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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n CRISP: a semantics for focus-sensitive particles in questions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Marvin Schmitt.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Master's thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2018.\n
University of Amsterdam, MSc thesis\n\n
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@mastersthesis{Schmitt:18,\n\tabstract = {Focus particles like only, too, even, etc. are well studied expressions in formal semantics. They received a lot of attention from different view points, e.g. presupposition theory and the study of scalar implicatures. However, these particles did not receive as much attention when occurring in questions (with the exception from focus intervention effects). Concentrating on too we present interesting data points on too in alternative questions, plain polar questions, and who-questions, showing that too is infelicitous in some questions, but not all. We restrict ourselves thereby to questions in matrix form. The explanation of these data would be a first step towards a general account of the distribution of too in questions. \nIn order to explain the data points, the thesis will develop a compositional inquisitive semantics with focus and presuppositions: CRISP. This is motivated both conceptually and technically, since the few accessible frameworks for such a study are either technically restricted, or conceptually ill-suited. We will show that CRISP can account for the data points.},\n\tauthor = {Marvin Schmitt},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tnote = {University of Amsterdam, MSc thesis},\n\tschool = {University of Amsterdam},\n\ttitle = {CRISP: a semantics for focus-sensitive particles in questions},\n\turl = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1635/1/MoL-2018-21.text.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1635/1/MoL-2018-21.text.pdf}}\n\n
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\n Focus particles like only, too, even, etc. are well studied expressions in formal semantics. They received a lot of attention from different view points, e.g. presupposition theory and the study of scalar implicatures. However, these particles did not receive as much attention when occurring in questions (with the exception from focus intervention effects). Concentrating on too we present interesting data points on too in alternative questions, plain polar questions, and who-questions, showing that too is infelicitous in some questions, but not all. We restrict ourselves thereby to questions in matrix form. The explanation of these data would be a first step towards a general account of the distribution of too in questions. In order to explain the data points, the thesis will develop a compositional inquisitive semantics with focus and presuppositions: CRISP. This is motivated both conceptually and technically, since the few accessible frameworks for such a study are either technically restricted, or conceptually ill-suited. We will show that CRISP can account for the data points.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Factual conditionals and hypothetical commitments.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Jonathan Pesetsky.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Master's thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2018.\n
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@mastersthesis{Pesetsky:18,\n\tabstract = {A very general intuition about conditionals is that they ask us to consider their consequents in light of their antecedents. Different theories cash out this intuition in different ways, but one common assumption is that an agent parsing a conditional must consider only the ways in which the antecedent affects the information and issues present in discourse. In this thesis, I argue that one must also consider the conventional discourse effects brought about by its antecedent. \nMy central argument comes from the contrast between `if so' and `if yes'. While the former can occur felicitously as a response either to a question or to an assertion, the latter can only occur in response to a question. This restriction cannot arise from constraints on informational or inquisitive content, since `so' and `yes' have the same content when they are anaphoric to the same proposition. Rather, it must arise from the fact that `yes' commits its speaker to its anaphoric antecedent on the basis of their private inquisitive-evidentiary state (i.e. it creates a self-sourced commitment), while `so' creates a commitment based exclusively on testimony (i.e. a dependent commitment). Therefore, this contrast motivates a treatment of conditionals which is sensitive to these kinds of discourse-level distinctions. \nTo explain this data, I propose a stack-based analysis of conditionals in which an `if so' conditional creates a temporary hypothetical context where the speaker has a dependent commitment, while `if yes' creates a hypothetical context where the speaker has a self-sourced commitment. I show that this analysis can help us make sense of factual conditionals, an otherwise mysterious class of conditionals whose antecedents echo a previous utterance.},\n\tauthor = {Pesetsky, Jonathan},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tkeywords = {conditionals},\n\tschool = {University of Amsterdam},\n\ttitle = {Factual conditionals and hypothetical commitments},\n\turl = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1629/1/MoL-2018-15.text.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1629/1/MoL-2018-15.text.pdf}}\n\n
