@incollection{Bernecker2017c,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of philosophical theories of memory: traditional archival views and contemporary constructive views. The archival view claims that memory is a purely passive device for registering, storing and reproducing representations of particular past experiences. On this picture, a subject misremembers whenever the content of her state of seeming to remember differs from the content of the corresponding original representation. Given that memory aims at preservation of content, any discrepancy between the encoded and the retrieved content is taken to be a mistake. Hume, for instance, declares that " memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that wherever we depart from it in recollecting anything, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty " (2000: 12). The archival view is still very much with us today; it is a tacit assumption behind the widespread storehouse metaphors of memory.},
address = {New York},
author = {Bernecker, Sven},
booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Bernecker - 2017 - Memory and truth.pdf:pdf},
pages = {51--62},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{Memory and truth}},
year = {2017}
}

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