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\n  \n 2025\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Binary mechanisms under privacy-preserving noise.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Pourbabaee, F.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory, 224: 105965. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"BinaryPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{POURBABAEE2025105965,\ntitle = {Binary mechanisms under privacy-preserving noise},\njournal = {Journal of Economic Theory},\nvolume = {224},\npages = {105965},\nyear = {2025},\nissn = {0022-0531},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2025.105965},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053125000110},\nauthor = {Farzad Pourbabaee and Federico Echenique},\nabstract = {We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly “flipped,” so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study the tradeoffs between preserving the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pursuing efficiency, and mitigating the effect of noise on revenue.}\n}\n\n
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\n We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly “flipped,” so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study the tradeoffs between preserving the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pursuing efficiency, and mitigating the effect of noise on revenue.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Price and Choose.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Núñez, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 17(2): 1–27. May 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/mic.20230095,\nAuthor = {Echenique, Federico and Núñez, Matías},\nTitle = {Price and Choose},\nJournal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},\nVolume = {17},\nNumber = {2},\nYear = {2025},\nMonth = {May},\nPages = {1–27},\nDOI = {10.1257/mic.20230095},\nURL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20230095}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Empirical welfare economics.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Economics, 20(3): 911-939. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{TE20250911,\n\tauthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico},\n\ttitle = {Empirical welfare economics},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Economics},\n\tvolume = {20},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tyear = {2025},\n\tpages = {911-939},\n\turl = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20250911/0}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Li, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of the European Economic Association, 23(5): 1712-1742. 01 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1093/jeea/jvaf002,\n    author = {Echenique, Federico and Li, Anqi},\n    title = {Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps},\n    journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},\n    volume = {23},\n    number = {5},\n    pages = {1712-1742},\n    year = {2025},\n    month = {01},\n    abstract = {When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors one group over another. The former group faces incentives to invest in becoming productive, while the latter is discouraged from such investments. In turn, the principal largely overlooks the productivity differences between groups and primarily promotes the invested group, unless the underinvested group surprises him with a genuinely outstanding outcome. We show that, when attention costs are intermediate, investment costs are low, and investments are likely to succeed, the discriminatory equilibrium is the most preferred by the principal, despite all groups being ex-ante identical. Our results inform the discussion of affirmative action, implicit bias, and occupational segregation and stereotypes.},\n    issn = {1542-4766},\n    doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvaf002},\n    url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf002},\n    eprint = {https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-pdf/23/5/1712/61445200/jvaf002.pdf},\n}\n\n
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\n When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors one group over another. The former group faces incentives to invest in becoming productive, while the latter is discouraged from such investments. In turn, the principal largely overlooks the productivity differences between groups and primarily promotes the invested group, unless the underinvested group surprises him with a genuinely outstanding outcome. We show that, when attention costs are intermediate, investment costs are low, and investments are likely to succeed, the discriminatory equilibrium is the most preferred by the principal, despite all groups being ex-ante identical. Our results inform the discussion of affirmative action, implicit bias, and occupational segregation and stereotypes.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Yariv, F. E. A. A. R. A. L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Quantitative Economics, 16(2): 497-533. 2025.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"AnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{https://doi.org/10.3982/QE2316,\nauthor = {Federico Echenique AND Alejandro Robinson‐Cortés AND Leeat Yariv},\ntitle = {An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching},\njournal = {Quantitative Economics},\nvolume = {16},\nnumber = {2},\npages = {497-533},\nkeywords = {Decentralized matching, experiments, market design},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.3982/QE2316},\nurl = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/QE2316},\neprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.3982/QE2316},\nabstract = {<p>We present an experimental study of decentralized two‐sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary nonbinding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights emerge. First, stable outcomes are prevalent. Second, while centralized clearinghouses commonly aim at implementing extremal stable matchings, our decentralized markets most frequently culminate in the <i>median</i> stable matching. Third, preferences' cardinal representations impact the stable partners with whom participants match. Last, the dynamics underlying our results exhibit strategic sophistication, with agents successfully avoiding cycles of blocking pairs.</p>},\nyear = {2025}\n}\n\n\n\n
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We present an experimental study of decentralized two‐sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary nonbinding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights emerge. First, stable outcomes are prevalent. Second, while centralized clearinghouses commonly aim at implementing extremal stable matchings, our decentralized markets most frequently culminate in the median stable matching. Third, preferences' cardinal representations impact the stable partners with whom participants match. Last, the dynamics underlying our results exhibit strategic sophistication, with agents successfully avoiding cycles of blocking pairs.

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Stable Matching as Transportation.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Root, J.; and Sandomirskiy, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of EC '24, pages 418, New York, NY, USA, 2024. Association for Computing Machinery\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StablePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{10.1145/3670865.3673585,\nauthor = {Echenique, Federico and Root, Joseph and Sandomirskiy, Fedor},\ntitle = {Stable Matching as Transportation},\nyear = {2024},\nisbn = {9798400707049},\npublisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},\naddress = {New York, NY, USA},\nurl = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673585},\ndoi = {10.1145/3670865.3673585},\nabstract = {We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between common design objectives---stability, efficiency, and fairness---and the theory of optimal transport. Optimal transport gives new insights into the structural properties of matchings obtained from pursuing these objectives, and into the trade-offs between different objectives. Matching markets with aligned preferences provide a tractable stylized model capturing supply-demand imbalances in a range of settings such as partnership formation, school choice, organ donor exchange, and markets with transferable utility where bargaining over transfers happens after a match is formed.The full paper is available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13378},\nbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},\npages = {418},\nnumpages = {1},\nkeywords = {stable matching, optimal transport},\nlocation = {New Haven, CT, USA},\nseries = {EC '24}\n}\n\n\n
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\n We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between common design objectives—stability, efficiency, and fairness—and the theory of optimal transport. Optimal transport gives new insights into the structural properties of matchings obtained from pursuing these objectives, and into the trade-offs between different objectives. Matching markets with aligned preferences provide a tractable stylized model capturing supply-demand imbalances in a range of settings such as partnership formation, school choice, organ donor exchange, and markets with transferable utility where bargaining over transfers happens after a match is formed.The full paper is available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13378\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Goel, S.; and Lee, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory, 222: 105921. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StablePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{ECHENIQUE2024105921,\ntitle = {Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies},\njournal = {Journal of Economic Theory},\nvolume = {222},\npages = {105921},\nyear = {2024},\nissn = {0022-0531},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105921},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124001273},\nauthor = {Federico Echenique and Sumit Goel and SangMok Lee},\nabstract = {We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to express fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from generalizing the original study of an exchange economy with unit demand and unit endowments, the housing model. Our first approach uses Scarf's theorem, and proposes sufficient conditions under which a “convexify then round” technique ensures that the core is nonempty. The upshot is that a core allocation exists in categorical economies with dichotomous preferences. Our second approach uses a generalization of the TTC: it works under general conditions, and finds a solution that is a version of the stable set.}\n}\n\n
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\n We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to express fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from generalizing the original study of an exchange economy with unit demand and unit endowments, the housing model. Our first approach uses Scarf's theorem, and proposes sufficient conditions under which a “convexify then round” technique ensures that the core is nonempty. The upshot is that a core allocation exists in categorical economies with dichotomous preferences. Our second approach uses a generalization of the TTC: it works under general conditions, and finds a solution that is a version of the stable set.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Screening p-hackers: Dissemination noise as bait.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and He, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(21): e2400787121. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ScreeningPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{\ndoi:10.1073/pnas.2400787121,\nauthor = {Federico Echenique  and Kevin He },\ntitle = {Screening <i>p</i>-hackers: Dissemination noise as bait},\njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\nvolume = {121},\nnumber = {21},\npages = {e2400787121},\nyear = {2024},\ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.2400787121},\nURL = {https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2400787121},\neprint = {https://www.pnas.org/doi/pdf/10.1073/pnas.2400787121},\nabstract = {We show that adding noise before publishing data effectively screens p-hacked findings: spurious explanations produced by fitting many statistical models (data mining). Noise creates “baits” that affect two types of researchers differently. Uninformed p-hackers, who are fully ignorant of the true mechanism and engage in data mining, often fall for baits. Informed researchers, who start with an ex ante hypothesis, are minimally affected. We show that as the number of observations grows large, dissemination noise asymptotically achieves optimal screening. In a tractable special case where the informed researchers’ theory can identify the true causal mechanism with very few data, we characterize the optimal level of dissemination noise and highlight the relevant trade-offs. Dissemination noise is a tool that statistical agencies currently use to protect privacy. We argue this existing practice can be repurposed to screen p-hackers and thus improve research credibility.}}\n\n
