@article{Bermudez2012,
abstract = {First person judgments that are immune to error through misidentifi cation (IEM) are fundamental to self-conscious thought. Th e IEM status of many such judgments can be understood in terms of the possession conditions of the con- cepts they involve. However, this approach cannot be extended to fi rst person judgments based on autobiographical memory. Th e paper develops an account of why such judgments have the IEM property and how thinkers are able to exploit this fact in inference.},
author = {Berm{\'{u}}dez, Jos{\'{e}} Luis},
doi = {10.1163/9789401207904_007},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Berm{\'{u}}dez - 2012 - Memory judgments and immunity to error through misidentification.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0165-9227},
journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
number = {1},
pages = {123--142},
title = {{Memory judgements and immunity to error through misidentification}},
url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/gps/84/1/article-p123{\_}7.xml},
volume = {84},
year = {2012}
}

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