var bibbase_data = {"data":"\"Loading..\"\n\n
\n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n
\n generated by\n \n \"bibbase.org\"\n\n \n
\n \n\n
\n\n \n\n\n
\n\n Excellent! Next you can\n create a new website with this list, or\n embed it in an existing web page by copying & pasting\n any of the following snippets.\n\n
\n JavaScript\n (easiest)\n
\n \n <script src=\"https://bibbase.org/show?bib=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dropbox.com%2Fs%2F6t3cp30yfj9d6n6%2FPublications.bib%3Fdl%3D1&jsonp=1&jsonp=1\"></script>\n \n
\n\n PHP\n
\n \n <?php\n $contents = file_get_contents(\"https://bibbase.org/show?bib=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dropbox.com%2Fs%2F6t3cp30yfj9d6n6%2FPublications.bib%3Fdl%3D1&jsonp=1\");\n print_r($contents);\n ?>\n \n
\n\n iFrame\n (not recommended)\n
\n \n <iframe src=\"https://bibbase.org/show?bib=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dropbox.com%2Fs%2F6t3cp30yfj9d6n6%2FPublications.bib%3Fdl%3D1&jsonp=1\"></iframe>\n \n
\n\n

\n For more details see the documention.\n

\n
\n
\n\n
\n\n This is a preview! To use this list on your own web site\n or create a new web site from it,\n create a free account. The file will be added\n and you will be able to edit it in the File Manager.\n We will show you instructions once you've created your account.\n
\n\n
\n\n

To the site owner:

\n\n

Action required! Mendeley is changing its\n API. In order to keep using Mendeley with BibBase past April\n 14th, you need to:\n

    \n
  1. renew the authorization for BibBase on Mendeley, and
  2. \n
  3. update the BibBase URL\n in your page the same way you did when you initially set up\n this page.\n
  4. \n
\n

\n\n

\n \n \n Fix it now\n

\n
\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n \n
\n
\n  \n 2022\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Sequence of tense and cessation implicatures: evidence from Polish.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mucha, A.; Renans, A.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language and Linguistic Theory. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SequencePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Mucha:2022,\n\tauthor = {Mucha, Anne and Renans, Agata and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2022-07-20 13:27:13 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2022-07-20 13:28:24 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Natural Language and Linguistic Theory}},\n\t\turl = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11049-022-09545-2.pdf},\n\ttitle = {Sequence of tense and cessation implicatures: evidence from Polish},\n\tyear = {2022}}\n\t\n\t\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Implicating in semi-cooperative contexts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; Romoli, J.; Sudo, Y.; and Breheny, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2022.\n under review\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ImplicatingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Marty:2022,\n\tauthor = {Marty, Paul and Romoli, Jacopo and Sudo, Yasutada and Breheny, Richard},\n\tdate-added = {2022-07-20 13:26:02 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2022-07-20 13:27:00 +0200},\n\t\t\turl = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/006698/current.pdf?_s=egpYkNuJAFiQOWes},\n\t\t\tnote = {under review},\n\ttitle = {Implicating in semi-cooperative contexts},\n\tyear = {2022}}\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What makes an inference robust?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; Romoli, J.; Sudo, Y.; and Breheny, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2022.\n under review\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WhatPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Marty:2021b,\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Jacopo Romoli and Yasutada Sudo and Richard Breheny},\n\tdate-added = {2020-09-29 13:02:27 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-11-09 16:03:10 +0100},\n\tnote = {under review},\n\ttitle = {What makes an inference robust?},\n\turl = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/006205?_s=pEQAHafzjamqK7zo&_k=6O7AfYta3cP962OR},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/006205?_s=pEQAHafzjamqK7zo&_k=6O7AfYta3cP962OR}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Varieties of Hurford Disjunction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics & Pragmatics. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"VarietiesPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Marty:2021,\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Jacopo Romoli},\n\tdate-added = {2020-09-29 13:02:27 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2022-02-18 17:24:20 +0100},\n\tjournal = {{Semantics \\& Pragmatics}},\n\ttitle = {Varieties of Hurford Disjunction},\n\turl = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005755},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005755}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Alternatives in counterfactuals: what is right and what is not.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; Wittenberg, E.; and Santorio, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"AlternativesPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Wittenberg:2020,\n\tauthor = {Jacopo Romoli and Eva Wittenberg and Paolo Santorio},\n\tdate-added = {2020-09-29 13:05:29 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2022-02-18 17:25:04 +0100},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\ttitle = {{Alternatives in counterfactuals: what is \\textit{right} and what is \\textit{not}}},\n\turl = {https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005921},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mEwMmQzN/counterfactuals.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2021\n \n \n (4)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Negative Free Choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; Romoli, J.; Sudo, Y.; and Breheny, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics & Pragmatics, 14(13). 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"NegativePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 19 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Marty:2020c,\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Jacopo Romoli and Yasutada Sudo and Richard Breheny},\n\tdate-added = {2020-09-29 13:02:27 +0200},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-11-09 16:03:10 +0100},\n\tjournal = {{Semantics \\& Pragmatics}},\n\tnumber = {13},\n\ttitle = {Negative Free Choice},\n\turl = {https://semprag.org/index.php/sp/article/view/sp.14.13/pdf},\n\tvolume = {14},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semprag.org/index.php/sp/article/view/sp.14.13/pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n On children's variable success with scalar inferences: Insights from disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bill, C.; Tieu, L.; Pagliarini, E.; Romoli, J.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Bill:2021,\n\tauthor = {Cory Bill and Lyn Tieu and Elena Pagliarini and Jacopo Romoli and Stephen Crain},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:53:17 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:25:58 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\ttitle = {On children's variable success with scalar inferences: Insights from disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier},\n\tyear = 2021}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Presupposed free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics & Philosophy. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PresupposedPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 23 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Marty-Romoli:2020,\n\tabstract = {A disjunctive sentence like Olivia took Logic or Algebra suggests that\nOlivia didn't take both classes (`exclusivity' inference) and that the speaker is\nignorant as to which of the classes she took (`ignorance' inference). The corresponding sentence with a possibility modal, Olivia can take Logic or Algebra, conveys that she can take Logic and that she can take Algebra (`free choice'\ninference). These exclusivity, ignorance and free choice inferences are argued\nby many to be scalar implicatures. Recent work has looked at cases in which exclusivity and ignorance appears to be computed in the presupposition, in addition to or independently from the assertion. On the basis of those data, Spector & Sudo\n(2017) has argued for a hybrid account based on two distinct scalar strengthening\nmechanisms, namely a grammatical theory of implicatures for deriving implicatures in the assertion and a pragmatic principle for deriving implicatures in the presupposition. In this paper, we observe that a sentence like Noah is unaware that\nOlivia can take Logic or Algebra has a reading on which free choice appears in the\npresupposition (i.e., it suggests that Olivia can choose between the two classes),\nbut not in the assertion (i.e., it conveys that Noah doesn't believe that she can\ntake either one). We show that deriving this presupposed free choice reading is\nchallenging on Spector & Sudo's (2017) hybrid account. Following the dialectic in\nFox 2007, we argue against a pragmatic approach to presupposition-based implicatures on the ground that it is not able to account for presupposed free choice. In addition, we raise a novel challenge for Spector & Sudo's (2017) system coming\nfrom the con\u001eicting presupposed ignorance triggered by sentences like #Noah\nis unaware that I have a son or a daughter, which is odd even if it's not common\nknowledge whether the speaker has a son or a daughter. More generally, our set of\ndata reveals a systematic parallelism between the assertion and presuppositional\nlevels in terms of exclusivity, ignorance, and free choice. We argue that such\nparallels call for a uni\u001bed analysis of those inferences at the two di\u001derent levels\nat which they can arise, and we sketch how a grammatical theory of implicatures\nwhere meaning strengthening operates in the same way at both levels (Gajewski\n& Sharvit 2012, Magri 2009 and Marty 2017) can account for such parallels.},\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Jacopo Romoli},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-02 21:22:26 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Linguistics & Philosophy}},\n\ttitle = {Presupposed free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DVlNzM0M/pres_fc.pdf},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DVlNzM0M/pres_fc.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n A disjunctive sentence like Olivia took Logic or Algebra suggests that Olivia didn't take both classes (`exclusivity' inference) and that the speaker is ignorant as to which of the classes she took (`ignorance' inference). The corresponding sentence with a possibility modal, Olivia can take Logic or Algebra, conveys that she can take Logic and that she can take Algebra (`free choice' inference). These exclusivity, ignorance and free choice inferences are argued by many to be scalar implicatures. Recent work has looked at cases in which exclusivity and ignorance appears to be computed in the presupposition, in addition to or independently from the assertion. On the basis of those data, Spector & Sudo (2017) has argued for a hybrid account based on two distinct scalar strengthening mechanisms, namely a grammatical theory of implicatures for deriving implicatures in the assertion and a pragmatic principle for deriving implicatures in the presupposition. In this paper, we observe that a sentence like Noah is unaware that Olivia can take Logic or Algebra has a reading on which free choice appears in the presupposition (i.e., it suggests that Olivia can choose between the two classes), but not in the assertion (i.e., it conveys that Noah doesn't believe that she can take either one). We show that deriving this presupposed free choice reading is challenging on Spector & Sudo's (2017) hybrid account. Following the dialectic in Fox 2007, we argue against a pragmatic approach to presupposition-based implicatures on the ground that it is not able to account for presupposed free choice. In addition, we raise a novel challenge for Spector & Sudo's (2017) system coming from the con\u001eicting presupposed ignorance triggered by sentences like #Noah is unaware that I have a son or a daughter, which is odd even if it's not common knowledge whether the speaker has a son or a daughter. More generally, our set of data reveals a systematic parallelism between the assertion and presuppositional levels in terms of exclusivity, ignorance, and free choice. We argue that such parallels call for a uni\u001bed analysis of those inferences at the two di\u001derent levels at which they can arise, and we sketch how a grammatical theory of implicatures where meaning strengthening operates in the same way at both levels (Gajewski & Sharvit 2012, Magri 2009 and Marty 2017) can account for such parallels.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Presuppositions, implicatures, and contextual equivalence.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Presuppositions,Paper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 13 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Marty:2020,\n\tabstract = {Classical versions of Maximize Presupposition! (MP) posit a competition\nbetween contextually equivalent sentences that di\u001der in regard of the logical\nstrength of their presuppositions. Yet recent work has unveiled novel MP-like\ncases which fall beyond the empirical scope of MP precisely because the relevant\ncompetitors are not contextually equivalent to their base sentence. To account\nfor these cases, Spector & Sudo (2017) propose a novel principle, the Presupposed\nIgnorance Principle (PIP), whose formulation parallels that of MP but leaves out the\nformer condition on contextual equivalence. This amendment of MP allows the\nPIP to capture the novel cases while preserving the classical ones. In this paper,\nwe show that the PIP, however, overgenerates and undergenerates in a variety\nof other examples, and we argue that the main culprit is precisely dropping the\ncondition on contextual equivalence. We discuss two directions moving forward.\nThe \u001brst is the Logical Integrity approach by Anvari 2019, 2018, which, among\nother things, replaces contextual equivalence with contextual entailment. As we\ndiscuss, this approach cannot account for our problematic cases either, and thus\ndoesn't fare much better than Spector & Sudo (2017) in that respect. The second is\nthe implicature-based approach by Marty & Romoli 2019, which combines insights\nfrom Magri 2009, Marty 2017, 2019b and Meyer 2013 and which subsume the\nconditions on contextual equivalence and presupposition satisfaction from MP\nunder the broader notion of relevance. This approach can account for the cases by\nSpector & Sudo (2017) as well as for some of our novel cases, yet not all of them.\nWe conclude that the issue of how to properly restrict the competition for MP-like\ncases, accounting for the classical cases, those of Spector & Sudo (2017) and the\nnovel ones we present here, remains an important challenge for all accounts in the\nliterature.},\n\tauthor = {Paul Marty and Jacopo Romoli},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-02 21:24:22 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\ttitle = {Presuppositions, implicatures, and contextual equivalence},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/Tg2NzkyM/contextual.pdf},\n\tyear = {2021},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/Tg2NzkyM/contextual.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Classical versions of Maximize Presupposition! (MP) posit a competition between contextually equivalent sentences that di\u001der in regard of the logical strength of their presuppositions. Yet recent work has unveiled novel MP-like cases which fall beyond the empirical scope of MP precisely because the relevant competitors are not contextually equivalent to their base sentence. To account for these cases, Spector & Sudo (2017) propose a novel principle, the Presupposed Ignorance Principle (PIP), whose formulation parallels that of MP but leaves out the former condition on contextual equivalence. This amendment of MP allows the PIP to capture the novel cases while preserving the classical ones. In this paper, we show that the PIP, however, overgenerates and undergenerates in a variety of other examples, and we argue that the main culprit is precisely dropping the condition on contextual equivalence. We discuss two directions moving forward. The \u001brst is the Logical Integrity approach by Anvari 2019, 2018, which, among other things, replaces contextual equivalence with contextual entailment. As we discuss, this approach cannot account for our problematic cases either, and thus doesn't fare much better than Spector & Sudo (2017) in that respect. The second is the implicature-based approach by Marty & Romoli 2019, which combines insights from Magri 2009, Marty 2017, 2019b and Meyer 2013 and which subsume the conditions on contextual equivalence and presupposition satisfaction from MP under the broader notion of relevance. This approach can account for the cases by Spector & Sudo (2017) as well as for some of our novel cases, yet not all of them. We conclude that the issue of how to properly restrict the competition for MP-like cases, accounting for the classical cases, those of Spector & Sudo (2017) and the novel ones we present here, remains an important challenge for all accounts in the literature.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2020\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Counterfactuals and Undefinedness: homogeneity vs supervaluations.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marty, P.; Romoli, J.; and Santorio, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In s, editor(s), Proceedings of SALT30, pages 208–227, 2020. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"CounterfactualsPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 15 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Marty:2020b,\n\tabstract = {Theories of counterfactuals agree on appealing to a relation of comparative\nsimilarity, but disagree on the quantificational force of counterfactuals. We report on\ntwo experiments testing the predictions of three main approaches: universal theories,\nhomogeneity theories, and single-world selection theories (plus supervaluations over\nselection functions). The critical cases in our experiment were constructed so as to\ndiscriminate between the three theories. Our results provide empirical support for\nthe selectional theories, while challenging the other two approaches.