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\n A very general intuition about conditionals is that they ask us to consider their consequents in light of their antecedents. Different theories cash out this intuition in different ways, but one common assumption is that an agent parsing a conditional must consider only the ways in which the antecedent affects the information and issues present in discourse. In this thesis, I argue that one must also consider the conventional discourse effects brought about by its antecedent. My central argument comes from the contrast between `if so' and `if yes'. While the former can occur felicitously as a response either to a question or to an assertion, the latter can only occur in response to a question. This restriction cannot arise from constraints on informational or inquisitive content, since `so' and `yes' have the same content when they are anaphoric to the same proposition. Rather, it must arise from the fact that `yes' commits its speaker to its anaphoric antecedent on the basis of their private inquisitive-evidentiary state (i.e. it creates a self-sourced commitment), while `so' creates a commitment based exclusively on testimony (i.e. a dependent commitment). Therefore, this contrast motivates a treatment of conditionals which is sensitive to these kinds of discourse-level distinctions. To explain this data, I propose a stack-based analysis of conditionals in which an `if so' conditional creates a temporary hypothetical context where the speaker has a dependent commitment, while `if yes' creates a hypothetical context where the speaker has a self-sourced commitment. I show that this analysis can help us make sense of factual conditionals, an otherwise mysterious class of conditionals whose antecedents echo a previous utterance.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Inquisitive Logical Triviality and Grammar.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Hana Möller Kalpak.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Master's thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2018.\n
University of Amsterdam, MSc thesis\n\n
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@mastersthesis{MollerKalpak:18,\n\tabstract = {In this thesis, I de\u001bne the notion of inquisitive logical triviality, and investigate its connection to grammaticality in natural language. Inquisitive logical triviality is a property characterizing sentences which are either contradictory, or tautologous and non-inquisitive, purely in virtue of their logical vocabulary, and the presuppositions that this vocabulary triggers. I propose that inquisitive logical triviality is a source of systematic unacceptability of sentences, to the e\u001dect that sentences exhibiting this form of triviality are ungrammatical. I argue that this assumption allows us to explain various empirical puzzles involving inde\u001bnite and interrogative pronouns. First, it is shown to allow an account of previously unnoticed patterns of (un)grammaticality of constructions in which the exclusive particle only or an it-cleft associates with an inde\u001bnite pronoun or determiner phrase. Second, it is shown to allow a semantic account of the system of question formation in Yucatec Maya, a language with little-tono interrogative-speci\u001bc morphosyntax. Third, it is shown to allow an account for the cross-linguistic ability of focus to disambiguate quexistentials; words that can function both as inde\u001bnite and as interrogative pronouns.},\n\tauthor = {M{\\"o}ller Kalpak, Hana},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tkeywords = {questions},\n\tnote = {University of Amsterdam, MSc thesis},\n\tschool = {University of Amsterdam},\n\ttitle = {Inquisitive Logical Triviality and Grammar},\n\turl = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1633/1/MoL-2018-19.text.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1633/1/MoL-2018-19.text.pdf}}\n\n
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\n In this thesis, I de\u001bne the notion of inquisitive logical triviality, and investigate its connection to grammaticality in natural language. Inquisitive logical triviality is a property characterizing sentences which are either contradictory, or tautologous and non-inquisitive, purely in virtue of their logical vocabulary, and the presuppositions that this vocabulary triggers. I propose that inquisitive logical triviality is a source of systematic unacceptability of sentences, to the e\u001dect that sentences exhibiting this form of triviality are ungrammatical. I argue that this assumption allows us to explain various empirical puzzles involving inde\u001bnite and interrogative pronouns. First, it is shown to allow an account of previously unnoticed patterns of (un)grammaticality of constructions in which the exclusive particle only or an it-cleft associates with an inde\u001bnite pronoun or determiner phrase. Second, it is shown to allow a semantic account of the system of question formation in Yucatec Maya, a language with little-tono interrogative-speci\u001bc morphosyntax. Third, it is shown to allow an account for the cross-linguistic ability of focus to disambiguate quexistentials; words that can function both as inde\u001bnite and as interrogative pronouns.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Coordinating questions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Morwenna Hoeks.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Master's thesis, ILLC, University of Amsterdam, 2018.\n
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@mastersthesis{Hoeks:18,\n\tabstract = {This thesis explores how a well-founded and uniform compositional account can be given of coordinated questions. First, the empirical picture of question coordination is explored by making a direct comparison between conjunctive, disjunctive, and polar questions. Some surprising observations are discussed, which show that conjunctive questions always correspond to conjunctions of polar questions (PolQs), while disjunctive questions can never be analyzed as disjunctions of PolQs. The proposed account allows us to express several different readings of disjunctive questions, thereby deriving the differences between those readings from the interplay between their intonation, discourse effects, and underlying syntactic structure. In particular, it is argued that the contribution of the question operator should be split up into two components: a component that introduces a presupposition and a component that deals with the at issue question meaning. The way these two components interact is taken to be the crucial difference between PolQs and AltQs. The difference between AltQs and conjunctive questions is explained by making reference to their effects on discourse.},\n\tauthor = {Morwenna Hoeks},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tkeywords = {questions},\n\tschool = {ILLC, University of Amsterdam},\n\ttitle = {Coordinating questions},\n\turl = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1644/1/MoL-2018-30.text.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1644/1/MoL-2018-30.text.pdf}}\n\n
