@article{van_den_berg_spread_2023,
	title = {The {Spread} of the {Mathematical} {Method} in {Eighteenth}-{Century} {Germany}: {A} {Quantitative} {Investigation} [ongoing]},
	abstract = {In the eighteenth century, the German mathematician and philosopher Christian Wolff famously claimed that all sciences should apply the so-called mathematical method. Interpreters (e.g. Frängsmyr 1975; Friedman 1992; Zammito 2002) typically identify Wolff's mathematical method with the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, i.e. the tenet that a proper science should have an axiomatic structure. In this paper we argue against this identification. We show that several eighteenth-century authors who did reject the mathematical method in science did so while retaining the axiomatic ideal of science - which suggests that the two should not be identified. We argue that in the eighteenth century the expression 'the mathematical method' designated a specific take on the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, and that it is this specific take that was targeted by critics, not the axiomatic ideal of science tout court. In order to substantiate our claims, we rely on information from a corpus of approximately 700 eighteenth-century books on logic and philosophy in German and Latin, processed using a novel method building upon the mixed one (qualitative, quantitative and computational) introduced by Betti et al (2019). In keeping with the latter, we claim that historical-interpretive claims should rely on a corpus which is as large as possible, and employ precisely defined annotation schemes to capture differences and similarities between various conceptions in a way which is as accountable as possible. We supplement the method with a new explicitly defined procedure of book-centered corpus building for historians of philosophy which is as objective and accountable as possible. Our results should be understood as part of a longer-term ambition of making historico-interpretive investigations more scientific, i.e., controlled, explicit, and as objective as possible.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein and Parisi, Maria Chiara and Oortwijn, Yvette and Betti, Arianna and Wang, Shenghui and Koopman, Rob and Bloem, Jelke},
	year = {2023},
}

In the eighteenth century, the German mathematician and philosopher Christian Wolff famously claimed that all sciences should apply the so-called mathematical method. Interpreters (e.g. Frängsmyr 1975; Friedman 1992; Zammito 2002) typically identify Wolff's mathematical method with the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, i.e. the tenet that a proper science should have an axiomatic structure. In this paper we argue against this identification. We show that several eighteenth-century authors who did reject the mathematical method in science did so while retaining the axiomatic ideal of science - which suggests that the two should not be identified. We argue that in the eighteenth century the expression 'the mathematical method' designated a specific take on the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, and that it is this specific take that was targeted by critics, not the axiomatic ideal of science tout court. In order to substantiate our claims, we rely on information from a corpus of approximately 700 eighteenth-century books on logic and philosophy in German and Latin, processed using a novel method building upon the mixed one (qualitative, quantitative and computational) introduced by Betti et al (2019). In keeping with the latter, we claim that historical-interpretive claims should rely on a corpus which is as large as possible, and employ precisely defined annotation schemes to capture differences and similarities between various conceptions in a way which is as accountable as possible. We supplement the method with a new explicitly defined procedure of book-centered corpus building for historians of philosophy which is as objective and accountable as possible. Our results should be understood as part of a longer-term ambition of making historico-interpretive investigations more scientific, i.e., controlled, explicit, and as objective as possible.

@article{van_den_berg_rise_2023,
	title = {The {Rise} and {Development} of {Animal} {Models} of {Mental} {Disorders}: {From} {Modeling} {Whole} {Syndromes} to {Modeling} {Endophenotypes} [ongoing]},
	abstract = {This paper provides a historical and philosophical analysis of the rise and development of animal models of mental disorders during the second half of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. I analyze a shift in the way animal models of mental disorders are conceptualized: the shift from the early view that animal models model entire or whole syndromes classified in manuals such as the DSM to the later view that animal models model component parts of psychiatric syndromes. I argue that animal models of mental disorders gained in popularity during a period when ethology interacted with psychiatry. Within this period, animal models of mental disorders were sometimes taken to model entire or whole psychiatric syndromes and were validated by looking at how well the animal models matched the entire syndrome. I show that researchers in psychiatry came to reject this view because of the following problems: (a) it leads to problems with validating animal models. More specifically, the procedure of matching animal models to entire psychiatric syndromes validates animal models on the basis of non-valid disease categories that are in flux, i.e., it validates animal models without having access to a gold standard, and (b) the procedure gives rise to several skeptical objections against animal models of mental disorders. I subsequently show that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, researchers in psychiatry came to believe that animal models of mental disorders should model component parts of mental disorders, adopting a so-called endophenotype approach. This approach rejects validating animal models on the basis of entire psychiatric syndromes listed in manuals such as the DSM, is taken to allow us to better validate animal models, and is taken to solve some of the skeptical problems that have been leveled against animal models of mental disorders.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2023},
}

This paper provides a historical and philosophical analysis of the rise and development of animal models of mental disorders during the second half of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. I analyze a shift in the way animal models of mental disorders are conceptualized: the shift from the early view that animal models model entire or whole syndromes classified in manuals such as the DSM to the later view that animal models model component parts of psychiatric syndromes. I argue that animal models of mental disorders gained in popularity during a period when ethology interacted with psychiatry. Within this period, animal models of mental disorders were sometimes taken to model entire or whole psychiatric syndromes and were validated by looking at how well the animal models matched the entire syndrome. I show that researchers in psychiatry came to reject this view because of the following problems: (a) it leads to problems with validating animal models. More specifically, the procedure of matching animal models to entire psychiatric syndromes validates animal models on the basis of non-valid disease categories that are in flux, i.e., it validates animal models without having access to a gold standard, and (b) the procedure gives rise to several skeptical objections against animal models of mental disorders. I subsequently show that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, researchers in psychiatry came to believe that animal models of mental disorders should model component parts of mental disorders, adopting a so-called endophenotype approach. This approach rejects validating animal models on the basis of entire psychiatric syndromes listed in manuals such as the DSM, is taken to allow us to better validate animal models, and is taken to solve some of the skeptical problems that have been leveled against animal models of mental disorders.