},\n\tauthor = {Marty, Paul and Romoli, Jacopo and Santorio, Paolo},\n\tbooktitle = {{Proceedings of SALT30}},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:50:50 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-08 21:38:23 +0200},\n\teditor = {s},\n\tpages = {208--227},\n\ttitle = {{Counterfactuals and Undefinedness: homogeneity vs supervaluations}},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jgwZDc2Z/conditionals.pdf},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jgwZDc2Z/conditionals.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Theories of counterfactuals agree on appealing to a relation of comparative similarity, but disagree on the quantificational force of counterfactuals. We report on two experiments testing the predictions of three main approaches: universal theories, homogeneity theories, and single-world selection theories (plus supervaluations over selection functions). The critical cases in our experiment were constructed so as to discriminate between the three theories. Our results provide empirical support for the selectional theories, while challenging the other two approaches.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Choice and prohibition in non-monotonic contexts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Gotzner, N.; Romoli, J.; and Santorio, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics, 28: 141–174. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ChoicePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 18 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Gotzner-Romoli-Santorio:2019,\n\tabstract = {Disjunctions in the scope of possibility modals give rise to a conjunctive inference,\ngenerally referred to as `free choice.' For example, Emma can take Spanish or Calculus suggests that Emma can take Spanish and can take Calculus. This inference is not valid on standard semantics for modals in combination with a Boolean semantics\nfor disjunction. Hence free choice has sparked a whole industry of theories in philosophy of language and semantics. This paper investigates free choice in sentences involving a non-monotonic modified numeral, under which we embed a possibility\nmodal scoping over disjunction. One example is Exactly one student can(not) take\nSpanish or Calculus. As we point out, the presence (or absence) of certain readings\nof these sentences is a key test for a prominent approach, which analyzes free choice\nas a kind of scalar implicature. We report on two experiments investigating the readings of such sentences, using an inferential task. Our results are challenging for the implicature approach. We sketch two possible solutions within this approach, either\nadopting a different recent implicature algorithm, or exploring a different meaning for\nmodified numerals with exactly. Both of them suffer from a variety of problems. We\nthen discuss a third solution, which exploits a recent account of free choice based on\nhomogeneity. This approach can account for our results, in combination with plausible\nassumptions about homogeneity projection, though it too has open issues with related\ncases. Regardless of which solution is chosen, non-monotonic contexts turn out to be\nan important test case for theories of free choice, implicature, and modified numerals.},\n\tauthor = {Nicole Gotzner and Jacopo Romoli and Paolo Santorio},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:38:07 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-23 22:17:10 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Natural Language Semantics}},\n\tpages = {141--174},\n\ttitle = {Choice and prohibition in non-monotonic contexts},\n\turl = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11050-019-09160-9.pdf},\n\tvolume = {28},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11050-019-09160-9.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Disjunctions in the scope of possibility modals give rise to a conjunctive inference, generally referred to as `free choice.' For example, Emma can take Spanish or Calculus suggests that Emma can take Spanish and can take Calculus. This inference is not valid on standard semantics for modals in combination with a Boolean semantics for disjunction. Hence free choice has sparked a whole industry of theories in philosophy of language and semantics. This paper investigates free choice in sentences involving a non-monotonic modified numeral, under which we embed a possibility modal scoping over disjunction. One example is Exactly one student can(not) take Spanish or Calculus. As we point out, the presence (or absence) of certain readings of these sentences is a key test for a prominent approach, which analyzes free choice as a kind of scalar implicature. We report on two experiments investigating the readings of such sentences, using an inferential task. Our results are challenging for the implicature approach. We sketch two possible solutions within this approach, either adopting a different recent implicature algorithm, or exploring a different meaning for modified numerals with exactly. Both of them suffer from a variety of problems. We then discuss a third solution, which exploits a recent account of free choice based on homogeneity. This approach can account for our results, in combination with plausible assumptions about homogeneity projection, though it too has open issues with related cases. Regardless of which solution is chosen, non-monotonic contexts turn out to be an important test case for theories of free choice, implicature, and modified numerals.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Multiplicity and modifiers.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Renans, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"MultiplicityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli:2020,\n\tabstract = {A sentence with an adverbial modifier under negation like Mike didn't wash the window with soap gives rise to an inference that Mike did wash the window. A sentence with a plural noun like Mike washed windows gives rise to a so-called `multiplicity' inference that Mike washed multiple windows. In this note, we focus on the interaction between these two inferences in sentences containing both an adverbial modifier and a plural noun under negation, like Mike didn't wash windows with soap. We observe that this sentence has a reading conveying that Mike didn't wash any window with soap but that he did wash multiple windows (albeit not with soap). As we discuss, this reading is not predicted by any version of the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference, in combination with the implicature treatment of the inference of adverbial modifiers. We sketch two solutions for this problem. The first keeps the implicature approach to adverbial modifiers but adopts a non-implicature approach to multiplicity based on homogeneity. The second solution holds on to the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference but accounts for the inference of adverbial modifiers as a presupposition. In addition, it adopts the idea that presuppositions can be strengthened via implicatures, as proposed recently in the literature. Either way, the interaction between multiplicity and the inference of adverbial modifiers suggests that we cannot treat both as implicatures: if we want to treat either one as an implicature, we need to do something different for the other. We end by comparing the case above to analogous cases involving different scalar inferences and showing that the ambiguity approach to the multiplicity inference does not provide a solution to our problem.},\n\tauthor = {Jacopo Romoli and Agata Renans},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-02 21:25:22 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\ttitle = {Multiplicity and modifiers},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mJkYzdmM/multiplicity.pdf},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/doi/10.1093/jos/ffaa005/5863458}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n A sentence with an adverbial modifier under negation like Mike didn't wash the window with soap gives rise to an inference that Mike did wash the window. A sentence with a plural noun like Mike washed windows gives rise to a so-called `multiplicity' inference that Mike washed multiple windows. In this note, we focus on the interaction between these two inferences in sentences containing both an adverbial modifier and a plural noun under negation, like Mike didn't wash windows with soap. We observe that this sentence has a reading conveying that Mike didn't wash any window with soap but that he did wash multiple windows (albeit not with soap). As we discuss, this reading is not predicted by any version of the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference, in combination with the implicature treatment of the inference of adverbial modifiers. We sketch two solutions for this problem. The first keeps the implicature approach to adverbial modifiers but adopts a non-implicature approach to multiplicity based on homogeneity. The second solution holds on to the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference but accounts for the inference of adverbial modifiers as a presupposition. In addition, it adopts the idea that presuppositions can be strengthened via implicatures, as proposed recently in the literature. Either way, the interaction between multiplicity and the inference of adverbial modifiers suggests that we cannot treat both as implicatures: if we want to treat either one as an implicature, we need to do something different for the other. We end by comparing the case above to analogous cases involving different scalar inferences and showing that the ambiguity approach to the multiplicity inference does not provide a solution to our problem.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Plurality and cross-linguistic variation: An experimental investigation of the Turkish plural.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Renans, A.; Sag, Y.; Ketrez, N.; Tieu, L.; Folli, R.; Tsoulas, G.; de Vries, H.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"PluralityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 9 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Renans:2020,\n\tabstract = {In English and many other languages, the interpretation of the plural is associated\nwith the inclusive reading in positive sentences and exclusive reading in negative\nsentences. Different approaches to the meaning contribution of the English plural\nvary in how they account for this apparent alternation across the polarities, but\nconverge on assuming that (at least one of) the denotation(s) of the plural should\ninclude atomic individuals. Turkish, on the other hand, is often cited as one of the\nfew known languages in which the plural only receives an exclusive interpretation\n(Bale & Khanjian 2014, G{\\"o}rg{\\"u}l{\\"u} 2012). It remains controversial whether the Turkish\nplural should in fact be analysed more like the English plural (Kan 2010, Sagˇ 2017)\nor whether indeed it should only be assigned an exclusive denotation. We report two\nexperiments investigating Turkish-speaking adults' and preschool-aged children's\ninterpretation of positive and negative sentences containing plural nouns. The\nresults provide clear evidence for inclusive interpretations of the plural in Turkish,\nsupporting accounts that treat the Turkish and English plurals alike.},\n\tauthor = {Agata Renans and Yagmur Sag and Nihan Ketrez and Lyn Tieu and Raffaella Folli and George Tsoulas and Hanna de Vries and Jacopo Romoli},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-02 21:21:15 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Natural Language Semantics}},\n\ttitle = {Plurality and cross-linguistic variation: An experimental investigation of the Turkish plural},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TZhZGNiO/main.pdf},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TZhZGNiO/main.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n In English and many other languages, the interpretation of the plural is associated with the inclusive reading in positive sentences and exclusive reading in negative sentences. Different approaches to the meaning contribution of the English plural vary in how they account for this apparent alternation across the polarities, but converge on assuming that (at least one of) the denotation(s) of the plural should include atomic individuals. Turkish, on the other hand, is often cited as one of the few known languages in which the plural only receives an exclusive interpretation (Bale & Khanjian 2014, Görgülü 2012). It remains controversial whether the Turkish plural should in fact be analysed more like the English plural (Kan 2010, Sagˇ 2017) or whether indeed it should only be assigned an exclusive denotation. We report two experiments investigating Turkish-speaking adults' and preschool-aged children's interpretation of positive and negative sentences containing plural nouns. The results provide clear evidence for inclusive interpretations of the plural in Turkish, supporting accounts that treat the Turkish and English plurals alike.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Testing theories of plural meanings: Insights from child language.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Bill, C.; Romoli, J.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TestingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 13 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu:2020,\n\tabstract = {Plural morphology in English is associated with a multiplicity inference. For example, ``Emily\nfed giraff‚es'' is typically interpreted to mean that Emily fed multiple giraff‚es. It has long been\nobserved that this inference disappears in downward-entailing linguistic environments, such\nas in the scope of negation. For example, ``Emily didn't feed girffa‚es'' does not merely suggest that she didn't feed multiple giraff‚es, but rather that she didn't feed any. ‘There are three main approaches to explaining this puzzle: the €rest proposes that the plural is ambiguous, and\ninvokes a preference for stronger meanings; the second derives multiplicity inferences as implicatures; and the third provides a homogeneity-based account. ‘These di‚fferent approaches can all account for the interpretation of the plural across upward- and downward-entailing\nenvironments. ‘They diff‚er, however, in what they predict for three further aspects of the\nplural: the status of positive and negative plural sentences in singular contexts, children's\nacquisition of plural meanings, and the relationship between plural meanings and scalar implicatures. In this paper, we report on three experiments investigating adults' and preschool-aged children's interpretation of plural morphology in English. ‘e experiments reveal that\nparticipants distinguish positive and negative plural sentences presented in singular contexts,\nand that adults assign a di‚erent status to these positive and negative sentences. It is also observed that children, unlike adults, tend to accept underinformative positive plural sentences in singular contexts --- in parallel with their behavior on standard scalar implicatures --- while\nthey are relatively more adult-like when it comes to negative plural sentences in the same\ncontexts, showing a tendency to reject the negative sentences. We discuss how the €ndings\nof the three experiments are expected on a scalar implicature approach to multiplicity inferences, and the open challenges they pose for the ambiguity and homogeneity approaches.},\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Bill, Cory and Romoli, Jacopo and Crain, Stephen},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-02 21:34:54 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Cognition},\n\ttitle = {Testing theories of plural meanings: Insights from child language},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jE1NDFkY/TBRC_AcqPlurals.pdf},\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jE1NDFkY/TBRC_AcqPlurals.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Plural morphology in English is associated with a multiplicity inference. For example, ``Emily fed giraff‚es'' is typically interpreted to mean that Emily fed multiple giraff‚es. It has long been observed that this inference disappears in downward-entailing linguistic environments, such as in the scope of negation. For example, ``Emily didn't feed girffa‚es'' does not merely suggest that she didn't feed multiple giraff‚es, but rather that she didn't feed any. ‘There are three main approaches to explaining this puzzle: the €rest proposes that the plural is ambiguous, and invokes a preference for stronger meanings; the second derives multiplicity inferences as implicatures; and the third provides a homogeneity-based account. ‘These di‚fferent approaches can all account for the interpretation of the plural across upward- and downward-entailing environments. ‘They diff‚er, however, in what they predict for three further aspects of the plural: the status of positive and negative plural sentences in singular contexts, children's acquisition of plural meanings, and the relationship between plural meanings and scalar implicatures. In this paper, we report on three experiments investigating adults' and preschool-aged children's interpretation of plural morphology in English. ‘e experiments reveal that participants distinguish positive and negative plural sentences presented in singular contexts, and that adults assign a di‚erent status to these positive and negative sentences. It is also observed that children, unlike adults, tend to accept underinformative positive plural sentences in singular contexts — in parallel with their behavior on standard scalar implicatures — while they are relatively more adult-like when it comes to negative plural sentences in the same contexts, showing a tendency to reject the negative sentences. We discuss how the €ndings of the three experiments are expected on a scalar implicature approach to multiplicity inferences, and the open challenges they pose for the ambiguity and homogeneity approaches.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2019\n \n \n (8)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Plurality.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Cummins, C.; and Katsos, N., editor(s), The Oxford Handbook of Experimental Semantics and Pragmatics, pages 208–227, 2019. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Tieu:2018,\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tbooktitle = {{The Oxford Handbook of Experimental Semantics and Pragmatics}},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:50:50 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-08 21:38:23 +0200},\n\teditor = {Chris Cummins and Napoleon Katsos},\n\tpages = {208--227},\n\ttitle = {{Plurality}},\n\tyear = {2019}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Fixing de Morgan's laws in Counterfactuals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; Santorio, P.; and Wittenberg, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2019, 2019. