Breaking the Brexit Impasse: Achieving a Fair, Legitimate and Democratic Outcome. Aidt, T., Chadha, J., & Sabourian, H. In VOX - CEPR Policy Portal, pages 63748+. Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Breaking the Brexit Impasse: Achieving a Fair, Legitimate and Democratic Outcome [link]Paper  abstract   bibtex   
Unanimous agreement on the UK's Brexit question is clearly not going to be achievable. But as this column argues, using a sequential voting system, it is within reach to structure the democratic process so that a voting procedure is fair to all views and the outcome is preferred by a majority to any other alternatives. [Excerpt: Minimal voting requirements] For any voting procedure to have democratic legitimacy, it should satisfy two minimal requirements. One is that if there exists an alternative, let's call it A, that is preferred by a majority to any other B, C, D, E etc. in a head-to-head vote, the procedure selects alternative A. [] This alternative is called the Condorcet winner (CW) after the 18th century philosopher and mathematician, the Marquis de Condorcet. Selecting the CW derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is stable, in the sense that once the CW is selected, there is no other alternative that can win a majority vote against it. [] The second requirement is that the procedure treats all alternatives in the same way. This is the neutrality principle that ensures fairness. It means that how the voting procedure works should not bias the final choice. Thus, voting procedures that treat different alternatives differently by, say, excluding some alternative at some stage of the procedure violate this principle. [...] [] Given the possibility of strategic voting, a body of academic research using game theory [...] shows that procedures designed with only one round of voting (including the single transferable vote) are insufficient to ensure that the CW is selected. [] This deficiency undermines the legitimacy of any standard one-round voting procedures. But the deficiency can be overcome by a sequential voting scheme in which in each round, one alternative is eliminated [...]. [] An example of such a procedure is binary sequential voting in which in each round, voters choose between only two alternatives. But this procedure does not obey the neutrality principle [...]. [] Another example of the above is what we call the weakest link procedure [...], and it is what we propose. This is a multi-round election in which in each round, voters [...] would vote between all remaining alternatives and the one with the least votes would be eliminated. Voting continues until only one alternative is left. This procedure satisfies the principle of neutrality and can ensure that the CW is selected (if there is one). [...] [] [...]
@incollection{aidtBreakingBrexitImpasse2019,
  title = {Breaking the {{Brexit}} Impasse: Achieving a Fair, Legitimate and Democratic Outcome},
  booktitle = {{{VOX}} - {{CEPR}} Policy Portal},
  author = {Aidt, Toke and Chadha, Jagjit and Sabourian, Hamid},
  date = {2019-01},
  pages = {63748+},
  publisher = {{Centre for Economic Policy Research}},
  location = {{London, United Kingdom}},
  url = {https://voxeu.org/node/63748},
  abstract = {Unanimous agreement on the UK's Brexit question is clearly not going to be achievable. But as this column argues, using a sequential voting system, it is within reach to structure the democratic process so that a voting procedure is fair to all views and the outcome is preferred by a majority to any other alternatives.

[Excerpt: Minimal voting requirements]

For any voting procedure to have democratic legitimacy, it should satisfy two minimal requirements. One is that if there exists an alternative, let's call it A, that is preferred by a majority to any other B, C, D, E etc. in a head-to-head vote, the procedure selects alternative A.

[] This alternative is called the Condorcet winner (CW) after the 18th century philosopher and mathematician, the Marquis de Condorcet. Selecting the CW derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is stable, in the sense that once the CW is selected, there is no other alternative that can win a majority vote against it. 

[] The second requirement is that the procedure treats all alternatives in the same way. This is the neutrality principle that ensures fairness. It means that how the voting procedure works should not bias the final choice. Thus, voting procedures that treat different alternatives differently by, say, excluding some alternative at some stage of the procedure violate this principle. [...] 

[] Given the possibility of strategic voting, a body of academic research using game theory [...] shows that procedures designed with only one round of voting (including the single transferable vote) are insufficient to ensure that the CW is selected.

[] This deficiency undermines the legitimacy of any standard one-round voting procedures. But the deficiency can be overcome by a sequential voting scheme in which in each round, one alternative is eliminated [...].

[] An example of such a procedure is binary sequential voting in which in each round, voters choose between only two alternatives. But this procedure does not obey the neutrality principle [...].

[] Another example of the above is what we call the weakest link procedure [...], and it is what we propose. This is a multi-round election in which in each round, voters [...] would vote between all remaining alternatives and the one with the least votes would be eliminated. Voting continues until only one alternative is left. This procedure satisfies the principle of neutrality and can ensure that the CW is selected (if there is one). [...]

[] [...]},
  keywords = {*imported-from-citeulike-INRMM,~INRMM-MiD:c-14680156,conflicts,decision-making-procedure,democracy,human-behaviour,science-policy-interface,science-society-interface,society,uncertainty}
}
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