@article{bellomo_bolzanos_2023,
	title = {On {Bolzano}'s {Real} {Numbers} [ongoing]},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {2023},
}

@article{van_den_berg_induction_2023,
	title = {Induction and {Certainty} in {Eighteenth}-{Century} {Philosophy} of {Physics}: {Wolff}, {Crusius}, and {Kant} [{R} \& {R}]},
	journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
	author = {van den Berg, Hein and Demarest, Boris},
	year = {2023},
}

@article{van_den_berg_essentialism_2023,
	title = {The {Essentialism} of {Early} {Modern} {Psychiatric} {Nosology}},
	volume = {45},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00562-x},
	doi = {10.1007/s40656-023-00562-x},
	journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
	author = {van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {[12]},
}

@article{betti_historians_2023,
	title = {Historians and the ‘{Great} {Unread}’ {A} {New} {Method} for {Objective} {Corpus} {Building} in the {History} of {Philosophy} [ongoing]},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Van den Berg, Hein and Oortwijn, Yvette and Parisi, Maria Chiara and Wang, Shenghui and Koopman, Rob},
	year = {2023},
}

@article{van_den_berg_classical_2023,
	title = {The {Classical} {Model} of {Science} in {Eighteenth}-{Century} {German} {Philosophy} [ongoing]},
	abstract = {In this paper I describe different varieties of the Classical Model of Science in the works of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). I argue that all four authors accept the the core of the ideal of science codified by the Classical Model of Science. This accounts for a certain amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science. However, the four authors sometimes interpret the conditions of the Classical Model of Science differently. This accounts for a certain amount of discontinuity between the conceptions of the authors. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis and comparison of the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science with reference to all of the conditions of the Classical Model of Science. Through my analysis, it becomes clear that there is a greater amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant than is sometimes assumed.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2023},
}

In this paper I describe different varieties of the Classical Model of Science in the works of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). I argue that all four authors accept the the core of the ideal of science codified by the Classical Model of Science. This accounts for a certain amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science. However, the four authors sometimes interpret the conditions of the Classical Model of Science differently. This accounts for a certain amount of discontinuity between the conceptions of the authors. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis and comparison of the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science with reference to all of the conditions of the Classical Model of Science. Through my analysis, it becomes clear that there is a greater amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant than is sometimes assumed.

@article{demarest_kants_2022,
	title = {Kant's theory of scientific hypotheses in its historical context},
	volume = {92},
	issn = {00393681},
	url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0039368122000115},
	doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.01.011},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-05-26},
	journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Demarest, Boris and Van Den Berg, Hein},
	month = apr,
	year = {2022},
	pages = {12--19},
}

@article{van_den_berg_animal_2022,
	title = {Animal languages in eighteenth-century {German} philosophy and science},
	volume = {93},
	issn = {00393681},
	url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0039368122000541},
	doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.03.003},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-05-26},
	journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Van Den Berg, Hein},
	month = jun,
	year = {2022},
	pages = {72--81},
}

@article{van_den_berg_evaluating_2022,
	title = {Evaluating the validity of animal models of mental disorder: from modeling syndromes to modeling endophenotypes},
	volume = {44},
	issn = {0391-9714, 1742-6316},
	shorttitle = {Evaluating the validity of animal models of mental disorder},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40656-022-00537-4},
	doi = {10.1007/s40656-022-00537-4},
	abstract = {Abstract
            
              This paper provides a historical analysis of a shift in the way animal models of mental disorders were conceptualized: the shift from the mid-twentieth-century view, adopted by some, that animal models model syndromes classified in manuals such as the
              Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
              (
              DSM
              ), to the later widespread view that animal models model component parts of psychiatric syndromes. I argue that in the middle of the twentieth century the attempt to maximize the face validity of animal models sometimes led to the pursuit of the ideal of an animal model that represented a behaviorally defined psychiatric syndrome as described in manuals such as the
              DSM
              . I show how developments within psychiatric genetics and related criticism of the
              DSM
              in the 1990s and 2000s led to the rejection of this ideal and how researchers in the first decade of the twenty-first century came to believe that animal models of mental disorders should model component parts of mental disorders, adopting a so-called endophenotype approach.},
	language = {en},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2023-05-26},
	journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
	author = {Van Den Berg, Hein},
	month = dec,
	year = {2022},
	pages = {59},
}

Abstract This paper provides a historical analysis of a shift in the way animal models of mental disorders were conceptualized: the shift from the mid-twentieth-century view, adopted by some, that animal models model syndromes classified in manuals such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ( DSM ), to the later widespread view that animal models model component parts of psychiatric syndromes. I argue that in the middle of the twentieth century the attempt to maximize the face validity of animal models sometimes led to the pursuit of the ideal of an animal model that represented a behaviorally defined psychiatric syndrome as described in manuals such as the DSM . I show how developments within psychiatric genetics and related criticism of the DSM in the 1990s and 2000s led to the rejection of this ideal and how researchers in the first decade of the twenty-first century came to believe that animal models of mental disorders should model component parts of mental disorders, adopting a so-called endophenotype approach.

@incollection{ginammi_bolzano_2022,
	address = {Pittsburgh},
	title = {Bolzano, {Kant} and the {Traditional} {Theory} of {Concepts} - {A} {Computational} {Investigation}},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOib9tYSHBrtZk7w2pGQ?e=Z8TIjb},
	abstract = {Abstract
Recent research shows that valuable contributions are obtained by applying even rather simple, well-known computational techniques to texts relevant to the work of researchers in history and philosophy of science (van Wierst et al. 2016). In this paper we substantiate the point by relying on computational text analysis in addressing an open question regarding Bernard Bolzano’s work on the general methodology of the sciences. We investigate to which extent Bolzano followed Kant in seeing concepts as hierarchically ordered by means of definition via compositional analysis by genus proximum and differentia specifica. We show that Bolzano did follow Kant on this traditional doctrine point to a large extent, although Bolzano's conceptual hierarchy is based on subordination rather than composition relations, and that definitions play for Bolzano a merely subjective role. We include a discussion of the computational methodology, and link appendix describing corpus and step-by-step workings of the algorithm applied.},
	booktitle = {The {Dynamics} of {Science}: {Computational} {Frontiers} in {History} and {Philosophy} of {Science}},
	publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola and Bloem, Jelke and Koopman, Rob and Wang, Shenghui and Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {de Block, Andreas and Ramsey, Grant},
	year = {2022},
}

Abstract Recent research shows that valuable contributions are obtained by applying even rather simple, well-known computational techniques to texts relevant to the work of researchers in history and philosophy of science (van Wierst et al. 2016). In this paper we substantiate the point by relying on computational text analysis in addressing an open question regarding Bernard Bolzano’s work on the general methodology of the sciences. We investigate to which extent Bolzano followed Kant in seeing concepts as hierarchically ordered by means of definition via compositional analysis by genus proximum and differentia specifica. We show that Bolzano did follow Kant on this traditional doctrine point to a large extent, although Bolzano's conceptual hierarchy is based on subordination rather than composition relations, and that definitions play for Bolzano a merely subjective role. We include a discussion of the computational methodology, and link appendix describing corpus and step-by-step workings of the algorithm applied.

