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\n  \n 2023\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What politicians don't know can hurt you: The effects of information on politicians' spending decisions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ryan Jablonski; and Brigitte Seim.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n American Political Science Review,1-21. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"What paper\n  \n \n \n \"What pre-analysis plan\n  \n \n \n \"What data\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 48 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{JablonskiInfo,\r\n  title={What politicians don't know can hurt you: The effects of information on politicians' spending decisions},\r\n  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Seim, Brigitte},\r\n journal={American Political Science Review},\r\npages={1-21},\r\n  year={2023},\r\n  publisher={Cambridge University Press},\r\nabstract={Do well-informed politicians make more effective public spending decisions? In experiments with almost all (N=460) elected politicians in Malawi, we tested the effects of information on public spending by providing information about school needs, foreign aid and voting prior to real spending decisions. We show that this intervention reduced inequalities in public spending: treatment group politicians were more likely to spend in schools neglected by donors and more likely to spend in schools at the highest quartile of need. Treatment effects were often greatest in remote and less populated communities. The effect of some treatments also increased when politicians were told that they were being observed by voters or donors, suggesting that greater transparency increases demand for accurate information. These results provide a novel explanation for inequalities in spending and imply social welfare benefits from improving politicians' access to and demand for information about community needs.},\r\nurl_Paper={https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423001132},\r\nurl_Pre-Analysis_Plan={https://osf.io/xj72z/},\r\nurl_Data={https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS5R5S}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n Do well-informed politicians make more effective public spending decisions? In experiments with almost all (N=460) elected politicians in Malawi, we tested the effects of information on public spending by providing information about school needs, foreign aid and voting prior to real spending decisions. We show that this intervention reduced inequalities in public spending: treatment group politicians were more likely to spend in schools neglected by donors and more likely to spend in schools at the highest quartile of need. Treatment effects were often greatest in remote and less populated communities. The effect of some treatments also increased when politicians were told that they were being observed by voters or donors, suggesting that greater transparency increases demand for accurate information. These results provide a novel explanation for inequalities in spending and imply social welfare benefits from improving politicians' access to and demand for information about community needs.\n
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\n  \n 2021\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Individualized text messages about public services fail to sway voters: evidence from a field experiment on Ugandan elections.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ryan S Jablonski; Mark T Buntaine; Daniel L Nielson; and Paula M Pickering.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Experimental Political Science,1-13. 2021.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Individualized publication\n  \n \n \n \"Individualized ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"Individualized data\n  \n \n \n \"Individualized pre-analysis plan\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 12 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{jablonski2021individualized,\r\n  title={Individualized text messages about public services fail to sway voters: evidence from a field experiment on Ugandan elections},\r\n  author={Jablonski, Ryan S and Buntaine, Mark T and Nielson, Daniel L and Pickering, Paula M},\r\n  journal={Journal of Experimental Political Science},\r\n  pages={1-13},\r\n  year={2021},\r\n  publisher={Cambridge University Press},\r\nabstract={Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior..},\r\nurl_Publication={https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2021.15},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://r.s.jablonski.s3.amazonaws.com/articles/Vote_Choice_Public_Services.pdf},\r\nurl_Data={https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VL4UTZ},\r\nurl_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior..\n
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\n  \n 2020\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n How information about foreign aid affects public spending decisions: Evidence from a field experiment in Malawi.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Brigitte Seim; Ryan Jablonski; and Johan Ahlback.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Development Economics. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"How publication\n  \n \n \n \"How ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"How data\n  \n \n \n \"How pre-analysis plan\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 21 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n 
@article{seim2020information,\r\n  title={How information about foreign aid affects public spending decisions: Evidence from a field experiment in Malawi},\r\n  author={Seim, Brigitte and Jablonski, Ryan and Ahlback, Johan},\r\n  journal={Journal of Development Economics},\r\n  year={2020},\r\nabstract={Does foreign aid shift public spending? Many worry that aid will be "fungible'' in the sense that governments reallocate public funds in response to aid. If so, this could undermine development, increase the poorest’s dependency on donors, and free resources for patronage. Yet, there is little agreement about the scale or consequences of such effects. We conducted an experiment with 460 elected politicians in Malawi. We provided information about foreign aid projects in local schools to these politicians. Afterwards, politicians made real decisions about which schools to target with development goods. Politicians who received the aid information treatment were 18\\% less likely to target schools with existing aid. These effects increase to 22-29\\% when the information was plausibly novel. We find little evidence that aid information heightens targeting of political supporters or family members, or dampens support to the neediest. Instead, the evidence indicates politicians allocate the development goods in line with equity concerns.