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FixingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Romoli-Santorio-Wittenberg:2019,\n\tauthor = {Jacopo Romoli and Paolo Santorio and Eva Wittenberg},\n\tbooktitle = {{Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2019}},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:32:50 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-04 17:58:57 +0200},\n\ttitle = {Fixing de Morgan's laws in Counterfactuals},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TYyNWQ1Y/counterfactuals},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TYyNWQ1Y/counterfactuals}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Homogeneity or implicature: an experimental investigation of free choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Bill, C.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of SALT 29, pages 706–726, 2019. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"HomogeneityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Tieu-Cory-Romoli:2019,\n\tauthor = {Lyn Tieu and Cory Bill and Jacopo Romoli},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of {SALT 29}},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:21:38 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-04 17:57:50 +0200},\n\tpages = {706--726},\n\ttitle = {Homogeneity or implicature: an experimental investigation of free choice},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DgzMjIyN/homogeneity},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DgzMjIyN/homogeneity}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Filtering free choice.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Santorio, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics & Pragmatics, 12(12): 1–27. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"FilteringPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli-Santorio:2019,\n\tabstract = {Sentences involving disjunctions under a possibility modal give rise to\nso-called `free choice' inferences, i.e. inferences to the effect that each disjunct\nis possible. This note investigates the interaction between free choice and presupposition projection. We focus on sentences embedding both a disjunction in\nthe scope of a possibility modal and a presupposition trigger, and we investigate\nhow the free choice inference triggered by the former can contribute to filtering\nthe presupposition of the latter. We consider three cases: conditionals, disjunctions\nand unless sentences. We observe that in all of these cases the presuppositions\ntriggered from the consequent, second disjunct, or the scope of unless appear to\nbe filtered by a free choice inference associated with the rest of the sentence. The\ncase of the conditional can be accommodated by scalar accounts of free choice, but\nthe disjunction and unless cases cause a substantial problem for all these accounts.\nAfter discarding a natural but unsuccessful attempt at a solution, we consider two\nmore promising strategies. The first holds on to an implicature account of free\nchoice and exploits an algorithm of free insertion of redundant material. The second\nexploits a semantic account of free choice. Each of these solutions comes with\nrelated problems. We conclude that the correct form of a theory of free choice\nremains open, though the data concerning the interaction between free choice and\npresupposition can significantly help sharpen our theoretical choices.},\n\tauthor = {Jacopo Romoli and Paolo Santorio},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-23 22:21:48 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Semantics & Pragmatics}},\n\tnumber = {12},\n\tpages = {1--27},\n\ttitle = {Filtering free choice},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WYyYmYwZ/filtering.pdf},\n\tvolume = {12},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WYyYmYwZ/filtering.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentences involving disjunctions under a possibility modal give rise to so-called `free choice' inferences, i.e. inferences to the effect that each disjunct is possible. This note investigates the interaction between free choice and presupposition projection. We focus on sentences embedding both a disjunction in the scope of a possibility modal and a presupposition trigger, and we investigate how the free choice inference triggered by the former can contribute to filtering the presupposition of the latter. We consider three cases: conditionals, disjunctions and unless sentences. We observe that in all of these cases the presuppositions triggered from the consequent, second disjunct, or the scope of unless appear to be filtered by a free choice inference associated with the rest of the sentence. The case of the conditional can be accommodated by scalar accounts of free choice, but the disjunction and unless cases cause a substantial problem for all these accounts. After discarding a natural but unsuccessful attempt at a solution, we consider two more promising strategies. The first holds on to an implicature account of free choice and exploits an algorithm of free insertion of redundant material. The second exploits a semantic account of free choice. Each of these solutions comes with related problems. We conclude that the correct form of a theory of free choice remains open, though the data concerning the interaction between free choice and presupposition can significantly help sharpen our theoretical choices.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Vagueness and the derivation of implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Leffel, T.; Cremers, A.; Gotzner, N.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 36(2): 317–348. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"VaguenessPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 12 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Leffel:2019,\n\tabstract = {We show that the interpretation of sentences like John is not very ADJ depends on whether ADJ\nis vague. We argue that this follows from a constraint on the interaction between vagueness\nand conversational implicature, a domain that has not been studied extensively. The constraint\nstates that implicatures are not drawn if they lead to ``borderline contradictions'' (see Ripley\n2011; Alxatib & Pelletier 2011; a.o.), a natural extension of the idea that implicatures should\nnot contradict assertions (Fox 2007; Fox & Hackl 2006; a.o.). Experiment 1 establishes that not\nvery ADJ gives rise to the implicature ADJ for the non-vague absolute adjective late, but not for\nthe vague relative adjective tall (in the terminology of Kennedy & McNally 2005a). Experiment\n2 generalizes this result to three relative adjectives in the positive form (tall, hot, fast), against\nthose same adjectives in their (non-vague) comparative forms (taller/hotter/faster than the\naverage X). We also constructed quantitative meaning representations for complex predicates of\nthe form ADJ∧¬ very ADJ, using fuzzy logic to model the contribution of boolean connectives\nand our experimental data to represent the meanings of adjectives. The results of these analyses\nsuggest that strengthening not very ADJ with ADJ leads to a more contradictory interpretation\nwhen ADJ is vague than when it is not, as expected on our theory. While our results apply\ndirectly to only a specific set of lexical items, we hypothesize that they reflect a more general\npattern among gradable predicates. This motivates more systematic investigation into the role\nthat vagueness can play in the derivation of conversational implicatures.},\n\tauthor = {Leffel, Timothy and Cremers, Alexandre and Gotzner, Nicole and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-23 22:20:58 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {317--348},\n\ttitle = {Vagueness and the derivation of implicatures},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WJmZjg3Z/LCGR2019-JoS-preprint-SA.pdf},\n\tvolume = {36},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WJmZjg3Z/LCGR2019-JoS-preprint-SA.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We show that the interpretation of sentences like John is not very ADJ depends on whether ADJ is vague. We argue that this follows from a constraint on the interaction between vagueness and conversational implicature, a domain that has not been studied extensively. The constraint states that implicatures are not drawn if they lead to ``borderline contradictions'' (see Ripley 2011; Alxatib & Pelletier 2011; a.o.), a natural extension of the idea that implicatures should not contradict assertions (Fox 2007; Fox & Hackl 2006; a.o.). Experiment 1 establishes that not very ADJ gives rise to the implicature ADJ for the non-vague absolute adjective late, but not for the vague relative adjective tall (in the terminology of Kennedy & McNally 2005a). Experiment 2 generalizes this result to three relative adjectives in the positive form (tall, hot, fast), against those same adjectives in their (non-vague) comparative forms (taller/hotter/faster than the average X). We also constructed quantitative meaning representations for complex predicates of the form ADJ∧¬ very ADJ, using fuzzy logic to model the contribution of boolean connectives and our experimental data to represent the meanings of adjectives. The results of these analyses suggest that strengthening not very ADJ with ADJ leads to a more contradictory interpretation when ADJ is vague than when it is not, as expected on our theory. While our results apply directly to only a specific set of lexical items, we hypothesize that they reflect a more general pattern among gradable predicates. This motivates more systematic investigation into the role that vagueness can play in the derivation of conversational implicatures.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n We discovered that projection in conjunction is asymmetric (and it is!).\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Matthew Mandelkern, J. Z.; and Schwarz, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics & Philosophy. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Mandelkern:2019,\n\tabstract = {Is the mechanism behind presupposition projection and filtering fundamentally asymmetric or symmetric? This is a foundational question for the theory of presupposition\nwhich has been at the centre of attention in recent literature (Schlenker in Theor Linguist 38(3):287--316, 2008b. https://doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2008.021, Semant Pragmat 2(3):1--78, 2009. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.2.3; Rothschild in Semant Pragmat\n4(3):1--43, 2011/2015. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.4.3 a.o.). It also bears on broader\nissues concerning the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these\nsimply rooted in superficial asymmetries of language use (language use happens in\ntime, which we experience as fundamentally asymmetric); or are they, at least in part,\ndirectly encoded in linguistic knowledge and representations? In this paper we aim\nto make progress on these questions by exploring presupposition projection across\nconjunction, which has traditionally been taken as a central piece of evidence that presupposition filtering is asymmetric in general. As a number of authors have recently\npointed out, however, the evidence which has typically been used to support this\nconclusion is muddied by independent issues concerning redundancy; additional concerns have to do with the possibility of local accommodation. We report on a series of\nexperiments, building on previous work by Chemla and Schlenker (Nat Lang Semant\n20(2):177--226, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-012-9080-7) and Schwarz (in:\nSchwarz (ed) Experimental perspectives on presuppositions, Springer, Cham, 2015),\nusing inference and acceptability tasks, which aim to control for both of these potential confounds. In our results, we find strong evidence for left-to-right filtering across conjunctions, but no evidence for right-to-left filtering---even when right-to-left filtering\nwould, if available, rescue an otherwise unacceptable sentence. These results suggest\nthat presupposition filtering across conjunction is asymmetric, contra suggestions in\nthe recent literature (Schlenker in Theor Linguist 34(3):157--212, 2008a. https://doi.\norg/10.1515/THLI.2008.013, 2009 a.o.), and pave the way for the investigation of further questions about the nature of this asymmetry and presupposition projection more\ngenerally. Our results also have broader implications for the study of presupposition:\nwe find important differences in the verdicts of acceptability versus inference tasks\nin testing for projected content, which has both methodological ramifications for the\nquestion of how to distinguish presupposed content, and theoretical repercussions for\nunderstanding the nature of projection and presuppositions more generally},\n\tauthor = {Matthew Mandelkern, Jeremy Zehr, Jacopo Romoli and Florian Schwarz},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-23 22:19:58 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Linguistics & Philosophy}},\n\ttitle = {We discovered that projection in conjunction is asymmetric (and it is!)},\n\turl = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10988-019-09276-5.pdf},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10988-019-09276-5.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Is the mechanism behind presupposition projection and filtering fundamentally asymmetric or symmetric? This is a foundational question for the theory of presupposition which has been at the centre of attention in recent literature (Schlenker in Theor Linguist 38(3):287–316, 2008b. https://doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2008.021, Semant Pragmat 2(3):1–78, 2009. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.2.3; Rothschild in Semant Pragmat 4(3):1–43, 2011/2015. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.4.3 a.o.). It also bears on broader issues concerning the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these simply rooted in superficial asymmetries of language use (language use happens in time, which we experience as fundamentally asymmetric); or are they, at least in part, directly encoded in linguistic knowledge and representations? In this paper we aim to make progress on these questions by exploring presupposition projection across conjunction, which has traditionally been taken as a central piece of evidence that presupposition filtering is asymmetric in general. As a number of authors have recently pointed out, however, the evidence which has typically been used to support this conclusion is muddied by independent issues concerning redundancy; additional concerns have to do with the possibility of local accommodation. We report on a series of experiments, building on previous work by Chemla and Schlenker (Nat Lang Semant 20(2):177–226, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-012-9080-7) and Schwarz (in: Schwarz (ed) Experimental perspectives on presuppositions, Springer, Cham, 2015), using inference and acceptability tasks, which aim to control for both of these potential confounds. In our results, we find strong evidence for left-to-right filtering across conjunctions, but no evidence for right-to-left filtering—even when right-to-left filtering would, if available, rescue an otherwise unacceptable sentence. These results suggest that presupposition filtering across conjunction is asymmetric, contra suggestions in the recent literature (Schlenker in Theor Linguist 34(3):157–212, 2008a. https://doi. org/10.1515/THLI.2008.013, 2009 a.o.), and pave the way for the investigation of further questions about the nature of this asymmetry and presupposition projection more generally. Our results also have broader implications for the study of presupposition: we find important differences in the verdicts of acceptability versus inference tasks in testing for projected content, which has both methodological ramifications for the question of how to distinguish presupposed content, and theoretical repercussions for understanding the nature of projection and presuppositions more generally\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What's not to like.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Mandelkern, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistic Inquiry. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"What'sPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 17 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli:2019,\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo and Matthew Mandelkern},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-04 17:51:30 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Linguistic Inquiry}},\n\ttitle = {What's not to like},\n\turl = {http://mandelkern.hosting.nyu.edu/Like.pdf},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://mandelkern.hosting.nyu.edu/Like.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What we Know about Knowing: Presuppositions generated by factive verbs influence downstream neural processing.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Einat Shetreet, E. J. A.; Romoli, J.; and Gennaro Chierchia, G. K.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 184: 96-16. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"WhatPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Einat:2019,\n\tabstract = {Presuppositions convey information that comprehenders assume to be true, even when it is\ntangential to the communicator's main message. For example, a class of verbs called `factives'\n(e.g. realize, know) trigger the presupposition that the events or states conveyed by their\nsentential complements are true. In contrast, non-factive verbs (e.g. think, believe) do not trigger\nthis presupposition. We asked whether, during language comprehension, presuppositions\ntriggered by factive verbs are encoded within the comprehender's discourse model, with neural\nconsequences if violated by later bottom-up inputs. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we\nexamined neural activity to words that were either consistent or inconsistent with events/states\nconveyed by the complements of factive versus non-factive verbs while comprehenders read and\nactively monitored the coherence of short discourse scenarios. We focused on the modulation of\na posteriorly-distributed late positivity or P600. This ERP component is produced when\ncomprehenders constrain their discourse model such that it restricts predictions only to event\nstructures that are compatible with this model, and new input violates these event structure\npredictions. Between 500-700ms, we observed a larger amplitude late posterior positivity/P600\non words that were inconsistent (versus consistent) with the events/states conveyed by the\ncomplements of factive verbs. No such effect was observed following non-factive verbs. These\nfindings suggest that, during active discourse comprehension, the presuppositions triggered by\nfactive verbs are encoded and maintained within the comprehender's discourse model.