Security Evaluation Against Side-Channel Analysis at Compilation Time. Bruneau, N., Christen, C., Danger, J., Facon, A., & Guilley, S. In Gueye, C. T., Persichetti, E., Cayrel, P., & Buchmann, J., editors, Algebra, Codes and Cryptology, pages 129–148, Cham, 2019. Springer International Publishing.
Security Evaluation Against Side-Channel Analysis at Compilation Time [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   2 downloads  
Masking countermeasure is implemented to thwart side-channel attacks. The maturity of high-order masking schemes has reached the level where the concepts are sound and proven. For instance, Rivain and Prouff proposed a full-fledged AES at CHES 2010. Some non-trivial fixes regarding refresh functions were needed though. Now, industry is adopting such solutions, and for the sake of both quality and certification requirements, masked cryptographic code shall be checked for correctness using the same model as that of the theoretical protection rationale (for instance the probing leakage model).
@inproceedings{10.1007/978-3-030-36237-9_8,
  title = {Security Evaluation Against Side-Channel Analysis at Compilation Time},
  author = {Bruneau, Nicolas and Christen, Charles and Danger, Jean-Luc and Facon, Adrien and Guilley, Sylvain},
  year = 2019,
  booktitle = {Algebra, Codes and Cryptology},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  address = {Cham},
  pages = {129--148},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-36237-9_8},
  isbn = {978-3-030-36237-9},
  url = {https://hal-cnrs.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02915643},
  editor = {Gueye, Cheikh Thiecoumba and Persichetti, Edoardo and Cayrel, Pierre-Louis and Buchmann, Johannes},
  abstract = {Masking countermeasure is implemented to thwart side-channel attacks. The maturity of high-order masking schemes has reached the level where the concepts are sound and proven. For instance, Rivain and Prouff proposed a full-fledged AES at CHES 2010. Some non-trivial fixes regarding refresh functions were needed though. Now, industry is adopting such solutions, and for the sake of both quality and certification requirements, masked cryptographic code shall be checked for correctness using the same model as that of the theoretical protection rationale (for instance the probing leakage model).}
}

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