@conference {ccs07-doa,
	title = {Denial of Service or Denial of Security? How Attacks on Reliability can Compromise Anonymity},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of CCS 2007},
	year = {2007},
	month = {October},
	publisher = {ACM  New York, NY, USA},
	organization = {ACM  New York, NY, USA},
	abstract = {We consider the effect attackers who disrupt anonymous communications have on the security of traditional high- and low-latency anonymous communication systems, as well as on the Hydra-Onion and Cashmere systems that aim to offer reliable mixing, and Salsa, a peer-to-peer anonymous communication network. We show that denial of service (DoS) lowers anonymity as messages need to get retransmitted to be delivered, presenting more opportunities for attack. We uncover a fundamental limit on the security of mix networks, showing that they cannot tolerate a majority of nodes being malicious. Cashmere, Hydra-Onion, and Salsa security is also badly affected by DoS attackers. Our results are backed by probabilistic modeling and extensive simulations and are of direct applicability to deployed anonymity systems.
},
	keywords = {anonymity, attack, denial-of-service, reliability},
	isbn = {978-1-59593-703-2},
	doi = {10.1145/1315245.1315258},
	url = {http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1315258},
	author = {Borisov, Nikita and George Danezis and Prateek Mittal and Parisa Tabriz}
}

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