@incollection{van_wierst_translation_2021,
	address = {Cham},
	title = {Translation from {Dutch}: {Papers} on the {Pedagogy} of {Mathematics}},
	isbn = {978-3-030-47971-8},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47971-8_8},
	abstract = {The goal of this writing is to consider only that of geometry, which has common cultural worth, and therefore, justifies that it be taught also to people that do not have an aptitude for mathematics, and in their further life will not come in contact with mathematics, nor with its applications.},
	booktitle = {The {Legacy} of {Tatjana} {Afanassjewa}: {Philosophical} {Insights} from the {Work} of an {Original} {Physicist} and {Mathematician}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline},
	editor = {Uffink, Jos and Valente, Giovanni and Werndl, Charlotte and Zuchowski, Lena},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {181--198},
}

The goal of this writing is to consider only that of geometry, which has common cultural worth, and therefore, justifies that it be taught also to people that do not have an aptitude for mathematics, and in their further life will not come in contact with mathematics, nor with its applications.

@inproceedings{van_boven_eliciting_2021,
	address = {Online},
	title = {Eliciting {Explicit} {Knowledge} {From} {Domain} {Experts} in {Direct} {Intrinsic} {Evaluation} of {Word} {Embeddings} for {Specialized} {Domains}},
	url = {https://aclanthology.org/2021.humeval-1.12},
	abstract = {We evaluate the use of direct intrinsic word embedding evaluation tasks for specialized language. Our case study is philosophical text: human expert judgements on the relatedness of philosophical terms are elicited using a synonym detection task and a coherence task. Uniquely for our task, experts must rely on explicit knowledge and cannot use their linguistic intuition, which may differ from that of the philosopher. We find that inter-rater agreement rates are similar to those of more conventional semantic annotation tasks, suggesting that these tasks can be used to evaluate word embeddings of text types for which implicit knowledge may not suffice.},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the {Workshop} on {Human} {Evaluation} of {NLP} {Systems} ({HumEval})},
	publisher = {Association for Computational Linguistics},
	author = {van Boven, Goya and Bloem, Jelke},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	pages = {107--113},
}

We evaluate the use of direct intrinsic word embedding evaluation tasks for specialized language. Our case study is philosophical text: human expert judgements on the relatedness of philosophical terms are elicited using a synonym detection task and a coherence task. Uniquely for our task, experts must rely on explicit knowledge and cannot use their linguistic intuition, which may differ from that of the philosopher. We find that inter-rater agreement rates are similar to those of more conventional semantic annotation tasks, suggesting that these tasks can be used to evaluate word embeddings of text types for which implicit knowledge may not suffice.

@inproceedings{zhou_comparing_2021,
	address = {Düsseldorf, Germany},
	title = {Comparing {Contextual} and {Static} {Word} {Embeddings} with {Small} {Data}},
	url = {https://aclanthology.org/2021.konvens-1.27},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 17th {Conference} on {Natural} {Language} {Processing} ({KONVENS} 2021)},
	publisher = {KONVENS 2021 Organizers},
	author = {Zhou, Wei and Bloem, Jelke},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {253--259},
}

@inproceedings{oortwijn_challenging_2021,
	address = {Online},
	title = {Challenging {Distributional} {Models} with a {Conceptual} {Network} of {Philosophical} {Terms}},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2021 {Annual} {Conference} of the {North} {American} {Chapter} of the {Association} for {Computational} {Linguistics}},
	publisher = {Association for Computational Linguistics},
	author = {Oortwijn, Yvette and Bloem, Jelke and Sommerauer, Pia and Meyer, François and Zhou, Wei and Fokkens, Antske},
	month = may,
	year = {2021},
	keywords = {HumaneAI},
	pages = {2511--2522},
}

@inproceedings{oortwijn_interrater_2021,
	address = {Online},
	title = {Interrater {Disagreement} {Resolution}: {A} {Systematic} {Procedure} to {Reach} {Consensus} in {Annotation} {Tasks}},
	shorttitle = {Interrater {Disagreement} {Resolution}},
	url = {https://aclanthology.org/2021.humeval-1.15},
	abstract = {We present a systematic procedure for interrater disagreement resolution. The procedure is general, but of particular use in multiple-annotator tasks geared towards ground truth construction. We motivate our proposal by arguing that, barring cases in which the researchers' goal is to elicit different viewpoints, interrater disagreement is a sign of poor quality in the design or the description of a task. Consensus among annotators, we maintain, should be striven for, through a systematic procedure for disagreement resolution such as the one we describe.},
	urldate = {2023-05-26},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the {Workshop} on {Human} {Evaluation} of {NLP} {Systems} ({HumEval})},
	publisher = {Association for Computational Linguistics},
	author = {Oortwijn, Yvette and Ossenkoppele, Thijs and Betti, Arianna},
	month = apr,
	year = {2021},
	pages = {131--141},
}

We present a systematic procedure for interrater disagreement resolution. The procedure is general, but of particular use in multiple-annotator tasks geared towards ground truth construction. We motivate our proposal by arguing that, barring cases in which the researchers' goal is to elicit different viewpoints, interrater disagreement is a sign of poor quality in the design or the description of a task. Consensus among annotators, we maintain, should be striven for, through a systematic procedure for disagreement resolution such as the one we describe.