},\r\nurl_Publication={https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102522},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://aiddata.org/publications/how-information-about-foreign-aid-affects-public-spending-decisions-evidence-from-a-field-experiment-in-malawi},\r\nurl_Data={https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GMQUAQ},\r\nurl_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/XJ72Z}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Does foreign aid shift public spending? Many worry that aid will be \"fungible'' in the sense that governments reallocate public funds in response to aid. If so, this could undermine development, increase the poorest’s dependency on donors, and free resources for patronage. Yet, there is little agreement about the scale or consequences of such effects. We conducted an experiment with 460 elected politicians in Malawi. We provided information about foreign aid projects in local schools to these politicians. Afterwards, politicians made real decisions about which schools to target with development goods. Politicians who received the aid information treatment were 18% less likely to target schools with existing aid. These effects increase to 22-29% when the information was plausibly novel. We find little evidence that aid information heightens targeting of political supporters or family members, or dampens support to the neediest. Instead, the evidence indicates politicians allocate the development goods in line with equity concerns.\n
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\n  \n 2019\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Budgets, SMS Texts and Voting in Uganda.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mark Buntaine; Sarah Bush; Ryan Jablonski; Dan Neilson; and Paula Pickering.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information, Accountability and Cumulative Learning. Cambridge University Press, 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Budgets, publication\n  \n \n \n \"Budgets, ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"Budgets, data\n  \n \n \n \"Budgets, pre-analysis plan\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n 
@incollection{buntaine2019budgets,\r\n  title={Budgets, SMS Texts and Voting in Uganda},\r\n  author={Buntaine, Mark and Bush, Sarah and Jablonski, Ryan and Neilson, Dan and Pickering, Paula},\r\n  booktitle={Information, Accountability and Cumulative Learning},\r\n  year={2019},\r\n  publisher={Cambridge University Press},\r\nabstract={},\r\nurl_Publication={https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/information-accountability-and-cumulative-learning/45DD58C16ED29DFFA9D69F0CF740EFB4},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102151/},\r\nurl_Data={https://github.com/egap/metaketa-i},\r\nurl_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Thad Dunning; Guy Grossman; Macartan Humphreys; Susan D Hyde; Craig McIntosh; Gareth Nellis; Claire L Adida; Eric Arias; Clara Bicalho; Taylor C Boas; and others.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Science advances, 5(7). 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Voter publication\n  \n \n \n \"Voter pre-analysis plan\n  \n \n \n \"Voter data\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n 
@article{dunning2019voter,\r\n  title={Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials},\r\n  author={Dunning, Thad and Grossman, Guy and Humphreys, Macartan and Hyde, Susan D and McIntosh, Craig and Nellis, Gareth and Adida, Claire L and Arias, Eric and Bicalho, Clara and Boas, Taylor C and others},\r\n  journal={Science advances},\r\n  volume={5},\r\n  number={7},\r\n  year={2019},\r\nabstract={Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning.},\r\nurl_Publication={https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/7/eaaw2612},\r\nurl_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/736},\r\nurl_Data={https://github.com/egap/metaketa-i}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
\n
\n\n\n
\n Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning.\n
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\n  \n 2018\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Surviving elections: Election violence, incumbent victory and post-election repercussions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Emilie M Hafner-Burton; Susan D Hyde; and Ryan S Jablonski.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n British Journal of Political Science, 48(2): 459-488. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Surviving publication\n  \n \n \n \"Surviving ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"Surviving data\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{hafner2018surviving,\r\n  title={Surviving elections: Election violence, incumbent victory and post-election repercussions},\r\n  author={Hafner-Burton, Emilie M and Hyde, Susan D and Jablonski, Ryan S},\r\n  journal={British Journal of Political Science},\r\n  volume={48},\r\n  number={2},\r\n  pages={459-488},\r\n  year={2018},\r\nabstract={It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, this article shows that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders.},\r\nurl_Publication={https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600020X},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/Surviving%20Elections.pdf},\r\nurl_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/BJPS%20Replication2.zip}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, this article shows that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n SMS texts on corruption help Ugandan voters hold elected councillors accountable at the polls.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mark T Buntaine; Ryan Jablonski; Daniel L Nielson; and Paula M Pickering.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(26): 6668-6673. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"SMS publication\n  \n \n \n \"SMS data\n  \n \n \n \"SMS pre-analysis plan\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 9 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{buntaine2018sms,\r\n  title={SMS texts on corruption help Ugandan voters hold elected councillors accountable at the polls},\r\n  author={Buntaine, Mark T and Jablonski, Ryan and Nielson, Daniel L and Pickering, Paula M},\r\n  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\r\n  volume={115},\r\n  number={26},\r\n  pages={6668-6673},\r\n  year={2018},\r\nurl_Publication={http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2018/06/05/1722306115},\r\nurl_Data={https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/T1DDVF},\r\nurl_Pre-Analysis_Plan={http://egap.org/registration/1615},\r\nabstract={Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior.}\r\n\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens' ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians accountable. In a large-scale randomized controlled trial in Uganda (n=16,083), we investigated whether citizens who receive private, timely and individualized text messages by mobile phone about public services in their community punished or rewarded incumbents in local elections in line with the information. The majority of respondents claimed to find the messages valuable and there is evidence that they briefly updated their beliefs based on the messages; however, the treatment did not cause increased votes for incumbents where public services were better than expected nor decreased votes where public services were worse than anticipated. The considerable knowledge gaps among citizens identified in this study indicate potential for communication technologies to effectively share civic information. Yet the findings imply that when the attribution of public service outcomes is difficult, even individualized information is unlikely to affect voting behavior.\n
