Optimal redistribution behind the veil of ignorance. Abatemarco, A. & Stroffolini, F. Economia Politica, 40(3):995 – 1024, 2023. Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH Type: Article
Optimal redistribution behind the veil of ignorance [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
We propose a formalization of the Difference Principle (maximin) by which Rawls’ contribution is shown to go beyond distributive value judgments in such a way as to embrace efficiency issues as well. In our model, inequalities are shown to be permitted as far as they stimulate a greater effort in education (or training), and so economic growth. This is the only possibility for an income disparity to be unanimously accepted by both the most-, and above all, the least-advantaged individual. In this vein, we highlight the peculiarity of the Rawlsian equity-efficiency trade off behind the veil of ignorance. Finally, by recalling the old tradition of ‘universal ex-post efficiency’, we identify the set of Rawls-optimal social contracts, which is shown to be a subset of Pareto-optimal ones. © 2023, The Author(s).
@article{abatemarco_optimal_2023,
	title = {Optimal redistribution behind the veil of ignorance},
	volume = {40},
	issn = {11202890},
	url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85145866125&doi=10.1007%2fs40888-022-00290-8&partnerID=40&md5=eb0945d3a71c6e3d65f7678708e6ee0a},
	doi = {10.1007/s40888-022-00290-8},
	abstract = {We propose a formalization of the Difference Principle (maximin) by which Rawls’ contribution is shown to go beyond distributive value judgments in such a way as to embrace efficiency issues as well. In our model, inequalities are shown to be permitted as far as they stimulate a greater effort in education (or training), and so economic growth. This is the only possibility for an income disparity to be unanimously accepted by both the most-, and above all, the least-advantaged individual. In this vein, we highlight the peculiarity of the Rawlsian equity-efficiency trade off behind the veil of ignorance. Finally, by recalling the old tradition of ‘universal ex-post efficiency’, we identify the set of Rawls-optimal social contracts, which is shown to be a subset of Pareto-optimal ones. © 2023, The Author(s).},
	language = {English},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Economia Politica},
	author = {Abatemarco, Antonio and Stroffolini, Francesca},
	year = {2023},
	note = {Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Type: Article},
	pages = {995 -- 1024},
}

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