@article{van_den_berg_kants_2021,
	title = {Kant's {Ideal} of {Systematicity} in {Historical} {Context}},
	volume = {26},
	doi = {10.1017/S1369415420000576},
	abstract = {This article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the background of de Jong \& Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2010) and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. According to my interpretation, Meier, Lambert, and Kant accepted an axiomatic idea of science, articulated by the Classical Model, which elucidates their conceptions of systematicity. I show that Kant’s critique of the mathematical method is compatible with his adherence to this axiomatic conception of science. I further show that systematicity furthers traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific knowledge, which explains why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’.},
	number = {2},
	journal = {Kantian Review},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {261--286},
}

This article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the background of de Jong & Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2010) and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. According to my interpretation, Meier, Lambert, and Kant accepted an axiomatic idea of science, articulated by the Classical Model, which elucidates their conceptions of systematicity. I show that Kant’s critique of the mathematical method is compatible with his adherence to this axiomatic conception of science. I further show that systematicity furthers traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific knowledge, which explains why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’.

@article{bellomo_domain_2021,
	title = {Domain {Extension} and {Ideal} {Elements} in {Mathematics}†},
	volume = {29},
	issn = {1744-6406},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkab018},
	doi = {10.1093/philmat/nkab018},
	abstract = {Domain extension in mathematics occurs whenever a given mathematical domain is augmented so as to include new elements. Manders argues that the advantages of important cases of domain extension are captured by the model-theoretic notions of existential closure and model completion. In the specific case of domain extension via ideal elements, I argue, Manders’s proposed explanation does not suffice. I then develop and formalize a different approach to domain extension based on Dedekind’s Habilitationsrede, to which Manders’s account is compared. I conclude with an examination of three possible stances towards extensions via ideal elements.},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2023-05-24},
	journal = {Philosophia Mathematica},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	month = oct,
	year = {2021},
	pages = {366--391},
}

Domain extension in mathematics occurs whenever a given mathematical domain is augmented so as to include new elements. Manders argues that the advantages of important cases of domain extension are captured by the model-theoretic notions of existential closure and model completion. In the specific case of domain extension via ideal elements, I argue, Manders’s proposed explanation does not suffice. I then develop and formalize a different approach to domain extension based on Dedekind’s Habilitationsrede, to which Manders’s account is compared. I conclude with an examination of three possible stances towards extensions via ideal elements.

@misc{betti_corpus_2020,
	title = {Corpus {Building}: {WorldCat}, {Part} 2},
	shorttitle = {Corpus {Building}},
	url = {https://quine1960.wordpress.com/2020/06/06/corpus-building-worldcat-part-2/},
	abstract = {This is Part 2. Go to Part 1.WorldCat’s record identity and relatedness criteria WorldCat clusters records of the same edition of the same work, and links records of different editions of the…},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2020-08-15},
	journal = {quine1960},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = jun,
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {HumaneAI},
}

This is Part 2. Go to Part 1.WorldCat’s record identity and relatedness criteria WorldCat clusters records of the same edition of the same work, and links records of different editions of the…

@misc{betti_corpus_2020-1,
	title = {Corpus {Building}: {WorldCat}, {Part} 1},
	shorttitle = {Corpus {Building}},
	url = {https://quine1960.wordpress.com/2020/05/28/corpus-building-worldcat-part-1/},
	abstract = {Next: Corpus Building: World Cat, Part 2Suppose you want to put together a corpus of 16th century writings, in particular textbooks, on physics, in Latin. Here’s one method I will call Pseudo…},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2020-08-15},
	journal = {quine1960},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = may,
	year = {2020},
	keywords = {HumaneAI},
}

Next: Corpus Building: World Cat, Part 2Suppose you want to put together a corpus of 16th century writings, in particular textbooks, on physics, in Latin. Here’s one method I will call Pseudo…

@article{van_den_berg_theoretical_2020,
	title = {Theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition},
	volume = {42},
	issn = {0391-9714, 1742-6316},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40656-020-00332-z},
	doi = {10.1007/s40656-020-00332-z},
	abstract = {Abstract
            Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I adopt a philosophical perspective on this debate and argue that in order to fully understand the justification Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy gave for their respective theories, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. Through my philosophical study of the role of theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition, we obtain a deeper understanding of how theoretical virtues were conceptualized in eighteenth-century science and how they influenced the justification of theories of animal cognition.},
	language = {en},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2023-05-26},
	journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	month = sep,
	year = {2020},
	pages = {37},
}

Abstract Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I adopt a philosophical perspective on this debate and argue that in order to fully understand the justification Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy gave for their respective theories, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. Through my philosophical study of the role of theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition, we obtain a deeper understanding of how theoretical virtues were conceptualized in eighteenth-century science and how they influenced the justification of theories of animal cognition.

@article{van_den_berg_axiomatic_2020,
	title = {Axiomatic {Natural} {Philosophy} and the {Emergence} of {Biology} as a {Science}},
	volume = {53},
	issn = {0022-5010, 1573-0387},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10739-020-09609-2},
	doi = {10.1007/s10739-020-09609-2},
	abstract = {Abstract
            Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science.},
	language = {en},
	number = {3},
	urldate = {2023-05-26},
	journal = {Journal of the History of Biology},
	author = {Van Den Berg, Hein and Demarest, Boris},
	month = sep,
	year = {2020},
	pages = {379--422},
}

Abstract Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science.

@inproceedings{betti_expert_2020,
	address = {Barcelona, Spain (Online)},
	title = {Expert {Concept}-{Modeling} {Ground} {Truth} {Construction} for {Word} {Embeddings} {Evaluation} in {Concept}-{Focused} {Domains}},
	url = {https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/2020.coling-main.586},
	doi = {10.18653/v1/2020.coling-main.586},
	abstract = {We present a novel, domain expert-controlled, replicable procedure for the construction of concept-modeling ground truths with the aim of evaluating the application of word embeddings. In particular, our method is designed to evaluate the application of word and paragraph embeddings in concept-focused textual domains, where a generic ontology does not provide enough information. We illustrate the procedure, and validate it by describing the construction of an expert ground truth, QuiNE-GT. QuiNE-GT is built to answer research questions concerning the concept of naturalized epistemology in QUINE, a 2-million-token, single-author, 20th-century English philosophy corpus of outstanding quality, cleaned up and enriched for the purpose. To the best of our ken, expert concept-modeling ground truths are extremely rare in current literature, nor has the theoretical methodology behind their construction ever been explicitly conceptualised and properly systematised. Expert-controlled concept-modeling ground truths are however essential to allow proper evaluation of word embeddings techniques, and increase their trustworthiness in specialised domains in which the detection of concepts through their expression in texts is important. We highlight challenges, requirements, and prospects for future work.},
	urldate = {2021-01-26},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 28th {International} {Conference} on {Computational} {Linguistics}},
	publisher = {International Committee on Computational Linguistics},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Reynaert, Martin and Ossenkoppele, Thijs and Oortwijn, Yvette and Salway, Andrew and Bloem, Jelke},
	month = dec,
	year = {2020},
	pages = {6690--6702},
}