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\n This thesis explores how a well-founded and uniform compositional account can be given of coordinated questions. First, the empirical picture of question coordination is explored by making a direct comparison between conjunctive, disjunctive, and polar questions. Some surprising observations are discussed, which show that conjunctive questions always correspond to conjunctions of polar questions (PolQs), while disjunctive questions can never be analyzed as disjunctions of PolQs. The proposed account allows us to express several different readings of disjunctive questions, thereby deriving the differences between those readings from the interplay between their intonation, discourse effects, and underlying syntactic structure. In particular, it is argued that the contribution of the question operator should be split up into two components: a component that introduces a presupposition and a component that deals with the at issue question meaning. The way these two components interact is taken to be the crucial difference between PolQs and AltQs. The difference between AltQs and conjunctive questions is explained by making reference to their effects on discourse.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On selectional restrictions of clause-embedding predicates.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2018.\n
Presented at the First Modal Universals Workshop in Leiden, December 2018\n\n
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@unpublished{Roelofsen18:moduni,\n\tauthor = {Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tnote = {Presented at the First Modal Universals Workshop in Leiden, December 2018},\n\ttitle = {On selectional restrictions of clause-embedding predicates},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jQxOTBjZ/slides.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jQxOTBjZ/slides.pdf}}\n\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Intonation and sentence type conventions: Two types of rising declaratives.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Sunwoo Jeong.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Journal of Semantics, 35(2): 305-356. 2018.\n
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@article{Jeong:18,\n\tabstract = {This paper presents an experimental study that provides evidence for the existence of two types of rising declaratives in English which differ systematically in their forms and their functions. The two are labelled assertive rising declaratives and inquisitive rising declaratives, respectively. Guided by the experimental results, the paper develops a semantic analysis of them. Having as backdrop an extended Lewisian model of discourse involving a conversational scoreboard, the analysis associates assertive and inquisitive rising declaratives with distinct sets of context-changing conventions that bring about fundamentally different updates to core elements of the context. In the process, it highlights their respective partial overlaps with the conventions for two other sentence types, falling declaratives and polar interrogatives. The analysis fully captures the experimental results presented in the paper and reconciles disparate, seemingly contradictory observations about English rising declaratives noted in previous work.},\n\tauthor = {Sunwoo Jeong},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1093/semant/ffy001},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Semantics},\n\tkeywords = {questions},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {305-356},\n\ttitle = {Intonation and sentence type conventions: Two types of rising declaratives},\n\turl = {https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/35/2/305/4925551},\n\tvolume = {35},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/35/2/305/4925551},\n\tBdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1093/semant/ffy001}}\n\n
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\n This paper presents an experimental study that provides evidence for the existence of two types of rising declaratives in English which differ systematically in their forms and their functions. The two are labelled assertive rising declaratives and inquisitive rising declaratives, respectively. Guided by the experimental results, the paper develops a semantic analysis of them. Having as backdrop an extended Lewisian model of discourse involving a conversational scoreboard, the analysis associates assertive and inquisitive rising declaratives with distinct sets of context-changing conventions that bring about fundamentally different updates to core elements of the context. In the process, it highlights their respective partial overlaps with the conventions for two other sentence types, falling declaratives and polar interrogatives. The analysis fully captures the experimental results presented in the paper and reconciles disparate, seemingly contradictory observations about English rising declaratives noted in previous work.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Plurality effects in an exhaustification-based theory of embedded questions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Alexandre Cremers.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Natural Language Semantics. 2018.\n
