On the Relation Between Ignorance and Epistemic Injustice: An ignorance-first analysis. Bain, Z. In Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies. Routledge, 2 edition, 2022. Num Pages: 14
abstract   bibtex   
Scholars of ignorance have long been concerned with how what we don’t know, forget, or ignore contributes to injustice or wrongdoing. Recent philosophical scholarship has developed the notion of epistemic injustice to refer to certain kinds of harms that are distinctively epistemic, as well as seeking to understand the relationship between different kinds of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, respectively—and ignorance. This chapter explains and then defends an ‘ignorance-first’ account of the relation between ignorance and epistemic injustice, where ignorance is taken to be causally and/or explanatorily prior to epistemic injustice. This account is grounded in philosophical work on the epistemology of ignorance offered by thinkers like Charles W. Mills, Gaile Pohlhaus Jr, and others. Through examination of cases involving racism and disability discrimination (ableism), this chapter seeks to defend the claim that an ignorance-first analysis is more adequate at tracking phenomena involved in the epistemology of domination, oppression, and injustice than epistemic injustice-first accounts.
@incollection{bain_relation_2022,
	edition = {2},
	title = {On the {Relation} {Between} {Ignorance} and {Epistemic} {Injustice}: {An} ignorance-first analysis},
	isbn = {978-1-00-310060-7},
	shorttitle = {On the {Relation} {Between} {Ignorance} and {Epistemic} {Injustice}},
	abstract = {Scholars of ignorance have long been concerned with how what we don’t know, forget, or ignore contributes to injustice or wrongdoing. Recent philosophical scholarship has developed the notion of epistemic injustice to refer to certain kinds of harms that are distinctively epistemic, as well as seeking to understand the relationship between different kinds of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, respectively—and ignorance. This chapter explains and then defends an ‘ignorance-first’ account of the relation between ignorance and epistemic injustice, where ignorance is taken to be causally and/or explanatorily prior to epistemic injustice. This account is grounded in philosophical work on the epistemology of ignorance offered by thinkers like Charles W. Mills, Gaile Pohlhaus Jr, and others. Through examination of cases involving racism and disability discrimination (ableism), this chapter seeks to defend the claim that an ignorance-first analysis is more adequate at tracking phenomena involved in the epistemology of domination, oppression, and injustice than epistemic injustice-first accounts.},
	booktitle = {Routledge {International} {Handbook} of {Ignorance} {Studies}},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Bain, Zara},
	year = {2022},
	note = {Num Pages: 14},
	keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
}

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