@misc{van_den_berg_annotation_2020,
	address = {Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy},
	type = {Invited {Lecture}},
	title = {From {Annotation} to {Ontologies}},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	collaborator = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = jan,
	year = {2020},
}

@incollection{ginammi_bolzano_2020,
	address = {Pittsburgh},
	title = {Bolzano, {Kant} and the {Traditional} {Theory} of {Concepts} - {A} {Computational}  {Investigation} [{R}\&{R} 16 dec 2019 for volume under contract]},
	booktitle = {The {Dynamics} of {Science}: {Computational} {Frontiers} in {History} and {Philosophy} of {Science}},
	publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola and Bloem, Jelke and Koopman, Rob and Wang, Shenghui and Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {de Block, Andreas and Ramsey, Grant},
	year = {2020},
}

@inproceedings{bloem_distributional_2020,
	address = {Marseille},
	title = {Distributional {Semantics} for {Neo}-{Latin}},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of {LT4HALA} ({Workshop} on {Language} {Technologies} for {Historical} and {Ancient} {Languages})},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Parisi, Maria Chiara and Reynaert, Martin and Oortwijn, Yvette and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {2020},
}

@article{van_den_berg_axiomatic_2020,
	title = {Axiomatic {Natural} {Philosophy} and the {Emergence} of {Biology} as a {Science} [forthcoming]},
	abstract = {Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany, Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science.},
	journal = {Journal of the History of Biology},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein and Demarest, Boris},
	year = {2020},
}

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany, Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science.

@misc{van_den_berg_theoretical_2019,
	address = {Prague},
	type = {Contributed talk},
	title = {Theoretical {Virtues} in {Eighteenth}-{Century} {Debates} on {Animal} {Cognition}},
	abstract = {Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I will provide a precise analysis and reconstruction of the empirical and theoretical reasons these authors gave for adopting these positions. I will argue that in order to fully understand why Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy adopted their positions, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. In addition, I will provide a precise analysis of the debate on the explanatory scope of mechanism in eighteenth-century animal cognition, which is central to understanding the three positions I have outlined.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	month = aug,
	year = {2019},
}

Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I will provide a precise analysis and reconstruction of the empirical and theoretical reasons these authors gave for adopting these positions. I will argue that in order to fully understand why Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy adopted their positions, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. In addition, I will provide a precise analysis of the debate on the explanatory scope of mechanism in eighteenth-century animal cognition, which is central to understanding the three positions I have outlined.

@misc{ginammi_computational_2019,
	title = {Computational methods for the history of philosophy: {Interpretative} models and corpus-building},
	url = {https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1sWTwE0xoF5jOdkS7uG5EuaWxD2xKyXfWd7mYJ2I9-No/edit#slide=id.g6b2111c0b8_0_0},
	abstract = {In what way can computational and quantitative methods supplement the largely qualitative methods of
traditional history of philosophy? In this talk, we will give some answers to that question, by means of
presenting several projects in the history of philosophy using computational methods carried out within
our team. The methods applied in these projects are rather different and range from count-based, highly
basic computational techniques, to rather sophisticated information retrieval tools based on
distributional semantics, to the use of formal ontologies. What these projects have in common is that
they use novel methods and thereby urge us to reflect on the methodology: how can these methods be
used in a transparent and reliable manner?
The majority of our projects employs the ``model-approach” which we introduced in (removed for blind
review), i.e. they use explicit conceptual frameworks which facilitate the interpretation of texts. We
argue that the model approach is a useful method to obtain philosophically relevant information from
the data delivered by quantitative computational methods, and at the same time makes the
interpretation of this data by researchers less arbitrary and biased. One of our projects supplements this
model approach by defined annotation schemes to capture differences and similarities between various
conceptions in a way which is as accountable as possible.
An undeniable benefit of computational methods is that research can be done on a scale which is
unthinkable for traditional methods. However, this raises a new issue which, in our view, hitherto
received insufficient attention: how to build a representative corpus relative to a given historical
research question? We discuss our efforts to build our datasets as systematically as possible, and
propose that corpus-building for historical-interpretive research should rely on a method taking
inspiration from the so-called “systematic literature review” common in the sciences. Additionally, we
will discuss the issues we encountered by building multilingual, multi-script corpora for our
computational research.},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola and Sommerauer, Pia},
	collaborator = {Oortwijn, Yvette and Meyer, François and Betti, Arianna and Fokkens, Antske and Bloem, Jelke},
	month = nov,
	year = {2019},
}

In what way can computational and quantitative methods supplement the largely qualitative methods of traditional history of philosophy? In this talk, we will give some answers to that question, by means of presenting several projects in the history of philosophy using computational methods carried out within our team. The methods applied in these projects are rather different and range from count-based, highly basic computational techniques, to rather sophisticated information retrieval tools based on distributional semantics, to the use of formal ontologies. What these projects have in common is that they use novel methods and thereby urge us to reflect on the methodology: how can these methods be used in a transparent and reliable manner? The majority of our projects employs the ``model-approach” which we introduced in (removed for blind review), i.e. they use explicit conceptual frameworks which facilitate the interpretation of texts. We argue that the model approach is a useful method to obtain philosophically relevant information from the data delivered by quantitative computational methods, and at the same time makes the interpretation of this data by researchers less arbitrary and biased. One of our projects supplements this model approach by defined annotation schemes to capture differences and similarities between various conceptions in a way which is as accountable as possible. An undeniable benefit of computational methods is that research can be done on a scale which is unthinkable for traditional methods. However, this raises a new issue which, in our view, hitherto received insufficient attention: how to build a representative corpus relative to a given historical research question? We discuss our efforts to build our datasets as systematically as possible, and propose that corpus-building for historical-interpretive research should rely on a method taking inspiration from the so-called “systematic literature review” common in the sciences. Additionally, we will discuss the issues we encountered by building multilingual, multi-script corpora for our computational research.

@mastersthesis{parisi_how_2019,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {On how perspectival hylemorphism got the facts wrong},
	school = {University of Amsterdam},
	author = {Parisi, Maria Chiara},
	year = {2019},
	note = {DIAMOND {\textbar} Supervisor: Arianna Betti; Second Reader: Hein van den Berg},
}

@phdthesis{ossenkoppele_quines_2019,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {{BA} thesis},
	title = {Quine's {Naturalistic} {Epistemology}; {A} {Quantitative} {Investigation}},
	school = {University of Amsterdam},
	author = {Ossenkoppele, Thijs},
	year = {2019},
	note = {DIAMOND {\textbar} Supervisor: Arianna Betti},
}