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@article{Cremers:18,\n\tabstract = {Questions embedded under responsive predicates and definite descriptions both give rise to a variety of phenomena which can be grouped under the term plurality effects: quantificational variability, cumulativity, and homogeneity effects. This similarity has not gone unnoticed, and many proposals have taken inspiration in theories of definite plurals to account for these effects with embedded questions (Dayal in Locality in WH quantification: questions and relative clauses in Hindi, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996; Lahiri in Questions and answers in embedded contexts, Oxford studies in theoretical linguistics 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002; a.o.). Recently these phenomena have received less attention, as the field has focused on the so-called intermediate exhaustive reading of embedded questions instead, after Spector (Exhaustive interpretations: what to say and what not to say, Presentation at LSA Workshop: `Context and Content', 2005) called into question the traditional dichotomy between weak and strong exhaustive readings. As a result, the intermediate exhaustive reading has been accounted for at the expense of empirical coverage in other areas. In this paper, I propose a modular theory which derives the currently much discussed exhaustive readings without giving up the rich semantics necessary to account for plurality effects. My account of quantificational variability, cumulativity, and homogeneity effects builds on recent work on these phenomena in the nominal domain by adopting a categorial approach to embedded questions, while the strong and intermediate exhaustive readings are implemented using an independent strengthening mechanism suggested in Klinedinst and Rothschild (Semant Pragmat 4(2):1--23, 2011). The resulting theory not only recovers important results on plurality effects; it offers new, simple solutions for some puzzles presented in George (Question embedding and the semantics of answers, Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 2011; Thought J Philos 2(2):166--177, 2013) and Paill{\\'e} and Schwarz (in: Stockwell (ed) Proceedings of WCCFL 36, vol 36, Cascadilla Proceedings Project, Somerville, 2018), naturally derives readings that had been postulated in previous literature (Preuss in Issues in the semantics of questions with quantifiers, Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 2001), makes correct predictions in many unexplored cases, and is compatible with recent results in psycholinguistics. In the last sections I justify my assumptions and show how possible limitations I inherit from the theories I build on can be accommodated under standard assumptions.},\n\tauthor = {Alexandre Cremers},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11050-018-9145-3},\n\tjournal = {Natural Language Semantics},\n\ttitle = {Plurality effects in an exhaustification-based theory of embedded questions},\n\turl = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11050-018-9145-3},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11050-018-9145-3},\n\tBdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-018-9145-3}}\n\n
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\n Questions embedded under responsive predicates and definite descriptions both give rise to a variety of phenomena which can be grouped under the term plurality effects: quantificational variability, cumulativity, and homogeneity effects. This similarity has not gone unnoticed, and many proposals have taken inspiration in theories of definite plurals to account for these effects with embedded questions (Dayal in Locality in WH quantification: questions and relative clauses in Hindi, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996; Lahiri in Questions and answers in embedded contexts, Oxford studies in theoretical linguistics 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002; a.o.). Recently these phenomena have received less attention, as the field has focused on the so-called intermediate exhaustive reading of embedded questions instead, after Spector (Exhaustive interpretations: what to say and what not to say, Presentation at LSA Workshop: `Context and Content', 2005) called into question the traditional dichotomy between weak and strong exhaustive readings. As a result, the intermediate exhaustive reading has been accounted for at the expense of empirical coverage in other areas. In this paper, I propose a modular theory which derives the currently much discussed exhaustive readings without giving up the rich semantics necessary to account for plurality effects. My account of quantificational variability, cumulativity, and homogeneity effects builds on recent work on these phenomena in the nominal domain by adopting a categorial approach to embedded questions, while the strong and intermediate exhaustive readings are implemented using an independent strengthening mechanism suggested in Klinedinst and Rothschild (Semant Pragmat 4(2):1–23, 2011). The resulting theory not only recovers important results on plurality effects; it offers new, simple solutions for some puzzles presented in George (Question embedding and the semantics of answers, Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 2011; Thought J Philos 2(2):166–177, 2013) and Paillé and Schwarz (in: Stockwell (ed) Proceedings of WCCFL 36, vol 36, Cascadilla Proceedings Project, Somerville, 2018), naturally derives readings that had been postulated in previous literature (Preuss in Issues in the semantics of questions with quantifiers, Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 2001), makes correct predictions in many unexplored cases, and is compatible with recent results in psycholinguistics. In the last sections I justify my assumptions and show how possible limitations I inherit from the theories I build on can be accommodated under standard assumptions.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ivano Ciardelli, Linmin Zhang, & Lucas Champollion.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Linguistics and Philosophy, 41(6): 577-621. 2018.\n