\nDownstream input that is inconsistent with these presuppositions violates event structure\npredictions and conflicts with this prior model, producing the late posterior positivity/P600. },\n\tauthor = {Einat Shetreet, Edward J. Alexander and Jacopo Romoli and Gennaro Chierchia, Gina Kuperberg},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 15:35:04 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-23 22:18:52 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Cognition},\n\tpages = {96-16},\n\tpublisher = {Cognition},\n\ttitle = {What we Know about Knowing: Presuppositions generated by factive verbs influence downstream neural processing},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mQ0OWRjZ/factives_cognition.pdf},\n\tvolume = {184},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mQ0OWRjZ/factives_cognition.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Presuppositions convey information that comprehenders assume to be true, even when it is tangential to the communicator's main message. For example, a class of verbs called `factives' (e.g. realize, know) trigger the presupposition that the events or states conveyed by their sentential complements are true. In contrast, non-factive verbs (e.g. think, believe) do not trigger this presupposition. We asked whether, during language comprehension, presuppositions triggered by factive verbs are encoded within the comprehender's discourse model, with neural consequences if violated by later bottom-up inputs. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we examined neural activity to words that were either consistent or inconsistent with events/states conveyed by the complements of factive versus non-factive verbs while comprehenders read and actively monitored the coherence of short discourse scenarios. We focused on the modulation of a posteriorly-distributed late positivity or P600. This ERP component is produced when comprehenders constrain their discourse model such that it restricts predictions only to event structures that are compatible with this model, and new input violates these event structure predictions. Between 500-700ms, we observed a larger amplitude late posterior positivity/P600 on words that were inconsistent (versus consistent) with the events/states conveyed by the complements of factive verbs. No such effect was observed following non-factive verbs. These findings suggest that, during active discourse comprehension, the presuppositions triggered by factive verbs are encoded and maintained within the comprehender's discourse model. Downstream input that is inconsistent with these presuppositions violates event structure predictions and conflicts with this prior model, producing the late posterior positivity/P600. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2018\n \n \n (9)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The symmetry problem: current theories and prospects.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Breheny, R.; Romoli, J.; and Sudo, Y.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics, 26: 85–110. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 9 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Breheny:2017,\n\tabstract = {Thestructuralapproachtoalternatives(KatzirinLinguistPhilos30(6):669-- 690, 2007; Fox and Katzir in Nat Lang Semant 19(1):87--107, 2011; Katzir in Semantics, pragmatics and the case of scalar implicatures, Palgrave Macmillan, Lon- don, pp 40--71, 2014) is the most developed attempt in the literature at solving the symmetry problem of scalar implicatures. Problematic data with indirect and particu- larised scalar implicatures have however been raised (Romoli in Snippets 27:14--15, 2013; Trinh and Haida in Nat Lang Semant 25(4):249--270, 2015). To address these problems, Trinh and Haida (2015) proposed to augment the theory with the Atom- icity Constraint. Here we show that this constraint falls short of explaining minimal variants of the original problems, and moreover that it runs into trouble with the infer- ences of sentences involving gradable adjectives like full and empty. We furthermore discuss how the structural approach suffers at times from the problem of `too many lexical alternatives' pointed out by Swanson (Linguist Philos 33(1):31--36, 2010), and at other times from the opposite problem of `too few lexical alternatives'. These three problems epitomise the challenge of constructing just enough alternatives under the structural approach to solve the symmetry problem in full generality. Finally, we also sketch another recent attempt at solving the symmetry problem, Bergen et al. (Semant Pragmat 9(20), 2016), which is based on relative informativity and complexity. We argue that Bergen et al. do not provide a general solution to the symmetry problem either, by pointing to some of the open problematic cases that remain for this approachas well. We conclude that while important progress has been made in the theory of\nalternatives for scalar implicatures in the last few years, a full solution to the symmetry\nproblem has not yet been attained.\n},\n\tauthor = {Breheny, Richard, Klinedinst, Nathan and Romoli, Jacopo and Sudo, Yasutada},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:32:48 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-27 20:46:53 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\tpages = {85--110},\n\ttitle = {The symmetry problem: current theories and prospects},\n\turl = {https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1568030/7/Sudo_10.1007%252Fs11050-017-9141-z.pdf},\n\tvolume = {26},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1568030/7/Sudo_10.1007%252Fs11050-017-9141-z.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Thestructuralapproachtoalternatives(KatzirinLinguistPhilos30(6):669– 690, 2007; Fox and Katzir in Nat Lang Semant 19(1):87–107, 2011; Katzir in Semantics, pragmatics and the case of scalar implicatures, Palgrave Macmillan, Lon- don, pp 40–71, 2014) is the most developed attempt in the literature at solving the symmetry problem of scalar implicatures. Problematic data with indirect and particu- larised scalar implicatures have however been raised (Romoli in Snippets 27:14–15, 2013; Trinh and Haida in Nat Lang Semant 25(4):249–270, 2015). To address these problems, Trinh and Haida (2015) proposed to augment the theory with the Atom- icity Constraint. Here we show that this constraint falls short of explaining minimal variants of the original problems, and moreover that it runs into trouble with the infer- ences of sentences involving gradable adjectives like full and empty. We furthermore discuss how the structural approach suffers at times from the problem of `too many lexical alternatives' pointed out by Swanson (Linguist Philos 33(1):31–36, 2010), and at other times from the opposite problem of `too few lexical alternatives'. These three problems epitomise the challenge of constructing just enough alternatives under the structural approach to solve the symmetry problem in full generality. Finally, we also sketch another recent attempt at solving the symmetry problem, Bergen et al. (Semant Pragmat 9(20), 2016), which is based on relative informativity and complexity. We argue that Bergen et al. do not provide a general solution to the symmetry problem either, by pointing to some of the open problematic cases that remain for this approachas well. We conclude that while important progress has been made in the theory of alternatives for scalar implicatures in the last few years, a full solution to the symmetry problem has not yet been attained. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Beyond the scope of acquisition: A novel perspective on the isomorphism effect from Broca's aphasia.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Lynda Kennedy, L. T.; Romoli, J.; and Folli, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language Acquisition. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"BeyondPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Kennedy:2018,\n\tabstract = {Children have been reported to prefer the surface scope or ``isomorphic''\nreading of scopally ambiguous sentences (Musolino 1998, among others).\nExisting accounts in the literature differ with respect to the proposed source\nof this isomorphism effect. Some accounts are based on learnability considerations (e.g., Moscati & Crain 2014), while others invoke pragmatic and/\nor processing factors (e.g., Gualmini et al. 2008; Musolino & Lidz 2006). The\npresent study investigates whether the isomorphism effect is specific to\ndevelopment or rather is observable in other populations with language\nprocessing limitations. We investigated the interpretation of ambiguous\nsentences containing ``every'' and negation in 4--6-year-old children, individuals with Broca's aphasia, and neurotypical adult controls. We observed\nparallel performance in the children and the aphasic group, with both\ngroups accessing more surface scope readings than inverse scope readings.\nThis finding suggests that the preference for isomorphism may not be\nspecific to acquisition and supports accounts that are not specifically\nbased on learnability considerations---for example, processing accounts\nalong the lines of Musolino & Lidz (2006).},\n\tauthor = {Lynda Kennedy, Lyn Tieu and Jacopo Romoli and Raffaella Folli},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:28:26 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:34:05 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Language Acquisition},\n\ttitle = {Beyond the scope of acquisition: A novel perspective on the isomorphism effect from Broca's aphasia},\n\turl = {https://www.unige.ch/lettres/linguistique/files/6915/3736/0094/Kennedy_et_al._2018.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://www.unige.ch/lettres/linguistique/files/6915/3736/0094/Kennedy_et_al._2018.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Children have been reported to prefer the surface scope or ``isomorphic'' reading of scopally ambiguous sentences (Musolino 1998, among others). Existing accounts in the literature differ with respect to the proposed source of this isomorphism effect. Some accounts are based on learnability considerations (e.g., Moscati & Crain 2014), while others invoke pragmatic and/ or processing factors (e.g., Gualmini et al. 2008; Musolino & Lidz 2006). The present study investigates whether the isomorphism effect is specific to development or rather is observable in other populations with language processing limitations. We investigated the interpretation of ambiguous sentences containing ``every'' and negation in 4–6-year-old children, individuals with Broca's aphasia, and neurotypical adult controls. We observed parallel performance in the children and the aphasic group, with both groups accessing more surface scope readings than inverse scope readings. This finding suggests that the preference for isomorphism may not be specific to acquisition and supports accounts that are not specifically based on learnability considerations—for example, processing accounts along the lines of Musolino & Lidz (2006).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Developmental insights into gappy phenomena: comparing presuppositions, implicature, homogeneity, and vagueness.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Bill, C.; Zehr, J.; Romoli, J.; and Schwarz, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n of Semantics in Language AcquisitionJohn Benjamins, 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"DevelopmentalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@book{Tieu-Cory-Zehr:2018,\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Bill, Cory and Zehr, Jeremy and Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:24:19 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-08 21:43:00 +0200},\n\tpublisher = {John Benjamins},\n\tseries = {{Semantics in Language Acquisition}},\n\ttitle = {{Developmental insights into gappy phenomena: comparing presuppositions, implicature, homogeneity, and vagueness}},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2JmOGI3Z/TiLAR_GappyAcq.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2JmOGI3Z/TiLAR_GappyAcq.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Hurford conditionals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mandelkern, M.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 35(2): 357–367. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"HurfordPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Mandelhern:2018,\n\tabstract = {Compare the following conditionals:\n\nBad #If John is not in Paris, he is in France.\nGood If John is in France, he is not in Paris.\n\nGood sounds entirely natural, whereas Bad sounds quite strange. This contrast is\npuzzling, because Bad and Good have the same structure at a certain level of logical\nabstraction:\n\n(1) If ¬p+, then p.\n\nWe argue that existing theories of informational oddness do not distinguish between\nBad and Good. We do not have an account of the divergence in judgments about the\ntwo, but we think this is a fascinating puzzle which we pose here in the hope others\nwill be able to solve it.},\n\tauthor = {Mandelkern, Matthew and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:22:23 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:23:43 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {357--367},\n\ttitle = {Hurford conditionals},\n\turl = {http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0776/Hurford.pdf},\n\tvolume = {35},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0776/Hurford.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Compare the following conditionals: Bad #If John is not in Paris, he is in France. Good If John is in France, he is not in Paris. Good sounds entirely natural, whereas Bad sounds quite strange. This contrast is puzzling, because Bad and Good have the same structure at a certain level of logical abstraction: (1) If ¬p+, then p. We argue that existing theories of informational oddness do not distinguish between Bad and Good. We do not have an account of the divergence in judgments about the two, but we think this is a fascinating puzzle which we pose here in the hope others will be able to solve it.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n More free choice and more inclusion An experimental investigation of free choice in non-monotonic environments.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Gotzner, N.; Romoli, J.; and Santorio, P.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of SALT 28, pages 690–710, 2018. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Gotzner:2018,\n\tauthor = {Nicole Gotzner and Jacopo Romoli and Paolo Santorio},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of {SALT 28}},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:56:30 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-08 21:31:56 +0200},\n\tpages = {690--710},\n\ttitle = {{More free choice and more inclusion An experimental investigation of free choice in non-monotonic environments}},\n\tyear = {2018}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On children's variable success with scalar inferences: Insights from disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Pagliarini, E.; Bill, C.; Tieu, L.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Cognition, 178: 178–192. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Pagliarini:2018,\n\tabstract = {Previous developmental studies have revealed variation in children's ability to compute scalar inferences. While children have been shown to\nstruggle with standard scalar inferences (e.g., with scalar quantifiers like\n``some'') (Noveck 2001, Chierchia et al. 2001, Papafragou and Musolino\n2003, Guasti et al. 2005), there is also a growing handful of inferences\nthat children have been reported to derive quite readily (Papafragou and\nMusolino 2003, Barner and Bachrach 2010, Stiller et al. 2015, Tieu et al.\n2016, Singh et al. 2016, Hochstein et al. 2016, Tieu et al. 2017). One recent\napproach, which we refer to as the Alternatives-based approach, attributes\nthe variability in children's performance to limitations in how children\nengage with the alternative sentences that are required to compute the\nrelevant inferences. Specifically, if the alternative sentences can be generated by simplifying the assertion, rather than by lexically replacing one\nscalar term with another, children should be better able to compute the\ninference. In this paper, we investigated this prediction by assessing how\nchildren and adults interpret sentences that embed disjunction under a\nuniversal quantifier, such as ``Every elephant caught a big butterfly or\na small butterfly''. For adults, such sentences typically give rise to the\ndistributive inference that some elephant caught a big butterfly and some\nelephant caught a small butterfly (Gazdar 1979, Fox 2007, Crniˇc et al.\n2015). Another possible interpretation, though not one typically accessed\nby adults, is the conjunctive inference that every elephant caught a big\nbutterfly and a small butterfly (Singh et al. 2016). Crucially, for our purposes, it has been argued that both of these inferences can be derived using\nalternatives that are generated by deleting parts of the asserted sentence,\nrather than through lexical replacement, making these sentences an ideal\ntest case for evaluating the predictions of the Alternatives-based approach.\nThe findings of our experimental study revealed that children are indeed\nable to successfully compute this class of inferences, providing support\nfor the Alternatives-based approach as a viable explanation of children's\nvariable success in computing scalar inferences.},\n\tauthor = {Elena Pagliarini and Cory Bill and Lyn Tieu and Stephen Crain},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:53:17 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:25:58 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Cognition}},\n\tpages = {178--192},\n\ttitle = {On children's variable success with scalar inferences: Insights from disjunction in the scope of a universal quantifier},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mE0YjdkN/PagliariniBillRomoliTieuCrain_DistributiveInferencesAcq.pdf},\n\tvolume = {178},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mE0YjdkN/PagliariniBillRomoliTieuCrain_DistributiveInferencesAcq.