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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Characterisation of 'Phelpsian' Statistical Discrimination.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
The Economic Journal, 131(637): 2018-2032. 08 2020.\n
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@article{chambersecheniquephelpsiandisc,\n author = {Chambers, Christopher P and Echenique, Federico},\n title = "{A Characterisation of 'Phelpsian' Statistical Discrimination}",\n journal = {The Economic Journal},\n volume = {131},\n number = {637},\n pages = {2018-2032},\n year = {2020},\n month = {08},\n abstract = "{We establish that a type of statistical\n discrimination -- that based on informativeness of signals about\n workers' skills and the ability appropriately to match workers\n to tasks is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signalling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).}",\n issn = {0013-0133},\n doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaa107},\n url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa107},\n eprint = {https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-pdf/131/637/2018/38851953/ueaa107.pdf},\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n We establish that a type of statistical discrimination – that based on informativeness of signals about workers' skills and the ability appropriately to match workers to tasks is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signalling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Basu, P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Theoretical Economics, 15(4): 1279-1305. 2020.\n
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@article{TE20201279,\n author = {Basu, Pathikrit and Echenique, Federico},\n title = {On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories},\n journal = {Theoretical Economics},\n volume = {15},\n number = {4},\n year = {2020},\n pages = {1279-1305},\n url = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20201279/0}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Imai, T.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12(4): 114-43. November 2020.\n
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@article{10.1257/mic.20180028,\nAuthor = {Echenique, Federico and Imai, Taisuke and Saito, Kota},\nTitle = {Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations},\nJournal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},\nVolume = {12},\nNumber = {4},\nYear = {2020},\nMonth = {November},\nPages = {114-43},\nDOI = {10.1257/mic.20180028},\nURL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20180028}}\n\n\n\n\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Barman, S.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of
EC '20, pages 765\u0013766, New York, NY, USA, 2020. Association for Computing Machinery\n
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@inproceedings{barmanechenedgeworth,\nauthor = {Barman, Siddharth and Echenique, Federico},\ntitle = {The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies},\nyear = {2020},\nisbn = {9781450379755},\npublisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},\naddress = {New York, NY, USA},\nurl = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399481},\ndoi = {10.1145/3391403.3399481},\nabstract = {We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.},\nbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},\npages = {765\u0013766},\nnumpages = {2},\nkeywords = {Walrasian equilibrium, approximate caratheodory theorem, piecewise-linear concave utilities, core convergence},\nlocation = {Virtual Event, Hungary},\nseries = {EC '20}\n}\n\n\n\n\n
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\n We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Spherical preferences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Journal of Economic Theory, 189: 105086. September 2020.\n
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@article{CHAMBERS2020105086,\ntitle = "Spherical preferences",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory",\nvolume = "189",\npages = "105086",\nmonth = "September",\nyear = "2020",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105086",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053120300818",\nauthor = "Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Spherical, Additivity, Euclidean, Orthogonal, Independence",\nabstract = "We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after each marginal change has been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both. We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with the same center, with preference being \u001cmonotone\u001d either away or towards the center. Spherical preferences include linear preferences as a special (limiting) case. We discuss different applications to economic and political environments. Our result delivers Euclidean preferences in models of spatial voting, quadratic welfare aggregation in social choice, and expected utility in models of choice under uncertainty."\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after each marginal change has been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both. We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with the same center, with preference being \u001cmonotone\u001d either away or towards the center. Spherical preferences include linear preferences as a special (limiting) case. We discuss different applications to economic and political environments. Our result delivers Euclidean preferences in models of spatial voting, quadratic welfare aggregation in social choice, and expected utility in models of choice under uncertainty.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n New Developments in Revealed Preference Theory: Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, and Intertemporal Choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Annual Review of Economics, 12(1): null. August 2020.\n
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@article{doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800,\nauthor = {Echenique, Federico},\ntitle = {New Developments in Revealed Preference Theory: Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, and Intertemporal Choice},\njournal = {Annual Review of Economics},\nvolume = {12},\nnumber = {1},\npages = {null},\nmonth = {August},\nyear = {2020},\ndoi = {10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800},\nURL = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800},\neprint = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800},\n abstract = { This article reviews recent developments in revealed preference theory. It discusses the testable implications of theories of choice that are germane to specific economic environments. The focus is on expected utility in risky environments, subjected expected utility and maxmin expected utility in the presence of uncertainty, and exponentially discounted utility for intertemporal choice. The testable implications of these theories for data on choice from classical linear budget sets are described and shown to follow a common thread. The theories all imply an inverse relation between prices and quantities, with different qualifications depending on the functional forms in the theory under consideration.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n
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\n This article reviews recent developments in revealed preference theory. It discusses the testable implications of theories of choice that are germane to specific economic environments. The focus is on expected utility in risky environments, subjected expected utility and maxmin expected utility in the presence of uncertainty, and exponentially discounted utility for intertemporal choice. The testable implications of these theories for data on choice from classical linear budget sets are described and shown to follow a common thread. The theories all imply an inverse relation between prices and quantities, with different qualifications depending on the functional forms in the theory under consideration.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Pareto Comparisons of a Group of Exponential Discounters.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Mathematics of Operations Research, 45(2): 622-640. May 2020.\n
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@article{chambers2020pareto,\n title={The Pareto Comparisons of a Group of Exponential Discounters},\n author={Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico},\n journal={Mathematics of Operations Research},\n year={2020},\n volume =\t{45},\n number = \t {2},\n pages = \t {622-640},\nmonth = {May}, \n publisher={INFORMS},\nURL= {https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1004},\ndoi= {10.1287/moor.2019.1004}\n}\n\n\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Incentive Compatible Active Learning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Prasad, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Vidick, T., editor(s),
11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020), volume 151, of
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 67:1 - 67:20, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2020. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik\n
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@InProceedings{echenique_et_al:LIPIcs:2020:11752,\n author =\t{Federico Echenique and Siddharth Prasad},\n title =\t{{Incentive Compatible Active Learning}},\n booktitle =\t{11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)},\n pages = {67:1 - 67:20},\n series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},\n ISBN = {978-3-95977-134-4},\n ISSN = {1868-8969},\n year = {2020},\n volume =\t{151},\n editor =\t{Thomas Vidick},\n publisher =\t{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},\n address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},\n URL =\t {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2020/11752},\n URN =\t\t{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-117525},\n doi =\t\t\t{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.67},\n annote =\t\t{Keywords: Active Learning, Incentive Compatibility, Preference Elicitation}\n}\n\n\n\n\n
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