Ontic and epistemic explanations: their coexistence, interdependence and interoperability in epistemic environments. 2023. abstract bibtex It is now commonly held that there are several ways of conceiving scientific explanation, but the most preeminent are the ontic and the epistemic conceptions (the distinction can be traced back to W. Salmon and A. Coffa). The class of Ontic Conceptions (OC) takes explanations as exhibiting relations (causal, mechanistic, etc.) or structures among real entities in the world (Salmon, Craver, Strevens, Glennan). OC is usually contrasted with and opposed conceptually to the epistemic conception (EC), according to which explanations are epistemic activities of scientists that operate with representations of entities and their relations (the explanandum and explanans together) rather than entities or structures themselves (Bechtel, Bokulich, Illari, Wright, i.a.). Recent literature shows a third trend aiming to diffuse and diminish the difference between OC and EC (Craver, Illari, van Eck, and partially Sheredos) by stating that best explanations fulfill both ontic and epistemic norms. This paper follows this third line of thought of reconciliation. As Sheredos argued, an OC-EC reconciliation can be framed in terms of norms and constraints on explanatory power. Sheredos takes Illari’s and Craver’s reconciliation argument as too strong and shows that epistemic and ontic norms cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. This paper offers another framework in which reconciliation is possible and argues for the coexistence and interdependence of epistemic and ontic types of explanation. It introduces the idea of “epistemic environments” in which activities such as: (i) knowledge-production, (ii) problem-solving and (iii) norm-generation, depend on both OC and EC explanations. In the present account, we need to focus on the outcome of successful explanation as a function operating on epistemic environments. Sheredos and others suggest that the same explanation can display epistemic and ontic phases: the suggestion presented here is to take two or more explanations operating and explaining the same explanandum as functions operating in epistemic environments. We transition from analyzing successful individual explanations to talking about clusters of explanations (both in EC and the OC framework) that successfully transform an epistemic environment. The approach is perspectival, as success is defined here based on scientific aims or standards. The paper concludes by showing this approach’s weaknesses and strengths for some examples of mathematical, mechanistic, and nomological explanations.
@unpublished{zotero-19046,
title = {Ontic and epistemic explanations: their coexistence, interdependence and interoperability in epistemic environments},
copyright = {All rights reserved},
abstract = {It is now commonly held that there are several ways of conceiving scientific explanation, but the most preeminent are the ontic and the epistemic conceptions (the distinction can be traced back to W. Salmon and A. Coffa). The class of Ontic Conceptions (OC) takes explanations as exhibiting relations (causal, mechanistic, etc.) or structures among real entities in the world (Salmon, Craver, Strevens, Glennan). OC is usually contrasted with and opposed conceptually to the epistemic conception (EC), according to which explanations are epistemic activities of scientists that operate with representations of entities and their relations (the explanandum and explanans together) rather than entities or structures themselves (Bechtel, Bokulich, Illari, Wright, i.a.). Recent literature shows a third trend aiming to diffuse and diminish the difference between OC and EC (Craver, Illari, van Eck, and partially Sheredos) by stating that best explanations fulfill both ontic and epistemic norms.