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Previous developmental studies have revealed variation in children's ability to compute scalar inferences. While children have been shown to struggle with standard scalar inferences (e.g., with scalar quantifiers like ``some'') (Noveck 2001, Chierchia et al. 2001, Papafragou and Musolino 2003, Guasti et al. 2005), there is also a growing handful of inferences that children have been reported to derive quite readily (Papafragou and Musolino 2003, Barner and Bachrach 2010, Stiller et al. 2015, Tieu et al. 2016, Singh et al. 2016, Hochstein et al. 2016, Tieu et al. 2017). One recent approach, which we refer to as the Alternatives-based approach, attributes the variability in children's performance to limitations in how children engage with the alternative sentences that are required to compute the relevant inferences. Specifically, if the alternative sentences can be generated by simplifying the assertion, rather than by lexically replacing one scalar term with another, children should be better able to compute the inference. In this paper, we investigated this prediction by assessing how children and adults interpret sentences that embed disjunction under a universal quantifier, such as ``Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly''. For adults, such sentences typically give rise to the distributive inference that some elephant caught a big butterfly and some elephant caught a small butterfly (Gazdar 1979, Fox 2007, Crniˇc et al. 2015). Another possible interpretation, though not one typically accessed by adults, is the conjunctive inference that every elephant caught a big butterfly and a small butterfly (Singh et al. 2016). Crucially, for our purposes, it has been argued that both of these inferences can be derived using alternatives that are generated by deleting parts of the asserted sentence, rather than through lexical replacement, making these sentences an ideal test case for evaluating the predictions of the Alternatives-based approach. The findings of our experimental study revealed that children are indeed able to successfully compute this class of inferences, providing support for the Alternatives-based approach as a viable explanation of children's variable success in computing scalar inferences.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Processing presuppositions and implicatures: similarities and differences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bill, C.; Romoli, J.; and Schwarz, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Communication, 3(44): 1–22. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ProcessingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Schwarz:2018,\n\tabstract = {Presuppositions (Ps) and Scalar implicatures (SIs) are traditionally considered to be distinct\nphenomena. But recently, various authors have argued that (at least certain) Ps should be\nanalyzed as SIs to capture differences between presupposition triggers. This scalar implicature\napproach to presuppositions predicts that, all else being equal, the two types of inferences\nwill display uniform behavior. Some initial processing studies tested this prediction, but yielded\nconflicting results. While some found no delay in Reaction Times (RTs) associated with Ps\nunder negation, which is in contrast with previous findings for SIs and thus challenges the SI\napproach to Ps, others compared SIs and Ps under negation directly and found uniform RT\npatterns for them. We review the conflicting results and argue that the difference in outcomes\nis attributable to a difference in the type of response being measured: the RTs associated with\nacceptance and rejection judgments seem to pattern in exactly opposite ways. Next, we report\non two experiments that systematically look at both acceptance and rejection responses for\nSIs and Ps respectively. The results suggest that, once the acceptance vs. rejection variable\nis factored in, RT patterns for Ps and SIs are indeed uniform, and only involve delays for the\nrespective inferences when looking at rejection judgments. However, a contrast between Ps and\nSIs re-emerges in the results of the third experiment, in which auditory stimuli are used to assess\nthe impact of prosody on deriving the respective inferences. This poses a first challenge to the\nscalar implicature approach to presuppositions. A third set of experiments investigates a further\nprediction by this approach by looking at a relevant presupposition trigger in affirmative contexts.\nAccording to the SI approach to Ps, the presuppositional inference is introduced as a simple\nentailment in affirmative contexts. This predicts that language users' behaviour towards other\nentailments and these presuppositional inferences will be uniform. We compare rejections of\naffirmative sentences based on either their presuppositional inference or their entailed content,\nand found longer RTs for the former case. A final variation investigated whether there might\nbe a parallel difference in the RTs of two entailments associated with always, and found no\nsuch difference. The results produced by the second two sets of experiments pose a substantial\nchallenge to approaches assimilating Ps and SIs, while being entirely in line with the traditional\nperspective of seeing the two phenomena as distinct in nature.},\n\tauthor = {Bill, Cory and Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:47:51 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:31:06 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Frontiers in Communication},\n\tnumber = {44},\n\tpages = {1--22},\n\ttitle = {Processing presuppositions and implicatures: similarities and differences},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2QyYjRhM/presupposition_implicatures.pdf},\n\tvolume = {3},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2QyYjRhM/presupposition_implicatures.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Presuppositions (Ps) and Scalar implicatures (SIs) are traditionally considered to be distinct phenomena. But recently, various authors have argued that (at least certain) Ps should be analyzed as SIs to capture differences between presupposition triggers. This scalar implicature approach to presuppositions predicts that, all else being equal, the two types of inferences will display uniform behavior. Some initial processing studies tested this prediction, but yielded conflicting results. While some found no delay in Reaction Times (RTs) associated with Ps under negation, which is in contrast with previous findings for SIs and thus challenges the SI approach to Ps, others compared SIs and Ps under negation directly and found uniform RT patterns for them. We review the conflicting results and argue that the difference in outcomes is attributable to a difference in the type of response being measured: the RTs associated with acceptance and rejection judgments seem to pattern in exactly opposite ways. Next, we report on two experiments that systematically look at both acceptance and rejection responses for SIs and Ps respectively. The results suggest that, once the acceptance vs. rejection variable is factored in, RT patterns for Ps and SIs are indeed uniform, and only involve delays for the respective inferences when looking at rejection judgments. However, a contrast between Ps and SIs re-emerges in the results of the third experiment, in which auditory stimuli are used to assess the impact of prosody on deriving the respective inferences. This poses a first challenge to the scalar implicature approach to presuppositions. A third set of experiments investigates a further prediction by this approach by looking at a relevant presupposition trigger in affirmative contexts. According to the SI approach to Ps, the presuppositional inference is introduced as a simple entailment in affirmative contexts. This predicts that language users' behaviour towards other entailments and these presuppositional inferences will be uniform. We compare rejections of affirmative sentences based on either their presuppositional inference or their entailed content, and found longer RTs for the former case. A final variation investigated whether there might be a parallel difference in the RTs of two entailments associated with always, and found no such difference. The results produced by the second two sets of experiments pose a substantial challenge to approaches assimilating Ps and SIs, while being entirely in line with the traditional perspective of seeing the two phenomena as distinct in nature.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Testing theories of temporal inferences: evidence from child language.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Cremers, A.; Kane, F.; Tieu, L.; Kennedy, L.; Sudo, Y.; Folli, R.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Glossa: a Journal of Generative Linguistics, 3(1): 1–21. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"TestingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Kane:2018,\n\tabstract = {Sentences involving past tense verbs, such as ``My dogs were on the carpet'', tend to give rise\nto the inference that the corresponding present tense version, ``My dogs are on the carpet'', is\nfalse. This inference is often referred to as a cessation or temporal inference, and is generally\nanalyzed as a type of implicature. There are two main proposals for capturing this asymmetry:\none assumes a difference in informativity between the past and present counterparts (Altshuler\n& Schwarzschild 2013), while the other proposes a structural difference between the two\n(Thomas 2012). The two approaches are similar in terms of empirical coverage, but differ in\ntheir predictions for language acquisition. Using a novel animated picture selection paradigm,\nwe investigated these predictions. Specifically, we compared the performance of a group of\n4--6-year-old children and a group of adults on temporal inferences, scalar implicatures arising\nfrom ``some'', and inferences of adverbial modifiers under negation. The results revealed that\noverall, children computed all three inferences at a lower rate than adult controls; however\nthey were more adult-like on temporal inferences and inferences of adverbial modifiers than\non scalar implicatures. We discuss the implications of the findings, both for a developmental\nalternatives-based hypothesis (e.g., Barner et al. 2011; Singh et al. 2016; Tieu et al. 2016; 2018), as\nwell as theories of temporal inferences, arguing that the finding that children were more (and\nequally) adult-like on temporal inferences and adverbial modifiers supports a structural theory\nof temporal inferences along the lines of Thomas (2012).},\n\tauthor = {Cremers, Alexandre and Kane, Frances and Tieu, Lyn and Kennedy, Lynda and Sudo, Yasutada and Folli, Raffaella and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:45:38 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:27:51 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Glossa: a Journal of Generative Linguistics}},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {1--21},\n\ttitle = {Testing theories of temporal inferences: evidence from child language},\n\turl = {https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/164005464/604_11749_1_PB.pdf},\n\tvolume = {3},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/164005464/604_11749_1_PB.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentences involving past tense verbs, such as ``My dogs were on the carpet'', tend to give rise to the inference that the corresponding present tense version, ``My dogs are on the carpet'', is false. This inference is often referred to as a cessation or temporal inference, and is generally analyzed as a type of implicature. There are two main proposals for capturing this asymmetry: one assumes a difference in informativity between the past and present counterparts (Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013), while the other proposes a structural difference between the two (Thomas 2012). The two approaches are similar in terms of empirical coverage, but differ in their predictions for language acquisition. Using a novel animated picture selection paradigm, we investigated these predictions. Specifically, we compared the performance of a group of 4–6-year-old children and a group of adults on temporal inferences, scalar implicatures arising from ``some'', and inferences of adverbial modifiers under negation. The results revealed that overall, children computed all three inferences at a lower rate than adult controls; however they were more adult-like on temporal inferences and inferences of adverbial modifiers than on scalar implicatures. We discuss the implications of the findings, both for a developmental alternatives-based hypothesis (e.g., Barner et al. 2011; Singh et al. 2016; Tieu et al. 2016; 2018), as well as theories of temporal inferences, arguing that the finding that children were more (and equally) adult-like on temporal inferences and adverbial modifiers supports a structural theory of temporal inferences along the lines of Thomas (2012).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The abundance inference of pluralised mass nouns is an implicature: Evidence from Greek.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Renans, A.; Romoli, J.; Tieu, L.; Makri, M.; de Vries, H.; Folli, R.; and Tsoulas, G.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Glossa: a Journal of Generative Linguistics, 3(1): 1–34. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Renans-2018,\n\tabstract = {Across languages, plural marking on count nouns typically gives rise to a multiplicity inference,\nindicating that the noun ranges over sums with a cardinality of 2 or more. Plural marking has also\nbeen observed to occur on mass nouns in Greek and a few other languages, giving rise to a parallel\nabundance inference, indicating that there is a lot of the relevant substance. It has been observed\nin the literature that both of these inferences disappear in downward- entailing environments,\nsuch as when a plural appears in the scope of negation (Tsoulas 2009; Kane et al. 2015). There are\ntwo main competing approaches in the literature that aim to account for the described pattern\nwith respect to multiplicity inferences: the ambiguity approach ( Farkas & de Swart 2010) and the\nimplicature approach (Sauerland 2003; Spector 2007; Mayr 2015, among others). As discussed in\nTieu et al. (2018), while both approaches can account for the upward- versus downward-entailing\npattern of multiplicity inferences, they differ in what they predict with respect to the acquisition\nof these inferences and their relationship with implicatures. Tieu et al. (2014; 2018) investigated multiplicity inferences in English and reported evidence for the implicature approach.\nIn this paper, we irst show how the ambiguity approach and the implicature approach to the\n multiplicity inference can be extended to account for the abundance inference. We then report\non an experiment that tests the predictions of the two approaches for multiplicity and abundance\ninferences in preschool-aged children and adult native speakers of Greek. Our results replicate\nthe patterns reported in Tieu et al. (2014; 2018) for multiplicity inferences, and crucially reveal an\nanalogous pattern for abundance inferences. Adults computed both kinds of inferences more in\nupward-entailing environments than in downward-entailing ones, and children computed fewer\ninferences overall than adults did. These results relect an overall pattern of implicature calculation in line with a uniied implicature analysis across the three kinds of inferences. By contrast,\nwe discuss how they pose a challenge for the ambiguity approach.},\n\tauthor = {Agata Renans and Jacopo Romoli and Lyn Tieu and Margarita Makri and Hanna de Vries and Raffaella Folli and George Tsoulas},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 22:41:49 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:29:14 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Glossa: a Journal of Generative Linguistics}},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {1--34},\n\ttitle = {{The abundance inference of pluralised mass nouns is an implicature: Evidence from Greek}},\n\turl = {http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/148004/1/531_10403_1_PB.pdf},\n\tvolume = {3},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/148004/1/531_10403_1_PB.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Across languages, plural marking on count nouns typically gives rise to a multiplicity inference, indicating that the noun ranges over sums with a cardinality of 2 or more. Plural marking has also been observed to occur on mass nouns in Greek and a few other languages, giving rise to a parallel abundance inference, indicating that there is a lot of the relevant substance. It has been observed in the literature that both of these inferences disappear in downward- entailing environments, such as when a plural appears in the scope of negation (Tsoulas 2009; Kane et al. 2015). There are two main competing approaches in the literature that aim to account for the described pattern with respect to multiplicity inferences: the ambiguity approach ( Farkas & de Swart 2010) and the implicature approach (Sauerland 2003; Spector 2007; Mayr 2015, among others). As discussed in Tieu et al. (2018), while both approaches can account for the upward- versus downward-entailing pattern of multiplicity inferences, they differ in what they predict with respect to the acquisition of these inferences and their relationship with implicatures. Tieu et al. (2014; 2018) investigated multiplicity inferences in English and reported evidence for the implicature approach. In this paper, we irst show how the ambiguity approach and the implicature approach to the multiplicity inference can be extended to account for the abundance inference. We then report on an experiment that tests the predictions of the two approaches for multiplicity and abundance inferences in preschool-aged children and adult native speakers of Greek. Our results replicate the patterns reported in Tieu et al. (2014; 2018) for multiplicity inferences, and crucially reveal an analogous pattern for abundance inferences. Adults computed both kinds of inferences more in upward-entailing environments than in downward-entailing ones, and children computed fewer inferences overall than adults did. These results relect an overall pattern of implicature calculation in line with a uniied implicature analysis across the three kinds of inferences. By contrast, we discuss how they pose a challenge for the ambiguity approach.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2017\n \n \n (11)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Asymmetry in presupposition projection: the case of conjunction.