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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Investigating the Encoding of Words in BERT's Neurons Using Feature Textualization.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Baeumel, T.; Vijayakumar, S.; van Genabith, J.; Neumann, G.; and Ostermann, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Belinkov, Y.; Hao, S.; Jumelet, J.; Kim, N.; McCarthy, A.; and Mohebbi, H., editor(s),
Proceedings of the 6th BlackboxNLP Workshop: Analyzing and Interpreting Neural Networks for NLP, of
BlackBoxNLP, pages 261–270, Singapore, December 2023. Association for Computational Linguistics\n
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Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{baeumel_investigating_2023,\n\taddress = {Singapore},\n\tseries = {{BlackBoxNLP}},\n\ttitle = {Investigating the {Encoding} of {Words} in {BERT}'s {Neurons} {Using} {Feature} {Textualization}},\n\turl = {https://aclanthology.org/2023.blackboxnlp-1.20},\n\tdoi = {10.18653/v1/2023.blackboxnlp-1.20},\n\tabstract = {Pretrained language models (PLMs) form the basis of most state-of-the-art NLP technologies. Nevertheless, they are essentially black boxes: Humans do not have a clear understanding of what knowledge is encoded in different parts of the models, especially in individual neurons. A contrast is in computer vision, where feature visualization provides a decompositional interpretability technique for neurons of vision models. Activation maximization is used to synthesize inherently interpretable visual representations of the information encoded in individual neurons. Our work is inspired by this but presents a cautionary tale on the interpretability of single neurons, based on the first large-scale attempt to adapt activation maximization to NLP, and, more specifically, large PLMs. We propose feature textualization, a technique to produce dense representations of neurons in the PLM word embedding space. We apply feature textualization to the BERT model to investigate whether the knowledge encoded in individual neurons can be interpreted and symbolized. We find that the produced representations can provide insights about the knowledge encoded in individual neurons, but that individual neurons do not represent clear-cut symbolic units of language such as words. Additionally, we use feature textualization to investigate how many neurons are needed to encode words in BERT.},\n\turldate = {2024-12-04},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th {BlackboxNLP} {Workshop}: {Analyzing} and {Interpreting} {Neural} {Networks} for {NLP}},\n\tpublisher = {Association for Computational Linguistics},\n\tauthor = {Baeumel, Tanja and Vijayakumar, Soniya and van Genabith, Josef and Neumann, Guenter and Ostermann, Simon},\n\teditor = {Belinkov, Yonatan and Hao, Sophie and Jumelet, Jaap and Kim, Najoung and McCarthy, Arya and Mohebbi, Hosein},\n\tmonth = dec,\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tpages = {261--270},\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n Pretrained language models (PLMs) form the basis of most state-of-the-art NLP technologies. Nevertheless, they are essentially black boxes: Humans do not have a clear understanding of what knowledge is encoded in different parts of the models, especially in individual neurons. A contrast is in computer vision, where feature visualization provides a decompositional interpretability technique for neurons of vision models. Activation maximization is used to synthesize inherently interpretable visual representations of the information encoded in individual neurons. Our work is inspired by this but presents a cautionary tale on the interpretability of single neurons, based on the first large-scale attempt to adapt activation maximization to NLP, and, more specifically, large PLMs. We propose feature textualization, a technique to produce dense representations of neurons in the PLM word embedding space. We apply feature textualization to the BERT model to investigate whether the knowledge encoded in individual neurons can be interpreted and symbolized. We find that the produced representations can provide insights about the knowledge encoded in individual neurons, but that individual neurons do not represent clear-cut symbolic units of language such as words. Additionally, we use feature textualization to investigate how many neurons are needed to encode words in BERT.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n From fear to action: AI governance and opportunities for all.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Baum, K.; Bryson, J.; Dignum, F.; Dignum, V.; Grobelnik, M.; Hoos, H.; Irgens, M.; Lukowicz, P.; Muller, C.; Rossi, F.; Shawe-Taylor, J.; Theodorou, A.; and Vinuesa, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Frontiers in Computer Science, 5. 2023.\n