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@article{Ciardelli:18counterfactuals,\n\tabstract = {Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.},\n\tauthor = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Zhang, Linmin and Champollion, Lucas},\n\tdate-added = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},\n\tissn = {1573-0549},\n\tjournal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},\n\tkeywords = {conditionals},\n\tnumber = {6},\n\tpages = {577-621},\n\ttitle = {Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals},\n\turl = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},\n\tvolume = {41},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},\n\tBdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4}}\n\n
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\n Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Dependence Statements Are Strict Conditionals.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ivano Ciardelli.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Guram Bezhanishvili, Giovanna D'Agostino, George Metcalfe, & Thomas Studer., editor(s),
Advances in Modal Logic (AIML), pages 123-142, London, 2018. College Publications\n
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@inproceedings{Ciardelli:18aiml,\n\taddress = {London},\n\tauthor = {Ivano Ciardelli},\n\tbooktitle = {Advances in Modal Logic (AIML)},\n\teditor = {Bezhanishvili, Guram and Giovanna D'Agostino and George Metcalfe and Thomas Studer},\n\tpages = {123-142},\n\tpublisher = {College Publications},\n\ttitle = {Dependence Statements Are Strict Conditionals},\n\tabstract={In this paper I discuss dependence statements like “whether p determines whether q”.\nI propose to analyze such statements as involving a generalized strict conditional\noperator applied to two questions—a determining question and a determined one.\nThe dependence statement is true or false at a world w according to whether, relative\nto the set of successors of w, every answer to the former yields an answer to the latter.\nThis motivates an investigation of strict conditionals in the context of inquisitive logic.\nA sound and complete axiomatization of the resulting logic is established, both for\nthe class of all Kripke frames, and for various notable frame classes.},\n\turl={http://www.ivanociardelli.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/aiml18-final.pdf},\n\tkeywords={inquisitive logic, dependence, conditionals},\n\tyear = {2018}}\n\n
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\n In this paper I discuss dependence statements like “whether p determines whether q”. I propose to analyze such statements as involving a generalized strict conditional operator applied to two questions—a determining question and a determined one. The dependence statement is true or false at a world w according to whether, relative to the set of successors of w, every answer to the former yields an answer to the latter. This motivates an investigation of strict conditionals in the context of inquisitive logic. A sound and complete axiomatization of the resulting logic is established, both for the class of all Kripke frames, and for various notable frame classes.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Inquisitive Semantics.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ivano Ciardelli, Jeroen Groenendijk, & Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Oxford University Press, 2018.\n
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@book{Ciardelli:18book,\n\tabstract = {This book presents a new logical framework to capture the meaning of sentences in conversation. The traditional approach equates meaning with truth-conditions: to know the meaning of a sentence is to know under which circumstances it is true. The reason for this is that linguistic and philosophical investigations are usually carried out in a logical framework that was originally designed to characterize valid argumentation. However, argumentation is neither the sole, nor the primary function of language. One task that language more widely and ordinarily fulfils is to enable the exchange of information between conversational participants. In the framework outlined in this volume, inquisitive semantics, information exchange is seen as a process of raising and resolving issues. Inquisitive semantics provides a new formal notion of meaning, which makes it possible to model various concepts that are crucial for the analysis of linguistic information exchange in a more refined and more principled way than has been possible in previous frameworks. Importantly, it also allows an integrated treatment of statements and questions.\n\nThe first part of the book presents the framework in detail, while the second demonstrates its benefits in the semantic analysis of questions, coordination, modals, conditionals, and intonation. The book will be of interest to researchers and students from advanced undergraduate level upwards in the fields of semantics, pragmatics, philosophy of language, and logic.\n\nThis is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.},\n\tauthor = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Groenendijk, Jeroen and Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,questions,theoretical linguistics,monograph},\n\tpublisher = {Oxford University Press},\n\ttitle = {{Inquisitive Semantics}},\n\turl = {http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198814788.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198814788.pdf}}\n\n