We present a novel, domain expert-controlled, replicable procedure for the construction of concept-modeling ground truths with the aim of evaluating the application of word embeddings. In particular, our method is designed to evaluate the application of word and paragraph embeddings in concept-focused textual domains, where a generic ontology does not provide enough information. We illustrate the procedure, and validate it by describing the construction of an expert ground truth, QuiNE-GT. QuiNE-GT is built to answer research questions concerning the concept of naturalized epistemology in QUINE, a 2-million-token, single-author, 20th-century English philosophy corpus of outstanding quality, cleaned up and enriched for the purpose. To the best of our ken, expert concept-modeling ground truths are extremely rare in current literature, nor has the theoretical methodology behind their construction ever been explicitly conceptualised and properly systematised. Expert-controlled concept-modeling ground truths are however essential to allow proper evaluation of word embeddings techniques, and increase their trustworthiness in specialised domains in which the detection of concepts through their expression in texts is important. We highlight challenges, requirements, and prospects for future work.

@inproceedings{bloem_distributional_2020,
	address = {Marseille, France},
	title = {Distributional {Semantics} for {Neo}-{Latin}},
	isbn = {979-10-95546-53-5},
	url = {https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/2020.lt4hala-1.13},
	abstract = {We address the problem of creating and evaluating quality Neo-Latin word embeddings for the purpose of philosophical research, adapting the Nonce2Vec tool to learn embeddings from Neo-Latin sentences. This distributional semantic modeling tool can learn from tiny data incrementally, using a larger background corpus for initialization. We conduct two evaluation tasks: definitional learning of Latin Wikipedia terms, and learning consistent embeddings from 18th century Neo-Latin sentences pertaining to the concept of mathematical method. Our results show that consistent Neo-Latin word embeddings can be learned from this type of data. While our evaluation results are promising, they do not reveal to what extent the learned models match domain expert knowledge of our Neo-Latin texts. Therefore, we propose an additional evaluation method, grounded in expert-annotated data, that would assess whether learned representations are conceptually sound in relation to the domain of study.},
	language = {English},
	urldate = {2021-01-17},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of {LT4HALA} 2020 - 1st {Workshop} on {Language} {Technologies} for {Historical} and {Ancient} {Languages}},
	publisher = {European Language Resources Association (ELRA)},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Parisi, Maria Chiara and Reynaert, Martin and Oortwijn, Yvette and Betti, Arianna},
	month = may,
	year = {2020},
	pages = {84--93},
}

We address the problem of creating and evaluating quality Neo-Latin word embeddings for the purpose of philosophical research, adapting the Nonce2Vec tool to learn embeddings from Neo-Latin sentences. This distributional semantic modeling tool can learn from tiny data incrementally, using a larger background corpus for initialization. We conduct two evaluation tasks: definitional learning of Latin Wikipedia terms, and learning consistent embeddings from 18th century Neo-Latin sentences pertaining to the concept of mathematical method. Our results show that consistent Neo-Latin word embeddings can be learned from this type of data. While our evaluation results are promising, they do not reveal to what extent the learned models match domain expert knowledge of our Neo-Latin texts. Therefore, we propose an additional evaluation method, grounded in expert-annotated data, that would assess whether learned representations are conceptually sound in relation to the domain of study.

@inproceedings{oortwijn_ground_2020,
	address = {Salt Lake City},
	title = {Ground {Truths} in the {Humanities}},
	abstract = {Ensuring a faithful interaction with data and its representation for humanities
can and should depend on expert-constructed ground truths.},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th {Workshop} on {Visualization} for the {Digital} {Humanities} ({VIS4DH})},
	author = {Oortwijn, Yvette and Van den Berg, Hein and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {2020},
}

Ensuring a faithful interaction with data and its representation for humanities can and should depend on expert-constructed ground truths.

@misc{betti_trust_2019,
	address = {Vancouver, Canada (CA)},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {‘{Trust} in {VIS4DH}’ {Expert} {Panel} {Pitch}},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = oct,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{ossenkoppele_quines_2019,
	title = {Quine's {Naturalistic} {Epistemology}; {A} {Quantitative} {Investigation}},
	publisher = {University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam},
	author = {Ossenkoppele, Thijs},
	year = {2019},
	note = {Bachelor's Thesis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.},
}

@mastersthesis{parisi_how_2019,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {On how perspectival hylemorphism got the facts wrong},
	school = {University of Amsterdam},
	author = {Parisi, Maria Chiara},
	year = {2019},
}

@article{castermans_solarview_2019,
	title = {{SolarView}: {Low} {Distortion} {Radial} {Embedding} with a {Focus}},
	volume = {25},
	issn = {1077-2626},
	doi = {10.1109/TVCG.2018.2865361},
	abstract = {We propose a novel type of low distortion radial embedding which focuses on one specific entity and its closest neighbors. Our embedding preserves near-exact distances to the focus entity and aims to minimize distortion between the other entities. We present an interactive exploration tool SolarView which places the focus entity at the center of a “solar system” and embeds its neighbors guided by concentric circles. SolarView provides an implementation of our novel embedding and several state-of-the-art dimensionality reduction and embedding techniques, which we adapted to our setting in various ways. We experimentally evaluated our embedding and compared it to these state-of-the-art techniques. The results show that our embedding competes with these techniques and achieves low distortion in practice. Our method performs particularly well when the visualization, and hence the embedding, adheres to the solar system design principle of our application. Nonetheless-as with all dimensionality reduction techniques-the distortion may be high. We leverage interaction techniques to give clear visual cues that allow users to accurately judge distortion. We illustrate the use of SolarView by exploring the high-dimensional metric space of bibliographic entity similarities.},
	language = {English},
	number = {10},
	journal = {IEEE transactions on visualization and computer graphics},
	author = {Castermans, Thom and Verbeek, Kevin and Speckmann, Bettina and Westenberg, Michel A. and Koopman, Rob and Wang, Shenghui and van den Berg, Hein and Betti, Arianna},
	month = oct,
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Dimensionality reduction, Radial embedding, Visualizing distortion},
	pages = {2969--2982},
}