@misc{ossenkoppele_quines_2019-1,
	type = {Invited {Lecture}},
	title = {Quine's {Naturalistic} {Epistemology}; a {Quantitative} {Investigation}},
	url = {https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/15bEYIRK-0PKjCnOqd9deDqQvGs7x3tk2SqIKsCAiUMg/edit?usp=sharing},
	abstract = {In this presentation, I offer a supplementary, quantitative element to the close-reading based methods with which large-scale historico-philosophical research, aimed at confirming or disconfirming hypotheses about a certain historical philosopher's adherence to position x or y, is traditionally conducted. The conclusions which result from such research are often drawn on the basis of incomplete or selective evidence, and without the researcher's conceptual presuppositions having been made explicit. In order to be justified in ascribing either position x or position y to a historical philosopher, or in pointing out an inconsistent moving back and forth between x and y in that philosopher's work, the researcher ought to have taken all relevant passages concerning these positions into consideration. I argue that by supplementing traditional research with the use of interpretive models, in which the researcher's conceptual presuppositions have been made explicit, to guide the interpreting of passages found with computational tools in complete, high-quality corpora, historico-philosophical research can yield results based on a more comprehensive amount of evidence when compared with traditional methodology. At the same time, the use of complete corpora prevents the researcher from conveniently picking passages that support their hypotheses; all relevant data will have to be taken into consideration. In support of the functionality of this novel methodology, I present my application of it in answering a question which was raised by Susan Haack, and which was treated by both her and Sander Verhaegh in a traditional manner. The question concerns W.V.O. Quine's naturalistic epistemology: did he believe that a naturalized epistemology ought to be carried out from within the natural sciences alone (scientistic naturalistic epistemology), from within science in a broader sense (modest naturalistic epistemology), or was he ambivalent about the matter? Haack accused Quine of moving between modest and scientistic naturalism in his writings about epistemology, which would be problematic since the latter believed some of the epistemological questions that cannot be answered from within a scientistic naturalistic outlook are legitimate questions, such as: “do the natural sciences enjoy a privileged epistemic status?”. The evidence that Haack provided in support of her hypothesis is inconclusive, and the background assumptions she makes regarding notions such as 'natural science' were not made explicit. It is shown that with the application of the supplementary methods, thus using a model to help interpret passages concerning the methodology proper to epistemology from a corpus consisting of all of Quine's publications, Haack's question concerning the nature of Quine's naturalistic epistemology is answered with more conclusiveness and rigor than could be provided by traditional close reading-based research alone.},
	author = {Ossenkoppele, Thijs},
	month = nov,
	year = {2019},
}

In this presentation, I offer a supplementary, quantitative element to the close-reading based methods with which large-scale historico-philosophical research, aimed at confirming or disconfirming hypotheses about a certain historical philosopher's adherence to position x or y, is traditionally conducted. The conclusions which result from such research are often drawn on the basis of incomplete or selective evidence, and without the researcher's conceptual presuppositions having been made explicit. In order to be justified in ascribing either position x or position y to a historical philosopher, or in pointing out an inconsistent moving back and forth between x and y in that philosopher's work, the researcher ought to have taken all relevant passages concerning these positions into consideration. I argue that by supplementing traditional research with the use of interpretive models, in which the researcher's conceptual presuppositions have been made explicit, to guide the interpreting of passages found with computational tools in complete, high-quality corpora, historico-philosophical research can yield results based on a more comprehensive amount of evidence when compared with traditional methodology. At the same time, the use of complete corpora prevents the researcher from conveniently picking passages that support their hypotheses; all relevant data will have to be taken into consideration. In support of the functionality of this novel methodology, I present my application of it in answering a question which was raised by Susan Haack, and which was treated by both her and Sander Verhaegh in a traditional manner. The question concerns W.V.O. Quine's naturalistic epistemology: did he believe that a naturalized epistemology ought to be carried out from within the natural sciences alone (scientistic naturalistic epistemology), from within science in a broader sense (modest naturalistic epistemology), or was he ambivalent about the matter? Haack accused Quine of moving between modest and scientistic naturalism in his writings about epistemology, which would be problematic since the latter believed some of the epistemological questions that cannot be answered from within a scientistic naturalistic outlook are legitimate questions, such as: “do the natural sciences enjoy a privileged epistemic status?”. The evidence that Haack provided in support of her hypothesis is inconclusive, and the background assumptions she makes regarding notions such as 'natural science' were not made explicit. It is shown that with the application of the supplementary methods, thus using a model to help interpret passages concerning the methodology proper to epistemology from a corpus consisting of all of Quine's publications, Haack's question concerning the nature of Quine's naturalistic epistemology is answered with more conclusiveness and rigor than could be provided by traditional close reading-based research alone.

@techreport{oortwijn_semantics_2019,
	title = {The semantics of meaning: distributional approaches for studying philosophical text [ongoing]},
	author = {Oortwijn, Yvette and Meyer, François},
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{ginammi_interacting_2019,
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {Interacting with open collections: {Ariadne}, {BolVis} and {KantVis}},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola and Betti, Arianna},
	month = jun,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{bloem_e-ideas_2019,
	address = {Berlin},
	title = {The e-{Ideas} project: {Modeling} meaning and change in the history of ideas},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke},
	month = sep,
	year = {2019},
	note = {tex.ids: bloemEIdeasProjectModeling2019a},
}

@misc{bloem_hoe_2019,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {Hoe leert een computer een taal?},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke},
	month = oct,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{betti_building_2019,
	address = {Torino, Italy},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {Building {Corpora}:  {Objectivity} and {Quality} of {Corpora} for {Philosophical} {Research}},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Ginammi, Annapaola},
	month = feb,
	year = {2019},
	note = {tex.ids: ginammiBuildingCorporaObjectivity2019},
}

@misc{betti_computational_2019,
	address = {Leiden University},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {Computational humanities: models, methods, tools},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = dec,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{ginammi_bolzanos_2019,
	address = {Prague},
	type = {Contributed talk},
	title = {Bolzano's theory of ground and consequence and the traditional theory of concepts},
	url = {https://www.overleaf.com/read/sqxgcgssqxmr},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola and Betti, Arianna},
	month = aug,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{bloem_evaluating_2019,
	address = {Utrecht},
	title = {Evaluating the consistency of word embeddings from small data},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Fokkens, Antske and Herbelot, Aurélie},
	month = jan,
	year = {2019},
	note = {tex.ids: bloemEvaluatingConsistencyWord2019b},
}

@misc{bloem_learning_2019,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {Learning consistent embeddings from small data with {Nonce2Vec}},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke},
	month = mar,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{bloem_e-ideas_2019-1,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {e-{Ideas}: {Naar} een computationele ideeëngeschiedenis},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke},
	month = mar,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{betti_knowledge_2019,
	address = {Università di Bologna},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {Knowledge, {Trust}, {Technology}},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = nov,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{betti_nonsymbolic_2019,
	address = {VU University, Amsterdam},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {({Non}){Symbolic} {AI} in {Computational} {History} of {Philosophy}},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = nov,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{betti_trust_2019,
	address = {Vancouver, Canada (CA)},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {‘{Trust} in {VIS4DH}’ {Expert} {Panel} {Pitch}},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = oct,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{bellomo_domain_2019,
	address = {Salzburg},
	type = {Invited talk},
	title = {Domain {Extension} and {Ideal} {Elements} in {Mathematics}},
	url = {https://www.uni-salzburg.at/index.php?id=66639&L=1},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	month = may,
	year = {2019},
}

