A Software Safety Verification Method Based on System-Theoretic Process Analysis. Abdulkhaleq, A. & Wagner, S. In Bondavalli, A., Ceccarelli, A., & Ortmeier, F., editors, Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 401–412, Cham, 2014. Springer International Publishing. tex.ids= abdulkhaleqSoftwareSafetyVerification2014a, abdulkhaleqSoftwareSafetyVerification2014b place: Cham
doi  abstract   bibtex   
Modern safety-critical systems are increasingly reliant on software. Software safety is an important aspect in developing safety-critical systems, and it must be considered in the context of the system level into which the software will be embedded. STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a modern safety analysis approach which aims to identify the potential hazardous causes in complex safety-critical systems at the system level. To assure that these hazardous causes of an unsafe software’s behaviour cannot happen, safety verification involves demonstrating whether the software fulfills those safety requirements and will not result in a hazardous state. We propose a method for verifying of software safety requirements which are derived at the system level to provide evidence that the hazardous causes cannot occur (or reduce the associated risk to a low acceptable level). We applied the method to a cruise control prototype to show the feasibility of the proposed method.
@inproceedings{abdulkhaleq_software_2014,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Lecture {Notes} in {Computer} {Science}},
	title = {A {Software} {Safety} {Verification} {Method} {Based} on {System}-{Theoretic} {Process} {Analysis}},
	isbn = {978-3-319-10557-4},
	doi = {10/gf8xn5},
	abstract = {Modern safety-critical systems are increasingly reliant on software. Software safety is an important aspect in developing safety-critical systems, and it must be considered in the context of the system level into which the software will be embedded. STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a modern safety analysis approach which aims to identify the potential hazardous causes in complex safety-critical systems at the system level. To assure that these hazardous causes of an unsafe software’s behaviour cannot happen, safety verification involves demonstrating whether the software fulfills those safety requirements and will not result in a hazardous state. We propose a method for verifying of software safety requirements which are derived at the system level to provide evidence that the hazardous causes cannot occur (or reduce the associated risk to a low acceptable level). We applied the method to a cruise control prototype to show the feasibility of the proposed method.},
	language = {en},
	booktitle = {Computer {Safety}, {Reliability}, and {Security}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Abdulkhaleq, Asim and Wagner, Stefan},
	editor = {Bondavalli, Andrea and Ceccarelli, Andrea and Ortmeier, Frank},
	year = {2014},
	note = {tex.ids= abdulkhaleqSoftwareSafetyVerification2014a, abdulkhaleqSoftwareSafetyVerification2014b
place: Cham},
	keywords = {STPA approach, formal verification methods, safety verification, software safety analysis, temporal logic},
	pages = {401--412},
}

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