Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority. Beaver, D. Journal of Cryptology, 4(2):75–122, January, 1991. ![Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex A multiparty protocol to compute a function f(x1, ..., xn) operates as follows: each of n processors holds an input xi, and jointly they must compute and reveal f(x1, ..., xn) without revealing any additional information about the inputs. The processors are connected by secure communication lines but some number of processors may be corrupted by a resource-unbounded adversary that may attempt to interfere with the protocol or to gain extra information. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård have given protocols tolerating faults in t\textlessn/3 processors. We improve the bound to t\textlessn/2; as long as a majority remains uncorrupted, general and secure computations are achievable. To address and prove the security of our results, we introduce concise definitions for security and fault-tolerance. In particular, our notion of relative resilience—a means to compare the security and fault-tolerance of one protocol with that of another in a formal manner—provides a key tool for understanding and proving protocol security.
@article{beaver_secure_1991,
title = {Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority},
volume = {4},
issn = {1432-1378},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00196771},
doi = {10.1007/BF00196771},
abstract = {A multiparty protocol to compute a function f(x1, ..., xn) operates as follows: each of n processors holds an input xi, and jointly they must compute and reveal f(x1, ..., xn) without revealing any additional information about the inputs. The processors are connected by secure communication lines but some number of processors may be corrupted by a resource-unbounded adversary that may attempt to interfere with the protocol or to gain extra information. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård have given protocols tolerating faults in t{\textless}n/3 processors. We improve the bound to t{\textless}n/2; as long as a majority remains uncorrupted, general and secure computations are achievable. To address and prove the security of our results, we introduce concise definitions for security and fault-tolerance. In particular, our notion of relative resilience—a means to compare the security and fault-tolerance of one protocol with that of another in a formal manner—provides a key tool for understanding and proving protocol security.},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-11-25},
journal = {Journal of Cryptology},
author = {Beaver, Donald},
month = jan,
year = {1991},
keywords = {Distributed computing, Fault tolerance, Proof systems, Secret sharing, Zero knowledge},
pages = {75--122},
}
Downloads: 0
{"_id":"F7uZyLLvJR2CcdhRk","bibbaseid":"beaver-securemultipartyprotocolsandzeroknowledgeproofsystemstoleratingafaultyminority-1991","author_short":["Beaver, D."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority","volume":"4","issn":"1432-1378","url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00196771","doi":"10.1007/BF00196771","abstract":"A multiparty protocol to compute a function f(x1, ..., xn) operates as follows: each of n processors holds an input xi, and jointly they must compute and reveal f(x1, ..., xn) without revealing any additional information about the inputs. The processors are connected by secure communication lines but some number of processors may be corrupted by a resource-unbounded adversary that may attempt to interfere with the protocol or to gain extra information. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård have given protocols tolerating faults in t\\textlessn/3 processors. We improve the bound to t\\textlessn/2; as long as a majority remains uncorrupted, general and secure computations are achievable. To address and prove the security of our results, we introduce concise definitions for security and fault-tolerance. In particular, our notion of relative resilience—a means to compare the security and fault-tolerance of one protocol with that of another in a formal manner—provides a key tool for understanding and proving protocol security.","language":"en","number":"2","urldate":"2024-11-25","journal":"Journal of Cryptology","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Beaver"],"firstnames":["Donald"],"suffixes":[]}],"month":"January","year":"1991","keywords":"Distributed computing, Fault tolerance, Proof systems, Secret sharing, Zero knowledge","pages":"75–122","bibtex":"@article{beaver_secure_1991,\n\ttitle = {Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority},\n\tvolume = {4},\n\tissn = {1432-1378},\n\turl = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00196771},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/BF00196771},\n\tabstract = {A multiparty protocol to compute a function f(x1, ..., xn) operates as follows: each of n processors holds an input xi, and jointly they must compute and reveal f(x1, ..., xn) without revealing any additional information about the inputs. The processors are connected by secure communication lines but some number of processors may be corrupted by a resource-unbounded adversary that may attempt to interfere with the protocol or to gain extra information. Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, Chaum, Crépeau, and Damgård have given protocols tolerating faults in t{\\textless}n/3 processors. We improve the bound to t{\\textless}n/2; as long as a majority remains uncorrupted, general and secure computations are achievable. To address and prove the security of our results, we introduce concise definitions for security and fault-tolerance. In particular, our notion of relative resilience—a means to compare the security and fault-tolerance of one protocol with that of another in a formal manner—provides a key tool for understanding and proving protocol security.},\n\tlanguage = {en},\n\tnumber = {2},\n\turldate = {2024-11-25},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Cryptology},\n\tauthor = {Beaver, Donald},\n\tmonth = jan,\n\tyear = {1991},\n\tkeywords = {Distributed computing, Fault tolerance, Proof systems, Secret sharing, Zero knowledge},\n\tpages = {75--122},\n}\n\n","author_short":["Beaver, D."],"key":"beaver_secure_1991","id":"beaver_secure_1991","bibbaseid":"beaver-securemultipartyprotocolsandzeroknowledgeproofsystemstoleratingafaultyminority-1991","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00196771"},"keyword":["Distributed computing","Fault tolerance","Proof systems","Secret sharing","Zero knowledge"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}},"downloads":0,"html":""},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"https://api.zotero.org/users/14743564/collections/U5Q7H6UA/items?key=PeWr6Jhoh9jovDsqm638nXDG&format=bibtex&limit=100","dataSources":["vgq5Ajj98MgtNSsoa"],"keywords":["distributed computing","fault tolerance","proof systems","secret sharing","zero knowledge"],"search_terms":["secure","multiparty","protocols","zero","knowledge","proof","systems","tolerating","faulty","minority","beaver"],"title":"Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority","year":1991}