@misc{bellomo_dedekind_2019,
	address = {Cambridge, UK},
	type = {Contributed talk},
	title = {Dedekind and {Manders}: two conceptions of domain extension?},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	month = jan,
	year = {2019},
}

@inproceedings{bloem_evaluating_2019-1,
	address = {Varna, Bulgaria},
	title = {Evaluating the {Consistency} of {Word} {Embeddings} from {Small} {Data}},
	url = {http://lml.bas.bg/ranlp2019/proceedings-ranlp-2019.pdf},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the {International} {Conference} {Recent} {Advances} in {Natural} {Language} {Processing}, {RANLP} 2019},
	publisher = {Incoma Ltd},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Fokkens, Antske and Herbelot, Aurelie},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {132--141},
}

@incollection{betti_history_2019,
	address = {London},
	series = {Advances in {Experimental} {Philosophy}},
	title = {History of {Philosophy} in {Ones} and {Zeros}},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOiP5Q8-ia4_sSI3CyOw},
	abstract = {How can we best reconstruct the origin of a notion, its development, and possible spread to multiple fields? We present a pilot study on the spread of the notion of conceptual scheme. Though the notion is philosophically important, its origin, development, and spread are unclear. Several purely qualitative and competing historical hypotheses have been offered, which rely on disconnected disciplinary traditions, and have never been tested all at once in a single comprehensive investigation fitting the scope of its subject matter. As a step toward such an investigation, we trace the use of the bigram “conceptual scheme” in about 42,000 US journal articles in social sciences from 1888-1959 by using a novel method combining a quantitative procedure aided by basic computational techniques with qualitative elements informed by Betti and van den Berg (2014)’s ‘model approach to the history of ideas’.},
	booktitle = {Methodological {Advances} in {Experimental} {Philosophy}},
	publisher = {Bloomsbury},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and van den Berg, Hein and Oortwijn, Yvette and Treijtel, Caspar},
	editor = {Curtis, Mark and Fischer, Eugen},
	month = mar,
	year = {2019},
	note = {GREEN},
	pages = {295--332},
}

How can we best reconstruct the origin of a notion, its development, and possible spread to multiple fields? We present a pilot study on the spread of the notion of conceptual scheme. Though the notion is philosophically important, its origin, development, and spread are unclear. Several purely qualitative and competing historical hypotheses have been offered, which rely on disconnected disciplinary traditions, and have never been tested all at once in a single comprehensive investigation fitting the scope of its subject matter. As a step toward such an investigation, we trace the use of the bigram “conceptual scheme” in about 42,000 US journal articles in social sciences from 1888-1959 by using a novel method combining a quantitative procedure aided by basic computational techniques with qualitative elements informed by Betti and van den Berg (2014)’s ‘model approach to the history of ideas’.

@article{castermans_solarview_2019,
	title = {{SolarView}: {Low} {Distortion} {Radial} {Embedding} with a {Focus}},
	volume = {25},
	issn = {1077-2626},
	doi = {10.1109/TVCG.2018.2865361},
	abstract = {We propose a novel type of low distortion radial embedding which focuses on one specific entity and its closest neighbors. Our embedding preserves near-exact distances to the focus entity and aims to minimize distortion between the other entities. We present an interactive exploration tool SolarView which places the focus entity at the center of a “solar system” and embeds its neighbors guided by concentric circles. SolarView provides an implementation of our novel embedding and several state-of-the-art dimensionality reduction and embedding techniques, which we adapted to our setting in various ways. We experimentally evaluated our embedding and compared it to these state-of-the-art techniques. The results show that our embedding competes with these techniques and achieves low distortion in practice. Our method performs particularly well when the visualization, and hence the embedding, adheres to the solar system design principle of our application. Nonetheless-as with all dimensionality reduction techniques-the distortion may be high. We leverage interaction techniques to give clear visual cues that allow users to accurately judge distortion. We illustrate the use of SolarView by exploring the high-dimensional metric space of bibliographic entity similarities.},
	language = {English},
	number = {10},
	journal = {IEEE transactions on visualization and computer graphics},
	author = {Castermans, Thom and Verbeek, Kevin and Speckmann, Bettina and Westenberg, Michel A. and Koopman, Rob and Wang, Shenghui and van den Berg, Hein and Betti, Arianna},
	month = oct,
	year = {2019},
	note = {DIAMOND},
	keywords = {Dimensionality reduction, Radial embedding, Visualizing distortion},
	pages = {2969--2982},
}

We propose a novel type of low distortion radial embedding which focuses on one specific entity and its closest neighbors. Our embedding preserves near-exact distances to the focus entity and aims to minimize distortion between the other entities. We present an interactive exploration tool SolarView which places the focus entity at the center of a “solar system” and embeds its neighbors guided by concentric circles. SolarView provides an implementation of our novel embedding and several state-of-the-art dimensionality reduction and embedding techniques, which we adapted to our setting in various ways. We experimentally evaluated our embedding and compared it to these state-of-the-art techniques. The results show that our embedding competes with these techniques and achieves low distortion in practice. Our method performs particularly well when the visualization, and hence the embedding, adheres to the solar system design principle of our application. Nonetheless-as with all dimensionality reduction techniques-the distortion may be high. We leverage interaction techniques to give clear visual cues that allow users to accurately judge distortion. We illustrate the use of SolarView by exploring the high-dimensional metric space of bibliographic entity similarities.

@inproceedings{van_wierst_bolvis_2018,
	address = {Berlin},
	title = {{BolVis}: {Visualization} for {Text}-based {Research} in {Philosophy}},
	url = {http://vis4dh.dbvis.de/papers/2018/BolVis%20Visualization%20for%20Text-based%20Research%20in%20Philosophy.pdf},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline and Betti, Arianna and Hofstede, Steven and Castermans, Thom and Westenberg, Michel and Oortwijn, Yvette and Wang, Shenghui and Koopman, Rob},
	year = {2018},
	note = {DIAMOND},
}

@misc{van_wierst_computational_2018,
	address = {Salzburg},
	type = {Contributed talk},
	title = {A {Computational} {Look} at {Bolzano}},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline and Hüngebuhler, Silvan},
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{van_wierst_bolvis_2018-1,
	address = {Berlin},
	type = {contributed},
	title = {{BolVis}: visualization for text-based research in philosophy},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline and Castermans, Thom},
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{van_wierst_bolzano_2018,
	address = {Groningen},
	type = {Contributed talk},
	title = {Bolzano in {Ones} and {Zeros}: {A} quantitative study in 19th century philosophy of mathematics},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{betti_history_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Invited talk},
	title = {History of {Philosophy} in {Ones} and {Zeros}},
	abstract = {How can we best reconstruct the origin of a notion, its development, and possible spread to multiple fields? We present a pilot study on the spread of the notion of conceptual scheme. Though the notion is philosophically important, its origin, development, and spread are unclear. Several purely qualitative and competing historical hypotheses have been offered, which rely on disconnected disciplinary traditions, and have never been tested all at once in a single comprehensive investigation fitting the scope of its subject matter. As a step toward such an investigation, we trace the use of the bigram "conceptual scheme" in about 42,000 US journal articles in social sciences from 1888-1959 by using a novel method combining a quantitative procedure aided by basic computational techniques with qualitative elements informed by Betti and van den Berg (2014)'s 'model approach to the history of idea'. This research was made possible by research support from the library of the University of Amsterdam. In this talk, we will pay special attention to how librarians can aid researchers in philosophy and the history of ideas.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	collaborator = {Betti, Arianna and Oortwijn, Yvette and Treijtel, Caspar},
	month = oct,
	year = {2018},
}

