Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance. Bodlović, P. Argumentation, 33(4):579–604, 2019. doi abstract bibtex By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance. © 2019, The Author(s).
@article{bodlovic_presumptions_2019,
title = {Presumptions, and {How} {They} {Relate} to {Arguments} from {Ignorance}},
volume = {33},
doi = {10.1007/s10503-019-09498-8},
abstract = {By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance. © 2019, The Author(s).},
number = {4},
journal = {Argumentation},
author = {Bodlović, P.},
year = {2019},
keywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Argument from ignorance, Burden of proof, Defeaters, Douglas Walton, Ignorance in philosophy and logic, Initial presumption, Negative evidence, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Presumptive reasoning, Starting points},
pages = {579--604},
}
Downloads: 0
{"_id":"MpqPk3Kbng6A5fnMs","bibbaseid":"bodlovi-presumptionsandhowtheyrelatetoargumentsfromignorance-2019","authorIDs":[],"author_short":["Bodlović, P."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance","volume":"33","doi":"10.1007/s10503-019-09498-8","abstract":"By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance. © 2019, The Author(s).","number":"4","journal":"Argumentation","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Bodlović"],"firstnames":["P."],"suffixes":[]}],"year":"2019","keywords":"12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Argument from ignorance, Burden of proof, Defeaters, Douglas Walton, Ignorance in philosophy and logic, Initial presumption, Negative evidence, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Presumptive reasoning, Starting points","pages":"579–604","bibtex":"@article{bodlovic_presumptions_2019,\n\ttitle = {Presumptions, and {How} {They} {Relate} to {Arguments} from {Ignorance}},\n\tvolume = {33},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s10503-019-09498-8},\n\tabstract = {By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance. © 2019, The Author(s).},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tjournal = {Argumentation},\n\tauthor = {Bodlović, P.},\n\tyear = {2019},\n\tkeywords = {12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields, Argument from ignorance, Burden of proof, Defeaters, Douglas Walton, Ignorance in philosophy and logic, Initial presumption, Negative evidence, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Presumptive reasoning, Starting points},\n\tpages = {579--604},\n}\n\n","author_short":["Bodlović, P."],"key":"bodlovic_presumptions_2019","id":"bodlovic_presumptions_2019","bibbaseid":"bodlovi-presumptionsandhowtheyrelatetoargumentsfromignorance-2019","role":"author","urls":{},"keyword":["12 Ignorance in other disciplinary fields","Argument from ignorance","Burden of proof","Defeaters","Douglas Walton","Ignorance in philosophy and logic","Initial presumption","Negative evidence","PRINTED (Fonds papier)","Presumptive reasoning","Starting points"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}},"downloads":0},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://bibbase.org/zotero-group/science_et_ignorance/1340424","creationDate":"2021-01-12T15:44:52.924Z","downloads":0,"keywords":["12 ignorance in other disciplinary fields","argument from ignorance","burden of proof","defeaters","douglas walton","ignorance in philosophy and logic","initial presumption","negative evidence","printed (fonds papier)","presumptive reasoning","starting points"],"search_terms":["presumptions","relate","arguments","ignorance","bodlović"],"title":"Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance","year":2019,"dataSources":["zX4acseCDM6D58AW7","NTvuMntpta5z9CAbT"]}