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\n  \n 2017\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Tortuga disease: the perverse effects of illicit foreign capital.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Steven Oliver; Ryan Jablonski; and Justin V Hastings.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n International Studies Quarterly, 61(2): 312-327. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"The publication\n  \n \n \n \"The ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"The data\n  \n \n \n \"The si\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n  \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{oliver2017tortuga,\r\n  title={The Tortuga disease: the perverse effects of illicit foreign capital},\r\n  author={Oliver, Steven and Jablonski, Ryan and Hastings, Justin V},\r\n  journal={International Studies Quarterly},\r\n  volume={61},\r\n  number={2},\r\n  pages={312-327},\r\n  year={2017},\r\nabstract={},\r\nurl_Publication={https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqw051/3850831/The-Tortuga-Disease-The-Perverse-Effects-of?redirectedFrom=fulltext},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233959},\r\nurl_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/Oliver%20Jablonski%20Hastings%20Replication.zip},\r\nurl_SI={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/tortuga-supplementary-appendices.pdf}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n  \n 2015\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa's Transitions.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Clark C Gibson; Barak D. Hoffman; and Ryan S. Jablonski.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n World Development. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Did publication\n  \n \n \n \"Did ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"Did data\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{gibson2015did,\r\n  title={Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa's Transitions},\r\n  author={Gibson, Clark C and Hoffman, Barak D. and Jablonski, Ryan S.},\r\n  journal={World Development},\r\n  year={2015},\r\nabstract={Did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in Africa in the 1990s? We argue that after the Cold War, donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats’ ability to use aid for patronage. To remain in power, autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents—from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections. We test our theory with panel data for all sub-Saharan African countries. While other factors played pivotal roles in Africa’s political liberalization, we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratization.},\r\nurl_Publication={http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X14003581},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/did-aid-promote-democracy-in-africa.pdf},\r\nurl_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/Gibson+Hoffman+Jablonski+WD+Replication.zip}\r\n\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n Did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in Africa in the 1990s? We argue that after the Cold War, donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats’ ability to use aid for patronage. To remain in power, autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents—from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections. We test our theory with panel data for all sub-Saharan African countries. While other factors played pivotal roles in Africa’s political liberalization, we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratization.\n
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\n  \n 2014\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n When do governments resort to election violence?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Emilie M Hafner-Burton; Susan D Hyde; and Ryan S Jablonski.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n British Journal of Political Science, 44(1): 149-179. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"When publication\n  \n \n \n \"When ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"When data\n  \n \n \n \"When blog post\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{hafner2014governments,\r\n  title={When do governments resort to election violence?},\r\n  author={Hafner-Burton, Emilie M and Hyde, Susan D and Jablonski, Ryan S},\r\n  journal={British Journal of Political Science},\r\n  volume={44},\r\n  number={1},\r\n  pages={149-179},\r\n  year={2014},\r\n  publisher={Cambridge University Press},\r\nabstract={When are governments most likely to use election violence, and what factors can mitigate government incentives to resort to violence? How do the dynamics of election violence differ in the pre- and post-election periods? The central argument of this article is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decision-making powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious to suggest that incumbents use election violence in an effort to fend off threats to their power, it is not obvious how to gauge these threats. Thus, a central objective of this article is to identify sources of information about the incumbent's popularity that can help predict the likelihood of election violence. The observable implications of this argument are tested using newly available cross-national evidence on elections, government use of pre- and post-election violence, and post-election protests from 1981 to 2004.},\r\nurl_Publication={http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9090389&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0007123412000671},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53268/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Jablonski,%20R_When%20governments%20resort_Jablonski_When%20governments%20resort_2016.pdf},\r\nurl_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/BJPS+replication+files.zip},\r\nurl_Blog_Post={http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/30/what-makes-some-elections-violent/}\r\n\r\n}\r\n\r\n\r\n