How can we best reconstruct the origin of a notion, its development, and possible spread to multiple fields? We present a pilot study on the spread of the notion of conceptual scheme. Though the notion is philosophically important, its origin, development, and spread are unclear. Several purely qualitative and competing historical hypotheses have been offered, which rely on disconnected disciplinary traditions, and have never been tested all at once in a single comprehensive investigation fitting the scope of its subject matter. As a step toward such an investigation, we trace the use of the bigram "conceptual scheme" in about 42,000 US journal articles in social sciences from 1888-1959 by using a novel method combining a quantitative procedure aided by basic computational techniques with qualitative elements informed by Betti and van den Berg (2014)'s 'model approach to the history of idea'. This research was made possible by research support from the library of the University of Amsterdam. In this talk, we will pay special attention to how librarians can aid researchers in philosophy and the history of ideas.

@misc{van_wierst_gerarchia_2018,
	address = {IUSS Pavia},
	type = {Invited {Seminar} {Talk}},
	title = {La gerarchia concettuale nella concezione {Bolzaniana} di grounding},
	language = {Italian},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline},
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{van_den_berg_kants_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Contributed talk},
	title = {Kant's {Ideal} of {Systematicity} in {Historical} {Context}},
	abstract = {This paper explains what systematicity is and why Kant claims that sciences must be systematic. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be fruitfully understood against the background of the Classical Model of Science and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. I further show that systematicity furthers several traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific cognition, which may partly explain why Kant thinks that sciences must be systematic.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	month = jul,
	year = {2018},
	note = {tex.ids: vandenbergKantIdealSystematicity2019},
}

This paper explains what systematicity is and why Kant claims that sciences must be systematic. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be fruitfully understood against the background of the Classical Model of Science and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. I further show that systematicity furthers several traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific cognition, which may partly explain why Kant thinks that sciences must be systematic.

@phdthesis{hungerbuhler_computational_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Master of {Logic} ({MSc}) {Thesis}},
	title = {A {Computational} {Method} for {Philosophical} {Interpretation}},
	url = {https://msclogic.illc.uva.nl/theses/recent/publication/4745/A-Computational-Method-for-Philosophical-Interpretation},
	abstract = {This thesis seeks to advance the use of computational techniques for the task of philosophical interpretation. To this end I present a novel method which draws on techniques and formal tools from logic-based knowledge modeling, automated reasoning, and natural language processing to support researchers in philosophy. This highly-interdisciplinary and experimental effort forms part of the e-Ideas project which seeks to build a new, computationally-scalable methodology for History of Ideas. I test my method on concrete research questions under investigation by e-Idea’s members and thus provide an illustration of my method’s functioning in practice as well as evidence for its methodological adequacy.},
	school = {Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam},
	author = {Hungerbühler, Silvan},
	month = jun,
	year = {2018},
	note = {DIAMOND {\textbar} Supervisor: Arianna Betti},
}

This thesis seeks to advance the use of computational techniques for the task of philosophical interpretation. To this end I present a novel method which draws on techniques and formal tools from logic-based knowledge modeling, automated reasoning, and natural language processing to support researchers in philosophy. This highly-interdisciplinary and experimental effort forms part of the e-Ideas project which seeks to build a new, computationally-scalable methodology for History of Ideas. I test my method on concrete research questions under investigation by e-Idea’s members and thus provide an illustration of my method’s functioning in practice as well as evidence for its methodological adequacy.

@techreport{bloem_abbyy_2018,
	title = {{ABBYY} {Manual} {Correction} {Guidelines}},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Oortwijn, Yvette and Dondorp, Lisa},
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{bloem_e-ideas_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Invited {Seminar} {Talk}},
	title = {e-{Ideas}: {Towards} a computational history of ideas},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Bellomo, Anna and Berg, Hein van den and Ginammi, Annapaola and Betti, Arianna},
	month = may,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {pres},
}

@misc{bloem_bolzanos_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Invited {Seminar} {Talk}},
	title = {Bolzano's semantic space: {Philosophical} investigations using an information retrieval tool},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Bellomo, Anna and Berg, Hein van den and Koopman, Rob and Oortwijn, Yvette and Wang, Shenghui and Ginammi, Annapaola and Betti, Arianna},
	month = jul,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {pres},
}

@techreport{bloem_planning_2018,
	title = {Planning {Quine2Vec}},
	url = {https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YkPSBTEGk4BCdAcb23zbCw0AXIcXDIIsf78UFx6YBm4/edit?usp=sharing},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke},
	month = jun,
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{bloem_isolating_2018,
	address = {Tel Aviv},
	type = {Contributed talk},
	title = {Isolating meaning from function using the distributional properties of a construction},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke},
	month = jul,
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {pres},
}

@misc{betti_philosophy_2018,
	address = {Milano, Italy},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {Philosophy and {Ontology}, but {Different}},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = nov,
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{betti_how_2018,
	address = {Saõ Paulo, Brasil},
	type = {Keynote},
	title = {How to {Trace} the {Origins} and {Spread} of {Anything} (but of {Concepts}, especially)},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = nov,
	year = {2018},
}

@techreport{bloem_tei_2018,
	title = {{TEI} {Annotation} {Guidelines} for e-{Ideas} {Corpus}},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Oortwijn, Yvette and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {2018},
}

@techreport{bloem_quality_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {Quality requirements for e-{Ideas} corpora [draft technical report]},
	institution = {University of Amsterdam},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{betti_history_2018-1,
	address = {Leiden University},
	type = {Invited {Seminar} {Talk}},
	title = {History and {Philosophy} in {Ones} and {Zeros}},
	language = {es},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	collaborator = {Van den Berg, Hein and Oortwijn, Yvette and Treijtel, Caspar},
	month = nov,
	year = {2018},
	note = {tex.ids: bettiHistoryPhilosophyOnes2018a},
}

