Justification as faultlessness. Beddor, B. Philosophical Studies, 174(4):901–926, April, 2017. ![Justification as faultlessness [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals (should, ought to) and strong necessity modals (must, have to) to make progress on a question that has received surprisingly little discussion in the literature, namely: ‘What’s the best version of a deontological approach?’ The two most obvious hypotheses are the Permissive View, according to which justified expresses permission, and the Obligatory View, according to which justified expresses some species of obligation. I raise difficulties for both of these hypotheses. In light of these difficulties, I propose a new position, according to which justified expresses a property I call faultlessness, defined as the dual of weak necessity modals. According to this view, an agent is justified in $$\phi$$ϕ-ing iff it’s not the case that she should [/ought] not $$\phi$$ϕ. I argue that this ‘Faultlessness View’ gives us precisely what’s needed to avoid the problems facing the Permissive and Obligatory Views.
@article{beddor_justification_2017,
title = {Justification as faultlessness},
volume = {174},
issn = {1573-0883},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0713-4},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-016-0713-4},
abstract = {According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals (should, ought to) and strong necessity modals (must, have to) to make progress on a question that has received surprisingly little discussion in the literature, namely: ‘What’s the best version of a deontological approach?’ The two most obvious hypotheses are the Permissive View, according to which justified expresses permission, and the Obligatory View, according to which justified expresses some species of obligation. I raise difficulties for both of these hypotheses. In light of these difficulties, I propose a new position, according to which justified expresses a property I call faultlessness, defined as the dual of weak necessity modals. According to this view, an agent is justified in \$\${\textbackslash}phi\$\$ϕ-ing iff it’s not the case that she should [/ought] not \$\${\textbackslash}phi\$\$ϕ. I argue that this ‘Faultlessness View’ gives us precisely what’s needed to avoid the problems facing the Permissive and Obligatory Views.},
language = {en},
number = {4},
urldate = {2020-12-22},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
author = {Beddor, Bob},
month = apr,
year = {2017},
pages = {901--926},
}
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