The EM Side—Channel(s)

The EM Side—Channel(s). Agrawal, D., Archambeault, B., Rao, J. R., & Rohatgi, P. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2002, of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 29–45, August, 2002. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

Paper doi abstract bibtex

We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures.

@inproceedings{agrawal_em_2002,
	series = {Lecture {Notes} in {Computer} {Science}},
	title = {The {EM} {Side}—{Channel}(s)},
	isbn = {978-3-540-00409-7 978-3-540-36400-9},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_4},
	doi = {10.1007/3-540-36400-5_4},
	abstract = {We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2017-07-04TZ},
	booktitle = {Cryptographic {Hardware} and {Embedded} {Systems} - {CHES} 2002},
	publisher = {Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg},
	author = {Agrawal, Dakshi and Archambeault, Bruce and Rao, Josyula R. and Rohatgi, Pankaj},
	month = aug,
	year = {2002},
	pages = {29--45}
}

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