This paper follows this third line of thought of reconciliation. As Sheredos argued, an OC-EC reconciliation can be framed in terms of norms and constraints on explanatory power. Sheredos takes Illari’s and Craver’s reconciliation argument as too strong and shows that epistemic and ontic norms cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. This paper offers another framework in which reconciliation is possible and argues for the coexistence and interdependence of epistemic and ontic types of explanation. It introduces the idea of “epistemic environments” in which activities such as: (i) knowledge-production, (ii) problem-solving and (iii) norm-generation, depend on both OC and EC explanations. In the present account, we need to focus on the outcome of successful explanation as a function operating on epistemic environments. Sheredos and others suggest that the same explanation can display epistemic and ontic phases: the suggestion presented here is to take two or more explanations operating and explaining the same explanandum as functions operating in epistemic environments. We transition from analyzing successful individual explanations to talking about clusters of explanations (both in EC and the OC framework) that successfully transform an epistemic environment. The approach is perspectival, as success is defined here based on scientific aims or standards. The paper concludes by showing this approach’s weaknesses and strengths for some examples of mathematical, mechanistic, and nomological explanations.},
year = {2023},
}
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OC is usually contrasted with and opposed conceptually to the epistemic conception (EC), according to which explanations are epistemic activities of scientists that operate with representations of entities and their relations (the explanandum and explanans together) rather than entities or structures themselves (Bechtel, Bokulich, Illari, Wright, i.a.). Recent literature shows a third trend aiming to diffuse and diminish the difference between OC and EC (Craver, Illari, van Eck, and partially Sheredos) by stating that best explanations fulfill both ontic and epistemic norms. This paper follows this third line of thought of reconciliation. As Sheredos argued, an OC-EC reconciliation can be framed in terms of norms and constraints on explanatory power. Sheredos takes Illari’s and Craver’s reconciliation argument as too strong and shows that epistemic and ontic norms cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. This paper offers another framework in which reconciliation is possible and argues for the coexistence and interdependence of epistemic and ontic types of explanation. It introduces the idea of “epistemic environments” in which activities such as: (i) knowledge-production, (ii) problem-solving and (iii) norm-generation, depend on both OC and EC explanations. In the present account, we need to focus on the outcome of successful explanation as a function operating on epistemic environments. Sheredos and others suggest that the same explanation can display epistemic and ontic phases: the suggestion presented here is to take two or more explanations operating and explaining the same explanandum as functions operating in epistemic environments. We transition from analyzing successful individual explanations to talking about clusters of explanations (both in EC and the OC framework) that successfully transform an epistemic environment. The approach is perspectival, as success is defined here based on scientific aims or standards. The paper concludes by showing this approach’s weaknesses and strengths for some examples of mathematical, mechanistic, and nomological explanations.","year":"2023","bibtex":"@unpublished{zotero-19046,\n\ttitle = {Ontic and epistemic explanations: their coexistence, interdependence and interoperability in epistemic environments},\n\tcopyright = {All rights reserved},\n\tabstract = {It is now commonly held that there are several ways of conceiving scientific explanation, but the most preeminent are the ontic and the epistemic conceptions (the distinction can be traced back to W. Salmon and A. Coffa). The class of Ontic Conceptions (OC) takes explanations as exhibiting relations (causal, mechanistic, etc.) or structures among real entities in the world (Salmon, Craver, Strevens, Glennan). OC is usually contrasted with and opposed conceptually to the epistemic conception (EC), according to which explanations are epistemic activities of scientists that operate with representations of entities and their relations (the explanandum and explanans together) rather than entities or structures themselves (Bechtel, Bokulich, Illari, Wright, i.a.). Recent literature shows a third trend aiming to diffuse and diminish the difference between OC and EC (Craver, Illari, van Eck, and partially Sheredos) by stating that best explanations fulfill both ontic and epistemic norms.\nThis paper follows this third line of thought of reconciliation. As Sheredos argued, an OC-EC reconciliation can be framed in terms of norms and constraints on explanatory power. Sheredos takes Illari’s and Craver’s reconciliation argument as too strong and shows that epistemic and ontic norms cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. This paper offers another framework in which reconciliation is possible and argues for the coexistence and interdependence of epistemic and ontic types of explanation. It introduces the idea of “epistemic environments” in which activities such as: (i) knowledge-production, (ii) problem-solving and (iii) norm-generation, depend on both OC and EC explanations. In the present account, we need to focus on the outcome of successful explanation as a function operating on epistemic environments. Sheredos and others suggest that the same explanation can display epistemic and ontic phases: the suggestion presented here is to take two or more explanations operating and explaining the same explanandum as functions operating in epistemic environments. We transition from analyzing successful individual explanations to talking about clusters of explanations (both in EC and the OC framework) that successfully transform an epistemic environment. The approach is perspectival, as success is defined here based on scientific aims or standards. 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