Should We Aim for Consensus?. Beatty, J. & Moore, A. Episteme, 7(3):198–214, October, 2010. Publisher: Cambridge University Press![Should We Aim for Consensus? [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex There can be good reasons to doubt the authority of a group of scientists. But those reasons do not include lack of unanimity among them. Indeed, holding science to a unanimity or near-unanimity standard has a pernicious effect on scientific deliberation, and on the transparency that is so crucial to the authority of science in a democracy. What authorizes a conclusion is the quality of the deliberation that produced it, which is enhanced by the presence of a non-dismissible minority. Scientists can speak as one in more ways than one. We recommend a different sort of consensus that is partly substantive and partly procedural. It is a version of what Margaret Gilbert calls “joint acceptance”–we call it “deliberative acceptance.” It capitalizes on there being a persistent minority, and thereby encourages accurate reporting of the state of agreement and disagreement among deliberators.
@article{beatty_should_2010,
title = {Should {We} {Aim} for {Consensus}?},
volume = {7},
issn = {1750-0117, 1742-3600},
url = {http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/should-we-aim-for-consensus/44AE422B8618E9094FFA96E9B957E83A},
doi = {10.3366/E1742360010000948},
abstract = {There can be good reasons to doubt the authority of a group of scientists. But those reasons do not include lack of unanimity among them. Indeed, holding science to a unanimity or near-unanimity standard has a pernicious effect on scientific deliberation, and on the transparency that is so crucial to the authority of science in a democracy. What authorizes a conclusion is the quality of the deliberation that produced it, which is enhanced by the presence of a non-dismissible minority. Scientists can speak as one in more ways than one. We recommend a different sort of consensus that is partly substantive and partly procedural. It is a version of what Margaret Gilbert calls “joint acceptance”–we call it “deliberative acceptance.” It capitalizes on there being a persistent minority, and thereby encourages accurate reporting of the state of agreement and disagreement among deliberators.},
language = {en},
number = {3},
urldate = {2021-04-14},
journal = {Episteme},
author = {Beatty, John and Moore, Alfred},
month = oct,
year = {2010},
note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
pages = {198--214},
}
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