The myth of phenomenological overflow. Brown, R. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2):599–604, June, 2012.
The myth of phenomenological overflow [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
@article{brown_myth_2012,
	series = {Standing on the {Verge}: {Lessons} and {Limits} from the {Empirical} {Study} of {Consciousness}},
	title = {The myth of phenomenological overflow},
	volume = {21},
	issn = {1053-8100},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810011001589},
	doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2011.06.005},
	abstract = {In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2023-09-09},
	journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
	author = {Brown, Richard},
	month = jun,
	year = {2012},
	keywords = {Consciousness, Higher-order thought, Mesh argument, Methodological puzzle, Phenomenological overflow},
	pages = {599--604},
}

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