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@article{baum_fear_2023,\n\ttitle = {From fear to action: {AI} governance and opportunities for all},\n\tvolume = {5},\n\tissn = {2624-9898},\n\tshorttitle = {From fear to action},\n\turl = {https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomp.2023.1210421},\n\turldate = {2023-05-18},\n\tjournal = {Frontiers in Computer Science},\n\tauthor = {Baum, Kevin and Bryson, Joanna and Dignum, Frank and Dignum, Virginia and Grobelnik, Marko and Hoos, Holger and Irgens, Morten and Lukowicz, Paul and Muller, Catelijne and Rossi, Francesca and Shawe-Taylor, John and Theodorou, Andreas and Vinuesa, Ricardo},\n\tyear = {2023},\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Causing Intended Effects in Collaborative Decision-Making.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Meyer-Vitali, A.; and Mulder, W.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Murukannaiah, P. K.; and Hirzle, T., editor(s),
Proceedings of the Workshops at the Second International Conference on Hybrid Human-Artificial Intelligence, volume 3456, of
CEUR Workshop Proceedings, pages 137–144, Munich, Germany, June 2023. CEUR\n
ISSN: 1613-0073\n\n
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@inproceedings{meyer-vitali_causing_2023,\n\taddress = {Munich, Germany},\n\tseries = {{CEUR} {Workshop} {Proceedings}},\n\ttitle = {Causing {Intended} {Effects} in {Collaborative} {Decision}-{Making}},\n\tvolume = {3456},\n\tcopyright = {All rights reserved},\n\turl = {https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3456/#short4-1},\n\tlanguage = {en},\n\turldate = {2023-08-16},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the {Workshops} at the {Second} {International} {Conference} on {Hybrid} {Human}-{Artificial} {Intelligence}},\n\tpublisher = {CEUR},\n\tauthor = {Meyer-Vitali, André and Mulder, Wico},\n\teditor = {Murukannaiah, Pradeep K. and Hirzle, Teresa},\n\tmonth = jun,\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tnote = {ISSN: 1613-0073},\n\tpages = {137--144},\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Knowledge Engineering for Hybrid Intelligence.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tiddi, I.; De Boer, V.; Schlobach, S.; and Meyer-Vitali, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
Proceedings of the 12th Knowledge Capture Conference 2023, of
K-CAP '23, pages 75–82, New York, NY, USA, December 2023. Association for Computing Machinery\n
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Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{tiddi_knowledge_2023,\n\taddress = {New York, NY, USA},\n\tseries = {K-{CAP} '23},\n\ttitle = {Knowledge {Engineering} for {Hybrid} {Intelligence}},\n\tcopyright = {All rights reserved},\n\tisbn = {9798400701412},\n\turl = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3587259.3627541},\n\tdoi = {10.1145/3587259.3627541},\n\tabstract = {Hybrid Intelligence (HI) is a rapidly growing field aiming at creating collaborative systems where humans and intelligent machines cooperate in mixed teams towards shared goals. A clear characterization of the tasks and knowledge exchanged by the agents in HI applications is still missing, hampering both standardization and reuse when designing new HI systems. Knowledge Engineering (KE) methods have been used to solve such issue through the formalization of tasks and roles in knowledge-intensive processes. We investigate whether KE methods can be applied to HI scenarios, and specifically whether common, reusable elements such as knowledge roles, tasks and subtasks can be identified in contexts where symbolic, subsymbolic and human-in-the-loop components are involved. We first adapt the well-known CommonKADS methodology to HI, and then use it to analyze several HI projects and identify common tasks. The results are (i) a high-level ontology of HI knowledge roles, (ii) a set of novel, HI-specific tasks and (iii) an open repository to store scenarios1 – allowing reuse, validation and design of existing and new HI applications.},\n\turldate = {2023-11-29},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 12th {Knowledge} {Capture} {Conference} 2023},\n\tpublisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},\n\tauthor = {Tiddi, Ilaria and De Boer, Victor and Schlobach, Stefan and Meyer-Vitali, André},\n\tmonth = dec,\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tkeywords = {CommonKADS, Hybrid Intelligence, Knowledge Engineering},\n\tpages = {75--82},\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n Hybrid Intelligence (HI) is a rapidly growing field aiming at creating collaborative systems where humans and intelligent machines cooperate in mixed teams towards shared goals. A clear characterization of the tasks and knowledge exchanged by the agents in HI applications is still missing, hampering both standardization and reuse when designing new HI systems. Knowledge Engineering (KE) methods have been used to solve such issue through the formalization of tasks and roles in knowledge-intensive processes. We investigate whether KE methods can be applied to HI scenarios, and specifically whether common, reusable elements such as knowledge roles, tasks and subtasks can be identified in contexts where symbolic, subsymbolic and human-in-the-loop components are involved. We first adapt the well-known CommonKADS methodology to HI, and then use it to analyze several HI projects and identify common tasks. The results are (i) a high-level ontology of HI knowledge roles, (ii) a set of novel, HI-specific tasks and (iii) an open repository to store scenarios1 – allowing reuse, validation and design of existing and new HI applications.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Security of AI-Systems: Fundamentals - Security Considerations for Symbolic and Hybrid AI.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Müller, C.; Vogt, R.; Nonnengart, A.; Klusch, M.; and Meyer-Vitali, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Technical Report Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), June 2023.\n