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\n We show that adding noise before publishing data effectively screens p-hacked findings: spurious explanations produced by fitting many statistical models (data mining). Noise creates “baits” that affect two types of researchers differently. Uninformed p-hackers, who are fully ignorant of the true mechanism and engage in data mining, often fall for baits. Informed researchers, who start with an ex ante hypothesis, are minimally affected. We show that as the number of observations grows large, dissemination noise asymptotically achieves optimal screening. In a tractable special case where the informed researchers’ theory can identify the true causal mechanism with very few data, we characterize the optimal level of dissemination noise and highlight the relevant trade-offs. Dissemination noise is a tool that statistical agencies currently use to protect privacy. We argue this existing practice can be repurposed to screen p-hackers and thus improve research credibility.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Decreasing Impatience.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; Echenique, F.; and Miller, A. D.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(3): 527–551. August 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/mic.20210361,\nAuthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico and Miller, Alan D.},\nTitle = {Decreasing Impatience},\nJournal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},\nVolume = {15},\nNumber = {3},\nYear = {2023},\nMonth = {August},\nPages = {527--551},\nDOI = {10.1257/mic.20210361},\nURL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210361}}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Miralles, A.; and Zhang, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior, 141: 428-443. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{ECHENIQUE2023428,\ntitle = {Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments},\njournal = {Games and Economic Behavior},\nvolume = {141},\npages = {428-443},\nyear = {2023},\nissn = {0899-8256},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.002},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825623000957},\nauthor = {Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles and Jun Zhang},\nkeywords = {Discrete allocation, Endowment, Pseudo-market procedure, Balanced individual rationality},\nabstract = {In a variant of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)'s model that allows agents to start out with different endowments, we develop a pseudo-market procedure that allows the policymaker to decide to what extent individual endowment differences shall be balanced by the average endowment. Our procedure sidesteps the known non-existence problem of Walrasian equilibria, and finds an efficient and balanced individually-rational allocation. Envy in our procedure is justified in a utilitarian sense: an envying agent's endowment must make a lower contribution to standard weighted utilitarian welfare than that of the envied agent.}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n In a variant of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)'s model that allows agents to start out with different endowments, we develop a pseudo-market procedure that allows the policymaker to decide to what extent individual endowment differences shall be balanced by the average endowment. Our procedure sidesteps the known non-existence problem of Walrasian equilibria, and finds an efficient and balanced individually-rational allocation. Envy in our procedure is justified in a utilitarian sense: an envying agent's endowment must make a lower contribution to standard weighted utilitarian welfare than that of the envied agent.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cite-seeing and reviewing: A study on citation bias in peer review.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Stelmakh, I. A. R.; Charvi AND Liu, R. A. C.; and Shuchi AND Echenique, F. A. S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n PLOS ONE, 18(7): 1-16. 07 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Cite-seeingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Stelmakh_etal_PLOS2023,\n    doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0283980},\n    author = {Stelmakh, Ivan AND Rastogi, Charvi AND Liu, Ryan AND Chawla, Shuchi AND Echenique, Federico AND Shah, Nihar B.},\n    journal = {PLOS ONE},\n    publisher = {Public Library of Science},\n    title = {Cite-seeing and reviewing: A study on citation bias in peer review},\n    year = {2023},\n    month = {07},\n    volume = {18},\n    url = {https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0283980},\n    pages = {1-16},\n    abstract = {Citations play an important role in researchers’ careers as a key factor in evaluation of scientific impact. Many anecdotes advice authors to exploit this fact and cite prospective reviewers to try obtaining a more positive evaluation for their submission. In this work, we investigate if such a citation bias actually exists: Does the citation of a reviewer’s own work in a submission cause them to be positively biased towards the submission? In conjunction with the review process of two flagship conferences in machine learning and algorithmic economics, we execute an observational study to test for citation bias in peer review. In our analysis, we carefully account for various confounding factors such as paper quality and reviewer expertise, and apply different modeling techniques to alleviate concerns regarding the model mismatch. Overall, our analysis involves 1,314 papers and 1,717 reviewers and detects citation bias in both venues we consider. In terms of the effect size, by citing a reviewer’s work, a submission has a non-trivial chance of getting a higher score from the reviewer: an expected increase in the score is approximately 0.23 on a 5-point Likert item. For reference, a one-point increase of a score by a single reviewer improves the position of a submission by 11% on average.},\n    number = {7}}\n\n\n\n\n
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\n Citations play an important role in researchers’ careers as a key factor in evaluation of scientific impact. Many anecdotes advice authors to exploit this fact and cite prospective reviewers to try obtaining a more positive evaluation for their submission. In this work, we investigate if such a citation bias actually exists: Does the citation of a reviewer’s own work in a submission cause them to be positively biased towards the submission? In conjunction with the review process of two flagship conferences in machine learning and algorithmic economics, we execute an observational study to test for citation bias in peer review. In our analysis, we carefully account for various confounding factors such as paper quality and reviewer expertise, and apply different modeling techniques to alleviate concerns regarding the model mismatch. Overall, our analysis involves 1,314 papers and 1,717 reviewers and detects citation bias in both venues we consider. In terms of the effect size, by citing a reviewer’s work, a submission has a non-trivial chance of getting a higher score from the reviewer: an expected increase in the score is approximately 0.23 on a 5-point Likert item. For reference, a one-point increase of a score by a single reviewer improves the position of a submission by 11% on average.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Imai, T.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of the European Economic Association,1821 – 1864. 10 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ApproximatePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique_Imai_Saito_JEEA2023,\n    author = {Echenique, Federico and Imai, Taisuke and Saito, Kota},\n    title = "{Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization}",\n    journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},\n    pages = {1821 -- 1864},\n    year = {2023},\n    month = {10},\n    abstract = "{We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility theory. For any positive number e, we give a characterization of the datasets with a rationalization that is within e (in beliefs, utility, or perceived prices) of expected utility (EU) theory, under the assumption of risk aversion. The number e can then be used as a measure of how far the data is to EU theory. We apply our methodology to data from three large-scale experiments. Many subjects in these experiments are consistent with utility maximization, but not with EU maximization. Our measure of distance to expected utility is correlated with the subjects’ demographic characteristics.}",\n    issn = {1542-4766},\n    doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvad028},\n    url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad028},\n    eprint = {https://academic.oup.com/jeea/advance-article-pdf/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvad028/50597187/jvad028.pdf}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility theory. For any positive number e, we give a characterization of the datasets with a rationalization that is within e (in beliefs, utility, or perceived prices) of expected utility (EU) theory, under the assumption of risk aversion. The number e can then be used as a measure of how far the data is to EU theory. We apply our methodology to data from three large-scale experiments. Many subjects in these experiments are consistent with utility maximization, but not with EU maximization. Our measure of distance to expected utility is correlated with the subjects’ demographic characteristics.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Barman, S.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mathematics of Operations Research, 48(1): 313-331. February 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{edgeworthconjecture,\nauthor = {Barman, Siddharth and Echenique, Federico},\ntitle = {The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies},\nyear = {2023},\nvolume = {48},\nnumber = {1},\nmonth = {February},\npages = {313-331},\njournal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},\ndoi = {10.1287/moor.2022.1263},\nurl = {https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1263}\n}\n\n\n
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\n  \n 2022\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Closure operators: complexity and applications to classification and decision-making.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, New York, NY, USA, 2022. Association for Computing Machinery\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{10.1145/3490486co,\ntitle={Closure operators: complexity and applications to classification and decision-making},\nauthors={Hamed Hamze Bajgiran and Federico Echenique},\nbooktitle = {EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},\nyear = {2022},\nisbn = {9781450391504},\npublisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},\naddress = {New York, NY, USA},\nabstract = {The papers in these Proceedings were presented at the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'22), held between July 11 and 15, 2022 at the University of Colorado Boulder, USA. Since 1999, the ACM Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation (SIGecom) has sponsored EC, the leading scientific conference at the interface of economics and computation.},\nlocation = {Boulder, CO, USA}\n}\n\n
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\n The papers in these Proceedings were presented at the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'22), held between July 11 and 15, 2022 at the University of Colorado Boulder, USA. Since 1999, the ACM Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation (SIGecom) has sponsored EC, the leading scientific conference at the interface of economics and computation.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Screening $p$-hackers: dissemination noise as bait.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, New York, NY, USA, 2022. Association for Computing Machinery\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{10.1145/3490486spo,\ntitle={Screening $p$-hackers: dissemination noise as bait},\nauthors={Federico Echenique and Kevin He},\nbooktitle = {EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},\nyear = {2022},\nisbn = {9781450391504},\npublisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},\naddress = {New York, NY, USA},\nabstract = {The papers in these Proceedings were presented at the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'22), held between July 11 and 15, 2022 at the University of Colorado Boulder, USA. Since 1999, the ACM Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation (SIGecom) has sponsored EC, the leading scientific conference at the interface of economics and computation.},\nlocation = {Boulder, CO, USA}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n The papers in these Proceedings were presented at the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'22), held between July 11 and 15, 2022 at the University of Colorado Boulder, USA. Since 1999, the ACM Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation (SIGecom) has sponsored EC, the leading scientific conference at the interface of economics and computation.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; González, R.; Wilson, A. J.; and Yariv, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Review: Insights, 4(2): 223-38. June 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TopPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/aeri.20200800,\nAuthor = {Echenique, Federico and González, Ruy and Wilson, Alistair J. and Yariv, Leeat},\nTitle = {Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match},\nJournal = {American Economic Review: Insights},\nVolume = {4},\nNumber = {2},\nYear = {2022},\nMonth = {June},\nPages = {223-38},\nDOI = {10.1257/aeri.20200800},\nURL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20200800}}\n\n\n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Miyashita, M.; Nakamura, Y.; Pomatto, L.; and Vinson, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory, 202: 105448. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TwofoldPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{ECHENIQUE2022105448,\ntitle = {Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning},\njournal = {Journal of Economic Theory},\nvolume = {202},\npages = {105448},\nyear = {2022},\nissn = {0022-0531},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105448},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053122000382},\nauthor = {Federico Echenique and Masaki Miyashita and Yuta Nakamura and Luciano Pomatto and Jamie Vinson},\nkeywords = {Decision theory, Incomplete preference, Conservatism, Obvious dominance},\nabstract = {We propose a model of incomplete twofold multiprior preferences, in which an act f is ranked above an act g only when f provides higher utility in a worst-case scenario than what g provides in a best-case scenario. The model explains failures of contingent reasoning, captured through a weakening of the state-by-state monotonicity (or dominance) axiom. Our model gives rise to rich comparative statics results, as well as extension exercises, and connections to choice theory. We present an application to second-price auctions.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n
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\n We propose a model of incomplete twofold multiprior preferences, in which an act f is ranked above an act g only when f provides higher utility in a worst-case scenario than what g provides in a best-case scenario. The model explains failures of contingent reasoning, captured through a weakening of the state-by-state monotonicity (or dominance) axiom. Our model gives rise to rich comparative statics results, as well as extension exercises, and connections to choice theory. We present an application to second-price auctions.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dianat, A.; Echenique, F.; and Yariv, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior, 132: 41-58. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StatisticalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{discriminationinthelab,\ntitle = {Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab},\njournal = {Games and Economic Behavior},\nvolume = {132},\npages = {41-58},\nyear = {2022},\nissn = {0899-8256},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.013},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825621001585},\nauthor = {Ahrash Dianat and Federico Echenique and Leeat Yariv},\nkeywords = {Statistical discrimination, Affirmative action, Experiments},\nabstract = {We present results from laboratory experiments studying statistical discrimination and affirmative action. We induce statistical discrimination in simple labor-market interactions between firms and workers. We then introduce affirmative-action policies that vary in the size and duration of a subsidy that firms receive for hiring discriminated-against workers. These different affirmative-action policies have nearly the same effect, and practically eliminate discriminatory hiring practices. However, once lifted, few positive effects remain and discrimination reverts to its initial levels. One exception is lengthy affirmative-action policies, which exhibit somewhat longer-lived effects. Stickiness of beliefs, which we elicit, helps explain the observed outcomes.}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n We present results from laboratory experiments studying statistical discrimination and affirmative action. We induce statistical discrimination in simple labor-market interactions between firms and workers. We then introduce affirmative-action policies that vary in the size and duration of a subsidy that firms receive for hiring discriminated-against workers. These different affirmative-action policies have nearly the same effect, and practically eliminate discriminatory hiring practices. However, once lifted, few positive effects remain and discrimination reverts to its initial levels. One exception is lengthy affirmative-action policies, which exhibit somewhat longer-lived effects. Stickiness of beliefs, which we elicit, helps explain the observed outcomes.\n
