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Neuropsychologia, 42: 1435 - 1446. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"A$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{184,\ntitle = {A region of right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions},\nauthor = {R Saxe and D K Xiao and G Kovacs and D I Perrett and N Kanwisher},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393204000843, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Xiao-D.K.-Kovacs-G.-Perrett-D.I.-Kanwisher-N.-2004.-A-region-of-right-posterior-superior-temporal-sulcus-responds-to-observed-intentional-actions-Neuropsychologia.pdf, PDF\nhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Tv-zquoAAAAJ&citation_for_view=Tv-zquoAAAAJ:UeHWp8X0CEIC, Google Scholar},\ndoi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.04.015},\nissn = {00283932},\nyear  = {2004},\ndate = {2004-01-01},\nurldate = {2004-01-01},\njournal = {Neuropsychologia},\nvolume = {42},\npages = {1435 - 1446},\nabstract = {\nHuman adults and infants identify the actions of another agent based not only on its intrinsic perceptual features, but critically on the contingent relationship between its motion path and the environmental context [Trends Cogn. Sci. 7 (1995) 287; Cognition 72 (2003) 237]. Functional neuroimaging studies of the perception of agents and intentional actions, on the other hand, have mostly focussed on the perception of intrinsic cues to agency, like a face or articulated body motion (e.g. [J. Neurosci. 17 (1997) 4302; Neuroimage 8 (1998) 221; Trends Cogn. Sci. 4 (2000) 267; Nat. Neurosci. 3 (2000) 80; Neuroimage 13 (2001) 775; Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98 (2001) 11656; Neuron 35 (2002) 1167; Neuron 34 (2002) 149, Neuroscience 15 (2003) 991; J. Neurosci. 23 (2003) 6819; Philos. Trans. R Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 358 (2003) 435]. Here we describe a region of the right posterior superior temporal sulcus that is sensitive not to articulated body motion per se, but to the relationship between the observed motion and the structure of the surrounding environment. From this and other aspects of the region’s response, we hypothesize that this region is involved in the representation of observed intentional actions.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Saxe, R; and Kanwisher, N\n\n\n \n\n\n\n NeuroImage, 19: 1835 - 1842. 2003.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{34,\ntitle = {People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”},\nauthor = {R Saxe and N Kanwisher},\nurl = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811903002301, Publisher\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Kanwisher-N.-2003.-People-thinking-about-thinking-people-fMRI-studies-of-Theory-of-Mind-Neuroimage.pdf, PDF\nhttps://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Saxe-Kanwisher-2003-Stimuli.pdf, Stimuli\n},\ndoi = {10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00230-1},\nissn = {10538119},\nyear  = {2003},\ndate = {2003-08-01},\nurldate = {2003-08-01},\njournal = {NeuroImage},\nvolume = {19},\npages = {1835 - 1842},\nabstract = {Humans powerfully and flexibly interpret the behaviour of other people based on an understanding of their minds: that is, we use a “theory of mind.” In this study we distinguish theory of mind, which represents another person’s mental states, from a representation of the simple presence of another person per se. The studies reported here establish for the first time that a region in the human temporo-parietal junction (here called the TPJ-M) is involved specifically in reasoning about the contents of another person’s mind. First, the TPJ-M was doubly dissociated from the nearby extrastriate body area (EBA; Downing et al., 2001). Second, the TPJ-M does not respond to false representations in non-social control stories. Third, the BOLD response in the TPJ-M bilaterally was higher when subjects read stories about a character’s mental states, compared with stories that described people in physical detail, which did not differ from stories about nonhuman objects. Thus, the role of the TPJ-M in understanding other people appears to be specific to reasoning about the content of mental states.},\nkeywords = {},\npubstate = {published},\ntppubtype = {article}\n}\n\n

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