@incollection{Anscombe1981,
abstract = {[first paragraph] In the Theaetetus of Plato, Socrates disputes the definition of knowledge as perception with the objection: If I see, and then shut my eyes and remember what I saw, I still know it, but am not perceiving it. Therefore knowledge is not the same thing as perception. Later, putting a defence for phenomenalism into the mouth of Protagoras, he counters this argument with: "Do you suppose anyone will agree that in remembering what he has experienced, a man is having the same sort of exerience (Greek: pathos) as he had when he was experiencing what he now remembers?"},
address = {Oxford},
author = {Anscombe, G.E.M.},
booktitle = {Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Anscombe - 1981 - Memory, 'experience' and causation.pdf:pdf},
pages = {120--130},
publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
title = {{Memory, 'experience' and causation}},
year = {1981}
}

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