We propose a novel type of low distortion radial embedding which focuses on one specific entity and its closest neighbors. Our embedding preserves near-exact distances to the focus entity and aims to minimize distortion between the other entities. We present an interactive exploration tool SolarView which places the focus entity at the center of a “solar system” and embeds its neighbors guided by concentric circles. SolarView provides an implementation of our novel embedding and several state-of-the-art dimensionality reduction and embedding techniques, which we adapted to our setting in various ways. We experimentally evaluated our embedding and compared it to these state-of-the-art techniques. The results show that our embedding competes with these techniques and achieves low distortion in practice. Our method performs particularly well when the visualization, and hence the embedding, adheres to the solar system design principle of our application. Nonetheless-as with all dimensionality reduction techniques-the distortion may be high. We leverage interaction techniques to give clear visual cues that allow users to accurately judge distortion. We illustrate the use of SolarView by exploring the high-dimensional metric space of bibliographic entity similarities.

@incollection{betti_history_2019,
	address = {London},
	series = {Advances in {Experimental} {Philosophy}},
	title = {History of {Philosophy} in {Ones} and {Zeros}},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOiP5Q8-ia4_sSI3CyOw},
	abstract = {How can we best reconstruct the origin of a notion, its development, and possible spread to multiple fields? We present a pilot study on the spread of the notion of conceptual scheme. Though the notion is philosophically important, its origin, development, and spread are unclear. Several purely qualitative and competing historical hypotheses have been offered, which rely on disconnected disciplinary traditions, and have never been tested all at once in a single comprehensive investigation fitting the scope of its subject matter. As a step toward such an investigation, we trace the use of the bigram “conceptual scheme” in about 42,000 US journal articles in social sciences from 1888-1959 by using a novel method combining a quantitative procedure aided by basic computational techniques with qualitative elements informed by Betti and van den Berg (2014)’s ‘model approach to the history of ideas’.},
	booktitle = {Methodological {Advances} in {Experimental} {Philosophy}},
	publisher = {Bloomsbury},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and van den Berg, Hein and Oortwijn, Yvette and Treijtel, Caspar},
	editor = {Curtis, Mark and Fischer, Eugen},
	month = mar,
	year = {2019},
	pages = {295--332},
}

How can we best reconstruct the origin of a notion, its development, and possible spread to multiple fields? We present a pilot study on the spread of the notion of conceptual scheme. Though the notion is philosophically important, its origin, development, and spread are unclear. Several purely qualitative and competing historical hypotheses have been offered, which rely on disconnected disciplinary traditions, and have never been tested all at once in a single comprehensive investigation fitting the scope of its subject matter. As a step toward such an investigation, we trace the use of the bigram “conceptual scheme” in about 42,000 US journal articles in social sciences from 1888-1959 by using a novel method combining a quantitative procedure aided by basic computational techniques with qualitative elements informed by Betti and van den Berg (2014)’s ‘model approach to the history of ideas’.

@inproceedings{bloem_evaluating_2019,
	address = {Varna, Bulgaria},
	title = {Evaluating the {Consistency} of {Word} {Embeddings} from {Small} {Data}},
	url = {http://lml.bas.bg/ranlp2019/proceedings-ranlp-2019.pdf},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the {International} {Conference} {Recent} {Advances} in {Natural} {Language} {Processing}, {RANLP} 2019},
	publisher = {Incoma Ltd},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Fokkens, Antske and Herbelot, Aurelie},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {132--141},
}

@misc{betti_history_2018,
	address = {Tilburg University},
	type = {Invited {Seminar} {Talk}},
	title = {History and {Philosophy} in {Ones} and {Zeros}},
	language = {es},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	collaborator = {Van den Berg, Hein and Oortwijn, Yvette and Treijtel, Caspar},
	month = oct,
	year = {2018},
}

@mastersthesis{hungerbuhler_computational_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {A {Computational} {Method} for {Philosophical} {Interpretation}},
	url = {https://msclogic.illc.uva.nl/theses/recent/publication/4745/A-Computational-Method-for-Philosophical-Interpretation},
	abstract = {This thesis seeks to advance the use of computational techniques for the task of philosophical interpretation. To this end I present a novel method which draws on techniques and formal tools from logic-based knowledge modeling, automated reasoning, and natural language processing to support researchers in philosophy. This highly-interdisciplinary and experimental effort forms part of the e-Ideas project which seeks to build a new, computationally-scalable methodology for History of Ideas. I test my method on concrete research questions under investigation by e-Idea’s members and thus provide an illustration of my method’s functioning in practice as well as evidence for its methodological adequacy.},
	school = {Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam},
	author = {Hungerbühler, Silvan},
	month = jun,
	year = {2018},
}

This thesis seeks to advance the use of computational techniques for the task of philosophical interpretation. To this end I present a novel method which draws on techniques and formal tools from logic-based knowledge modeling, automated reasoning, and natural language processing to support researchers in philosophy. This highly-interdisciplinary and experimental effort forms part of the e-Ideas project which seeks to build a new, computationally-scalable methodology for History of Ideas. I test my method on concrete research questions under investigation by e-Idea’s members and thus provide an illustration of my method’s functioning in practice as well as evidence for its methodological adequacy.

