@conference {Acquisti03onthe,
	title = {On the Economics of Anonymity},
	booktitle = {Financial Cryptography. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2742},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {84{\textendash}102},
	abstract = {Decentralized anonymity infrastructures are still not in wide use today. While there are technical barriers to a secure robust design, our lack of understanding of the incentives to participate in such systems remains a major roadblock. Here we explore some reasons why anonymity systems are particularly hard to deploy, enumerate the incentives to participate either as senders or also as nodes, and build a general model to describe the effects of these incentives. We then describe and justify some simplifying assumptions to make the model manageable, and compare optimal strategies for participants based on a variety of scenarios.},
	url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.13.5636\&rep=rep1\&type=pdf},
	author = {Alessandro Acquisti and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson}
}

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