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\n When are governments most likely to use election violence, and what factors can mitigate government incentives to resort to violence? How do the dynamics of election violence differ in the pre- and post-election periods? The central argument of this article is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decision-making powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious to suggest that incumbents use election violence in an effort to fend off threats to their power, it is not obvious how to gauge these threats. Thus, a central objective of this article is to identify sources of information about the incumbent's popularity that can help predict the likelihood of election violence. The observable implications of this argument are tested using newly available cross-national evidence on elections, government use of pre- and post-election violence, and post-election protests from 1981 to 2004.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n How Aid Target Votes: The Effect of Electoral Strategies on the Distribution of Foreign Aid.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ryan Jablonski.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n World Politics, 66(2): 293-330. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"How publication\n  \n \n \n \"How ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"How si\n  \n \n \n \"How data\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 21 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{jablonski2014aid,\r\n  title={How Aid Target Votes: The Effect of Electoral Strategies on the Distribution of Foreign Aid},\r\n  author={Jablonski, Ryan},\r\n  journal={World Politics},\r\n  volume={66},\r\n  number={2},\r\n  pages={293-330},\r\n  year={2014},\r\nabstract={Despite allegations that foreign aid promotes corruption and patronage, little is known about how recipient governments' electoral incentives influence aid spending. This article proposes a distributional politics model of aid spending in which governments use their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate a disproportionate share of aid to electorally strategic supporters, allowing governments to translate aid into votes. To evaluate this argument, the author codes data on the spatial distribution of multilateral donor projects in Kenya from 1992 to 2010 and shows that Kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favor of copartisan and coethnic voters, a bias that holds for each of Kenya's last three regimes. He confirms that aid distribution increases incumbent vote share. This evidence suggests that electoral motivations play a significant role in aid allocation and that distributional politics may help explain the gap between donor intentions and outcomes.},\r\nurl_Publication={http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9216103&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0043887114000045},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53267/},\r\nurl_SI={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/how-aid-targets-votes-supplementary-appendix.pdf},\r\nurl_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/BJPS+replication+files.zip}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n Despite allegations that foreign aid promotes corruption and patronage, little is known about how recipient governments' electoral incentives influence aid spending. This article proposes a distributional politics model of aid spending in which governments use their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate a disproportionate share of aid to electorally strategic supporters, allowing governments to translate aid into votes. To evaluate this argument, the author codes data on the spatial distribution of multilateral donor projects in Kenya from 1992 to 2010 and shows that Kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favor of copartisan and coethnic voters, a bias that holds for each of Kenya's last three regimes. He confirms that aid distribution increases incumbent vote share. This evidence suggests that electoral motivations play a significant role in aid allocation and that distributional politics may help explain the gap between donor intentions and outcomes.\n
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\n  \n 2013\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Political Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and Modern Piracy.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Ryan Jablonski; and Steven Oliver.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(4): 682-708. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"The publication\n  \n \n \n \"The ungated paper\n  \n \n \n \"The si\n  \n \n \n \"The data\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n  \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{jablonski2013political,\r\n  title={The Political Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and Modern Piracy},\r\n  author={Jablonski, Ryan and Oliver, Steven},\r\n  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},\r\n  volume={57},\r\n  number={4},\r\n  pages={682-708},\r\n  year={2013},\r\nabstract={Maritime piracy is a growing scourge on the international community—imposing large costs on maritime states and the shipping industry, as well as potentially undermining state capacity and funding terrorism. Using original data on over 3,000 pirate attacks, the authors argue that these attacks are, in part, a response to poor labor market opportunities. To establish this, the authors take advantage of the strong effect of commodity prices on labor market opportunities in piracy-prone states. Consistent with this theory, the authors show that changes in the price of labor- and capital-intensive commodities have consistent and strong effects on the number of pirate attacks in a country’s territorial waters each month. The authors confirm these results by instrumenting for commodity prices using monthly precipitation levels.},\r\nurl_Publication={http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/57/4/682.full},\r\nurl_Ungated_Paper={http://www.ryanjablonski.com/articles/jablonskioliverpoliticaleconomyofplunder.pdf},\r\nurl_SI={http://www.ryanjablonski.comarticles/jablonski-oliver-supplementary-appendix.pdf},\r\nurl_Data={https://s3.amazonaws.com/r.s.jablonski/replication/Jablonski+Oliver+Replication.zip}\r\n}\r\n\r\n
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\n Maritime piracy is a growing scourge on the international community—imposing large costs on maritime states and the shipping industry, as well as potentially undermining state capacity and funding terrorism. Using original data on over 3,000 pirate attacks, the authors argue that these attacks are, in part, a response to poor labor market opportunities. To establish this, the authors take advantage of the strong effect of commodity prices on labor market opportunities in piracy-prone states. Consistent with this theory, the authors show that changes in the price of labor- and capital-intensive commodities have consistent and strong effects on the number of pirate attacks in a country’s territorial waters each month. The authors confirm these results by instrumenting for commodity prices using monthly precipitation levels.\n
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