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\n  \n 2021\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Miralles, A.; and Zhang, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Review, 111(11): 3699-3732. November 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ConstrainedPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/aer.20201769,\nAuthor = {Echenique, Federico and Miralles, Antonio and Zhang, Jun},\nTitle = {Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium},\nJournal = {American Economic Review},\nVolume = {111},\nNumber = {11},\nYear = {2021},\nMonth = {November},\nPages = {3699-3732},\nDOI = {10.1257/aer.20201769},\nURL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20201769}}\n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Recovering preferences from finite data.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P; Echenique, F.; and Lambert, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Econometrica, 89: 1633-1664. July 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{chambechenlamb2021recovering,\n  title={Recovering preferences from finite data},\n  author={Chambers, Christopher P and Echenique, Federico and Lambert, Nicolas},\njournal={Econometrica},\n  year={2021},\nvolume = {89},\nmonth={July},\nissue={4},\npages={1633-1664},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17845},\nabstract={We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying ``true'' preference. Our conditions are weak and, therefore, valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility theory, choice over consumption bundles, and menu choice. Our framework unifies the revealed preference tradition with models that allow for errors.}\n}\n\n
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\n We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying ``true'' preference. Our conditions are weak and, therefore, valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility theory, choice over consumption bundles, and menu choice. Our framework unifies the revealed preference tradition with models that allow for errors.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Miralles, A.; and Zhang, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory, 195: 105274. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FairnessPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{envy_emz_jet,\ntitle = {Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints},\njournal = {Journal of Economic Theory},\nvolume = {195},\npages = {105274},\nyear = {2021},\nissn = {0022-0531},\ndoi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105274},\nurl = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053121000910},\nauthor = {Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles and Jun Zhang},\nkeywords = {Fairness, Justified envy, Efficiency, Participation constraint, Pseudo-market equilibrium},\nabstract = {We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy, but this can be incompatible with reservation utilities. It is possible that Alice's envy of Bob's assignment cannot be remedied without violating Bob's participation constraint. Instead, we seek to rule out justified envy, defined as envy for which a remedy would not violate any agent's participation constraint. We show that fairness, meaning the absence of justified envy, can be achieved together with efficiency and individual rationality. We introduce a competitive equilibrium approach with price-dependent incomes obtaining the desired properties.}\n}\n\n
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\n We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy, but this can be incompatible with reservation utilities. It is possible that Alice's envy of Bob's assignment cannot be remedied without violating Bob's participation constraint. Instead, we seek to rule out justified envy, defined as envy for which a remedy would not violate any agent's participation constraint. We show that fairness, meaning the absence of justified envy, can be achieved together with efficiency and individual rationality. We introduce a competitive equilibrium approach with price-dependent incomes obtaining the desired properties.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Lee, S.; Shum, M.; and Yenmez, M. B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games, 12(2). 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StabilityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@Article{g12020033,\nAUTHOR = {Echenique, Federico and Lee, SangMok and Shum, Matthew and Yenmez, M. Bumin},\nTITLE = {Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings},\nJOURNAL = {Games},\nVOLUME = {12},\nYEAR = {2021},\nNUMBER = {2},\nARTICLE-NUMBER = {33},\nURL = {https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/33},\nISSN = {2073-4336},\nABSTRACT = {We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as the median stable matching.},\nDOI = {10.3390/g12020033}\n}\n\n\n\n\n
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\n We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as the median stable matching.\n
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\n  \n 2020\n \n \n (8)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Characterisation of 'Phelpsian' Statistical Discrimination.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The Economic Journal, 131(637): 2018-2032. 08 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{chambersecheniquephelpsiandisc,\n    author = {Chambers, Christopher P and Echenique, Federico},\n    title = "{A Characterisation of 'Phelpsian' Statistical Discrimination}",\n    journal = {The Economic Journal},\n    volume = {131},\n    number = {637},\n    pages = {2018-2032},\n    year = {2020},\n    month = {08},\n    abstract = "{We establish that a type of statistical\n      discrimination -- that based on informativeness of signals about\n      workers' skills and the ability appropriately to match workers\n      to tasks is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signalling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).}",\n    issn = {0013-0133},\n    doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaa107},\n    url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa107},\n    eprint = {https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-pdf/131/637/2018/38851953/ueaa107.pdf},\n}\n\n\n
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\n We establish that a type of statistical discrimination – that based on informativeness of signals about workers' skills and the ability appropriately to match workers to tasks is possible if and only if it is impossible uniquely to identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realised empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signalling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Basu, P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Economics, 15(4): 1279-1305. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{TE20201279,\n        author = {Basu, Pathikrit and Echenique, Federico},\n        title = {On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories},\n        journal = {Theoretical Economics},\n        volume = {15},\n        number = {4},\n        year = {2020},\n        pages = {1279-1305},\n        url = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20201279/0}\n}\n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Imai, T.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12(4): 114-43. November 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TestablePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/mic.20180028,\nAuthor = {Echenique, Federico and Imai, Taisuke and Saito, Kota},\nTitle = {Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations},\nJournal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},\nVolume = {12},\nNumber = {4},\nYear = {2020},\nMonth = {November},\nPages = {114-43},\nDOI = {10.1257/mic.20180028},\nURL = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20180028}}\n\n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Barman, S.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of EC '20, pages 765\u0013766, New York, NY, USA, 2020. Association for Computing Machinery\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{barmanechenedgeworth,\nauthor = {Barman, Siddharth and Echenique, Federico},\ntitle = {The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies},\nyear = {2020},\nisbn = {9781450379755},\npublisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},\naddress = {New York, NY, USA},\nurl = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399481},\ndoi = {10.1145/3391403.3399481},\nabstract = {We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.},\nbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},\npages = {765\u0013766},\nnumpages = {2},\nkeywords = {Walrasian equilibrium, approximate caratheodory theorem, piecewise-linear concave utilities, core convergence},\nlocation = {Virtual Event, Hungary},\nseries = {EC '20}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Spherical preferences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory, 189: 105086. September 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SphericalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{CHAMBERS2020105086,\ntitle = "Spherical preferences",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory",\nvolume = "189",\npages = "105086",\nmonth = "September",\nyear = "2020",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105086",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053120300818",\nauthor = "Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Spherical, Additivity, Euclidean, Orthogonal, Independence",\nabstract = "We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after each marginal change has been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both. We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with the same center, with preference being \u001cmonotone\u001d either away or towards the center. Spherical preferences include linear preferences as a special (limiting) case. We discuss different applications to economic and political environments. Our result delivers Euclidean preferences in models of spatial voting, quadratic welfare aggregation in social choice, and expected utility in models of choice under uncertainty."\n}\n\n\n
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\n We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after each marginal change has been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both. We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with the same center, with preference being \u001cmonotone\u001d either away or towards the center. Spherical preferences include linear preferences as a special (limiting) case. We discuss different applications to economic and political environments. Our result delivers Euclidean preferences in models of spatial voting, quadratic welfare aggregation in social choice, and expected utility in models of choice under uncertainty.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n New Developments in Revealed Preference Theory: Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, and Intertemporal Choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Annual Review of Economics, 12(1): null. August 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"NewPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800,\nauthor = {Echenique, Federico},\ntitle = {New Developments in Revealed Preference Theory: Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, and Intertemporal Choice},\njournal = {Annual Review of Economics},\nvolume = {12},\nnumber = {1},\npages = {null},\nmonth = {August},\nyear = {2020},\ndoi = {10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800},\nURL = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800},\neprint = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-110800},\n    abstract = { This article reviews recent developments in revealed preference theory. It discusses the testable implications of theories of choice that are germane to specific economic environments. The focus is on expected utility in risky environments, subjected expected utility and maxmin expected utility in the presence of uncertainty, and exponentially discounted utility for intertemporal choice. The testable implications of these theories for data on choice from classical linear budget sets are described and shown to follow a common thread. The theories all imply an inverse relation between prices and quantities, with different qualifications depending on the functional forms in the theory under consideration.}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n This article reviews recent developments in revealed preference theory. It discusses the testable implications of theories of choice that are germane to specific economic environments. The focus is on expected utility in risky environments, subjected expected utility and maxmin expected utility in the presence of uncertainty, and exponentially discounted utility for intertemporal choice. The testable implications of these theories for data on choice from classical linear budget sets are described and shown to follow a common thread. The theories all imply an inverse relation between prices and quantities, with different qualifications depending on the functional forms in the theory under consideration.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Pareto Comparisons of a Group of Exponential Discounters.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mathematics of Operations Research, 45(2): 622-640. May 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{chambers2020pareto,\n  title={The Pareto Comparisons of a Group of Exponential Discounters},\n  author={Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico},\n  journal={Mathematics of Operations Research},\n  year={2020},\n  volume =\t{45},\n  number = \t {2},\n  pages = \t {622-640},\nmonth = {May}, \n publisher={INFORMS},\nURL= {https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1004},\ndoi= {10.1287/moor.2019.1004}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Incentive Compatible Active Learning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Prasad, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Vidick, T., editor(s), 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020), volume 151, of Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 67:1 - 67:20, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2020. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"IncentivePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@InProceedings{echenique_et_al:LIPIcs:2020:11752,\n  author =\t{Federico Echenique and Siddharth Prasad},\n  title =\t{{Incentive Compatible Active Learning}},\n  booktitle =\t{11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)},\n  pages =   {67:1 - 67:20},\n  series =  {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},\n  ISBN = {978-3-95977-134-4},\n  ISSN = {1868-8969},\n  year = {2020},\n  volume =\t{151},\n  editor =\t{Thomas Vidick},\n  publisher =\t{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},\n  address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},\n  URL =\t    {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2020/11752},\n  URN =\t\t{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-117525},\n  doi =\t\t\t{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.67},\n  annote =\t\t{Keywords: Active Learning, Incentive Compatibility, Preference Elicitation}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n  \n 2019\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n General Luce model.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Economic Theory, 68(4): 811-826. November 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"GeneralPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@Article{echeniquesaito-generalluce,\n  author = \t {Echenique, Federico and Saito, Kota},\n  title = \t {General Luce model},\n  journal = \t {Economic Theory},\n  year = \t {2019},\n  volume = \t {68},\n  number = \t {4},\n  pages = \t {811-826},\n  month = \t {November},\nabstract = {We extend the Luce model of discrete choice theory to satisfactorily handle zero-probability choices. The Luce mode struggles to explain choices that are not made. The model requires that if an alternative y is never chosen when x is available, then there is no set of alternatives from which y is chosen with positive probability. In our model, if an alternative y is never chosen when x is available, then we infer that y is dominated by x. While dominated by x, y may still be chosen with positive probability, when grouped with a comparable set of alternatives.},\nurl = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1145-5},\nDOI = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1145-5}\n}\n\n\n