@misc{betti_how_2018-1,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Keynote},
	title = {How to {Do} the {History} of the {Humanities} {Digitally}},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = nov,
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{van_den_berg_philosophical_2018,
	address = {Berlin},
	type = {contributed},
	title = {A {Philosophical} {Perspective} on {Visualization} for {Digital} {Humanities}},
	url = {http://vis4dh.dbvis.de/papers/2018/A%20Philosophical%20Perspective%20on%20Visualization%20for%20Digital%20Humanities.pdf},
	abstract = {In this position paper, we describe a number of methodological and philosophical challenges that arose within our interdisciplinary Digital Humanities project CatVis, which is a collaboration between applied geometric algorithms and visualization researchers, data scientists working at OCLC, and philosophers who have a strong interest in the methodological foundations of visualization research. The challenges we describe concern aspects of one single epistemic need: that of methodologically securing (an increase in) trust in visualizations. We discuss the lack of ground truths in the (digital) humanities and argue that trust in visualizations requires that we evaluate visualizations on the basis of ground truths that humanities scholars themselves create. We further argue that trust in visualizations requires that a visualization provides provable guarantees on the faithfulness of the visual representation and that we must clearly communicate to the users which part of the visualization can be trusted and how much. Finally, we discuss transparency and accessibility in visualization research and provide measures for securing transparency and accessibility.},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	collaborator = {Van den Berg, Hein and {Castermans, Thom} and {Koopman, Rob} and {Speckmann, Bettina} and {Verbeek, Kevin} and {van der Werf, Titia} and {Wang, Shenghui} and {Westenberg, Michel}},
	year = {2018},
}

In this position paper, we describe a number of methodological and philosophical challenges that arose within our interdisciplinary Digital Humanities project CatVis, which is a collaboration between applied geometric algorithms and visualization researchers, data scientists working at OCLC, and philosophers who have a strong interest in the methodological foundations of visualization research. The challenges we describe concern aspects of one single epistemic need: that of methodologically securing (an increase in) trust in visualizations. We discuss the lack of ground truths in the (digital) humanities and argue that trust in visualizations requires that we evaluate visualizations on the basis of ground truths that humanities scholars themselves create. We further argue that trust in visualizations requires that a visualization provides provable guarantees on the faithfulness of the visual representation and that we must clearly communicate to the users which part of the visualization can be trusted and how much. Finally, we discuss transparency and accessibility in visualization research and provide measures for securing transparency and accessibility.

@techreport{bellomo_bolzanos_2018,
	title = {Bolzano’s semantic space: {Philosophical} investigations using an information retrieval tool [{Unpublished} abstract]},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOiO9KUaYXHj-UDy1idw},
	language = {en},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna and van den Berg, Hein and Betti, Arianna and Bloem, Jelke and Koopman, Rob and Oortwijn, Yvette and Wang, Shenghui and van Wierst, Pauline},
	month = apr,
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{bellomo_significance_2018,
	address = {Salzburg},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {On the significance of {Bolzano}'s measurable numbers},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	month = sep,
	year = {2018},
}

@misc{bellomo_introduction_2018,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Invited seminar presentation},
	title = {An {Introduction} to {Bernard} {Bolzano}'s {Philosophy} of {Mathematics}},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	month = may,
	year = {2018},
}

@inproceedings{van_den_berg_philosophical_2018-1,
	address = {Berlin},
	title = {A {Philosophical} {Perspective} on {Visualization} for {Digital} {Humanities}},
	url = {http://vis4dh.dbvis.de/papers/2018/A%20Philosophical%20Perspective%20on%20Visualization%20for%20Digital%20Humanities.pdf},
	abstract = {In this position paper, we describe a number of methodological and philosophical challenges that arose within our interdisciplinary Digital Humanities project CatVis, which is a collaboration between applied geometric algorithms and visualization researchers, data scientists working at OCLC, and philosophers who have a strong interest in the methodological foundations of visualization research. The challenges we describe concern aspects of one single epistemic need: that of methodologically securing (an increase in) trust in visualizations. We discuss the lack of ground truths in the (digital) humanities and argue that trust in visualizations requires that we evaluate visualizations on the basis of ground truths that humanities scholars themselves create. We further argue that trust in visualizations requires that a visualization provides provable guarantees on the faithfulness of the visual representation and that we must clearly communicate to the users which part of the visualization can be trusted and how much. Finally, we discuss transparency and accessibility in visualization research and provide measures for securing transparency and accessibility.},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd {Workshop} on {Visualization} for the {Digital} {Humanities} ({VIS4DH})},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein and Betti, Arianna and {Castermans, Thom} and {Koopman, Rob} and {Speckmann, Bettina} and {Verbeek, Kevin} and {van der Werf, Titia} and {Wang, Shenghui} and {Westenberg, Michel}},
	year = {2018},
	note = {DIAMOND},
}

In this position paper, we describe a number of methodological and philosophical challenges that arose within our interdisciplinary Digital Humanities project CatVis, which is a collaboration between applied geometric algorithms and visualization researchers, data scientists working at OCLC, and philosophers who have a strong interest in the methodological foundations of visualization research. The challenges we describe concern aspects of one single epistemic need: that of methodologically securing (an increase in) trust in visualizations. We discuss the lack of ground truths in the (digital) humanities and argue that trust in visualizations requires that we evaluate visualizations on the basis of ground truths that humanities scholars themselves create. We further argue that trust in visualizations requires that a visualization provides provable guarantees on the faithfulness of the visual representation and that we must clearly communicate to the users which part of the visualization can be trusted and how much. Finally, we discuss transparency and accessibility in visualization research and provide measures for securing transparency and accessibility.

@article{van_den_berg_kant_2018,
	title = {Kant and the {Scope} of {Analogy} in the {Life} {Sciences}},
	volume = {71},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368117300146},
	doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.07.007},
	abstract = {In the present paper I investigate the role that analogy plays in eighteenth-century biology and in Kant’s philosophy of biology. I will argue that according to Kant, biology, as it was practiced in the eighteenth century, is fundamentally based on analogical reflection. However, precisely because biology is based on analogical reflection, biology cannot be a proper science. I provide two arguments for this interpretation. First, I argue that although analogical reflection is, according to Kant, necessary to comprehend the nature of organisms, it is also necessarily insufficient to fully comprehend the nature of organisms. The upshot of this argument is that for Kant our understanding of organisms is necessarily limited. Second, I argue that Kant did not take biology to be a proper science because biology was based on analogical arguments. I show that Kant stemmed from a philosophical tradition that did not assign analogical arguments an important justificatory role in natural science. Analogy, according to this conception, does not provide us with apodictically certain cognition. Hence, sciences based on analogical arguments cannot constitute proper sciences.},
	journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2018},
	note = {GREEN},
	pages = {67--76},
}

In the present paper I investigate the role that analogy plays in eighteenth-century biology and in Kant’s philosophy of biology. I will argue that according to Kant, biology, as it was practiced in the eighteenth century, is fundamentally based on analogical reflection. However, precisely because biology is based on analogical reflection, biology cannot be a proper science. I provide two arguments for this interpretation. First, I argue that although analogical reflection is, according to Kant, necessary to comprehend the nature of organisms, it is also necessarily insufficient to fully comprehend the nature of organisms. The upshot of this argument is that for Kant our understanding of organisms is necessarily limited. Second, I argue that Kant did not take biology to be a proper science because biology was based on analogical arguments. I show that Kant stemmed from a philosophical tradition that did not assign analogical arguments an important justificatory role in natural science. Analogy, according to this conception, does not provide us with apodictically certain cognition. Hence, sciences based on analogical arguments cannot constitute proper sciences.

