Facts-values, apriorism, coherentism, naturalism: reassessing philosophical dichotomies in the age of AI. 2024. abstract bibtex In this talk, I argue that the Fact-Value (V/F) dichotomy, in a modified version, can be used to develop AI models in “machine ethics” and philosophical approaches to AI. More generally, it is reviewed here whether (a) philosophy's history and some celebrated results within are relevant to the current development of AI and ML (machine learning). I also reflect on (b) how AI architectures can be constructed to reflect what philosophers have discussed for centuries. In the line of (a) and recent literature on the philosophy of AI (Buckner, Magnani, Humphreys, Chalmers, etc.), I evaluate the way canonical dichotomies from philosophy help understand better current progress and limitations in AI and ML. For (b) I focus on a modified F/V dichotomy and how it can be reconstructed in the age of AI and used to design machines that may develop “moral cognition.” The roots of the V/F dichotomy, its dismissal, and the connection to the analytic-synthetic distinction are also explored as potential components of ‘philosophical models’ of AI.
@unpublished{noauthor_facts-values_2024,
address = {UTRGV},
title = {Facts-values, apriorism, coherentism, naturalism: reassessing philosophical dichotomies in the age of {AI}},
abstract = {In this talk, I argue that the Fact-Value (V/F) dichotomy, in a modified version, can be used to develop AI models in “machine ethics” and philosophical approaches to AI. More generally, it is reviewed here whether (a) philosophy's history and some celebrated results within are relevant to the current development of AI and ML (machine learning). I also reflect on (b) how AI architectures can be constructed to reflect what philosophers have discussed for centuries. In the line of (a) and recent literature on the philosophy of AI (Buckner, Magnani, Humphreys, Chalmers, etc.), I evaluate the way canonical dichotomies from philosophy help understand better current progress and limitations in AI and ML. For (b) I focus on a modified F/V dichotomy and how it can be reconstructed in the age of AI and used to design machines that may develop “moral cognition.” The roots of the V/F dichotomy, its dismissal, and the connection to the analytic-synthetic distinction are also explored as potential components of ‘philosophical models’ of AI.},
language = {2. Philosophy of computation},
year = {2024},
}
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