Entick v. Carrington (1765)

That a warrant to search for and seize the papers of the accused, in the case of a seditious libel, is contrary to law. But this was not the only question in the Case: “Lastly, it s urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases had been shown where the law forceth evidence out of the owner’s custody by process. There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has been often tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no way to get it back but by action. In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet there are some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, and housebreaking to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious that libelling. But our law has provided no paper search in these cases to help forward the convictions. Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public I will not say. It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty. Observe the wisdom as well as mercy of the law. The strongest evidence before a trial, being only ex parte, is but suspicion; it is not proof. Weak evidence is a ground of suspicion, though in a lower degree; and if suspicion at large should be a ground of search, especially in the case of libels, whose hose would be safe? If, however, a right of search for the sake of discovering evidence ought in any case to be allowed, this crime above all others ought to be excepted, as a wanting such a discovery less than any other. It is committed in open daylight and in the face of the world; every act of publication makes new proof; and the solicitor of the treasury, if pleases, may be the witness himself.”

@article{noauthor_entick_nodate,
title = {Entick v. {Carrington} (1765)},
url = {http://www.constitution.org/trials/entick/entick_v_carrington.htm},
abstract = {That a warrant to search for and seize the papers of the accused, in the case of a seditious libel, is contrary to law. But this was not the only question in the Case: “Lastly, it s urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases had been shown where the law forceth evidence out of the owner’s custody by process. There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has been often tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no way to get it back but by action. In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet there are some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, and housebreaking to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious that libelling. But our law has provided no paper search in these cases to help forward the convictions. Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public I will not say. It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty. Observe the wisdom as well as mercy of the law. The strongest evidence before a trial, being only ex parte, is but suspicion; it is not proof. Weak evidence is a ground of suspicion, though in a lower degree; and if suspicion at large should be a ground of search, especially in the case of libels, whose hose would be safe? If, however, a right of search for the sake of discovering evidence ought in any case to be allowed, this crime above all others ought to be excepted, as a wanting such a discovery less than any other. It is committed in open daylight and in the face of the world; every act of publication makes new proof; and the solicitor of the treasury, if pleases, may be the witness himself.”},
keywords = {Mental Health/Ethics: Jurisprudence}
}

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