Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems: The case of knowing how. Abbott, B. Philosophical Perspectives, 27(1):1–21, 2013. ![Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems: The case of knowing how [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex [first paragraph] This paper will focus on a particular attempt to apply linguistic evidence to the solution of a philosophical problem. The problem is whether or not there is a distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that.i Ryle (1949) argued that there is, and indeed there is a lot of intuitive support for that position. To someone who knows how to play tennis, or how to play the violin, this kind of knowledge just does not feel propositional. As many people have noted, knowledge of how to do things requiring skill takes a lot of time and practice, while even complex propositional knowledge can be attained almost instantly. And Ryle himself pointed out that "though it is proper to ask for the grounds or reasons for someone's acceptance of a proposition, this question cannot be asked of someone's skill at cards—" (1949, 28). Nevertheless, despite this kind of evidence, Jason Stanley has argued at length, based on linguistic analysis, that knowledge how is not different from knowledge that, but is instead just a subcategory of propositional knowledge (Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Stanley 2012; Stanley and Williamson 2001 (hereinafter SW)), a position he calls (following Ryle) "intellectualism". At least two issues can be distinguished here. One is, what exactly is the linguistic evidence telling us about knowledge how vs. knowledge that? Another is, should we believe what linguistic evidence tells us? We will take up those issues in that order.
@article{Abbott2013,
abstract = {[first paragraph] This paper will focus on a particular attempt to apply linguistic evidence to the solution of a philosophical problem. The problem is whether or not there is a distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that.i Ryle (1949) argued that there is, and indeed there is a lot of intuitive support for that position. To someone who knows how to play tennis, or how to play the violin, this kind of knowledge just does not feel propositional. As many people have noted, knowledge of how to do things requiring skill takes a lot of time and practice, while even complex propositional knowledge can be attained almost instantly. And Ryle himself pointed out that "though it is proper to ask for the grounds or reasons for someone's acceptance of a proposition, this question cannot be asked of someone's skill at cards—" (1949, 28). Nevertheless, despite this kind of evidence, Jason Stanley has argued at length, based on linguistic analysis, that knowledge how is not different from knowledge that, but is instead just a subcategory of propositional knowledge (Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Stanley 2012; Stanley and Williamson 2001 (hereinafter SW)), a position he calls (following Ryle) "intellectualism". At least two issues can be distinguished here. One is, what exactly is the linguistic evidence telling us about knowledge how vs. knowledge that? Another is, should we believe what linguistic evidence tells us? We will take up those issues in that order.},
author = {Abbott, Barbara},
doi = {10.1111/phpe.12019},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Abbott - 2013 - Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems The case of knowing how.pdf:pdf},
issn = {15208583},
journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
number = {1},
pages = {1--21},
title = {{Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems: The case of knowing how}},
url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpe.12019},
volume = {27},
year = {2013}
}
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