Access to collective epistemic reasons: reply to Mitova. Boult, C. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2023. Publisher: Springer Nature Type: Article![Access to collective epistemic reasons: reply to Mitova [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex In this short paper, I critically examine Veli Mitova’s proposal that social-identity groups can have collective epistemic reasons. My primary focus is the role of privileged access in her account of how collective reasons become epistemic reasons for social-identity groups. I argue that there is a potentially worrying structural asymmetry in her account of two different types of cases. More specifically, the mechanisms at play in cases of “doxastic reasons” seem fundamentally different from those at play in cases of “epistemic-conduct reasons.” The upshot is a need for further explanation of what unifies these dimensions of the account. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
@article{boult_access_2023,
title = {Access to collective epistemic reasons: reply to {Mitova}},
volume = {2},
issn = {27314642},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85183667092&doi=10.1007%2fs44204-023-00114-x&partnerID=40&md5=4d504197c8ff97ec1ec16c6bff2d215a},
doi = {10.1007/s44204-023-00114-x},
abstract = {In this short paper, I critically examine Veli Mitova’s proposal that social-identity groups can have collective epistemic reasons. My primary focus is the role of privileged access in her account of how collective reasons become epistemic reasons for social-identity groups. I argue that there is a potentially worrying structural asymmetry in her account of two different types of cases. More specifically, the mechanisms at play in cases of “doxastic reasons” seem fundamentally different from those at play in cases of “epistemic-conduct reasons.” The upshot is a need for further explanation of what unifies these dimensions of the account. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.},
language = {English},
number = {2},
journal = {Asian Journal of Philosophy},
author = {Boult, Cameron},
year = {2023},
note = {Publisher: Springer Nature
Type: Article},
}
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