“Unconceived alternatives” or “expected unifications”? An eliminative argument against K. Stanford’s “New Induction”. January 2017.
abstract   bibtex   
This paper offers an eliminative inference based on a “unification ideal” that can weaken the antirealist “New Induction” advanced by K. Stanford. (2006, 2009) The minimal model of unification is couched in terms of identification of two theoretical terms (c1 and c2), one belonging to a theory T1 and the other to another theory T2. First, four scenarios of inconceivability are proposed. The formal approach proposed here is based on a “syntactic view” of scientific theories. The upshot of this mechanism is that some alternatives to T1, which still remain unconceived (relative to the conceptual and ideological space of T1), can be eliminated because they are inconsistent with alternatives to another theory T¬2. Consistency is here a requirement imposed on set of theories. An alternative view, based on an idea of “state spaces” and “conceptual spaces” is quickly discussed. This argument shows in what sense Stanford’s antirealist inductive argument is weakened when scientists or communities of scientists operate based on some theoretical ideals such as unification, parsimony, simplicity, etc.
@unpublished{noauthor_unconceived_2017,
	title = {“{Unconceived} alternatives” or “expected unifications”? {An} eliminative argument against {K}. {Stanford}’s “{New} {Induction}”},
	abstract = {This paper offers an eliminative inference based on a “unification ideal” that can weaken the antirealist “New Induction” advanced by K. Stanford. (2006, 2009) The minimal model of unification is couched in terms of identification of two theoretical terms (c1 and c2), one belonging to a theory T1 and the other to another theory T2. First, four scenarios of inconceivability are proposed. The formal approach proposed here is based on a “syntactic view” of scientific theories. The upshot of this mechanism is that some alternatives to T1, which still remain unconceived (relative to the conceptual and ideological space of T1), can be eliminated because they are inconsistent with alternatives to another theory T¬2. Consistency is here a requirement imposed on set of theories. An alternative view, based on an idea of “state spaces” and “conceptual spaces” is quickly discussed. This argument shows in what sense Stanford’s antirealist inductive argument is weakened when scientists or communities of scientists operate based on some theoretical ideals such as unification, parsimony, simplicity, etc.},
	month = jan,
	year = {2017},
}

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