https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Publikationen/Studien/Projekt_P464/Projekt_P464_node.html https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Presse/Alle-Meldungen-News/Meldungen/Studien_Cyber-Sicherheit_KI-Systeme_230202.html\n\n
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Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@techreport{muller_security_2023,\n\ttitle = {Security of {AI}-{Systems}: {Fundamentals} - {Security} {Considerations} for {Symbolic} and {Hybrid} {AI}},\n\tcopyright = {All rights reserved},\n\tshorttitle = {Security of {AI}-{Systems}},\n\turl = {https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/KI/Security-of-AI-systems_fundamentals_considerations_symbolic_hybrid.html},\n\tabstract = {Until recent years, cybersecurity was mostly concerned with an arms race of attackers and defence\nmechanisms on the level of admission control, protection of data transmission, cryptography, and so forth.\nOn the other side, functional safety of software-based systems dealt with faults in the system behaviour,\nwhich are caused by electro-mechanical errors in one of its sub-components or systematic errors (like bugs).\nWith AI-based systems becoming ever more wide-spread and complex, both paradigms need to be extended\nand, in a way, they are growing closer together. AI security and AI safety have a large overlap. Part of what\nAI safety tries to cope with are perturbations (or distribution shifts) that occur “naturally”, for example\nbecause the environment changes (day to night, summer to winter, Europe to Asia, simulation to reality,\netc.) or because the domain gradually evolves (demographic changes, generation changes, etc.). Seldom,\nevents can occur that have never been considered in training, causing an undesired emergent behaviour\n(misclassification, wrong decision, etc.) at inference time. Couldn’t we also say that the unexpected event\ncaused an “evasion”? AI security, aside from assuming an adversary, deals with similar problems. Data\npoisoning is the attempt to smuggle-in examples to the training set that decrease the accuracy of the system\n(or increase test error), thereby trying to be as efficient and subtle as possible. Evasion attacks alter the\ninference situation, either by manipulating the environment or otherwise making sure that the system\nreceives input that leads to misclassifications. In a sense, they are trying to create an event that was not\nexpected during training. It is possible that poisoning and evasion attacks are combined in a sense that the\npoisoning attack introduces a trigger for the later evasion. The proximity between the two problem domains\nexists on all levels: in highly automated driving, for example, it is plausible to describe a case in which the\ncar with ego-centric vision is tricked by the behaviour of another vehicle (agent) exhibiting a strange\nmanoeuvre. If we had reasons to assume that the agent’s “adversarial driving” was based on knowledge\nabout the inner working of the ego car, we would call it a security breach – otherwise a safety issue. It\nbecomes apparent that the distinction is somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, if we look at the body of literature\nin AI security, the game of finding new attacks, on the one side, and inventing new ways of defending them,\non the other, could also be framed under the umbrella of research on robustness.},\n\tinstitution = {Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)},\n\tauthor = {Müller, Christian and Vogt, Roland and Nonnengart, Andreas and Klusch, Matthias and Meyer-Vitali, André},\n\tmonth = jun,\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tnote = {https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Publikationen/Studien/Projekt\\_P464/Projekt\\_P464\\_node.html\nhttps://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Presse/Alle-Meldungen-News/Meldungen/Studien\\_Cyber-Sicherheit\\_KI-Systeme\\_230202.html},\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n Until recent years, cybersecurity was mostly concerned with an arms race of attackers and defence mechanisms on the level of admission control, protection of data transmission, cryptography, and so forth. On the other side, functional safety of software-based systems dealt with faults in the system behaviour, which are caused by electro-mechanical errors in one