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\n This book presents a new logical framework to capture the meaning of sentences in conversation. The traditional approach equates meaning with truth-conditions: to know the meaning of a sentence is to know under which circumstances it is true. The reason for this is that linguistic and philosophical investigations are usually carried out in a logical framework that was originally designed to characterize valid argumentation. However, argumentation is neither the sole, nor the primary function of language. One task that language more widely and ordinarily fulfils is to enable the exchange of information between conversational participants. In the framework outlined in this volume, inquisitive semantics, information exchange is seen as a process of raising and resolving issues. Inquisitive semantics provides a new formal notion of meaning, which makes it possible to model various concepts that are crucial for the analysis of linguistic information exchange in a more refined and more principled way than has been possible in previous frameworks. Importantly, it also allows an integrated treatment of statements and questions. The first part of the book presents the framework in detail, while the second demonstrates its benefits in the semantic analysis of questions, coordination, modals, conditionals, and intonation. The book will be of interest to researchers and students from advanced undergraduate level upwards in the fields of semantics, pragmatics, philosophy of language, and logic. This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n An Inquisitive Perspective on Modals and Quantifiers.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ivano Ciardelli, & Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Annual Review of Linguistics, 4: 129–149. 2018.\n
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@article{CiardelliRoelofsen:18,\n\tabstract = {Inquisitive semantics enriches the standard truth-conditional notion of meaning, in order to facilitate an integrated semantic analysis of statements and questions. Taking this richer view on meaning as a starting point, this review presents a new perspective on modal operators and quantifiers, one that has the potential to address a number of challenges for standard semantic analyses of such operators. To illustrate the new perspective, we present an inquisitive take on the semantics of attitude verbs and on quantifiers taking scope out of questions.},\n\tauthor = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011817-045626},\n\tjournal = {Annual Review of Linguistics},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,modality,quantification,questions,theoretical linguistics,survey},\n\tmendeley-tags = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,modality,quantification,questions},\n\tpages = {129--149},\n\ttitle = {{An Inquisitive Perspective on Modals and Quantifiers}},\n\turl = {http://www.annualreviews.org/eprint/QJ7NerczQ6Yaj9rGbGQe/full/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011817-045626},\n\tvolume = {4},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {http://www.annualreviews.org/eprint/QJ7NerczQ6Yaj9rGbGQe/full/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011817-045626},\n\tBdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011817-045626}}\n\n
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\n Inquisitive semantics enriches the standard truth-conditional notion of meaning, in order to facilitate an integrated semantic analysis of statements and questions. Taking this richer view on meaning as a starting point, this review presents a new perspective on modal operators and quantifiers, one that has the potential to address a number of challenges for standard semantic analyses of such operators. To illustrate the new perspective, we present an inquisitive take on the semantics of attitude verbs and on quantifiers taking scope out of questions.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Questions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Charles Cross, & Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Edward Zalta., editor(s),
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 2018.\n
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@incollection{CrossRoelofsen:18,\n\tabstract = {The philosophy of language since Frege has emphasized propositions and declarative sentences, but it is clear that questions and interrogative sentences are just as important. Scientific investigation and explanation proceed in part through the posing and answering of questions, and human-computer interaction is often structured in terms of queries and answers. After going over some preliminaries we will focus on three lines of work on questions: one located at the intersection of philosophy of language and formal semantics, focusing on the semantics of what Belnap and Steel (1976) call elementary questions; a second located at the intersection of philosophy of language and philosophy of science, focusing on why-questions and the notion of explanation; and a third located at the intersection of philosophy of language and epistemology, focusing on embedded or indirect questions.},\n\tauthor = {Cross, Charles and Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tbooktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\teditor = {Zalta, Edward},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,questions,theoretical linguistics,survey},\n\tmendeley-tags = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,questions},\n\tpublisher = {Stanford University},\n\ttitle = {{Questions}},\n\turl = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/questions},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/questions}}\n\n
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\n The philosophy of language since Frege has emphasized propositions and declarative sentences, but it is clear that questions and interrogative sentences are just as important. Scientific investigation and explanation proceed in part through the posing and answering of questions, and human-computer interaction is often structured in terms of queries and answers. After going over some preliminaries we will focus on three lines of work on questions: one located at the intersection of philosophy of language and formal semantics, focusing on the semantics of what Belnap and Steel (1976) call elementary questions; a second located at the intersection of philosophy of language and philosophy of science, focusing on why-questions and the notion of explanation; and a third located at the intersection of philosophy of language and epistemology, focusing on embedded or indirect questions.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n NPIs in questions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2018.\n
NYU Linguistics Colloquium\n\n