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\n We extend the Luce model of discrete choice theory to satisfactorily handle zero-probability choices. The Luce mode struggles to explain choices that are not made. The model requires that if an alternative y is never chosen when x is available, then there is no set of alternatives from which y is chosen with positive probability. In our model, if an alternative y is never chosen when x is available, then we infer that y is dominated by x. While dominated by x, y may still be chosen with positive probability, when grouped with a comparable set of alternatives.\n
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\n  \n 2018\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The perception-adjusted Luce model.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Saito, K.; and Tserenjigmid, G.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mathematical Social Sciences, 93: 67 - 76. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{palmpaper,\ntitle = "The perception-adjusted Luce model",\njournal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",\nvolume = "93",\npages = "67 - 76",\nyear = "2018",\nissn = "0165-4896",\ndoi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.02.004",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489618300167",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Kota Saito and Gerelt Tserenjigmid",\nabstract = "We develop an axiomatic theory of random choice that builds on Luce’s (1959) model to incorporate a role for perception. We capture the role of perception through perception priorities; priorities that determine whether an object or alternative is perceived sooner or later than other alternatives. We identify agents’ perception priorities from their violations of Luce’s axiom of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The direction of the violation of IIA implies an orientation of agents’ priority rankings. We adjust choice probabilities to account for the effects of perception, and impose that adjusted choice probabilities satisfy IIA. So all violations of IIA are accounted for by the perception order. The theory can explain some very well-documented behavioral phenomena in individual choice."\n}\n\n
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\n We develop an axiomatic theory of random choice that builds on Luce’s (1959) model to incorporate a role for perception. We capture the role of perception through perception priorities; priorities that determine whether an object or alternative is perceived sooner or later than other alternatives. We identify agents’ perception priorities from their violations of Luce’s axiom of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The direction of the violation of IIA implies an orientation of agents’ priority rankings. We adjust choice probabilities to account for the effects of perception, and impose that adjusted choice probabilities satisfy IIA. So all violations of IIA are accounted for by the perception order. The theory can explain some very well-documented behavioral phenomena in individual choice.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Learnability and Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Basu, P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of EC '18, pages 53 - 53, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"LearnabilityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{Basu:2018:LMD:3219166.3219223,\n author = {Basu, Pathikrit and Echenique, Federico},\n title = {Learnability and Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},\n series = {EC '18},\n year = {2018},\n isbn = {978-1-4503-5829-3},\n location = {Ithaca, Massachusetts, USA},\n pages = {53 - 53},\n numpages = {1},\n url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3219166.3219223},\n doi = {10.1145/3219166.3219223},\n acmid = {3219223},\n publisher = {ACM},\n address = {New York, NY, USA},\n keywords = {decisions under uncertainty, pac learning, preference recovery, revealed preference},\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On Multiple Discount Rates.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Econometrica, 86(4): 1325-1346. July 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@Article{multiplediscountrates,\n  author = \t {Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique},\n  title = \t {On Multiple Discount Rates},\n  journal = \t {Econometrica},\n  year = \t {2018},\n  volume = \t {86},\n  number = \t {4},\n  pages = \t {1325-1346},\n  month = \t {July},\ndoi = {10.3982/ECTA14866},\nURL = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14866},\neprint = { \n        https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14866},\n    abstract = { We study the problem of resolving conflicting discount rates via a social choice approach. We introduce several axioms, seeking to capture the tension between allowing for intergenerational comparisons of utility, and imposing intergenerational fairness. Depending on which axioms are judged appropriate, we are led to one of several conclusions: a utilitarian, maxmin, or a multi\u0010utilitarian rule, whereby a utility stream is judged by the worst in a set of utilitarian weighting schemes across discount rates. }\n}\n\n
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\n We study the problem of resolving conflicting discount rates via a social choice approach. We introduce several axioms, seeking to capture the tension between allowing for intergenerational comparisons of utility, and imposing intergenerational fairness. Depending on which axioms are judged appropriate, we are led to one of several conclusions: a utilitarian, maxmin, or a multi\u0010utilitarian rule, whereby a utility stream is judged by the worst in a set of utilitarian weighting schemes across discount rates. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mathematics of Operations Research, 43(1): 222-227. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{doi:10.1287/moor.2017.0859,\nauthor = {Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique},\ntitle = {A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand},\njournal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},\nvolume = {43},\nnumber = {1},\npages = {222-227},\nyear = {2018},\ndoi = {10.1287/moor.2017.0859},\nURL = {https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2017.0859},\neprint = { \n        https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2017.0859},\n    abstract = { We prove that combinatorial demand functions are characterized by two properties: continuity and the law of demand. }\n}\n\n\n
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\n We prove that combinatorial demand functions are characterized by two properties: continuity and the law of demand. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On path independent stochastic choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ahn, D. S.; Echenique, F.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Economics, 13(1): 61-86. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{TE20180061,\n\tauthor = {Ahn, David S. and Echenique, Federico and Saito, Kota},\n\ttitle = {On path independent stochastic choice},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Economics},\n\tvolume = {13},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tpages = {61-86},\n\turl = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20180061/0}\n}\n\n\n
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\n  \n 2017\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n General revealed preference theory.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; Echenique, F.; and Shmaya, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Economics, 12(2): 493-511. May 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"GeneralPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{TE20170493,\n\tauthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico and Shmaya, Eran}, \n\ttitle = {General revealed preference theory},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Economics},\n\tvolume = {12},\n\tnumber = {2},\nmonth = {May},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tpages = {493-511},\n\turl = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20170493/0}\n}\n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Response time and utility .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization , 139: 49 - 59. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ResponsePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique201749,\ntitle = "Response time and utility ",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ",\nvolume = "139",\nnumber = "",\npages = "49 - 59",\nyear = "2017",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0167-2681",\ndoi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.008",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117301014",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Kota Saito",\nkeywords = "Response time",\nkeywords = "Revealed preference test",\nkeywords = "Axiom ",\nabstract = "Abstract Response time is the time an agent needs to make a decision. One fundamental finding in psychology and neuroscience is that, in a binary choice, there is a monotonic relationship between the response time and the difference between the utilities of the two options. We consider situations in which utilities are not observed, but rather inferred from revealed preferences: meaning they are inferred from subjects\u0019 choices. Given data on subjects\u0019 choices, and the time to make those choices, we give conditions on the data that characterize the property that response time is a monotonic function of utility differences. "\n}\n\n\n
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\n Abstract Response time is the time an agent needs to make a decision. One fundamental finding in psychology and neuroscience is that, in a binary choice, there is a monotonic relationship between the response time and the difference between the utilities of the two options. We consider situations in which utilities are not observed, but rather inferred from revealed preferences: meaning they are inferred from subjects\u0019 choices. Given data on subjects\u0019 choices, and the time to make those choices, we give conditions on the data that characterize the property that response time is a monotonic function of utility differences. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Galichon, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior , 101(1): 63-77 . 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OrdinalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{EcheniqueGalichon2015,\ntitle = "Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching ",\njournal = "Games and Economic Behavior ",\nvolume = "101",\nnumber = "1",\npages = " 63-77 ",\nyear = "2017",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0899-8256",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615001323",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Alfred Galichon",\nkeywords = "Market design",\nkeywords = "Matching theory",\nkeywords = "National resident matching program ",\nabstract = "Abstract We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome. "\n}\n\n
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\n Abstract We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome. \n
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\n  \n 2016\n \n \n (6)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Wilson, A. J; and Yariv, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Quantitative Economics, 7(2): 449–482. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{echenique2016clearinghouses,\n  title={Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study},\n  author={Echenique, Federico and Wilson, Alistair J and Yariv, Leeat},\n  journal={Quantitative Economics},\n  volume={7},\n  number={2},\n  pages={449--482},\n  year={2016},\n  publisher={Wiley Online Library}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Rachel Cummings, F. E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Operations Research, 64(1): 67-78. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{echeniquerevprefprivacychoice,\ntitle = {The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice},\nauthor = {Rachel Cummings, Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman},\njournal = {Operations Research},\nvolume = {64},\nnumber = {1},\npages = {67-78},\nyear = {2016},\ndoi = {10.1287/opre.2015.1458},\n    abstract = { This paper initiates the study of the testable implications of choice data in settings where agents have privacy preferences. We adapt the standard conceptualization of consumer choice theory to a situation where the consumer is aware of, and has preferences over, the information revealed by her choices. The main message of the paper is that little can be inferred about consumers’ preferences once we introduce the possibility that the consumer has concerns about privacy. This holds even when consumers’ privacy preferences are assumed to be monotonic and separable. This motivates the consideration of stronger assumptions and, to that end, we introduce an additive model for privacy preferences that has testable implications. }\n}\n\n\n
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\n This paper initiates the study of the testable implications of choice data in settings where agents have privacy preferences. We adapt the standard conceptualization of consumer choice theory to a situation where the consumer is aware of, and has preferences over, the information revealed by her choices. The main message of the paper is that little can be inferred about consumers’ preferences once we introduce the possibility that the consumer has concerns about privacy. This holds even when consumers’ privacy preferences are assumed to be monotonic and separable. This motivates the consideration of stronger assumptions and, to that end, we introduce an additive model for privacy preferences that has testable implications. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Efficiency and bargaining power in the interbank loan market.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Allen, J.; Chapman, J.; Echenique, F.; and Shum, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n International Economic Review, 57(2): 691–716. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"EfficiencyPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article {IERE:IERE12173,\nauthor = {Allen, Jason and Chapman, James and Echenique, Federico and Shum, Matthew},\ntitle = {Efficiency and bargaining power in the interbank loan market},\njournal = {International Economic Review},\nvolume = {57},\nnumber = {2},\nissn = {1468-2354},\nurl = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12173},\ndoi = {10.1111/iere.12173},\npages = {691--716},\nyear = {2016},\nabstract = {Using detailed transactions-level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers.},\n}\n\n\n
