@article{
 title = {Rational bubbles in closed economies},
 type = {article},
 year = {2016},
 id = {31766448-54e2-3373-b7c6-756c99dd4bf0},
 created = {2016-10-31T11:02:58.000Z},
 file_attached = {false},
 profile_id = {8856f0a8-e934-3b54-83b3-1dc0f138e432},
 group_id = {bd0f1172-1660-3fe3-b7d0-9f2d0b4051ad},
 last_modified = {2017-03-14T12:29:36.496Z},
 tags = {DOLFINS_T1.1,DOLFINS_WP1},
 read = {false},
 starred = {false},
 authored = {false},
 confirmed = {true},
 hidden = {false},
 citation_key = {Battiston2016},
 abstract = {This paper considers the issue of rational bubbles in closed economic systems. Evidence of bubbly equilibria is provided even for infinite-horizon models with finite population and wealth and non- volatile fundamental value, as long as there is uncertainty about the future, which in the examples provided is a consequence of mixed strategies. The result is obtained in the presence of perfectly rational and symmetric agents, and an example of such rational bubble is simulated. Given the closed economy assumption, the model is suitable for studying the endogenous formation of financial networks, considered as closed systems. It allows to show that bubbles can have important consequences on the topology of the financial network, and hence, as previous studies have shown, on its robustness to local failures. This implies that the pervasiveness of financial bubbles in shaping the dynamics and performances of financial markets - in particular in times of systemic crises - may be much more important than it is commonly assumed, and that “too big to fail” financial institutions, which represent a crucial problem for regulators, do not emerge by chance, but rather as the natural outcome of a process favouring concentration.},
 bibtype = {article},
 author = {Battiston, Pietro},
 journal = {paper-progress}
}

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