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@unpublished{Roelofsen:18nyu,\n\tauthor = {Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,npi,questions,theoretical linguistics,ongoing},\n\tmendeley-tags = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,npi,questions},\n\tnote = {NYU Linguistics Colloquium},\n\ttitle = {{NPIs in questions}},\n\turl = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WY0MzU0N/handout.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WY0MzU0N/handout.pdf}}\n\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Do modals take propositions or sets of propositions? Evidence from Japanese darou.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Wataru Uegaki, & Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Sireemas Maspong, Brynhildur Stefansdottir, Katherine Blake, & Forrest Davis., editor(s),
Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT 28), pages 809-829, 2018. Linguistics Society of America\n
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@inproceedings{UegakiRoelofsen:18,\n\tabstract = {The Japanese modal particle darou can take either a declarative or an interrogative prejacent (Hara 2006; Hara & Davis 2013). We point out, however, that its interrogative-embedding use cannot be reduced to its declarative-embedding use. This is problematic under the standard assumption that modal operators always apply to propositions, but not under more recent proposals which take modal op- erators to apply to sets of propositions. We develop a detailed account of darou, capturing its non-reductive nature as well as its puzzling interaction with intonation (Hara 2015).},\n\tauthor = {Uegaki, Wataru and Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tbooktitle = {Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT 28)},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.3765/salt.v28i0.4427},\n\teditor = {Sireemas Maspong and Brynhildur Stefansdottir and Katherine Blake and Forrest Davis},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,modality,questions,attitude predicates},\n\tmendeley-tags = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,modality,questions,attitude predicates},\n\tpages = {809-829},\n\tpublisher = {Linguistics Society of America},\n\ttitle = {Do modals take propositions or sets of propositions? Evidence from Japanese darou},\n\turl = {https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/SALT/article/view/28.809},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/SALT/article/view/28.809},\n\tBdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.3765/salt.v28i0.4427}}\n\n
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\n The Japanese modal particle darou can take either a declarative or an interrogative prejacent (Hara 2006; Hara & Davis 2013). We point out, however, that its interrogative-embedding use cannot be reduced to its declarative-embedding use. This is problematic under the standard assumption that modal operators always apply to propositions, but not under more recent proposals which take modal op- erators to apply to sets of propositions. We develop a detailed account of darou, capturing its non-reductive nature as well as its puzzling interaction with intonation (Hara 2015).\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Polarity sensitivity of question embedding: experimental evidence.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Thom Gessel, Alexandre Cremers, & Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Sireemas Maspong, Brynhildur Stefansdottir, Katherine Blake, & Forrest Davis., editor(s),
Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT 28), pages 217–232, 2018. \n
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@inproceedings{Gessel:18salt,\n\tabstract = {Attitude predicates can be classified by the kinds of complements they can embed: declaratives, interrogatives or both. However, several authors have claimed that predicates like be certain can only embed interrogatives in specific environments. According to Mayr, these are exactly the environments that license negative polarity items (NPIs). In his analysis, both NPIs and embedded interrogatives are licensed by the same semantic strengthening procedure. If this is right, one would expect a correlation between acceptability of be certain whether and NPIs. The analysis also predicts a contrast between antecedents vs. consequents of conditionals and restrictors vs. scopes of universal quantifiers. This paper tests these predictions experimentally through an acceptability judgment task. We find that judgments for be certain whether do not correlate with judgments on NPIs, which suggests that be certain whether and NPIs are in fact licensed by different mechanisms.},\n\tauthor = {van Gessel, Thom and Cremers, Alexandre and Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tbooktitle = {Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT 28)},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\tdoi = {10.3765/salt.v28i0.4424},\n\teditor = {Sireemas Maspong and Brynhildur Stefansdottir and Katherine Blake and Forrest Davis},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,questions,attitude predicates,experimental linguistics,npi,negation},\n\tmendeley-tags = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics},\n\tpages = {217--232},\n\ttitle = {{Polarity sensitivity of question embedding: experimental evidence}},\n\turl = {https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/SALT/article/view/28.217},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/SALT/article/view/28.217},\n\tBdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.3765/salt.v28i0.4424}}\n\n