@article{van_den_berg_blooming_2018,
	title = {A {Blooming} and {Buzzing} {Confusion}: {Buffon}, {Reimarus}, and {Kant} on {Animal} {Cognition}},
	volume = {72},
	doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2018.10.002},
	abstract = {Kant’s views on animals have received much attention in recent years.  According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant’s views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of Kant’s views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant’s position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant’s views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition.},
	journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {2018},
	note = {GREEN},
	pages = {1--9},
}

Kant’s views on animals have received much attention in recent years. According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant’s views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of Kant’s views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant’s position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant’s views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition.

@misc{betti_bolzano_2017,
	address = {Salzburg, Austria},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {Bolzano in {Ones} and {Zeroes}},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and van Wierst, Pauline},
	month = sep,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_data-driven_2017,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	type = {Keynote},
	title = {Data-{Driven} {Philosophy}: {The} {State} of the {Art}},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Van den Berg, Hein},
	month = dec,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_computationele_2017,
	address = {Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Den Haag},
	type = {Keynote},
	title = {Computationele {Ideeëngeschiedenis}},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	collaborator = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = jan,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_modelling_2017,
	address = {Amsterdam, The Netherlands},
	type = {Invited {Seminar} {Talk}},
	title = {Modelling the {History} of {Ideas}},
	language = {nl},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Van den Berg, Hein},
	month = oct,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_history_2017,
	address = {UEA, Norwich, UK},
	type = {Invited {Keynote} {Address}},
	title = {History of {Philosophy} in {Ones} and {Zeroes} (based on joint work with {Hein} van den {Berg}, {Lisa} {Dondorp}, {Yvette} {Oortwijn} and {Pauline} van {Wierst})},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = jul,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_computational_2017,
	address = {Leiden, The Netherlands},
	type = {Keynote},
	title = {A {Computational} {History} of {Ideas}},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Van den Berg, Hein},
	month = jun,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_linking_2017,
	address = {Leiden, The Netherlands},
	type = {Invited {Talk}},
	title = {Linking datasets via ontologies in linguistics - {Best} practices from other fields and four recommendations},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Carretta Zamborlini, Veruska},
	month = jun,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_sums_2017,
	address = {Helsinki, Finland},
	type = {Invited {Keynote} {Address}},
	title = {Sums, {Facts} and '{Nothing} {Over} and {Above}'},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	month = aug,
	year = {2017},
}

@misc{betti_creating_2017,
	address = {Torino, Italy},
	type = {Keynote {Lecture}},
	title = {Creating a {Computational} {History} of {Ideas}},
	language = {en},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	collaborator = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	month = jan,
	year = {2017},
	note = {tex.ids: bettiCreatingComputationalHistory2017a, vandenbergCreatingComputationalHistory2017},
}

@inproceedings{zamborlini_toward_2017,
	address = {Amsterdam},
	title = {Toward a {Core} {Conceptual} {Model} for ({Im})material {Cultural} {Heritage} in the {Golden} {Agents} project - {Storyfying} data},
	isbn = {1613-0073},
	url = {http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2063/events-paper1.pdf},
	abstract = {This paper reports on the initial idea of a core conceptual model
for the Golden Agents Project, which aims to integrate several heterogeneous
datasets about cultural heritage of the Dutch Golden
Age. We hypothesize that the combination of event and storytelling
modeling would provide us a common infrastructure to represent
and retrieve some core information regardless to its specific nature:
painting, book, notary act or theatre performance. The proposed
model was developed based on (i) several discussions conducted
with humanities experts and (ii) foundational ontology for grounding
the modeling decisions. It is assessed through a case study
about Vermeer, the painting ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’ and a novel
written about the production of the painting. We conclude that
the model satisfactorily addresses the case study, and we discuss
some next steps to further assess and extend the model, as well as
implementing and testing it in practice.},
	booktitle = {{SEMANTiCS} 2017 workshop proceedings - {Joint} {Proceedings} of {SEMANTiCS} 2017 {Workshops}  co-located with the 13th {International} {Conference} on {Semantic} {Systems} ({SEMANTiCS} 2017)},
	author = {Zamborlini, Veruska and Betti, Arianna and van den Heuvel, Charles},
	editor = {Fensel, Anna and Daniele, Laura and Aroyo, Lora and de Boer, Victor and Inel, Oana and Kuys, Gerard and Petram, Lodewijk},
	year = {2017},
	note = {DIAMOND},
}

This paper reports on the initial idea of a core conceptual model for the Golden Agents Project, which aims to integrate several heterogeneous datasets about cultural heritage of the Dutch Golden Age. We hypothesize that the combination of event and storytelling modeling would provide us a common infrastructure to represent and retrieve some core information regardless to its specific nature: painting, book, notary act or theatre performance. The proposed model was developed based on (i) several discussions conducted with humanities experts and (ii) foundational ontology for grounding the modeling decisions. It is assessed through a case study about Vermeer, the painting ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’ and a novel written about the production of the painting. We conclude that the model satisfactorily addresses the case study, and we discuss some next steps to further assess and extend the model, as well as implementing and testing it in practice.

@incollection{betti_philostei_2017,
	address = {London},
	title = {@{PhilosTEI}: {Building} {Corpora} for {Philosophers}},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/bbi.32},
	abstract = {The step to e-research in philosophy depends on the availability of high quality, easily and freely accessible corpora in a sustainable format composed from multi-language, multi-script books from different historical periods. Corpora matching these needs are at the moment virtually non-existing. Within @PhilosTei, we have addressed this corpus building problem by developing an open source, web-based, user-friendly workflow from textual images to TEI, based on state-of-the-art open source OCR software, to wit Tesseract, and a multi-language version of TICCL, a powerful OCR post-correction tool. We have demonstrated the utility of the tool by applying it to a multilingual, multi-script corpus of important eighteenth to twentieth-century European philosophical texts.},
	booktitle = {{CLARIN} in the {Low} {Countries}},
	publisher = {Ubiquity Press},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Reynaert, Martin and van den Berg, Hein},
	editor = {Odijk, Jan and van Hessen, Arjan},
	year = {2017},
	note = {DIAMOND},
	pages = {371--384},
}

The step to e-research in philosophy depends on the availability of high quality, easily and freely accessible corpora in a sustainable format composed from multi-language, multi-script books from different historical periods. Corpora matching these needs are at the moment virtually non-existing. Within @PhilosTei, we have addressed this corpus building problem by developing an open source, web-based, user-friendly workflow from textual images to TEI, based on state-of-the-art open source OCR software, to wit Tesseract, and a multi-language version of TICCL, a powerful OCR post-correction tool. We have demonstrated the utility of the tool by applying it to a multilingual, multi-script corpus of important eighteenth to twentieth-century European philosophical texts.