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\n Using detailed transactions-level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Revealed Preference Theory.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cambridge University Press (Econometric Society Monographs), 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@book{chambers2016revealed,\n  title={Revealed Preference Theory},\n  author={Chambers, Christopher P and Echenique, Federico},\n  publisher = \t {Cambridge University Press (Econometric Society Monographs)},\n  year={2016}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Testing theories of financial decision making.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; Echenique, F.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(15): 4003-4008. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TestingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Chambers12042016,\nauthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico and Saito, Kota}, \ntitle = {Testing theories of financial decision making},\nvolume = {113}, \nnumber = {15}, \npages = {4003-4008}, \nyear = {2016}, \ndoi = {10.1073/pnas.1517760113}, \nabstract ={We describe the observable content of some of the most widely used models of decision under uncertainty: models of translation invariant preferences. In particular, we characterize the models of variational, maxmin, constant absolute risk aversion, and constant relative risk aversion utilities. In each case we present a revealed preference axiom that is satisfied by a dataset if and only if the dataset is consistent with the corresponding utility representation. We test our axioms using data from an experiment on financial decisions.}, \nURL = {http://www.pnas.org/content/113/15/4003.abstract}, \neprint = {http://www.pnas.org/content/113/15/4003.full.pdf}, \njournal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences} \n}\n\n\n
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\n We describe the observable content of some of the most widely used models of decision under uncertainty: models of translation invariant preferences. In particular, we characterize the models of variational, maxmin, constant absolute risk aversion, and constant relative risk aversion utilities. In each case we present a revealed preference axiom that is satisfied by a dataset if and only if the dataset is consistent with the corresponding utility representation. We test our axioms using data from an experiment on financial decisions.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Pereyra, J. S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Economics, 11(1): 1-39. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StrategicPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{TE20160001,\n\tauthor = {Echenique, Federico and Pereyra, Juan Sebasti�n},\n\ttitle = {Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Economics},\n\tvolume = {11},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tpages = {1-39},\n\turl = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20160001/0}\n}\n\n
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\n  \n 2015\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n How to Control Controlled School Choice.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Yenmez, M B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Review, 105(8): 2679–2694. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{echenique2015control,\n  title={How to Control Controlled School Choice},\n  author={Echenique, Federico and Yenmez, M Bumin},\n  journal={American Economic Review},\n  volume={105},\n  number={8},\n  pages={2679--2694},\n  year={2015},\nabstract={We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed.},\n  publisher={American Economic Association}\n}\n\n
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\n We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Savage in the Market.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Saito, K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Econometrica, 83(4): 1467–1495. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{echenique2015savage,\n  title={Savage in the Market},\n  author={Echenique, Federico and Saito, Kota},\n  journal={Econometrica},\n  volume={83},\n  number={4},\n  pages={1467--1495},\n  year={2015},\nabstract={\nWe develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of subjective expected utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent's behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a \u001crevealed preference axiom\u001d if and only if there exists a SEU model (a subjective probability over states and a concave utility function over money) that accounts for the given asset purchases.},\n  publisher={Wiley Online Library}\n}\n\n
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\n We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of subjective expected utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent's behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a \u001crevealed preference axiom\u001d if and only if there exists a SEU model (a subjective probability over states and a concave utility function over money) that accounts for the given asset purchases.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(1): 144-64. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/mic.20130089,\nAuthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico},\nTitle = {The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers},\nJournal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},\nVolume = {7},\nNumber = {1},\nYear = {2015},\nPages = {144-64},\nabstract = {We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment\ngame (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we\ncall \\textit{consistency}. Consistency of a set of matchings states that,\nfor any matching $\\nu $, if, for each agent $i$ there exists a matching $\\mu \n$ in the set for which $\\mu \\left( i\\right) =\\nu \\left( i\\right) $, then $%\n\\nu $ is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if\nthere is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the\nsurplus. We also identify conditions under which we can assume the\nassignment game has nonnegative values.},\nDOI = {10.1257/mic.20130089},\nURL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.20130089}}\n\n
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\n We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching $ν $, if, for each agent $i$ there exists a matching $μ $ in the set for which $μ łeft( ii̊ght) =ν łeft( ii̊ght) $, then $% ν $ is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. We also identify conditions under which we can assume the assignment game has nonnegative values.\n
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\n  \n 2014\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; Echenique, F.; and Shmaya, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Review, 104(8): 2303-19. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/aer.104.8.2303,\nAuthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico and Shmaya, Eran},\nTitle = {The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content},\nJournal = {American Economic Review},\nVolume = {104},\nNumber = {8},\nYear = {2014},\nPages = {2303-19},\nabstract = {We define the empirical content of an economic theory as the least restrictive observationally equivalent theory. We show that the empirical content of a theory is captured by a certain kind of axiomatization, with axioms that are universal negations of conjunctions of atomic formulae.},\nDOI = {10.1257/aer.104.8.2303},\nURL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.8.2303}}\n\n\n
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\n We define the empirical content of an economic theory as the least restrictive observationally equivalent theory. We show that the empirical content of a theory is captured by a certain kind of axiomatization, with axioms that are universal negations of conjunctions of atomic formulae.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Barman, S.; Bhaskar, U.; Echenique, F.; and Wierman, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, WINE 2014, Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014. Proceedings, pages 447 – 452, 2014. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/wine/BarmanBEW14,\n  author    = {Siddharth Barman and\n               Umang Bhaskar and\n               Federico Echenique and\n               Adam Wierman},\n  title     = {On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior},\n  booktitle = {Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, {WINE}\n               2014, Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014. Proceedings},\n  pages     = {447 -- 452},\n  year      = {2014},\n  crossref  = {DBLP:conf/wine/2014},\n  url       = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_38},\n  doi       = {10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_38},\n  timestamp = {Wed, 26 Nov 2014 14:31:47 +0100},\n  biburl    = {http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bib/conf/wine/BarmanBEW14},\n  bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, http://dblp.org}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On the consistency of data with bargaining theories.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Economics, 9(1): 137-162. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{TE20140137,\n\tauthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico},\n\ttitle = {On the consistency of data with bargaining theories},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Economics},\n\tvolume = {9},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tyear = {2014},\n\tpages = {137-162},\nabstract = {We develop observable restrictions of well-known the-\nories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a \fnite\ndata set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and\ndisagreement points, but no information on utility functions.  We\nask when a given theory could generate the data.  We show that\nif the disagreement point is \fxed and symmetric, the Nash, utili-\ntarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all obser-\nvationally equivalent.  Data compatible with these theories are in\nturn characterized by the property of comonotonicity of bargaining\noutcomes.\nWe establish di\u000berent tests for each of the theories under consid-\neration in the case in which the disagreement point can be variable.\nOur results are readily applicable, outside of the bargaining frame-\nwork, to testing the tax code for compliance with the principle of\nequal loss.},\n\turl = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20140137/0}\n}\n\n
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\n We develop observable restrictions of well-known the- ories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a \fnite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the data. We show that if the disagreement point is \fxed and symmetric, the Nash, utili- tarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all obser- vationally equivalent. Data compatible with these theories are in turn characterized by the property of comonotonicity of bargaining outcomes. We establish di\u000berent tests for each of the theories under consid- eration in the case in which the disagreement point can be variable. Our results are readily applicable, outside of the bargaining frame- work, to testing the tax code for compliance with the principle of equal loss.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Empirical Implications of Privacy-aware Choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cummings, R.; Echenique, F.; and Wierman, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, of EC '14, pages 969–969, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{Cummings:2014:EIP:2600057.2602830,\n author = {Cummings, Rachel and Echenique, Federico and Wierman, Adam},\n title = {The Empirical Implications of Privacy-aware Choice},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},\n series = {EC '14},\n year = {2014},\n isbn = {978-1-4503-2565-3},\n location = {Palo Alto, California, USA},\n pages = {969--969},\n numpages = {1},\n url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2600057.2602830},\n doi = {10.1145/2600057.2602830},\n acmid = {2602830},\n publisher = {ACM},\n address = {New York, NY, USA},\n keywords = {privacy, revealed preference},\nabstract = {\nThis paper initiates the study of the testable impli-\ncations of choice data in settings where agents have privacy pref-\nerences.   We  adapt  the  standard  conceptualization  of  consumer\nchoice theory to a situation where the consumer is aware of, and\nhas preferences over, the information revealed by her choices.  The\nmain  message  of  the  paper  is  that  little  can  be  inferred  about\nconsumers' preferences once we introduce the possibility that the\nconsumer has concerns about privacy.  This holds even when con-\nsumers' privacy preferences are assumed to be monotonic and sep-\narable.  This motivates the consideration of stronger assumptions\nand, to that end, we introduce an additive model for privacy pref-\nerences that does have testable implications}\n} \n\n
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\n This paper initiates the study of the testable impli- cations of choice data in settings where agents have privacy pref- erences. We adapt the standard conceptualization of consumer choice theory to a situation where the consumer is aware of, and has preferences over, the information revealed by her choices. The main message of the paper is that little can be inferred about consumers' preferences once we introduce the possibility that the consumer has concerns about privacy. This holds even when con- sumers' privacy preferences are assumed to be monotonic and sep- arable. This motivates the consideration of stronger assumptions and, to that end, we introduce an additive model for privacy pref- erences that does have testable implications\n