of its sub-components or systematic errors (like bugs). With AI-based systems becoming ever more wide-spread and complex, both paradigms need to be extended and, in a way, they are growing closer together. AI security and AI safety have a large overlap. Part of what AI safety tries to cope with are perturbations (or distribution shifts) that occur “naturally”, for example because the environment changes (day to night, summer to winter, Europe to Asia, simulation to reality, etc.) or because the domain gradually evolves (demographic changes, generation changes, etc.). Seldom, events can occur that have never been considered in training, causing an undesired emergent behaviour (misclassification, wrong decision, etc.) at inference time. Couldn’t we also say that the unexpected event caused an “evasion”? AI security, aside from assuming an adversary, deals with similar problems. Data poisoning is the attempt to smuggle-in examples to the training set that decrease the accuracy of the system (or increase test error), thereby trying to be as efficient and subtle as possible. Evasion attacks alter the inference situation, either by manipulating the environment or otherwise making sure that the system receives input that leads to misclassifications. In a sense, they are trying to create an event that was not expected during training. It is possible that poisoning and evasion attacks are combined in a sense that the poisoning attack introduces a trigger for the later evasion. The proximity between the two problem domains exists on all levels: in highly automated driving, for example, it is plausible to describe a case in which the car with ego-centric vision is tricked by the behaviour of another vehicle (agent) exhibiting a strange manoeuvre. If we had reasons to assume that the agent’s “adversarial driving” was based on knowledge about the inner working of the ego car, we would call it a security breach – otherwise a safety issue. It becomes apparent that the distinction is somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, if we look at the body of literature in AI security, the game of finding new attacks, on the one side, and inventing new ways of defending them, on the other, could also be framed under the umbrella of research on robustness.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n A Maturity Model for Collaborative Agents in Human-AI Ecosystems.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mulder, W.; and Meyer-Vitali, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Camarinha-Matos, L. M.; Boucher, X.; and Ortiz, A., editor(s),
Collaborative Networks in Digitalization and Society 5.0, of
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, pages 328–335, Cham, 2023. Springer Nature Switzerland\n
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\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{mulder_maturity_2023,\n\taddress = {Cham},\n\tseries = {{IFIP} {Advances} in {Information} and {Communication} {Technology}},\n\ttitle = {A {Maturity} {Model} for {Collaborative} {Agents} in {Human}-{AI} {Ecosystems}},\n\tcopyright = {All rights reserved},\n\tisbn = {978-3-031-42622-3},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/978-3-031-42622-3_23},\n\tabstract = {AI entities lean on the aspects of their autonomy to carry out their tasks and perform intelligently. But when these entities collaborate in human-AI teams, their levels of autonomy and collaboration have to be balanced out. We present a maturity model for agents regarding this aspect of balancing. Whereas simple AI systems use pre-designed mechanisms, more advanced systems are able to learn this from experience. The maturity model is a two-dimensional matrix in which the degree of agency forms the horizontal axis, and the level of interaction the vertical axis. We validate the use of this maturity model with use-cases in the field of urban energy efficiency.},\n\tlanguage = {en},\n\tbooktitle = {Collaborative {Networks} in {Digitalization} and {Society} 5.0},\n\tpublisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},\n\tauthor = {Mulder, Wico and Meyer-Vitali, André},\n\teditor = {Camarinha-Matos, Luis M. and Boucher, Xavier and Ortiz, Angel},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tkeywords = {Agency, Collaborative networks, Human-AI teaming},\n\tpages = {328--335},\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n AI entities lean on the aspects of their autonomy to carry out their tasks and perform intelligently. But when these entities collaborate in human-AI teams, their levels of autonomy and collaboration have to be balanced out. We present a maturity model for agents regarding this aspect of balancing. Whereas simple AI systems use pre-designed mechanisms, more advanced systems are able to learn this from experience. The maturity model is a two-dimensional matrix in which the degree of agency forms the horizontal axis, and the level of interaction the vertical axis. We validate the use of this maturity model with use-cases in the field of urban energy efficiency.\n
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