@article{van_den_berg_kant_2018,
	title = {Kant and the {Scope} of {Analogy} in the {Life} {Sciences}},
	volume = {71},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368117300146},
	doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.07.007},
	abstract = {In the present paper I investigate the role that analogy plays in eighteenth-century biology and in Kant’s philosophy of biology. I will argue that according to Kant, biology, as it was practiced in the eighteenth century, is fundamentally based on analogical reflection. However, precisely because biology is based on analogical reflection, biology cannot be a proper science. I provide two arguments for this interpretation. First, I argue that although analogical reflection is, according to Kant, necessary to comprehend the nature of organisms, it is also necessarily insufficient to fully comprehend the nature of organisms. The upshot of this argument is that for Kant our understanding of organisms is necessarily limited. Second, I argue that Kant did not take biology to be a proper science because biology was based on analogical arguments. I show that Kant stemmed from a philosophical tradition that did not assign analogical arguments an important justificatory role in natural science. Analogy, according to this conception, does not provide us with apodictically certain cognition. Hence, sciences based on analogical arguments cannot constitute proper sciences.},
	journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {67--76},
}

In the present paper I investigate the role that analogy plays in eighteenth-century biology and in Kant’s philosophy of biology. I will argue that according to Kant, biology, as it was practiced in the eighteenth century, is fundamentally based on analogical reflection. However, precisely because biology is based on analogical reflection, biology cannot be a proper science. I provide two arguments for this interpretation. First, I argue that although analogical reflection is, according to Kant, necessary to comprehend the nature of organisms, it is also necessarily insufficient to fully comprehend the nature of organisms. The upshot of this argument is that for Kant our understanding of organisms is necessarily limited. Second, I argue that Kant did not take biology to be a proper science because biology was based on analogical arguments. I show that Kant stemmed from a philosophical tradition that did not assign analogical arguments an important justificatory role in natural science. Analogy, according to this conception, does not provide us with apodictically certain cognition. Hence, sciences based on analogical arguments cannot constitute proper sciences.

@inproceedings{van_wierst_bolvis_2018,
	address = {Berlin},
	title = {{BolVis}: {Visualization} for {Text}-based {Research} in {Philosophy}},
	url = {http://vis4dh.dbvis.de/papers/2018/BolVis%20Visualization%20for%20Text-based%20Research%20in%20Philosophy.pdf},
	abstract = {Traditional research in philosophy consists for a large part in conceptual analysis and close reading of texts. This is a precise but time-consuming approach, in which the researcher focuses on one particular text passage or one philosophical concept from one or more works of an author. In this paper, we present BolVis, a visualization tool for text-based research in philosophy. BolVis allows researchers to determine quickly which parts of a text corpus are most relevant for their research by performing a semantic similarity search on words, sentences, and passages. It supports activities such as filtering, exploring the semantic context, comparing, performing close reading on selected passages, et cetera. Our approach enables in-depth analysis of texts at a significantly greater scale than is possible by traditional means, thereby allowing researchers to gain in speed without compromising on precision. We demonstrate the usefulness of BolVis by applying it to a corpus consisting of about 11,000 pages of the writings of the Bohemian polymath Bernard Bolzano (1781--1848). Our use case addresses an open question about Bolzano's ideas concerning size equality for sets of natural numbers, and we show that the use of BolVis enabled us to find (at least a significant part of) the reason why he came to accept one-to-one correspondence as a sufficient criterion for size equality.},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd {Workshop} on {Visualization} for the {Digital} {Humanities} ({VIS4DH})},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline and Betti, Arianna and Hofstede, Steven and Castermans, Thom and Westenberg, Michel and Oortwijn, Yvette and Wang, Shenghui and Koopman, Rob},
	year = {2018},
}

Traditional research in philosophy consists for a large part in conceptual analysis and close reading of texts. This is a precise but time-consuming approach, in which the researcher focuses on one particular text passage or one philosophical concept from one or more works of an author. In this paper, we present BolVis, a visualization tool for text-based research in philosophy. BolVis allows researchers to determine quickly which parts of a text corpus are most relevant for their research by performing a semantic similarity search on words, sentences, and passages. It supports activities such as filtering, exploring the semantic context, comparing, performing close reading on selected passages, et cetera. Our approach enables in-depth analysis of texts at a significantly greater scale than is possible by traditional means, thereby allowing researchers to gain in speed without compromising on precision. We demonstrate the usefulness of BolVis by applying it to a corpus consisting of about 11,000 pages of the writings of the Bohemian polymath Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848). Our use case addresses an open question about Bolzano's ideas concerning size equality for sets of natural numbers, and we show that the use of BolVis enabled us to find (at least a significant part of) the reason why he came to accept one-to-one correspondence as a sufficient criterion for size equality.

@inproceedings{van_den_berg_philosophical_2018,
	address = {Berlin},
	title = {A {Philosophical} {Perspective} on {Visualization} for {Digital} {Humanities}},
	url = {http://vis4dh.dbvis.de/papers/2018/A%20Philosophical%20Perspective%20on%20Visualization%20for%20Digital%20Humanities.pdf},
	abstract = {In this position paper, we describe a number of methodological and philosophical challenges that arose within our interdisciplinary Digital Humanities project CatVis, which is a collaboration between applied geometric algorithms and visualization researchers, data scientists working at OCLC, and philosophers who have a strong interest in the methodological foundations of visualization research. The challenges we describe concern aspects of one single epistemic need: that of methodologically securing (an increase in) trust in visualizations. We discuss the lack of ground truths in the (digital) humanities and argue that trust in visualizations requires that we evaluate visualizations on the basis of ground truths that humanities scholars themselves create. We further argue that trust in visualizations requires that a visualization provides provable guarantees on the faithfulness of the visual representation and that we must clearly communicate to the users which part of the visualization can be trusted and how much. Finally, we discuss transparency and accessibility in visualization research and provide measures for securing transparency and accessibility.},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd {Workshop} on {Visualization} for the {Digital} {Humanities} ({VIS4DH})},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein and Betti, Arianna and {Castermans, Thom} and {Koopman, Rob} and {Speckmann, Bettina} and {Verbeek, Kevin} and {van der Werf, Titia} and {Wang, Shenghui} and {Westenberg, Michel}},
	year = {2018},
}

In this position paper, we describe a number of methodological and philosophical challenges that arose within our interdisciplinary Digital Humanities project CatVis, which is a collaboration between applied geometric algorithms and visualization researchers, data scientists working at OCLC, and philosophers who have a strong interest in the methodological foundations of visualization research. The challenges we describe concern aspects of one single epistemic need: that of methodologically securing (an increase in) trust in visualizations. We discuss the lack of ground truths in the (digital) humanities and argue that trust in visualizations requires that we evaluate visualizations on the basis of ground truths that humanities scholars themselves create. We further argue that trust in visualizations requires that a visualization provides provable guarantees on the faithfulness of the visual representation and that we must clearly communicate to the users which part of the visualization can be trusted and how much. Finally, we discuss transparency and accessibility in visualization research and provide measures for securing transparency and accessibility.