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\n  \n 2013\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Federico Echenique, S. L.; and Matthew Shum, M. B. Y.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Econometrica, 81(1): 153-171. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.2307/23357266,\n ISSN = {00129682, 14680262},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23357266},\n abstract = {We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characterization of the matchings that are rationalizable as stable matchings when agents' preferences are unobserved. The characterization is a simple nonparametric test for stability, in the tradition of revealed preference tests. We also characterize the observed stable matchings when monetary transfers are allowed and the stable matchings that are best for one side of the market: extremal stable matchings. We find that the theory of extremal stable matchings is observationally equivalent to requiring that there be a unique stable matching or that the matching be consistent with unrestricted monetary transfers.},\n author = {Federico Echenique, Sangmok Lee, Matthew Shum, M. Bumin Yenmez},\n journal = {Econometrica},\n number = {1},\n pages = {153-171},\n publisher = {[Wiley, Econometric Society]},\n title = {The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings},  \n volume = {81},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characterization of the matchings that are rationalizable as stable matchings when agents' preferences are unobserved. The characterization is a simple nonparametric test for stability, in the tradition of revealed preference tests. We also characterize the observed stable matchings when monetary transfers are allowed and the stable matchings that are best for one side of the market: extremal stable matchings. We find that the theory of extremal stable matchings is observationally equivalent to requiring that there be a unique stable matching or that the matching be consistent with unrestricted monetary transfers.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Barman, S.; Bhaskar, U.; Echenique, F.; and Wierman, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, of EC '13, pages 55–72, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{Barman:2013:EIR:2492002.2482589,\n author = {Barman, Siddharth and Bhaskar, Umang and Echenique, Federico and Wierman, Adam},\n title = {The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce},\n series = {EC '13},\n year = {2013},\n isbn = {978-1-4503-1962-1},\n location = {Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA},\n pages = {55--72},\n numpages = {18},\n url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2482540.2482589},\n doi = {10.1145/2482540.2482589},\n acmid = {2482589},\n publisher = {ACM},\n address = {New York, NY, USA},\n keywords = {game theory, matrix rank, nash equilibrium, revealed preference},\n} \n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n A test for monotone comparative statics.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Komunjer, I.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Structural Econometric Models, pages 183–232. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@incollection{echenique2013test,\n  title={A test for monotone comparative statics},\n  author={Echenique, Federico and Komunjer, Ivana},\n  booktitle={Structural Econometric Models},\n  pages={183--232},\n  year={2013},\n  publisher={Emerald Group Publishing Limited}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Partial identification in two-sided matching models.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Lee, S.; and Shum, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Structural Econometric Models, pages 117–139. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@incollection{echenique2013partial,\n  title={Partial identification in two-sided matching models},\n  author={Echenique, Federico and Lee, SangMok and Shum, Matthew},\n  booktitle={Structural Econometric Models},\n  pages={117--139},\n  year={2013},\n  publisher={Emerald Group Publishing Limited}\n}\n
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\n  \n 2012\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n When does aggregation reduce risk aversion? .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior , 76(2): 582 - 595. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WhenPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Chambers2012582,\ntitle = "When does aggregation reduce risk aversion? ",\njournal = "Games and Economic Behavior ",\nvolume = "76",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "582 - 595",\nyear = "2012",\nissn = "0899-8256",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.015",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001212",\nauthor = "Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Certainty equivalent",\nkeywords = "Aggregation",\nkeywords = "Risk aversion",\nkeywords = "Sum of individual certainty equivalents ",\nabstract = "We study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate. A household shares risky prospects using a social welfare functional. We characterize the social welfare functionals such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member, and satisfies the Pareto principle and an invariance axiom. We single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique member of this family which is quasiconcave over riskless allocations. "\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n We study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate. A household shares risky prospects using a social welfare functional. We characterize the social welfare functionals such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member, and satisfies the Pareto principle and an invariance axiom. We single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique member of this family which is quasiconcave over riskless allocations. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Contracts versus Salaries in Matching.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The American Economic Review, 102(1): 594-601. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ContractsPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.2307/41408786,\n ISSN = {00028282},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/41408786},\n author = {Federico Echenique},\n journal = {The American Economic Review},\n number = {1},\n pages = {594-601},\n publisher = {American Economic Association},\n title = {Contracts versus Salaries in Matching},\n volume = {102},\nabstract = {Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. (JEL C78, D86, J31, J41)},\n year = {2012}\n}\n\n
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\n Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. (JEL C78, D86, J31, J41)\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Finding a Walrasian Equilibrium is Easy for a Fixed Number of Agents.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Wierman, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, of EC '12, pages 495–495, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FindingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{Echenique:2012:FWE:2229012.2229049,\n author = {Echenique, Federico and Wierman, Adam},\n title = {Finding a Walrasian Equilibrium is Easy for a Fixed Number of Agents},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce},\n series = {EC '12},\n year = {2012},\n isbn = {978-1-4503-1415-2},\n location = {Valencia, Spain},\n pages = {495--495},\n numpages = {1},\n url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2229012.2229049},\n doi = {10.1145/2229012.2229049},\n acmid = {2229049},\n publisher = {ACM},\n address = {New York, NY, USA},\n keywords = {computational complexity, fisher equilibria, walrasian equilibria},\n} \n\n
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\n  \n 2011\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Lee, S.; and Shum, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Political Economy, 119(6): 1201-1223. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1086/665011,\n ISSN = {00223808, 1537534X},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/665011},\n abstract = {We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the MPI for these violations is small. The MPI indicates that the hypothesis of consumer rationality cannot be rejected.},\n author = {Federico Echenique and Sangmok Lee and Matthew Shum},\n journal = {Journal of Political Economy},\n number = {6},\n pages = {1201-1223},\n publisher = {University of Chicago Press},\n title = {The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations},\n volume = {119},\n year = {2011}\n}\n\n\n
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\n We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the MPI for these violations is small. The MPI indicates that the hypothesis of consumer rationality cannot be rejected.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Ivanov, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Mathematical Economics , 47(2): 129 - 136. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ImplicationsPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique2011129,\ntitle = "Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice ",\njournal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics ",\nvolume = "47",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "129 - 136",\nyear = "2011",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0304-4068",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.001",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406811000024",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Lozan Ivanov",\nkeywords = "Revealed preference",\nkeywords = "Choice theory",\nkeywords = "Pareto efficiency ",\nabstract = "We study when two-member household choice behavior is compatible with Pareto optimality. We ask when an external observer of household choices, who does not know the individuals\u0019 preferences, can rationalize the choices as being Pareto-optimal. Our main contribution is to reduce the problem of rationalization to a graph-coloring problem. As a result, we obtain simple tests for Pareto optimal choice behavior. In addition to the tests, and using our graph-theoretic representation, we show that Pareto rationalization is equivalent to a system of quadratic equations being solvable. "\n}\n\n
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\n We study when two-member household choice behavior is compatible with Pareto optimality. We ask when an external observer of household choices, who does not know the individuals\u0019 preferences, can rationalize the choices as being Pareto-optimal. Our main contribution is to reduce the problem of rationalization to a graph-coloring problem. As a result, we obtain simple tests for Pareto optimal choice behavior. In addition to the tests, and using our graph-theoretic representation, we show that Pareto rationalization is equivalent to a system of quadratic equations being solvable. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Testable Implications of Gross Substitutes in Demand for Two Goods.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; Echenique, F.; and Shmaya, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(1): 129-36. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TestablePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.1257/mic.3.1.129,\nAuthor = {Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico and Shmaya, Eran},\nTitle = {Testable Implications of Gross Substitutes in Demand for Two Goods},\nJournal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},\nVolume = {3},\nNumber = {1},\nYear = {2011},\nPages = {129-36},\nDOI = {10.1257/mic.3.1.129},\nURL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.1.129}}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Revealed Preference Approach to Computational Complexity in Economics.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Golovin, D.; and Wierman, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, of EC '11, pages 101–110, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{Echenique:2011:RPA:1993574.1993591,\n author = {Echenique, Federico and Golovin, Daniel and Wierman, Adam},\n title = {A Revealed Preference Approach to Computational Complexity in Economics},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce},\n series = {EC '11},\n year = {2011},\n isbn = {978-1-4503-0261-6},\n location = {San Jose, California, USA},\n pages = {101--110},\n numpages = {10},\n url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1993574.1993591},\n doi = {10.1145/1993574.1993591},\n acmid = {1993591},\n publisher = {ACM},\n address = {New York, NY, USA},\n keywords = {computational complexity, rationalization, revealed preference, theory of the consumer},\n} \n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Complexity and Economics: Computational Constraints May Not Matter Empirically.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Golovin, D.; and Wierman, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n SIGecom Exch., 10(1): 2–5. March 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ComplexityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique:2011:CEC:1978721.1978722,\n author = {Echenique, Federico and Golovin, Daniel and Wierman, Adam},\n title = {Complexity and Economics: Computational Constraints May Not Matter Empirically},\n journal = {SIGecom Exch.},\n issue_date = {March 2011},\n volume = {10},\n number = {1},\n month = mar,\n year = {2011},\n issn = {1551-9031},\n pages = {2--5},\n numpages = {4},\n url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1978721.1978722},\n doi = {10.1145/1978721.1978722},\n acmid = {1978722},\n publisher = {ACM},\n address = {New York, NY, USA},\n keywords = {bounded rationality, rationalization},\n} \n\n\n\n
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\n  \n 2010\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On behavioral complementarity and its implications .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; Echenique, F.; and Shmaya, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory , 145(6): 2332 - 2355. 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Chambers20102332,\ntitle = "On behavioral complementarity and its implications ",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory ",\nvolume = "145",\nnumber = "6",\npages = "2332 - 2355",\nyear = "2010",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.004",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205311000116X",\nauthor = "Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique and Eran Shmaya",\nkeywords = "Revealed preference",\nkeywords = "Gross complements",\nkeywords = "Demand theory ",\nabstract = "We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications for observable demand behavior (its testable implications), and for the consumer's underlying preferences. We characterize those data sets which can be generated by rational preferences exhibiting complementarities. The class of preferences that generate demand complements has Leontief and Cobb-Douglas as its as extreme members. "\n}\n\n
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\n We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications for observable demand behavior (its testable implications), and for the consumer's underlying preferences. We characterize those data sets which can be generated by rational preferences exhibiting complementarities. The class of preferences that generate demand complements has Leontief and Cobb-Douglas as its as extreme members. \n
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\n  \n 2009\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Testing Models with Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Komunjer, I.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Econometrica, 77(4): 1281-1297. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TestingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.2307/40263860,\n ISSN = {00129682, 14680262},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40263860},\n abstract = {This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based on the monotone comparative statics (MCS) property of equilibria. Our main result is that MCS produces testable implications on the (small and large) quantiles of the dependent variable, despite the presence of multiple equilibria. The key features of our approach are that (i) we work with a nonparametric structural model of a continuous dependent variable in which the unobservable is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variable in a reasonably general way; (ii) we do not require the structural function to be known or estimable; (iii) we remain fairly agnostic on how an equilibrium is selected. We illustrate the usefulness of our result for policy evaluation within Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes's (1999) model.},\n author = {Federico Echenique and Ivana Komunjer},\n journal = {Econometrica},\n number = {4},\n pages = {1281-1297},\n publisher = {[Wiley, Econometric Society]},\n title = {Testing Models with Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods},\n volume = {77},\n year = {2009},\nDOI = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA6223}\n}\n\n\n