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mandelkern, M.; Romoli, J.; and Schwarz, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In SALT27, M., editor(s), 2017. SALT27, Maryland, SALT27, Maryland\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Mandelkern-Zehr:2017,\n\tauthor = {Mandelkern, Matthew, Zehr, Jeremy and Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:55:35 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-06-30 23:57:40 +0100},\n\teditor = {SALT27, Maryland},\n\torganization = {SALT27, Maryland},\n\tpublisher = {SALT27, Maryland},\n\ttitle = {Asymmetry in presupposition projection: the case of conjunction},\n\tyear = {2017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Hierarchical order and local contexts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Mandelkern, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Sinn und Bedeutung 21, E., editor(s), 2017. Sinn und Bedeutung 21, Edinburgh\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"HierarchicalPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Romoli-Mandelkern:2017,\n\tabstract = {We use antecedent-final conditionals to formulate a challenge to parsing-based theories of local contexts, and associated theories of presupposition projection and triviality, like\nthe one given in Schlenker 2009. We show that a theory like Schlenker's predicts that the local context for the antecedent of an antecedent-final conditional will entail the negation of the\nconditional's consequent. It thus predicts that presuppositions triggered in the antecedent of\nantecedent-final conditionals will be filtered if the negation of the consequent entails the presupposition. But this is wrong: John isn't in Paris, if he regrets being in France intuitively presupposes that John is in France, contrary to this prediction. Likewise, parsing-based approaches\nto triviality predict that material entailed by the negation of the consequent will be felt to be\nredundant in the antecedent of the conditional. But this is wrong: John isn't in Paris, if he's in\nFrance and Mary is with him is intuitively felicitous, contrary to this prediction. Importantly,\ngiven that the material in question appears in sentence-final position in antecedent-final conditionals, both incremental (left-to-right) and symmetric versions of parsing-based theories of\nlocal contexts make the same problematic predictions here. In Mandelkern and Romoli 2017,\nwe discuss one solution to this problem, given within a broadly parsing-based pragmatic approach. In this paper, we explore an alternate direction: incorporating attention to hierarchical\nstructure into the calculation of local contexts. We sketch several possible implementations and\npoint to some of the possibilities and challenges for a hierarchical approach to local contexts.},\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo and Mandelkern, Matthew},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:53:08 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-25 13:25:46 +0200},\n\teditor = {Sinn und Bedeutung 21, Edinburgh},\n\tpublisher = {Sinn und Bedeutung 21, Edinburgh},\n\ttitle = {Hierarchical order and local contexts},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DRjNjViN/RomoliMandelkern.pdf},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DRjNjViN/RomoliMandelkern.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n We use antecedent-final conditionals to formulate a challenge to parsing-based theories of local contexts, and associated theories of presupposition projection and triviality, like the one given in Schlenker 2009. We show that a theory like Schlenker's predicts that the local context for the antecedent of an antecedent-final conditional will entail the negation of the conditional's consequent. It thus predicts that presuppositions triggered in the antecedent of antecedent-final conditionals will be filtered if the negation of the consequent entails the presupposition. But this is wrong: John isn't in Paris, if he regrets being in France intuitively presupposes that John is in France, contrary to this prediction. Likewise, parsing-based approaches to triviality predict that material entailed by the negation of the consequent will be felt to be redundant in the antecedent of the conditional. But this is wrong: John isn't in Paris, if he's in France and Mary is with him is intuitively felicitous, contrary to this prediction. Importantly, given that the material in question appears in sentence-final position in antecedent-final conditionals, both incremental (left-to-right) and symmetric versions of parsing-based theories of local contexts make the same problematic predictions here. In Mandelkern and Romoli 2017, we discuss one solution to this problem, given within a broadly parsing-based pragmatic approach. In this paper, we explore an alternate direction: incorporating attention to hierarchical structure into the calculation of local contexts. We sketch several possible implementations and point to some of the possibilities and challenges for a hierarchical approach to local contexts.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Oddness and conjunction.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Pistoia-Reda, S.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistic and psycholinguistic, 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@book{Pistoia-Reda:2017,\n\tauthor = {Pistoia-Reda, Salvatore and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:49:26 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-06-30 23:51:59 +0100},\n\teditor = {Linguistic and psycholinguistic approaches to implicatures and presuppositions, Pistoia-Reda, S. and Domaneschi, F. (eds.)},\n\tpublisher = {Linguistic and psycholinguistic},\n\ttitle = {Oddness and conjunction},\n\tyear = {2017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Children's comprehension of plural predicate conjunction.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Romoli, J.; Poortman, E.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Child Language, 45(1): 242-259. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu-Romoli:2017,\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Romoli, Jacopo and Poortman, Eva, Winter, Yoad and Crain, Stephen},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:46:22 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-06-30 23:49:06 +0100},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Child Language},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {242-259},\n\ttitle = {Children's comprehension of plural predicate conjunction},\n\tvolume = {45},\n\tyear = {2017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Lifetime effects as presuppositional scalar strengthening.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Sudo, Y.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n UCL working paper in linguistics, 39: 30-42. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Sudo:2017,\n\tauthor = {Sudo, Yasutada and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:43:44 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-06-30 23:45:39 +0100},\n\tjournal = {UCL working paper in linguistics},\n\tpages = {30-42},\n\ttitle = {Lifetime effects as presuppositional scalar strengthening},\n\tvolume = {39},\n\tyear = {2017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Parsing and presuppositions in the calculation of local contexts.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mandelkern, M.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics & Pragmatics, 10(7). 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ParsingPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Mandelkern-Romoli:2017,\n\tabstract = {In this paper, we use antecedent-final conditionals to formulate\ntwo problems for parsing-based theories of presupposition projection and\ntriviality of the kind given in Schlenker 2009. We show that, when it comes\nto antecedent-final conditionals, parsing-based theories predict filtering of\npresuppositions where there is in fact projection, and triviality judgments\nfor sentences which are in fact felicitous. More concretely, these theories\npredict that presuppositions triggered in the antecedent of antecedentfinal conditionals will be filtered (i.e. will not project) if the negation of the\nconsequent entails the presupposition. But this is wrong: John isn't in Paris,\nif he regrets being in France intuitively presupposes that John is in France,\ncontrary to this prediction. Likewise, parsing-based approaches to triviality\npredict that material entailed by the negation of the consequent will be\nredundant in the antecedent of the conditional; but John isn't in Paris, if he's\nin France and Mary is with him is intuitively felicitous, contrary to these\npredictions. Importantly, given that the trigger appears in sentence-final\nposition, both incremental (left-to-right) and symmetric versions of such\ntheories make the same predictions. These data constitute a challenge to\nthe idea that presupposition projection and triviality should be computed\non the basis of parsing. This issue is important because it relates to the\nmore general question as to whether presupposition and triviality calculation\nshould be thought of as a pragmatic post-compositional phenomenon or\nas part of compositional semantics (as in the more traditional dynamic\napproaches). We discuss a solution which allows us to maintain the parsingbased pragmatic approach; it is based on an analysis of conditionals which\nincorporates a presupposition that their antecedent is compatible with the\ncontext, together with a modification to Schlenker's (2009) algorithm for\ncalculating local contexts so that it takes into account presupposed material.\nAs we will discuss, this solution works within a framework broadly similar\nto that of Schlenker's (2009), but it doesn't extend in an obvious way to\nother parsing-based accounts (e.g. parsing-based trivalent approaches). We\nconclude that a parsing-based theory can be maintained, but only if we adopt\na substantial change of perspective on the framework.},\n\tauthor = {Mandelkern, Matthew and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:41:41 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-25 13:27:57 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Semantics & Pragmatics}},\n\tnumber = {7},\n\ttitle = {Parsing and presuppositions in the calculation of local contexts},\n\turl = {http://mandelkern.hosting.nyu.edu/Parsing.pdf},\n\tvolume = {10},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {http://mandelkern.hosting.nyu.edu/Parsing.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n In this paper, we use antecedent-final conditionals to formulate two problems for parsing-based theories of presupposition projection and triviality of the kind given in Schlenker 2009. We show that, when it comes to antecedent-final conditionals, parsing-based theories predict filtering of presuppositions where there is in fact projection, and triviality judgments for sentences which are in fact felicitous. More concretely, these theories predict that presuppositions triggered in the antecedent of antecedentfinal conditionals will be filtered (i.e. will not project) if the negation of the consequent entails the presupposition. But this is wrong: John isn't in Paris, if he regrets being in France intuitively presupposes that John is in France, contrary to this prediction. Likewise, parsing-based approaches to triviality predict that material entailed by the negation of the consequent will be redundant in the antecedent of the conditional; but John isn't in Paris, if he's in France and Mary is with him is intuitively felicitous, contrary to these predictions. Importantly, given that the trigger appears in sentence-final position, both incremental (left-to-right) and symmetric versions of such theories make the same predictions. These data constitute a challenge to the idea that presupposition projection and triviality should be computed on the basis of parsing. This issue is important because it relates to the more general question as to whether presupposition and triviality calculation should be thought of as a pragmatic post-compositional phenomenon or as part of compositional semantics (as in the more traditional dynamic approaches). We discuss a solution which allows us to maintain the parsingbased pragmatic approach; it is based on an analysis of conditionals which incorporates a presupposition that their antecedent is compatible with the context, together with a modification to Schlenker's (2009) algorithm for calculating local contexts so that it takes into account presupposed material. As we will discuss, this solution works within a framework broadly similar to that of Schlenker's (2009), but it doesn't extend in an obvious way to other parsing-based accounts (e.g. parsing-based trivalent approaches). We conclude that a parsing-based theory can be maintained, but only if we adopt a substantial change of perspective on the framework.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Presuppositions and accommodation.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Sauerland, U.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Routledge Handbook of Pragmatics, 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@book{Romoli-Sauerland:2017,\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo and Sauerland, Uli},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:39:12 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-04 18:00:25 +0200},\n\teditor = {Barron, A. and Steen, G.,and Yueguo, G.},\n\tpublisher = {Routledge Handbook of Pragmatics},\n\ttitle = {Presuppositions and accommodation},\n\tyear = {2017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Probability and implicature: a unified account of the scalar effects of disjunction under modals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Santorio, P.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics & Pragmatics, 10(13): 1–61. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ProbabilityPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Santorio-Romoli:2017,\n\tabstract = {Sentences involving disjunction under epistemic modal adjectives--- such as possible, likely, and certain--- give rise to the inference that\nthe disjuncts are epistemically possible. Inferences of this sort are often\nclassified and treated differently, depending on the force of the embedding\nmodal. Those triggered by possibility modals are singled out as `free choice\ninferences' (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, Klinedinst 2007, Fox 2007, Chierchia\n2013, a.o.), while those triggered by stronger modals are accounted for in\na different way (Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007, Crniˇc, Chemla & Fox 2015 a.o.).\nIn this paper, we pursue two goals. First, we develop and defend a degree\nsemantics for epistemic modal adjectives, building on much recent work on\nthe topic (Yalcin 2010, Lassiter 2011, 2014, Moss 2015a, Swanson 2015, a.o.).\nSecond, we show that this semantics, in combination with the assumption\nthat scalar implicatures can arise in embedded position (Fox 2007, Chierchia,\nFox & Spector 2012, a.o.), can predict all the inferences triggered by disjunction under modals, including free choice ones, via a uniform mechanism. We\nconclude by outlining how the proposal can be extended to epistemic modal\nitems in other syntactic categories, and to modals of different flavor},\n\tauthor = {Santorio, Paolo and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:36:36 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-25 13:30:21 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Semantics & Pragmatics}},\n\tnumber = {13},\n\tpages = {1--61},\n\ttitle = {Probability and implicature: a unified account of the scalar effects of disjunction under modals},\n\turl = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/76318286/Free_choice_paper.edits.pdf},\n\tvolume = {10},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/76318286/Free_choice_paper.edits.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Sentences involving disjunction under epistemic modal adjectives— such as possible, likely, and certain— give rise to the inference that the disjuncts are epistemically possible. Inferences of this sort are often classified and treated differently, depending on the force of the embedding modal. Those triggered by possibility modals are singled out as `free choice inferences' (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, Klinedinst 2007, Fox 2007, Chierchia 2013, a.o.), while those triggered by stronger modals are accounted for in a different way (Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007, Crniˇc, Chemla & Fox 2015 a.o.). In this paper, we pursue two goals. First, we develop and defend a degree semantics for epistemic modal adjectives, building on much recent work on the topic (Yalcin 2010, Lassiter 2011, 2014, Moss 2015a, Swanson 2015, a.o.). Second, we show that this semantics, in combination with the assumption that scalar implicatures can arise in embedded position (Fox 2007, Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012, a.o.), can predict all the inferences triggered by disjunction under modals, including free choice ones, via a uniform mechanism. We conclude by outlining how the proposal can be extended to epistemic modal items in other syntactic categories, and to modals of different flavor\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The scalar inferences of strong scalar terms under negative quantifiers and constraints on the theory of alternatives.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Gotzner, N.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 35(1): 95–126. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Gotzner-Romoli:2017,\n\tabstract = {Chemla & Spector (2011) have found experimental evidence that a universal sen- tence embedding a weak scalar term like Every student read some of the books has the strong inference that no student read all of the books, in addition to the weak one that not every student did (see also Clifton Jr & Dube 2010, Potts et al. 2015, Gotzner & Benz 2015). While it is controversial how this strong inference should be derived, there is consensus in the literature that this inference is an inference of the sentence above. On the other hand, the corresponding case of a negative quantifier embedding a strong scalar term like No student read all of the books with its corresponding potential strong inference that every student read some of the books, in addition to the weak one that some student read some of the books, is more controversial (Chemla 2009a,b,c, Romoli 2012, 2014, Trinh & Haida 2015). And, to our knowledge, there is no convincing experimental evidence for the existence of this strong inference. In this paper, we report on two experiments, building on Chemla & Spector 2011 and Chemla 2009c, systematically comparing sentences like the above with every and no. In our results, we find evidence for the strong inferences of both every and no. We discuss how standard theories of alternatives (e.g. Sauerland 2004b) can account for our data but also how they incur in an over- and under-generation problems which have been pointed out in connection with the combination of alternatives for sentences with multiple scalar terms (Fox 2007, Magri 2010, Chemla 2010, Romoli 2012). We discuss the two more constrained theories of alternatives by Fox 2007 and Romoli 2012 and we show that only the latter, combined with an independent account of the inferences of disjunction under universal modals (Crnic et al. 2015, Bar-Lev & Fox 2016), can account for our data without incurring in the above-mentioned problems.\n},\n\tauthor = {Gotzner, Nicole and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:34:51 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-27 20:44:06 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {95--126},\n\ttitle = {The scalar inferences of strong scalar terms under negative quantifiers and constraints on the theory of alternatives},\n\turl = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/11605936/Theoriesofalternatives.third_v2.website.pdf},\n\tvolume = {35},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/11605936/Theoriesofalternatives.third_v2.website.