The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption. Abelson, H., Anderson, R., Bellovin, S. M., Benaloh, J., Blaze, M., Diffie, W., Gilmore, J., Neumann, P. G., Rivest, R. L., Schiller, J. I., & Schneier, B. A Report by an Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists, 1998.
abstract   bibtex   
A variety of "key recovery," "key escrow," and "trusted third-party" encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environments brought about by new technologies. This report examines the fundamental properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks, costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to encryption keys.
@misc{ abe98,
  author = {Harold Abelson and Ross Anderson and Steven M. Bellovin and Josh Benaloh and Matt Blaze and Whitfield Diffie and John Gilmore and Peter G. Neumann and Ronald L. Rivest and Jeffrey I. Schiller and Bruce Schneier},
  title = {The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption},
  howpublished = {A Report by an Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists},
  year = {1998},
  uri = {http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/},
  abstract = {A variety of "key recovery," "key escrow," and "trusted third-party" encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environments brought about by new technologies. This report examines the fundamental properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks, costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to encryption keys.}
}

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