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\n This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based on the monotone comparative statics (MCS) property of equilibria. Our main result is that MCS produces testable implications on the (small and large) quantiles of the dependent variable, despite the presence of multiple equilibria. The key features of our approach are that (i) we work with a nonparametric structural model of a continuous dependent variable in which the unobservable is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variable in a reasonably general way; (ii) we do not require the structural function to be known or estimable; (iii) we remain fairly agnostic on how an equilibrium is selected. We illustrate the usefulness of our result for policy evaluation within Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes's (1999) model.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Supermodularity and preferences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory , 144(3): 1004 - 1014. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SupermodularityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Chambers20091004,\ntitle = "Supermodularity and preferences",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory ",\nvolume = "144",\nnumber = "3",\npages = "1004 - 1014",\nyear = "2009",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.004",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053108000859",\nauthor = "Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Complementarity",\nkeywords = "Revealed preference",\nkeywords = "Afriat's theorem",\nkeywords = "Refutability ",\nabstract = "We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite lattices under the assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment, we show that supermodularity is ordinally equivalent to the notion of quasisupermodularity introduced by Milgrom and Shannon. We conclude that supermodularity is a weak property, in the sense that many preferences have a supermodular representation. "\n}\n\n
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\n We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite lattices under the assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment, we show that supermodularity is ordinally equivalent to the notion of quasisupermodularity introduced by Milgrom and Shannon. We conclude that supermodularity is a weak property, in the sense that many preferences have a supermodular representation. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dubra, J.; Echenique, F.; and Manelli, A. M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory , 144(2): 825 - 849. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"EnglishPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Dubra2009825,\ntitle = "English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem ",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory ",\nvolume = "144",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "825 - 849",\nyear = "2009",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053108000914",\nauthor = "Juan Dubra and Federico Echenique and Alejandro M. Manelli",\nkeywords = "Auction theory",\nkeywords = "International trade",\nkeywords = "Monotone comparative statics",\nkeywords = "Global univalence ",\nabstract = "We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results. "\n}\n\n\n
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\n We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Boyle, E.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Choice and Welfare, 33(1): 87–99. 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SequentialPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@Article{BoyleEchenique2008,\nauthor="Boyle, Elette and Echenique, Federico",\ntitle="Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets",\njournal="Social Choice and Welfare",\nyear="2009",\nvolume="33",\nnumber="1",\npages="87--99",\nabstract="We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (J Econ Theory 103(2):429--443, 2002) and Cechl{\\'a}rov{\\'a} (Randomized matching mechanism revisited. Mimeo, Safarik University, 2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value.",\nissn="1432-217X",\ndoi="10.1007/s00355-008-0347-3",\nurl="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0347-3"\n}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (J Econ Theory 103(2):429–443, 2002) and Cechlárová (Randomized matching mechanism revisited. Mimeo, Safarik University, 2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value.\n
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\n  \n 2008\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Correspondence Principle, pages 1-3. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CorrespondencePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@Inbook{EcheniqueNP2008,\nauthor="Echenique, Federico",\ntitle="Correspondence Principle",\nbookTitle="The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics",\nyear="2008",\npublisher="Palgrave Macmillan UK",\naddress="London",\npages="1-3",\nabstract="The correspondence principle is the relation, which exists in certain economic models, between comparative statics of equilibria and the properties of out-of-equilibrium dynamics.",\nisbn="978-1-349-95121-5",\ndoi="10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3036-2",\nurl="https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3036-2"\n}\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n The correspondence principle is the relation, which exists in certain economic models, between comparative statics of equilibria and the properties of out-of-equilibrium dynamics.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mathematics of Operations Research, 33(3): 757-768. 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WhatPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{10.2307/25151884,\n ISSN = {0364765X, 15265471},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25151884},\n abstract = {This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsifiable. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.},\n author = {Federico Echenique},\n journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},\n number = {3},\n pages = {757-768},\n publisher = {INFORMS},\n title = {What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory},\n volume = {33},\n year = {2008}\n}\n\n
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\n\n\n
\n This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsifiable. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Profit maximization and supermodular technology.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Economic Theory, 40(2): 173–183. 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ProfitPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@Article{Chambers2008SM,\nauthor="Chambers, Christopher P.\nand Echenique, Federico",\ntitle="Profit maximization and supermodular technology",\njournal="Economic Theory",\nyear="2008",\nvolume="40",\nnumber="2",\npages="173--183",\nabstract="A dataset is a list of observed factor inputs and prices for a technology; profits and production levels are unobserved. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a dataset to be consistent with profit maximization under a monotone and concave revenue based on the notion of cyclic monotonicity. Our result implies that monotonicity and concavity cannot be tested, and that one cannot decide if a firm is competitive based on factor demands. We also introduce a condition, cyclic supermodularity, which is both necessary and sufficient for data to be consistent with a supermodular technology. Cyclic supermodularity provides a test for complementarity of production factors.",\nissn="1432-0479",\ndoi="10.1007/s00199-008-0340-1",\nurl="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0340-1"\n}\n\n
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\n\n\n
\n A dataset is a list of observed factor inputs and prices for a technology; profits and production levels are unobserved. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a dataset to be consistent with profit maximization under a monotone and concave revenue based on the notion of cyclic monotonicity. Our result implies that monotonicity and concavity cannot be tested, and that one cannot decide if a firm is competitive based on factor demands. We also introduce a condition, cyclic supermodularity, which is both necessary and sufficient for data to be consistent with a supermodular technology. Cyclic supermodularity provides a test for complementarity of production factors.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Ordinal notions of submodularity .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Chambers, C. P.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Mathematical Economics , 44(11): 1243 - 1245. 2008.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OrdinalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Chambers20081243,\ntitle = "Ordinal notions of submodularity ",\njournal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics ",\nvolume = "44",\nnumber = "11",\npages = "1243 - 1245",\nyear = "2008",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0304-4068",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.03.001",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406808000256",\nauthor = "Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Quasisupermodularity",\nkeywords = "Quasisubmodularity",\nkeywords = "Comparative statics",\nkeywords = "Submodularity ",\nabstract = "We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to Kreps [Kreps, D.M., 1979. A representation theorem for Preference for Flexibility. Econometrica 47 (3), 565-578] and one is a weakening of a notion due to Milgrom and Shannon [Milgrom, P., Shannon, C., 1994. Monotone comparative statics. Econometrica 62 (1), 157-180]. We show that any reflexive binary relation satisfying either of Kreps's definitions also satisfies Milgrom and Shannon's definition, and that any transitive and monotonic binary relation satisfying the Milgrom and Shannon's condition satisfies both of Kreps's conditions. "\n}\n\n
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\n We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to Kreps [Kreps, D.M., 1979. A representation theorem for Preference for Flexibility. Econometrica 47 (3), 565-578] and one is a weakening of a notion due to Milgrom and Shannon [Milgrom, P., Shannon, C., 1994. Monotone comparative statics. Econometrica 62 (1), 157-180]. We show that any reflexive binary relation satisfying either of Kreps's definitions also satisfies Milgrom and Shannon's definition, and that any transitive and monotonic binary relation satisfying the Milgrom and Shannon's condition satisfies both of Kreps's conditions. \n
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\n  \n 2007\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Yenmez, M B.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior, 59(1): 46–71. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{echenique2007solution,\n  title={A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues},\n  author={Echenique, Federico and Yenmez, M Bumin},\n  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},\n  volume={59},\n  number={1},\n  pages={46--71},\n  year={2007},\nabstract={We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment\nof students to colleges, where the students have preferences\nover the other students who would attend the\nsame college. It is well known that the core of this model may be\nempty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce\na method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions\nthat may be useful when the core is empty},\n  publisher={Elsevier}\n}\n\n
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\n\n\n
\n We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Fryer, R. G.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2): 441-485. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{10.2307/25098850,\n ISSN = {00335533, 15314650},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098850},\n abstract = {We develop an index of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. We present an index that satisfies (1) and (2) and that is based on agents' social interactions: the extent to which blacks interact with blacks, whites with whites, etc. We use the index to measure school and residential segregation. Using detailed data on friendship networks, we calculate levels of within-school racial segregation in a sample of U. S. schools. We also calculate residential segregation across major U. S. cities, using block-level data from the 2000 U. S. Census.},\n author = {Federico Echenique and Roland G. Fryer},\n journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},\n number = {2},\n pages = {441-485},\n publisher = {Oxford University Press},\n title = {A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions},\n volume = {122},\n year = {2007}\n}\n\n\n
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\n We develop an index of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. We present an index that satisfies (1) and (2) and that is based on agents' social interactions: the extent to which blacks interact with blacks, whites with whites, etc. We use the index to measure school and residential segregation. Using detailed data on friendship networks, we calculate levels of within-school racial segregation in a sample of U. S. schools. We also calculate residential segregation across major U. S. cities, using block-level data from the 2000 U. S. Census.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory , 135(1): 514 - 532. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FindingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique2007514,\ntitle = "Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements ",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory ",\nvolume = "135",\nnumber = "1",\npages = "514 - 532",\nyear = "2007",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.001",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053106001086",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Computation of equilibrium",\nkeywords = "Supermodular games",\nkeywords = "Algorithms for finding Nash equilibria ",\nabstract = "I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. "\n}\n
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\n\n\n
\n I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Counting combinatorial choice rules .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior , 58(2): 231 - 245. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CountingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique2007231,\ntitle = "Counting combinatorial choice rules ",\njournal = "Games and Economic Behavior ",\nvolume = "58",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "231 - 245",\nyear = "2007",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0899-8256",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.009",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825606000431",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Choice rules",\nkeywords = "Substitutability",\nkeywords = "Independence of irrelevant alternatives",\nkeywords = "Rationalizabilty",\nkeywords = "Matching markets",\nkeywords = "Communication complexity ",\nabstract = "I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents, which has positive implications for the Gale-Shapley algorithm of matching theory. " \n}\n\n