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Chemla & Spector (2011) have found experimental evidence that a universal sen- tence embedding a weak scalar term like Every student read some of the books has the strong inference that no student read all of the books, in addition to the weak one that not every student did (see also Clifton Jr & Dube 2010, Potts et al. 2015, Gotzner & Benz 2015). While it is controversial how this strong inference should be derived, there is consensus in the literature that this inference is an inference of the sentence above. On the other hand, the corresponding case of a negative quantifier embedding a strong scalar term like No student read all of the books with its corresponding potential strong inference that every student read some of the books, in addition to the weak one that some student read some of the books, is more controversial (Chemla 2009a,b,c, Romoli 2012, 2014, Trinh & Haida 2015). And, to our knowledge, there is no convincing experimental evidence for the existence of this strong inference. In this paper, we report on two experiments, building on Chemla & Spector 2011 and Chemla 2009c, systematically comparing sentences like the above with every and no. In our results, we find evidence for the strong inferences of both every and no. We discuss how standard theories of alternatives (e.g. Sauerland 2004b) can account for our data but also how they incur in an over- and under-generation problems which have been pointed out in connection with the combination of alternatives for sentences with multiple scalar terms (Fox 2007, Magri 2010, Chemla 2010, Romoli 2012). We discuss the two more constrained theories of alternatives by Fox 2007 and Romoli 2012 and we show that only the latter, combined with an independent account of the inferences of disjunction under universal modals (Crnic et al. 2015, Bar-Lev & Fox 2016), can account for our data without incurring in the above-mentioned problems. \n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Turkish plural nouns are number-neutral: Experimental data.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Renans, A.; Tsoulas, G.; Folli, R.; Ketrez, N.; de Vries, H.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2017, 2017. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Renans:2018,\n\tauthor = {Renans, Agata and Tsoulas, George and Folli, Raffaella and Ketrez, Nihan and de Vries, Hanna and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tbooktitle = {{Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2017}},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:30:41 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-22 13:30:31 +0200},\n\ttitle = {Turkish plural nouns are number-neutral: Experimental data},\n\tyear = {2017}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On the role of alternatives in the acquisition of simple and complex disjunctions in French and Japanese.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Yatsushiro, K.; Cremers, A.; Romoli, J.; Sauerland, U.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 34(1): 127–152. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"OnPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu:2015g,\n\tabstract = {When interpreting disjunctive sentences of the form `A or B,' young children have\nbeen reported to differ from adults in two ways. First, children have been reported\nto interpret disjunction inclusively rather than exclusively, accepting `A or B' in contexts in which both A and B are true (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia & Guasti\n2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001). Second, some children have been\nreported to interpret disjunction conjunctively, rejecting `A or B' in contexts in which\nonly one of the disjuncts is true (Paris 1973; Braine & Rumain 1981; Chierchia, Guasti,\nGualmini, Meroni, Crain & Foppolo 2004; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar & Fox 2015).\nIn this paper, we extend the investigation of children's interpretation of disjunction to\ninclude both simple and complex forms of disjunction, in two typologically unrelated\nlanguages: French and Japanese. First, given that complex disjunctions have been\nargued to give rise to obligatory exclusivity inferences (Spector 2014), we investigated\nwhether the obligatoriness of the inference would play a role in the acquisition of the\nexclusive interpretation. Second, using a paradigm that makes the use of disjunction felicitous, we aimed to establish whether the finding of conjunctive interpretations\nwould be replicated for both simple and complex forms of disjunction, and in languages\nother than English. The main findings from our experiment are that both French- and\nJapanese-speaking children interpreted the simple and complex disjunctions either inclusively or conjunctively; in contrast, adults generally accessed exclusive readings of both disjunctions. We argue that our results lend further support to the proposal\nput forth in Singh et al. (2015), according to which the reason some children compute\nconjunctive meanings while adults compute exclusive meanings is that the two groups\ndiffer in their respective sets of alternatives for disjunction. Crucially, adults access\nconjunction as an alternative to disjunction, and compute exclusive interpretations;\nin contrast, children access only the individual disjuncts as alternatives, and therefore\neither interpret the disjunction literally or compute conjunctive inferences. More generally, our findings can be explained quite naturally within recent proposals according\nto which children differ from adults in the computation of scalar inferences because\nthey are more restricted than adults in the set of scalar alternatives they can access\n(Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou & Crain 2015b, among others).},\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Yatsushiro, Kazuko and Cremers, Alexandre and Romoli, Jacopo and Sauerland, Uli and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:55:38 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-27 20:50:20 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Semantics},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {127--152},\n\ttitle = {On the role of alternatives in the acquisition of simple and complex disjunctions in {F}rench and {J}apanese},\n\turl = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/76322046/AcqDisj_R3.pdf},\n\tvolume = {34},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/76322046/AcqDisj_R3.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n When interpreting disjunctive sentences of the form `A or B,' young children have been reported to differ from adults in two ways. First, children have been reported to interpret disjunction inclusively rather than exclusively, accepting `A or B' in contexts in which both A and B are true (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia & Guasti 2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001). Second, some children have been reported to interpret disjunction conjunctively, rejecting `A or B' in contexts in which only one of the disjuncts is true (Paris 1973; Braine & Rumain 1981; Chierchia, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain & Foppolo 2004; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar & Fox 2015). In this paper, we extend the investigation of children's interpretation of disjunction to include both simple and complex forms of disjunction, in two typologically unrelated languages: French and Japanese. First, given that complex disjunctions have been argued to give rise to obligatory exclusivity inferences (Spector 2014), we investigated whether the obligatoriness of the inference would play a role in the acquisition of the exclusive interpretation. Second, using a paradigm that makes the use of disjunction felicitous, we aimed to establish whether the finding of conjunctive interpretations would be replicated for both simple and complex forms of disjunction, and in languages other than English. The main findings from our experiment are that both French- and Japanese-speaking children interpreted the simple and complex disjunctions either inclusively or conjunctively; in contrast, adults generally accessed exclusive readings of both disjunctions. We argue that our results lend further support to the proposal put forth in Singh et al. (2015), according to which the reason some children compute conjunctive meanings while adults compute exclusive meanings is that the two groups differ in their respective sets of alternatives for disjunction. Crucially, adults access conjunction as an alternative to disjunction, and compute exclusive interpretations; in contrast, children access only the individual disjuncts as alternatives, and therefore either interpret the disjunction literally or compute conjunctive inferences. More generally, our findings can be explained quite naturally within recent proposals according to which children differ from adults in the computation of scalar inferences because they are more restricted than adults in the set of scalar alternatives they can access (Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou & Crain 2015b, among others).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2016\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Born in the USA: a comparison between modal and nominal quantifiers in child language.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Moscati, V.; Jacopo Romoli, T. D.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Natural Language Semantics. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Moscati:2016,\n\tauthor = {Moscati, Vincenzo and Jacopo Romoli, Tommaso Demarie and Stephen Crain},\n\tdate-added = {2020-07-01 12:20:33 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-01 12:21:37 +0100},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\ttitle = {Born in the USA: a comparison between modal and nominal quantifiers in child language},\n\tyear = {2016}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Scalar implicatures vs. presuppositions: The view from acquisition.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bill, C.; Romoli, J.; Schwarz, F.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Topoi, 35(1): 57-71. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Cory:2016,\n\tauthor = {Bill, Cory and Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian and Crain, Stephen},\n\tdate-added = {2020-07-01 12:06:24 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-01 12:10:09 +0100},\n\tjournal = {Topoi},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {57-71},\n\ttitle = {Scalar implicatures vs. presuppositions: The view from acquisition},\n\tvolume = {35},\n\tyear = {2016}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Testing the QUD approach: children's comprehension of scopally ambiguous questions.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Di Bacco, F.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of WCCFL34, S. L. C., editor(s), 2016. Proceedings of WCCFL34, Salt Lake City, Proceedings of WCCFL34, Salt Lake City\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{DiBacco:2016,\n\tauthor = {Di Bacco, Federica, Tieu, Lyn, Moscati, Vincenzo, Sevdali, Christina, Folli, Raffaella and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-06-30 23:57:50 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-06-30 23:59:17 +0100},\n\teditor = {Proceedings of WCCFL34, Salt Lake City},\n\torganization = {Proceedings of WCCFL34, Salt Lake City},\n\tpublisher = {Proceedings of WCCFL34, Salt Lake City},\n\ttitle = {Testing the QUD approach: children's comprehension of scopally ambiguous questions},\n\tyear = {2016}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Children's knowledge of free choice inferences and scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Romoli, J.; Zhou, P.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Semantics, 33(2): 269–298. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Children'sPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Tieu:2016,\n\tabstract = {This article presents experimental results showing that 4- and 5-year-old children are capable of drawing free choice inferences from disjunctive statements and from statements containing free choice indefinites, despite not being able to compute inferences of exclusivity for disjunctive statements, or other scalar implicatures. The findings appear to challenge accounts that attempt to unify the two kinds of inferences ( Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002 ; Alonso Ovalle 2005 ; Fox 2007 ; Klinedinst 2007 ; Chemla 2010 ; van Rooij 2010 ; Franke 2011 ; Chierchia 2013 ). We discuss, however, the compatibility of the child data with a recent approach in the experimental literature, which attributes children's failures to compute scalar implicatures to a difficulty with alternatives ( Chierchia et al. 2001 ; Gualmini et al. 2001 ; Reinhart 2006 ; Barner et al. 2011 ; Singh et al. 2013 ). Based on the results of two experiments, we propose an explanation for children's selective success on scalar inferences, according to which scalar inferences are generally unproblematic for children, unless they necessitate lexical retrieval of the required alternatives.},\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Romoli, Jacopo and Zhou, Peng and Crain, Stephen},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:55:23 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-02 21:06:53 +0200},\n\tjournal = {{Journal of Semantics}},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {269--298},\n\ttitle = {Children's knowledge of free choice inferences and scalar implicatures},\n\turl = {https://academic.oup.com/jos/article-abstract/33/2/269/2413864?redirectedFrom=fulltext},\n\tvolume = {33},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://academic.oup.com/jos/article-abstract/33/2/269/2413864?redirectedFrom=fulltext}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n This article presents experimental results showing that 4- and 5-year-old children are capable of drawing free choice inferences from disjunctive statements and from statements containing free choice indefinites, despite not being able to compute inferences of exclusivity for disjunctive statements, or other scalar implicatures. The findings appear to challenge accounts that attempt to unify the two kinds of inferences ( Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002 ; Alonso Ovalle 2005 ; Fox 2007 ; Klinedinst 2007 ; Chemla 2010 ; van Rooij 2010 ; Franke 2011 ; Chierchia 2013 ). We discuss, however, the compatibility of the child data with a recent approach in the experimental literature, which attributes children's failures to compute scalar implicatures to a difficulty with alternatives ( Chierchia et al. 2001 ; Gualmini et al. 2001 ; Reinhart 2006 ; Barner et al. 2011 ; Singh et al. 2013 ). Based on the results of two experiments, we propose an explanation for children's selective success on scalar inferences, according to which scalar inferences are generally unproblematic for children, unless they necessitate lexical retrieval of the required alternatives.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A puzzle for theories of redundancy: exhaustification, incrementality and the notion of local context.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mayr, C.; and Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics and Pragmatics, 9(7): 1–48. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"A paper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Mayr:2016,\n\tauthor = {Mayr, Clemens and Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-06 13:43:58 +0000},\n\tjournal = {Semantics and {P}ragmatics},\n\tnumber = {7},\n\tpages = {1--48},\n\tread = {0},\n\ttitle = {A puzzle for theories of redundancy: exhaustification, incrementality and the notion of local context},\n\turl_paper = {http://semprag.org/article/view/sp.9.7/pdf},\n\tvolume = {9},\n\tyear = {2016}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2015\n \n \n (7)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Le implicature scalari.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Pistoia-Reda, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Aphex: portale italiano di filosofia analitica, 11. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli-Pistoia:2015,\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo and Pistoia-Reda, Salvatore},\n\tdate-added = {2020-07-01 12:24:42 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-01 12:25:42 +0100},\n\tjournal = {Aphex: portale italiano di filosofia analitica},\n\ttitle = {Le implicature scalari},\n\tvolume = {11},\n\tyear = {2015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Toward a structural account of Conservativity.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Semantics-Syntax Interface. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli:2016,\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2020-07-01 12:22:25 +0100},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-01 12:23:27 +0100},\n\tjournal = {Semantics-Syntax Interface},\n\ttitle = {Toward a structural account of Conservativity},\n\tyear = {2015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Scope ambiguity in Broca's aphasia: Evidence for a grammar-specific impairment.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kennedy, L.; Romoli, J.; Tieu, L.; and Folli, R.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Poster presented at the 38th Generative Linguisics in the Old World (GLOW38), Paris, April 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@misc{Kennedy:2015,\n\tauthor = {Kennedy, Lynda and Romoli, Jacopo and Tieu, Lyn and Folli, Raffaella},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:56:06 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-09 13:56:06 +0000},\n\thowpublished = {Poster presented at the 38th Generative Linguisics in the Old World (GLOW38), Paris},\n\tmonth = {April},\n\ttitle = {Scope ambiguity in {B}roca's aphasia: {E}vidence for a grammar-specific impairment},\n\tyear = {2015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n On the acquisition of simple and complex disjunctions in French and Japanese.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Tieu, L.; Yatsushiro, K.; Cremers, A.; Romoli, J.; Sauerland, U.; and Chemla, E.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of SALT 25, 2015. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Tieu:2015a,\n\tauthor = {Tieu, Lyn and Yatsushiro, Kazuko and Cremers, Alexandre and Romoli, Jacopo and Sauerland, Uli and Chemla, Emmanuel},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of {SALT 25}},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:55:34 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-04 18:02:12 +0200},\n\ttitle = {On the acquisition of simple and complex disjunctions in {F}rench and {J}apanese},\n\tyear = {2015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Children's interpretation of sentences with multiple scalar terms.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bill, C.; Pagliarini, E.; Romoli, J.; Tieu, L.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2015.