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\n Attitude predicates can be classified by the kinds of complements they can embed: declaratives, interrogatives or both. However, several authors have claimed that predicates like be certain can only embed interrogatives in specific environments. According to Mayr, these are exactly the environments that license negative polarity items (NPIs). In his analysis, both NPIs and embedded interrogatives are licensed by the same semantic strengthening procedure. If this is right, one would expect a correlation between acceptability of be certain whether and NPIs. The analysis also predicts a contrast between antecedents vs. consequents of conditionals and restrictors vs. scopes of universal quantifiers. This paper tests these predictions experimentally through an acceptability judgment task. We find that judgments for be certain whether do not correlate with judgments on NPIs, which suggests that be certain whether and NPIs are in fact licensed by different mechanisms.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Implicatures of modified numerals: quality or quantity?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ivano Ciardelli, Liz Coppock, & Floris Roelofsen.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Robert Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern, & Hannah Rohde., editor(s),
Sinn und Bedeutung 21, pages 283–300, 2018. \n
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@inproceedings{Ciardelli2018,\n\tabstract = {This paper presents a theory of modified numerals that derives a three-way distinction in the implicature profile between superlative modifiers, comparative modifiers, and bare numerals. In contrast to the recent proposal by Schwarz (2016a), and drawing on elements from Coppock and Brochhagen's (2013) inquisitive analysis, the proposal decouples ignorance implicatures from upper-bounding implicatures, and thereby captures an important difference between more than and at least, which differ in their ignorance implicatures but both lack an upper-bounding implicature. At the same time, it accounts for the context-sensitivity in the ignorance implicatures of modified numerals found by Westera and Brasoveanu (2014), and addresses a problem with Coppock and Brochhagen (2013) pointed out by Schwarz (2016b). The key feature of the proposal is the fact that ignorance implicatures may arise in two different ways, namely, both from the Maxim of Quantity and from the Maxim of Quality.},\n\tauthor = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Coppock, Liz and Roelofsen, Floris},\n\tbooktitle = {Sinn und Bedeutung 21},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\teditor = {Truswell, Robert and Cummins, Chris and Heycock, Caroline and Rabern, Brian and Rohde, Hannah},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,numerals,ignorance,implicatures},\n\tmendeley-tags = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics},\n\tpages = {283--300},\n\ttitle = {{Implicatures of modified numerals: quality or quantity?}},\n\turl = {https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/sub/index.php/sub/article/view/138},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/sub/index.php/sub/article/view/138}}\n\n
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\n This paper presents a theory of modified numerals that derives a three-way distinction in the implicature profile between superlative modifiers, comparative modifiers, and bare numerals. In contrast to the recent proposal by Schwarz (2016a), and drawing on elements from Coppock and Brochhagen's (2013) inquisitive analysis, the proposal decouples ignorance implicatures from upper-bounding implicatures, and thereby captures an important difference between more than and at least, which differ in their ignorance implicatures but both lack an upper-bounding implicature. At the same time, it accounts for the context-sensitivity in the ignorance implicatures of modified numerals found by Westera and Brasoveanu (2014), and addresses a problem with Coppock and Brochhagen (2013) pointed out by Schwarz (2016b). The key feature of the proposal is the fact that ignorance implicatures may arise in two different ways, namely, both from the Maxim of Quantity and from the Maxim of Quality.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The distributive ignorance puzzle.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Floris Roelofsen, & Wataru Uegaki.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Robert Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern, & Hannah Rohde., editor(s),
Sinn und Bedeutung 21, pages 999-1016, 2018. \n
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@inproceedings{RoelofsenUegaki:16,\n\tabstract = {We observe that verbs like wonder do not just imply that their subject does not know the answer to the embedded question, but a stronger form of ignorance, which we call distributive ignorance. This is not predicted by existing work on the semantics of wonder, and we argue that it cannot be straightforwardly derived as a pragmatic inference either. We consider two possible semantic accounts, and conclude in favor of one on which the lexical semantics of wonder involves exhaustification w.r.t. structural alternatives as well as sub-domain alternatives of its complement.},\n\tauthor = {Roelofsen, Floris and Uegaki, Wataru},\n\tbooktitle = {Sinn und Bedeutung 21},\n\tdate-modified = {2021-08-17 00:00:00 +0000},\n\teditor = {Truswell, Robert and Cummins, Chris and Heycock, Caroline and Rabern, Brian and Rohde, Hannah},\n\tkeywords = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics,ignorance,questions,modality,attitude predicates,exhaustivity,implicatures},\n\tmendeley-tags = {inquisitive semantics,theoretical linguistics},\n\tpages = {999-1016},\n\ttitle = {{The distributive ignorance puzzle}},\n\turl = {https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/sub/index.php/sub/article/view/180},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tBdsk-Url-1 = {https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/sub/index.php/sub/article/view/180}}\n\n
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\n We observe that verbs like wonder do not just imply that their subject does not know the answer to the embedded question, but a stronger form of ignorance, which we call distributive ignorance. This is not predicted by existing work on the semantics of wonder, and we argue that it cannot be straightforwardly derived as a pragmatic inference either. We consider two possible semantic accounts, and conclude in favor of one on which the lexical semantics of wonder involves exhaustification w.r.t. structural alternatives as well as sub-domain alternatives of its complement.\n
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