Coevolutionary Dynamics of Actions and Opinions in Social Networks. Aghbolagh, H., Ye, M., Zino, L., Chen, Z., & Cao, M. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 68(12):7708–7723, 2023. doi abstract bibtex Empirical studies suggest a deep intertwining between opinion formation and decision-making processes, but these have been treated as separate problems in the study of dynamical models for social networks. In this article, we bridge the gap in the literature by proposing a novel coevolutionary model, in which each individual selects an action from a binary set and has an opinion on which action they prefer. Actions and opinions coevolve on a two-layer network. For homogeneous parameters, undirected networks, and under reasonable assumptions on the asynchronous updating mechanics, we prove that the coevolutionary dynamics is an ordinal potential game, enabling analysis via potential game theory. Specifically, we establish global convergence to the Nash equilibria of the game, proving that actions converge in a finite number of time steps, while opinions converge asymptotically. Next, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of, and convergence to, polarized equilibria, whereby the population splits into two communities, each selecting and supporting one of the actions. Finally, we use simulations to examine the social psychological phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance. © 1963-2012 IEEE.
@article{aghbolagh_coevolutionary_2023,
title = {Coevolutionary {Dynamics} of {Actions} and {Opinions} in {Social} {Networks}},
volume = {68},
issn = {0018-9286},
doi = {10.1109/TAC.2023.3290771},
abstract = {Empirical studies suggest a deep intertwining between opinion formation and decision-making processes, but these have been treated as separate problems in the study of dynamical models for social networks. In this article, we bridge the gap in the literature by proposing a novel coevolutionary model, in which each individual selects an action from a binary set and has an opinion on which action they prefer. Actions and opinions coevolve on a two-layer network. For homogeneous parameters, undirected networks, and under reasonable assumptions on the asynchronous updating mechanics, we prove that the coevolutionary dynamics is an ordinal potential game, enabling analysis via potential game theory. Specifically, we establish global convergence to the Nash equilibria of the game, proving that actions converge in a finite number of time steps, while opinions converge asymptotically. Next, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of, and convergence to, polarized equilibria, whereby the population splits into two communities, each selecting and supporting one of the actions. Finally, we use simulations to examine the social psychological phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance. © 1963-2012 IEEE.},
language = {English},
number = {12},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
author = {Aghbolagh, H.D. and Ye, M. and Zino, L. and Chen, Z. and Cao, M.},
year = {2023},
keywords = {Decision making, dynamics on networks, evolutionary game theory, opinion dynamics, polarization},
pages = {7708--7723},
}
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