\n Ms., Macquarie University\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@unpublished{Bill:2015,\n\tauthor = {Bill, Cory and Pagliarini, Elena and Romoli, Jacopo and Tieu, Lyn and Crain, Stephen},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:55:16 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-09 13:55:16 +0000},\n\tnote = {Ms., Macquarie University},\n\ttitle = {Children's interpretation of sentences with multiple scalar terms},\n\tyear = {2015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n An experimental comparison between presuppositions and indirect scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Schwarz, F.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Experimental Perspectives on Presuppositions, pages 215–240. Springer, 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Romoli:2015b,\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian},\n\tbooktitle = {Experimental {P}erspectives on {P}resuppositions},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:54:46 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-09 13:54:56 +0000},\n\tpages = {215--240},\n\tpublisher = {Springer},\n\ttitle = {An experimental comparison between presuppositions and indirect scalar implicatures},\n\tyear = {2015}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Presuppositions of Soft Triggers are obligatory scalar implicatures.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of semantics, 32(2): 173–219. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"ThePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli:2015,\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-08-09 16:10:46 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Journal of semantics},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {173--219},\n\ttitle = {The Presuppositions of Soft Triggers are obligatory scalar implicatures},\n\turl = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/11626362/The_presuppositions_of_soft_triggers_are.pdf},\n\tvolume = {32},\n\tyear = {2015},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://pure.ulster.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/11626362/The_presuppositions_of_soft_triggers_are.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2014\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Scalar implicatures versus presuppositions: The view from acquisition.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bill, C.; Romoli, J.; Schwarz, F.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n TOPOI, Special Issue on ``Presuppositions: Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology'',1–15. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Bill:2014b,\n\tauthor = {Bill, Cory and Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian and Crain, Stephen},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:56:04 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-09 13:56:04 +0000},\n\tjournal = {TOPOI, Special Issue on ``Presuppositions: Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology''},\n\tpages = {1--15},\n\tpublisher = {Springer},\n\ttitle = {Scalar implicatures versus presuppositions: {T}he view from acquisition},\n\tyear = {2014}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Presupposition vs. scalar implicatures in acquisition.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bill, C.; Romoli, J.; Schwarz, F.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 38th Annual Penn Linguistics Conference, volume 21, 2014. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Bill:2014a,\n\tauthor = {Bill, Cory and Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian and Crain, Stephen},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the 38th Annual Penn Linguistics Conference},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:55:58 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-06-28 11:05:59 +0200},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\ttitle = {Presupposition vs.~scalar implicatures in acquisition},\n\tvolume = {21},\n\tyear = {2014}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Indirect scalar implicatures are neither scalar implicatures nor presuppositions (or both).\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bill, C.; Romoli, J.; Schwarz, F.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of PLC 38. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@incollection{Bill:2014,\n\tauthor = {Bill, Cory and Romoli, Jacopo and Schwarz, Florian and Crain, Stephen},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of {PLC 38}},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\ttitle = {Indirect scalar implicatures are neither scalar implicatures nor presuppositions (or both)},\n\tyear = {2014}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2013\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A scalar implicature-based approach to Neg-raising.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Linguistics and Philosophy, 36(4): 291–353. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 11 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli:2013,\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:54:28 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-08-09 16:09:16 +0200},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {291--353},\n\ttitle = {A scalar implicature-based approach to {N}eg-raising},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/sub2012/Romoli.pdf},\n\tvolume = {36},\n\tyear = {2013},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/sub2012/Romoli.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Chidren's knowledge of alternatives.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Zhou, P.; Romoli, J.; and Crain, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of SALT 23, 2013. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Zhou:2013,\n\tauthor = {Zhou, Peng and Romoli, Jacopo and Crain, Stephen},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of {SALT 23}},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\ttitle = {Chidren's knowledge of alternatives},\n\tyear = {2013}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2012\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n A Solution (or two) to Soames' Problem: Presuppositions, Conditionals and Exhaustification.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n International Review of Pragmatics, 4(2): 153–184. 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"APaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@article{Romoli:2011c,\n\tabstract = {This paper focuses on sentences like Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too, first discussed by Soames (1982) and Karttunen and Peters (1979), which raise three problems.\nFirst, they are felicitous and do not appear to have presuppositions. However all major theories of presuppositions predict that they should presuppose what the antecedent\npresupposes (e.g., the sentence above should presuppose that Nixon is guilty). Second, there is a contrast between these sentences and the corresponding sentence-initial\nconditionals like if Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty. Finally, a way to solve the\nproblem would be to locally accommodate the presupposition in the antecedent. However, this wrongly predicts tautological truth-conditions. In the case above, the predicted meaning could be paraphrase as ``Nixon is guilty, if both Haldeman and Nixon\nare guilty.'' As a solution to these three problems, I propose that the presupposition is\nnonetheless locally accommodated in the antecedent and furthermore that the sentence\nis also interpreted exhaustively, which gives rise to a non-presuppositional and nontautological meaning analogous to Nixon is guilty, only if both Haldeman and Nixon\nare guilty. Furthermore, I argue that the degraded status of the sentence-initial case is\nan independent fact rooted in the topic-focus structure of sentence-final conditionals.\nFinally, the present proposal can also be extended to treat related non-presuppositional\ncases like I will go, if we go together.},\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-09 13:54:40 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:36:58 +0200},\n\tjournal = {International Review of Pragmatics},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {153--184},\n\ttitle = {A Solution (or two) to {S}oames' Problem: Presuppositions, Conditionals and Exhaustification},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/Dc4MGVkY/Soames.pdf},\n\tvolume = {4},\n\tyear = {2012},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/Dc4MGVkY/Soames.pdf}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n This paper focuses on sentences like Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too, first discussed by Soames (1982) and Karttunen and Peters (1979), which raise three problems. First, they are felicitous and do not appear to have presuppositions. However all major theories of presuppositions predict that they should presuppose what the antecedent presupposes (e.g., the sentence above should presuppose that Nixon is guilty). Second, there is a contrast between these sentences and the corresponding sentence-initial conditionals like if Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty. Finally, a way to solve the problem would be to locally accommodate the presupposition in the antecedent. However, this wrongly predicts tautological truth-conditions. In the case above, the predicted meaning could be paraphrase as ``Nixon is guilty, if both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.'' As a solution to these three problems, I propose that the presupposition is nonetheless locally accommodated in the antecedent and furthermore that the sentence is also interpreted exhaustively, which gives rise to a non-presuppositional and nontautological meaning analogous to Nixon is guilty, only if both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty. Furthermore, I argue that the degraded status of the sentence-initial case is an independent fact rooted in the topic-focus structure of sentence-final conditionals. Finally, the present proposal can also be extended to treat related non-presuppositional cases like I will go, if we go together.\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Soft but Strong: Neg-raising, Soft Triggers, and Exhaustification.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SoftPaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@phdthesis{Romoli:2012c,\n\tabstract = {In this thesis, I focus on scalar implicatures, presuppositions and their connections. In\nchapter 2, I propose a scalar implicature-based account of neg-raising inferences, standardly\nanalyzed as a presuppositional phenomenon (Gajewski 2005, 2007). I show that an approach\nbased on scalar implicatures can straightforwardly account for the differences and similarities\nbetween neg-raising predicates and presuppositional triggers.\nIn chapters 3 and 4, I extend this account to ``soft'' presuppositions, a class of\npresuppositions that are easily suspendable (Abusch 2002, 2010). I show how such account\ncan explain the differences and similarities between this class of presuppositions and other\npresuppositions on the one hand, and scalar implicatures on the other. Furthermore, I discuss\nvarious consequences that it has with respect to the behavior of soft presuppositions in\nquantificational sentences, their interactions with scalar implicatures, and their effects on the\nlicensing of negative polarity items.\nIn chapter 5, I show that by looking at the interaction between presuppositions and scalar\nimplicatures we can solve a notorious problem which arises with conditional sentences like (1)\n(Soames 1982, Karttunen and Peters 1979). The main issue with (1) is that it is intuitively not\npresuppositional and this is not predicted by any major theory of presupposition projection.\n\n(1) I'll go, if you go too.\n\nFinally, I explore in more detail the question of which alternatives should we consider in the\ncomputation of scalar implicatures (chapter 6). Traditionally, the answer has been to consider\nthe subset of logically stronger alternatives than the assertion. Recently, however, arguments\nhave been put forward in the literature for including also logically independent alternatives. I\nsupport this move by presenting some novel arguments in its favor and I show that while\nallowing new alternatives makes the right predictions in various cases, it also causes an underand an over-generation problem. I propose a solution to each problem, based on a novel\nrecursive algorithm for checking which alternatives are to be considered in the computation of\nscalar implicatures and the role of focus (Rooth 1992, Fox and Katzir 2011).},\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-07-24 22:39:12 +0200},\n\tschool = {Harvard University},\n\ttitle = {Soft but Strong: Neg-raising, Soft Triggers, and Exhaustification},\n\turl = {https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9909638/Romoli_gsas.harvard_0084L_10566.pdf?sequence=3},\n\tyear = {2012},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9909638/Romoli_gsas.harvard_0084L_10566.pdf?sequence=3}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n In this thesis, I focus on scalar implicatures, presuppositions and their connections. In chapter 2, I propose a scalar implicature-based account of neg-raising inferences, standardly analyzed as a presuppositional phenomenon (Gajewski 2005, 2007). I show that an approach based on scalar implicatures can straightforwardly account for the differences and similarities between neg-raising predicates and presuppositional triggers. In chapters 3 and 4, I extend this account to ``soft'' presuppositions, a class of presuppositions that are easily suspendable (Abusch 2002, 2010). I show how such account can explain the differences and similarities between this class of presuppositions and other presuppositions on the one hand, and scalar implicatures on the other. Furthermore, I discuss various consequences that it has with respect to the behavior of soft presuppositions in quantificational sentences, their interactions with scalar implicatures, and their effects on the licensing of negative polarity items. In chapter 5, I show that by looking at the interaction between presuppositions and scalar implicatures we can solve a notorious problem which arises with conditional sentences like (1) (Soames 1982, Karttunen and Peters 1979). The main issue with (1) is that it is intuitively not presuppositional and this is not predicted by any major theory of presupposition projection. (1) I'll go, if you go too. Finally, I explore in more detail the question of which alternatives should we consider in the computation of scalar implicatures (chapter 6). Traditionally, the answer has been to consider the subset of logically stronger alternatives than the assertion. Recently, however, arguments have been put forward in the literature for including also logically independent alternatives. I support this move by presenting some novel arguments in its favor and I show that while allowing new alternatives makes the right predictions in various cases, it also causes an underand an over-generation problem. I propose a solution to each problem, based on a novel recursive algorithm for checking which alternatives are to be considered in the computation of scalar implicatures and the role of focus (Rooth 1992, Fox and Katzir 2011).\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2011\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n An Experimental Investigation of Presupposition Projection in Conditional Sentences.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; Sudo, Y.; and Snedeker, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Ashton, N.; Chereches, A.; and Lut, D., editor(s), Semantic and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 21, Rutgers University, 2011. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Romoli:2011b,\n\taddress = {Rutgers University},\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo and Sudo, Yasutada and Snedeker, Jesse},\n\tbooktitle = {Semantic and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 21},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\teditor = {Neil Ashton and Anca Chereches and David Lut},\n\ttitle = {An Experimental Investigation of Presupposition Projection in Conditional Sentences},\n\tyear = {2011}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n The Presuppositions of Soft Triggers aren't Presuppositions.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Ashton, N.; Chereches, A.; and Lut, D., editor(s), Semantic and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 21, Rutgers University, 2011. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Romoli:2011a,\n\taddress = {Rutgers University},\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo},\n\tbooktitle = {Semantic and Linguistic Theory ({SALT}) 21},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\teditor = {Neil Ashton and Anca Chereches and David Lut},\n\ttitle = {The Presuppositions of Soft Triggers aren't Presuppositions},\n\tyear = {2011}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Variation of Presupposition Projection in Quantified Sentences.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Sudo, Y.; Romoli, J.; Fox, D.; and Hackl, M.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2011, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2011. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Romoli:2011e,\n\taddress = {Amsterdam, The Netherlands},\n\tauthor = {Sudo, Yasutada and Romoli, Jacopo and Fox, Danny and Hackl, Martin},\n\tbooktitle = {Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2011},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\ttitle = {Variation of Presupposition Projection in Quantified Sentences},\n\tyear = {2011}}\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n  \n 2008\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
\n
\n \n \n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n De re/de dicto ambiguity and presupposition projection.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Romoli, J.; and Sudo, Y.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Riester, A.; and Solstad, T., editor(s), Proceedings of SuB13, Stuttgart, 2008. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"<i>DePaper\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{Romoli:2008,\n\taddress = {Stuttgart},\n\tauthor = {Romoli, Jacopo and Sudo, Yasutada},\n\tbooktitle = {{Proceedings of SuB13}},\n\tdate-added = {2018-12-06 11:35:57 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2020-08-09 16:07:07 +0200},\n\teditor = {Arndt Riester and Torgrim Solstad},\n\ttitle = {\\textit{De re/de dicto} ambiguity and presupposition projection},\n\turl = {https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/sub/index.php/sub/article/view/563/509},\n\tyear = {2008},\n\tbdsk-url-1 = {https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/sub/index.php/sub/article/view/563/509}}\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n\n
\n"}; document.write(bibbase_data.data);