Genomic Contextualism, Genetic Determinism, and Causal Models. Boyce, A. The American Journal of Bioethics, 19(1):73–75, January, 2019.
Genomic Contextualism, Genetic Determinism, and Causal Models [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
Garrison and colleagues (2019 Garrison, N. A., K. B. Brothers, A. Goldenberg, and J. Lynch. 2019. Genomic contextualism: Shifting the rhetoric of gentic exceptionalism. American Journal of Bioethics 19(1):XX–XX. [Google Scholar] ) provide an insightful critique of the unproductive debates within the policy idiom of genetic exceptionalism. The authors clearly define a new idiom of genomic contextualism as a concept highlighting the importance of considering how genomic information is both similar to and distinct from other medical areas when making policy and practice decisions. By employing systematic rhetorical analysis and stasis theory, they illustrate how genomic contextualism can operate as a productive framework for assessing genetics and genomics and move beyond the limits of genetic exceptionalism. However, their focus is solely on use contexts for genomic information. Despite the clarity of their conceptual definition, the notion of genomic contextualism could be expanded to also serve as a conceptual tool for intervening in polarized policy debates about genetic determinism. Genetic exceptionalism and genetic determinism have different meanings, but there are shared or synergistic aspects; genetic determinism has been called an “extreme form” of genetic exceptionalism because the idea that genes determine who you are can help lead to a focus on genetics to the exclusion of other causal factors (Minor 2015 Minor, J. 2015. Informed consent in predictive genetic testing: A revised model. Cham: Springer. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ). There is a risk of muddying the conceptual waters with an expanded definition, but genomic contextualism could also serve as a helpful idiom within contentious debates about the causal relationship between genes, environments, and social forces, and the social and health policy decisions made based on beliefs about causality. Disease causality is a notoriously difficult topic to discuss within and across disciplines and expert and public domains. Genomic contextualism has promise as a new policy idiom highlighting the context dependency of “what causation is,” since different fields adopt fundamentally different causal models (Smart 2016 Smart, B. 2016. Concepts of causation in the philosophy of disease. In Concepts and causes in the philosophy of disease, ed. B. Smart, 44–69. London: Palgrave Pivot. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ).
@article{boyce_genomic_2019,
	title = {Genomic {Contextualism}, {Genetic} {Determinism}, and {Causal} {Models}},
	volume = {19},
	issn = {1526-5161},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2018.1544317},
	doi = {10.1080/15265161.2018.1544317},
	abstract = {Garrison and colleagues (2019 Garrison, N. A., K. B. Brothers, A. Goldenberg, and J. Lynch. 2019. Genomic contextualism: Shifting the rhetoric of gentic exceptionalism. American Journal of Bioethics 19(1):XX–XX.
 [Google Scholar]
) provide an insightful critique of the unproductive debates within the policy idiom of genetic exceptionalism. The authors clearly define a new idiom of genomic contextualism as a concept highlighting the importance of considering how genomic information is both similar to and distinct from other medical areas when making policy and practice decisions. By employing systematic rhetorical analysis and stasis theory, they illustrate how genomic contextualism can operate as a productive framework for assessing genetics and genomics and move beyond the limits of genetic exceptionalism. However, their focus is solely on use contexts for genomic information. Despite the clarity of their conceptual definition, the notion of genomic contextualism could be expanded to also serve as a conceptual tool for intervening in polarized policy debates about genetic determinism. Genetic exceptionalism and genetic determinism have different meanings, but there are shared or synergistic aspects; genetic determinism has been called an “extreme form” of genetic exceptionalism because the idea that genes determine who you are can help lead to a focus on genetics to the exclusion of other causal factors (Minor 2015 Minor, J. 2015. Informed consent in predictive genetic testing: A revised model. Cham: Springer.
[Crossref], , [Google Scholar]
). There is a risk of muddying the conceptual waters with an expanded definition, but genomic contextualism could also serve as a helpful idiom within contentious debates about the causal relationship between genes, environments, and social forces, and the social and health policy decisions made based on beliefs about causality. Disease causality is a notoriously difficult topic to discuss within and across disciplines and expert and public domains. Genomic contextualism has promise as a new policy idiom highlighting the context dependency of “what causation is,” since different fields adopt fundamentally different causal models (Smart 2016 Smart, B. 2016. Concepts of causation in the philosophy of disease. In Concepts and causes in the philosophy of disease, ed. B. Smart, 44–69. London: Palgrave Pivot.
[Crossref], , [Google Scholar]
).},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2019-01-28},
	journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics},
	author = {Boyce, Angie},
	month = jan,
	year = {2019},
	keywords = {Berman, Genomic Contextualism: Shifting the Rhetoric of Genetic Exceptionalism},
	pages = {73--75}
}

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