Content Preservation. Burge, T. The Philosophical Review, 102(4):457–488, 1993. ![Content Preservation [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex [first paragraph] Near the beginning of Rules for the Direction of the Mind Descartes holds that some things known "with certainty" and "by deduction" are not evident. He notes that in long deductions, we may know that "the last link is connected with the first, even though we do not take in by means of one and the same act of vision all the intermediate links on which that connection depends, but only remember that we have taken them successively under review... ". Though he acknowledges that such knowledge is not evident or purely intuitive, and that long deductions are more subject to error than is intuitive knowledge, Descartes thinks that if the knowledge is deduced from evident mathematical premises, it is certain and demonstrative. Presumably he would not doubt that it is apriori. I lay aside certainty. But the view that the knowledge is demonstrative and apriori seems to me true.
@article{Burge1993,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Near the beginning of Rules for the Direction of the Mind Descartes holds that some things known "with certainty" and "by deduction" are not evident. He notes that in long deductions, we may know that "the last link is connected with the first, even though we do not take in by means of one and the same act of vision all the intermediate links on which that connection depends, but only remember that we have taken them successively under review... ". Though he acknowledges that such knowledge is not evident or purely intuitive, and that long deductions are more subject to error than is intuitive knowledge, Descartes thinks that if the knowledge is deduced from evident mathematical premises, it is certain and demonstrative. Presumably he would not doubt that it is apriori. I lay aside certainty. But the view that the knowledge is demonstrative and apriori seems to me true.},
author = {Burge, Tyler},
doi = {10.2307/2185680},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Burge - 1995 - Content preservation.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00318108},
journal = {The Philosophical Review},
number = {4},
pages = {457--488},
title = {{Content Preservation}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/1523046?origin=crossref https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185680?origin=crossref},
volume = {102},
year = {1993}
}
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