@article{van_den_berg_blooming_2018,
	title = {A {Blooming} and {Buzzing} {Confusion}: {Buffon}, {Reimarus}, and {Kant} on {Animal} {Cognition}},
	volume = {72},
	doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2018.10.002},
	abstract = {Kant’s views on animals have received much attention in recent years.  According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant’s views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of Kant’s views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant’s position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant’s views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition.},
	journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {1--9},
}

Kant’s views on animals have received much attention in recent years. According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant’s views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of Kant’s views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant’s position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant’s views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition.

@inproceedings{zamborlini_toward_2017,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {Toward a {Core} {Conceptual} {Model} for ({Im})material {Cultural} {Heritage} in the {Golden} {Agents} project - {Storyfying} data},
	isbn = {1613-0073},
	url = {http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2063/events-paper1.pdf},
	abstract = {This paper reports on the initial idea of a core conceptual model
for the Golden Agents Project, which aims to integrate several heterogeneous
datasets about cultural heritage of the Dutch Golden
Age. We hypothesize that the combination of event and storytelling
modeling would provide us a common infrastructure to represent
and retrieve some core information regardless to its specific nature:
painting, book, notary act or theatre performance. The proposed
model was developed based on (i) several discussions conducted
with humanities experts and (ii) foundational ontology for grounding
the modeling decisions. It is assessed through a case study
about Vermeer, the painting ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’ and a novel
written about the production of the painting. We conclude that
the model satisfactorily addresses the case study, and we discuss
some next steps to further assess and extend the model, as well as
implementing and testing it in practice.},
	booktitle = {{SEMANTiCS} 2017 workshop proceedings - {Joint} {Proceedings} of {SEMANTiCS} 2017 {Workshops}  co-located with the 13th {International} {Conference} on {Semantic} {Systems} ({SEMANTiCS} 2017)},
	author = {Zamborlini, Veruska and Betti, Arianna and van den Heuvel, Charles},
	editor = {Fensel, Anna and Daniele, Laura and Aroyo, Lora and de Boer, Victor and Inel, Oana and Kuys, Gerard and Petram, Lodewijk},
	year = {2017},
}

This paper reports on the initial idea of a core conceptual model for the Golden Agents Project, which aims to integrate several heterogeneous datasets about cultural heritage of the Dutch Golden Age. We hypothesize that the combination of event and storytelling modeling would provide us a common infrastructure to represent and retrieve some core information regardless to its specific nature: painting, book, notary act or theatre performance. The proposed model was developed based on (i) several discussions conducted with humanities experts and (ii) foundational ontology for grounding the modeling decisions. It is assessed through a case study about Vermeer, the painting ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’ and a novel written about the production of the painting. We conclude that the model satisfactorily addresses the case study, and we discuss some next steps to further assess and extend the model, as well as implementing and testing it in practice.

@incollection{betti_brentano_2017,
	address = {London},
	title = {Brentano and {Twardowski}},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOgZJ0T7aOhOoo0qCFuw},
	booktitle = {The {Routledge} {Handbook} of {Franz} {Brentano} and the {Brentano} {School}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Kriegel, Uriah},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {305--311},
}

@incollection{betti_brentano_2017-1,
	address = {London},
	title = {Brentano and the {Lvov}-{Warsaw} {School}},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOgZJyRogFR4bkdEm9qw},
	booktitle = {The {Routledge} {Handbook} of {Franz} {Brentano} and the {Brentano} {School}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Kriegel, Uriah},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {334--340},
}

@incollection{betti_philostei_2017,
	address = {London},
	title = {@{PhilosTEI}: {Building} {Corpora} for {Philosophers}},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/bbi.32},
	abstract = {The step to e-research in philosophy depends on the availability of high quality, easily and freely accessible corpora in a sustainable format composed from multi-language, multi-script books from different historical periods. Corpora matching these needs are at the moment virtually non-existing. Within @PhilosTei, we have addressed this corpus building problem by developing an open source, web-based, user-friendly workflow from textual images to TEI, based on state-of-the-art open source OCR software, to wit Tesseract, and a multi-language version of TICCL, a powerful OCR post-correction tool. We have demonstrated the utility of the tool by applying it to a multilingual, multi-script corpus of important eighteenth to twentieth-century European philosophical texts.},
	booktitle = {{CLARIN} in the {Low} {Countries}},
	publisher = {Ubiquity Press},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Reynaert, Martin and van den Berg, Hein},
	editor = {Odijk, Jan and van Hessen, Arjan},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {371--384},
}

The step to e-research in philosophy depends on the availability of high quality, easily and freely accessible corpora in a sustainable format composed from multi-language, multi-script books from different historical periods. Corpora matching these needs are at the moment virtually non-existing. Within @PhilosTei, we have addressed this corpus building problem by developing an open source, web-based, user-friendly workflow from textual images to TEI, based on state-of-the-art open source OCR software, to wit Tesseract, and a multi-language version of TICCL, a powerful OCR post-correction tool. We have demonstrated the utility of the tool by applying it to a multilingual, multi-script corpus of important eighteenth to twentieth-century European philosophical texts.

@incollection{betti_semantics_2016,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Semantics and {Axiomatics} from {Bolzano} to {Tarski} [commissioned for the online version]},
	booktitle = {The {Oxford} {Handbook} of {The} {History} of {Analytic} {Philosophy} [online version only, not for the printed version]},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Beaney, Michael},
	year = {2016},
}

@incollection{betti_note_2016,
	address = {Amsterdam/New York, NY},
	series = {Poznań {Studies} in the {Philosophy} of the {Sciences} and the {Humanities}},
	title = {A {Note} on {Early} {Polish} {Semantics}, {Bolzano} and the {Woleński} {Thesis} [in proofs since 2005; revised proofs submitted on {Aug} 12, 2016]},
	url = {https://onedrive.live.com/redir?resid=8E8B912431DFEA03!13083&authkey=!AGOu6udBMKPtxXs&ithint=file%2cpdf},
	booktitle = {Essays for {Jan} {Woleński}},
	publisher = {Brill/Rodopi},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Werner, Konrad},
	year = {2016},
	keywords = {Bolzano},
}