@incollection{betti_brentano_2017,
	address = {London},
	title = {Brentano and {Twardowski}},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOgZJ0T7aOhOoo0qCFuw},
	booktitle = {The {Routledge} {Handbook} of {Franz} {Brentano} and the {Brentano} {School}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Kriegel, Uriah},
	year = {2017},
	note = {GREEN},
	pages = {305--311},
}

@incollection{betti_brentano_2017-1,
	address = {London},
	title = {Brentano and the {Lvov}-{Warsaw} {School}},
	url = {https://1drv.ms/b/s!AgPq3zEkkYuOgZJyRogFR4bkdEm9qw},
	booktitle = {The {Routledge} {Handbook} of {Franz} {Brentano} and the {Brentano} {School}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Kriegel, Uriah},
	year = {2017},
	note = {GREEN},
	pages = {334--340},
}

@unpublished{betti_idea_0,
	title = {On the {Idea} of a {Conceptual} {Scheme} in {Early} {US} {Linguistics} [idea, work ongoing]},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and van den Berg, Hein and Oortwijn, Yvette and Treijtel, Caspar},
	year = {0},
}

@unpublished{betti_wissenschaftslehre_0,
	title = {Wissenschaftslehre {Wiki} {Project} [on hold]},
	author = {Betti, Arianna and Blok, Johan and Huijgen, Paul and Loeb, Iris and Roski, Stefan and Sikkel, Constantijn and Koleva, Mariya and van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {0},
	keywords = {Bolzano},
}

@unpublished{betti_making_0,
	type = {Book},
	title = {Making {True} - {On} the {History} of {Facts} and the {Correspondence} {Theory} of {Truth} from {Aristotle} to {Armstrong} [draft, ms.]},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	year = {0},
	keywords = {Bolzano},
}

@unpublished{bellomo_bolzanos_0,
	type = {Manuscript},
	title = {Bolzano's {Collections}},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	year = {0},
	note = {In preparation},
}

@unpublished{bellomo_bolzanos_0-1,
	type = {Manuscript},
	title = {Bolzano's conception of mathematics within the {Classical} {Model} of {Science}},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	year = {0},
	note = {In preparation.},
}

@inproceedings{bloem_quines_0,
	title = {Quine's semantic space: {Count} or predict semantic vectors from small in-domain data? [manuscript in preparation 2020]},
	author = {Bloem, Jelke and Ossenkoppele, Thijs and Oortwijn, Yvette and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {0},
	pages = {8},
}

@incollection{betti_semantics_0,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {Semantics and {Axiomatics} from {Bolzano} to {Tarski} [commissioned for the online version]},
	booktitle = {The {Oxford} {Handbook} of {The} {History} of {Analytic} {Philosophy} [online version only, not for the printed version]},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Beaney, Michael},
	year = {0},
}

@incollection{betti_note_0,
	address = {Amsterdam/New York, NY},
	series = {Poznań {Studies} in the {Philosophy} of the {Sciences} and the {Humanities}},
	title = {A {Note} on {Early} {Polish} {Semantics}, {Bolzano} and the {Woleński} {Thesis} [in proofs since 2005; revised proofs submitted on {Aug} 12, 2016]},
	url = {https://onedrive.live.com/redir?resid=8E8B912431DFEA03!13083&authkey=!AGOu6udBMKPtxXs&ithint=file%2cpdf},
	booktitle = {Essays for {Jan} {Woleński}},
	publisher = {Brill/Rodopi},
	author = {Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {Werner, Konrad},
	year = {0},
	keywords = {Bolzano},
}

@article{van_den_berg_spread_0,
	title = {The {Spread} of the {Mathematical} {Method} in {Eighteenth}-{Century} {Germany}: {A} {Quantitative} {Investigation} [ongoing]},
	abstract = {In the eighteenth century, the German mathematician and philosopher Christian Wolff famously claimed that all sciences should apply the so-called mathematical method. Interpreters (e.g. Frängsmyr 1975; Friedman 1992; Zammito 2002) typically identify Wolff's mathematical method with the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, i.e. the tenet that a proper science should have an axiomatic structure. In this paper we argue against this identification. We show that several eighteenth-century authors who did reject the mathematical method in science did so while retaining the axiomatic ideal of science - which suggests that the two should not be identified. We argue that in the eighteenth century the expression 'the mathematical method' designated a specific take on the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, and that it is this specific take that was targeted by critics, not the axiomatic ideal of science tout court. In order to substantiate our claims, we rely on information from a corpus of approximately 700 eighteenth-century books on logic and philosophy in German and Latin, processed using a novel method building upon the mixed one (qualitative, quantitative and computational) introduced by Betti et al (2019). In keeping with the latter, we claim that historical-interpretive claims should rely on a corpus which is as large as possible, and employ precisely defined annotation schemes to capture differences and similarities between various conceptions in a way which is as accountable as possible. We supplement the method with a new explicitly defined procedure of book-centered corpus building for historians of philosophy which is as objective and accountable as possible. Our results should be understood as part of a longer-term ambition of making historico-interpretive investigations more scientific, i.e., controlled, explicit, and as objective as possible},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein and Betti, Arianna and Oortwijn, Yvette and Parisi, Maria Chiara and Wang, Shenghui and Koopman, Rob},
	year = {0},
}

In the eighteenth century, the German mathematician and philosopher Christian Wolff famously claimed that all sciences should apply the so-called mathematical method. Interpreters (e.g. Frängsmyr 1975; Friedman 1992; Zammito 2002) typically identify Wolff's mathematical method with the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, i.e. the tenet that a proper science should have an axiomatic structure. In this paper we argue against this identification. We show that several eighteenth-century authors who did reject the mathematical method in science did so while retaining the axiomatic ideal of science - which suggests that the two should not be identified. We argue that in the eighteenth century the expression 'the mathematical method' designated a specific take on the traditional axiomatic ideal of science, and that it is this specific take that was targeted by critics, not the axiomatic ideal of science tout court. In order to substantiate our claims, we rely on information from a corpus of approximately 700 eighteenth-century books on logic and philosophy in German and Latin, processed using a novel method building upon the mixed one (qualitative, quantitative and computational) introduced by Betti et al (2019). In keeping with the latter, we claim that historical-interpretive claims should rely on a corpus which is as large as possible, and employ precisely defined annotation schemes to capture differences and similarities between various conceptions in a way which is as accountable as possible. We supplement the method with a new explicitly defined procedure of book-centered corpus building for historians of philosophy which is as objective and accountable as possible. Our results should be understood as part of a longer-term ambition of making historico-interpretive investigations more scientific, i.e., controlled, explicit, and as objective as possible

