@article{adler_lawyers_????,
	title = {Lawyers as {Lawmakers}, {Privilege}, and {Agency}},
	issn = {0144-8188},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818813000823},
	doi = {10.1016/j.irle.2013.11.002},
	abstract = {Class action lawyers do not merely represent clients, they also make law, an observation explored by Kobayashi and Ribstein in “Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers.” Kobayashi and Ribstein observe that a class action lawyer's inability to internalize all the benefits of her innovation may lead to underinvestment in lawmaking, which they describe as a public good. But privileged groups may produce public goods, and where production of the good also enhances the probability that a supplier of the good will be compensated for her production, as may be the case in the selection of counsel in class action suits, there can even be overproduction. Moreover, if there is underinvestment in class action lawmaking, a more general, and potentially greater, cause is inherent in every contingent-fee lawyer-client relationship, namely that the lawyer bears the full cost of litigation but must share the benefits, if any, with the client.This essay is dedicated to the memory of my good friend, colleague, and mentor, Larry Ribstein. Thanks for helpful comments from participants at the Unlocking the Law Roundtable at George Mason University School of Law, September, 2012.},
	urldate = {2014-01-12},
	journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
	author = {Adler, Barry E.},
	file = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:files/48102/Adler - Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:files/48098/Adler - Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency.html:text/html}
}

{"_id":"oqo3ML3JBqDBB2HEP","bibbaseid":"adler-lawyersaslawmakersprivilegeandagency","downloads":0,"creationDate":"2016-09-09T06:27:32.865Z","title":"Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency","author_short":["Adler, B. E."],"year":null,"bibtype":"article","biburl":"https://www.sfu.ca/~howlett/howlett16.bib","bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency","issn":"0144-8188","url":"http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818813000823","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2013.11.002","abstract":"Class action lawyers do not merely represent clients, they also make law, an observation explored by Kobayashi and Ribstein in “Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers.” Kobayashi and Ribstein observe that a class action lawyer's inability to internalize all the benefits of her innovation may lead to underinvestment in lawmaking, which they describe as a public good. But privileged groups may produce public goods, and where production of the good also enhances the probability that a supplier of the good will be compensated for her production, as may be the case in the selection of counsel in class action suits, there can even be overproduction. Moreover, if there is underinvestment in class action lawmaking, a more general, and potentially greater, cause is inherent in every contingent-fee lawyer-client relationship, namely that the lawyer bears the full cost of litigation but must share the benefits, if any, with the client.This essay is dedicated to the memory of my good friend, colleague, and mentor, Larry Ribstein. Thanks for helpful comments from participants at the Unlocking the Law Roundtable at George Mason University School of Law, September, 2012.","urldate":"2014-01-12","journal":"International Review of Law and Economics","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Adler"],"firstnames":["Barry","E."],"suffixes":[]}],"file":"ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:files/48102/Adler - Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:files/48098/Adler - Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency.html:text/html","bibtex":"@article{adler_lawyers_????,\n\ttitle = {Lawyers as {Lawmakers}, {Privilege}, and {Agency}},\n\tissn = {0144-8188},\n\turl = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818813000823},\n\tdoi = {10.1016/j.irle.2013.11.002},\n\tabstract = {Class action lawyers do not merely represent clients, they also make law, an observation explored by Kobayashi and Ribstein in “Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers.” Kobayashi and Ribstein observe that a class action lawyer's inability to internalize all the benefits of her innovation may lead to underinvestment in lawmaking, which they describe as a public good. But privileged groups may produce public goods, and where production of the good also enhances the probability that a supplier of the good will be compensated for her production, as may be the case in the selection of counsel in class action suits, there can even be overproduction. Moreover, if there is underinvestment in class action lawmaking, a more general, and potentially greater, cause is inherent in every contingent-fee lawyer-client relationship, namely that the lawyer bears the full cost of litigation but must share the benefits, if any, with the client.This essay is dedicated to the memory of my good friend, colleague, and mentor, Larry Ribstein. Thanks for helpful comments from participants at the Unlocking the Law Roundtable at George Mason University School of Law, September, 2012.},\n\turldate = {2014-01-12},\n\tjournal = {International Review of Law and Economics},\n\tauthor = {Adler, Barry E.},\n\tfile = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:files/48102/Adler - Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:files/48098/Adler - Lawyers as Lawmakers, Privilege, and Agency.html:text/html}\n}\n\n","author_short":["Adler, B. E."],"key":"adler_lawyers_????","id":"adler_lawyers_????","bibbaseid":"adler-lawyersaslawmakersprivilegeandagency","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818813000823"},"downloads":0},"search_terms":["lawyers","lawmakers","privilege","agency","adler"],"keywords":[],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["Bn7xRaKMY43f7hFwh"]}