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\n\n\n
\n I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents, which has positive implications for the Gale-Shapley algorithm of matching theory. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Eguia, J. X.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2(4): 287-305. 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Cohesion,Paper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{echeniqueeguiaQJPS-6056,\nurl = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00006056},\nyear = {2007},\nvolume = {2},\njournal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},\ntitle = {Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution},\ndoi = {10.1561/100.00006056},\nissn = {1554-0626},\nnumber = {4},\npages = {287-305},\nauthor = {Federico Echenique and Jon X. Eguia}\n}\n\n\n
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\n  \n 2006\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Oviedo, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Theoretical Economics, 1(2): 233-273. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{TE2006233,\n\tauthor = {Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge},\n\ttitle = {A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets},\n\tjournal = {Theoretical Economics},\n\tvolume = {1},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tyear = {2006},\n\tpages = {233-273},\n\turl = {https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/2006233/0}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Is School Segregation Good or Bad?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; Fryer, R. G.; and Kaufman, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The American Economic Review, 96(2): 265-269. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"IsPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{10.2307/30034655,\n ISSN = {00028282},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034655},\n author = {Federico Echenique and Roland G. Fryer and Alex Kaufman},\n journal = {The American Economic Review},\n number = {2},\n pages = {265-269},\n publisher = {American Economic Association},\n title = {Is School Segregation Good or Bad?},\n volume = {96},\n year = {2006}\n}\n\n
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\n  \n 2005\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A short and constructive proof of Tarski's fixed-point theorem.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n International Journal of Game Theory, 33(2): 215–218. 2005.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@Article{ref1tarski,\nauthor="Echenique, Federico",\ntitle="A short and constructive proof of Tarski's fixed-point theorem",\njournal="International Journal of Game Theory",\nvolume="33",\nnumber="2",\nyear="2005",\npages="215--218",\nabstract="I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski's fixed-point theorem, and of Zhou's extension of Tarski's fixed-point theorem to set-valued maps.",\nissn="1432-1270",\ndoi="10.1007/s001820400192",\nurl="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820400192"\n}\n\n\n
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\n\n\n
\n I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski's fixed-point theorem, and of Zhou's extension of Tarski's fixed-point theorem to set-valued maps.\n
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\n  \n 2004\n \n \n (7)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A characterization of strategic complementarities .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior , 46(2): 325 - 347. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Echenique2004325,\ntitle = "A characterization of strategic complementarities ",\njournal = "Games and Economic Behavior ",\nvolume = "46",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "325 - 347",\nyear = "2004",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0899-8256",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00118-0",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825603001180",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique",\nabstract = "I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I�show that: (1)�generic 2X2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities; (2)�generic two-player finite ordinal potential games have complementarities. "\n}\n\n\n
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\n I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I�show that: (1)�generic 2X2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities; (2)�generic two-player finite ordinal potential games have complementarities. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Edlin, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory , 118(1): 61 - 79. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MixedPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique200461,\ntitle = "Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements ",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory ",\nvolume = "118",\nnumber = "1",\npages = "61 - 79",\nyear = "2004",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.004",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053103003685",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Aaron Edlin",\nkeywords = "Mixed equilibrium",\nkeywords = "Learning in games",\nkeywords = "Supermodular games",\nkeywords = "Strategic complementarities ",\nabstract = "Abstract In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria\u0014equilibria that are not in pure strategies\u0014are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. "\n}\n
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\n Abstract In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria\u0014equilibria that are not in pure strategies\u0014are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Supplement to: Core Many-to-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Oviedo, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory , 115(2): 1 - 3. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SupplementPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique20041,\ntitle = "Supplement to: Core Many-to-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods ",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory ",\nvolume = "115",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "1 - 3",\nyear = "2004",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00185-6",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053103001856",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo"\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Oviedo, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Economic Theory , 115(2): 358 - 376. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CorePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echeniquea2004358,\ntitle = "Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods ",\njournal = "Journal of Economic Theory ",\nvolume = "115",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "358 - 376",\nyear = "2004",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0022-0531",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(04)00042-1",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053104000421",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo"\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior , 46(2): 348 - 364. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Extensive-formPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique2004348,\ntitle = "Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities ",\njournal = "Games and Economic Behavior ",\nvolume = "46",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "348 - 364",\nyear = "2004",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0899-8256",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825603001222",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Strategic complementarities",\nkeywords = "Supermodular games",\nkeywords = "Subgame-perfect equilibrium",\nkeywords = "Dynamic games",\nkeywords = "Tarski's fixed point theorem ",\nabstract = "I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice---in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out---surprisingly---to be a very restrictive class of games. " \n}\n\n
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\n I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A weak correspondence principle for models with complementarities .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Mathematical Economics , 40(1-2): 145 - 152. 2004.\n Aggregation, Equilibrium and Observability in honor of Werner Hildenbrand \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique2004145,\ntitle = "A weak correspondence principle for models with complementarities ",\njournal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics ",\nvolume = "40",\nnumber = "1-2",\npages = "145 - 152",\nyear = "2004",\nnote = "Aggregation, Equilibrium and Observability in honor of Werner Hildenbrand ",\nissn = "0304-4068",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00090-9",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406803000909",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Correspondence principle",\nkeywords = "Monotone comparative statics",\nkeywords = "Out-of-equilibrium dynamics ",\nabstract = "I prove that, in models with complementarities, some non-monotone comparative statics must select unstable equilibria; and, under additional regularity conditions, that monotone comparative statics selects stable equilibria. "\n}\n\n
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\n I prove that, in models with complementarities, some non-monotone comparative statics must select unstable equilibria; and, under additional regularity conditions, that monotone comparative statics selects stable equilibria. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Information is not about measurability .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dubra, J.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mathematical Social Sciences , 47(2): 177 - 185. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"InformationPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{DubraEchenique2004177,\ntitle = "Information is not about measurability ",\njournal = "Mathematical Social Sciences ",\nvolume = "47",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "177 - 185",\nyear = "2004",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0165-4896",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00083-0",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489603000830",\nauthor = "Juan Dubra and Federico Echenique",\nkeywords = "Blackwell\u0019s theorem",\nkeywords = "Measurability",\nkeywords = "Models of information",\nkeywords = "Partitions",\nkeywords = "Information-preserving",\nkeywords = "�-algebras ",\nabstract = "We present a simple example where the use of �-algebras as a model of information leads to a paradoxical conclusion: a decisionmaker prefers less information to more. We then explain that the problem arises because the use of �-algebras as the informational content of a signal is inadequate. We provide a characterization of the different models of information in the literature in terms of Blackwell\u0019s theorem. "\n}\n\n
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\n We present a simple example where the use of �-algebras as a model of information leads to a paradoxical conclusion: a decisionmaker prefers less information to more. We then explain that the problem arises because the use of �-algebras as the informational content of a signal is inadequate. We provide a characterization of the different models of information in the literature in terms of Blackwell\u0019s theorem. \n
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\n  \n 2003\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Economic Theory, 22(4): 903–905. 2003.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{echenique2003equilibrium,\n  title={The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice},\n  author={Echenique, Federico},\n  journal={Economic Theory},\n  volume={22},\n  number={4},\n  pages={903--905},\n  year={2003},\n  publisher={Springer},\nabstract={I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space.}\n}\n\n
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\n I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Strong comparative statics of equilibria .\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.; and Sabarwal, T.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Games and Economic Behavior , 42(2): 307 - 314. 2003.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"StrongPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Echenique2003307,\ntitle = "Strong comparative statics of equilibria ",\njournal = "Games and Economic Behavior ",\nvolume = "42",\nnumber = "2",\npages = "307 - 314",\nyear = "2003",\nnote = "",\nissn = "0899-8256",\ndoi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00548-1",\nurl = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825602005481",\nauthor = "Federico Echenique and Tarun Sabarwal",\nkeywords = "Comparative statics",\nkeywords = "Computing equilibria",\nkeywords = "Strategic complementarities",\nkeywords = "Supermodular games ",\nabstract = "Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and are valid for games of strategic complementarities. "\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and are valid for games of strategic complementarities. \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Economic Theory, 22(1): 33–44. 2003.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MixedPaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@Article{ref1mixed,\nauthor="Echenique, Federico",\ntitle="Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities",\njournal="Economic Theory",\nvolume="22",\nyear="2003",\nnumber="1",\npages="33--44",\nabstract="The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.",\nissn="1432-0479",\ndoi="10.1007/s00199-002-0277-8",\nurl="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0277-8"\n}\n\n
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\n The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.\n
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\n  \n 2002\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Econometrica, 70(2): 833-844. 2002.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ComparativePaper\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{10.2307/2692295,\n ISSN = {00129682, 14680262},\n URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692295},\n author = {Federico Echenique},\n journal = {Econometrica},\n number = {2},\n pages = {833-844},\n publisher = {[Wiley, Econometric Society]},\n title = {Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle},\n volume = {70},\n year = {2002},\nDOI = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00308}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Monotone Preferences over Information.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Dubra, J.; and Echenique, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Topics in Theoretical Economics, 1(1). 2001.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{dubraechenique1monotone,\n  title={Monotone Preferences over Information},\n  author={Dubra, Juan and Echenique, Federico},\n  journal={Topics in Theoretical Economics},\nyear = {2001},\n  volume={1},\n  number={1}\n}\n
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