@article{van_den_berg_rise_0,
	title = {The {Rise} and {Development} of {Animal} {Models} of {Mental} {Disorders}: {From} {Modeling} {Whole} {Syndromes} to {Modeling} {Endophenotypes} (ongoing)},
	abstract = {This paper provides a historical and philosophical analysis of the rise and development of animal models of mental disorders during the second half of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. I analyze a shift in the way animal models of mental disorders are conceptualized: the shift from the early view that animal models model entire or whole syndromes classified in manuals such as the DSM to the later view that animal models model component parts of psychiatric syndromes. I argue that animal models of mental disorders gained in popularity during a period when ethology interacted with psychiatry. Within this period, animal models of mental disorders were sometimes taken to model entire or whole psychiatric syndromes and were validated by looking at how well the animal models matched the entire syndrome. I show that researchers in psychiatry came to reject this view because of the following problems: (a) it leads to problems with validating animal models. More specifically, the procedure of matching animal models to entire psychiatric syndromes validates animal models on the basis of non-valid disease categories that are in flux, i.e., it validates animal models without having access to a gold standard, and (b) the procedure gives rise to several skeptical objections against animal models of mental disorders. I subsequently show that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, researchers in psychiatry came to believe that animal models of mental disorders should model component parts of mental disorders, adopting a so-called endophenotype approach. This approach rejects validating animal models on the basis of entire psychiatric syndromes listed in manuals such as the DSM, is taken to allow us to better validate animal models, and is taken to solve some of the skeptical problems that have been leveled against animal models of mental disorders.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {0},
}

This paper provides a historical and philosophical analysis of the rise and development of animal models of mental disorders during the second half of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. I analyze a shift in the way animal models of mental disorders are conceptualized: the shift from the early view that animal models model entire or whole syndromes classified in manuals such as the DSM to the later view that animal models model component parts of psychiatric syndromes. I argue that animal models of mental disorders gained in popularity during a period when ethology interacted with psychiatry. Within this period, animal models of mental disorders were sometimes taken to model entire or whole psychiatric syndromes and were validated by looking at how well the animal models matched the entire syndrome. I show that researchers in psychiatry came to reject this view because of the following problems: (a) it leads to problems with validating animal models. More specifically, the procedure of matching animal models to entire psychiatric syndromes validates animal models on the basis of non-valid disease categories that are in flux, i.e., it validates animal models without having access to a gold standard, and (b) the procedure gives rise to several skeptical objections against animal models of mental disorders. I subsequently show that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, researchers in psychiatry came to believe that animal models of mental disorders should model component parts of mental disorders, adopting a so-called endophenotype approach. This approach rejects validating animal models on the basis of entire psychiatric syndromes listed in manuals such as the DSM, is taken to allow us to better validate animal models, and is taken to solve some of the skeptical problems that have been leveled against animal models of mental disorders.

@incollection{van_wierst_what_0,
	title = {What can and should geometry education offer a non-mathematician?},
	abstract = {Original: ``Wat kan en moet meetkunde onderwijs aan een niet-wiskundige geven?” by Tatiana Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, 1924},
	booktitle = {Tatiana {Ehrenfest}-{Afanassjewa}'s legacy},
	publisher = {Springer},
	author = {van Wierst, Pauline},
	year = {0},
}

Original: ``Wat kan en moet meetkunde onderwijs aan een niet-wiskundige geven?” by Tatiana Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, 1924

@article{van_den_berg_theoretical_0,
	title = {Theoretical {Virtues} in {Eighteenth}-{Century} {Debates} on {Animal} {Cognition} [{R}\&{R}]},
	abstract = {Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I will provide a precise analysis and reconstruction of the empirical and theoretical reasons these authors gave for adopting these positions. I will argue that in order to fully understand why Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy adopted their positions, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. In addition, I will provide a precise analysis of the debate on the explanatory scope of mechanism in eighteenth-century animal cognition, which is central to understanding the three positions I have outlined.},
	journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {0},
}

Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I will provide a precise analysis and reconstruction of the empirical and theoretical reasons these authors gave for adopting these positions. I will argue that in order to fully understand why Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy adopted their positions, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. In addition, I will provide a precise analysis of the debate on the explanatory scope of mechanism in eighteenth-century animal cognition, which is central to understanding the three positions I have outlined.

@article{van_den_berg_kants_0,
	title = {Kant's {Ideal} of {Systematicity} in {Historical} {Context} [{R}\&{R}]},
	abstract = {This paper explains what systematicity is and why Kant claims that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be fruitfully understood against the background of the Classical Model of Science and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. I further show that systematicity furthers several traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific cognition, which may partly explain why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’.},
	journal = {Kantian Review},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {0},
}

This paper explains what systematicity is and why Kant claims that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be fruitfully understood against the background of the Classical Model of Science and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. I further show that systematicity furthers several traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific cognition, which may partly explain why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’.

@article{van_den_berg_classical_0,
	title = {The {Classical} {Model} of {Science} in {Eighteenth}-{Century} {German} {Philosophy} [{Ongoing}]},
	abstract = {In this paper I describe different varieties of the Classical Model of Science in the works of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). I argue that all four authors accept the the core of the ideal of science codified by the Classical Model of Science. This accounts for a certain amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science. However, the four authors sometimes interpret the conditions of the Classical Model of Science differently. This accounts for a certain amount of discontinuity between the conceptions of the authors. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis and comparison of the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science with reference to all of the conditions of the Classical Model of Science. Through my analysis, it becomes clear that there is a greater amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant than is sometimes assumed.},
	author = {Van den Berg, Hein},
	year = {0},
}

In this paper I describe different varieties of the Classical Model of Science in the works of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). I argue that all four authors accept the the core of the ideal of science codified by the Classical Model of Science. This accounts for a certain amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science. However, the four authors sometimes interpret the conditions of the Classical Model of Science differently. This accounts for a certain amount of discontinuity between the conceptions of the authors. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis and comparison of the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant on science with reference to all of the conditions of the Classical Model of Science. Through my analysis, it becomes clear that there is a greater amount of continuity between the views of Wolff, Meier, Lambert, and Kant than is sometimes assumed.

@article{bellomo_bolzanos_0-2,
	title = {On {Bolzano}'s {Real} {Numbers} [ongoing]},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna and Betti, Arianna},
	year = {0},
	note = {In preparation.},
}

@article{bellomo_domain_0,
	title = {Domain extension and ideal elements in mathematics [submitted 25 {February} 2019]},
	author = {Bellomo, Anna},
	year = {0},
}

@incollection{ginammi_bolzano_0,
	address = {Pittsburgh},
	title = {Bolzano, {Kant} and the {Traditional} {Theory} of {Concepts} - {A} {Computational}  {Investigation} [provisory title] [commissioned for volume under contract] [ongoing]},
	booktitle = {The {Dynamics} of {Science}: {Computational} {Frontiers} in {History} and {Philosophy} of {Science}},
	publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press},
	author = {Ginammi, Annapaola and Bloem, Jelke and Koopman, Rob and Wang, Shenghui and Betti, Arianna},
	editor = {de Block, Andreas and Ramsey, Grant},
	year = {0},
}