@article{bykvist_critical_2018,
	title = {Some critical comments on {Zimmerman}'s ignorance and moral obligation},
	volume = {15},
	doi = {10.1163/17455243-01504001},
	abstract = {In his recent book, Michael Zimmerman continues to defend the Prospective View, according to which moral obligation depends on evidence about both empirical and evaluative factors. In my commentary, I shall first focus on Zimmerman's framework in which different moral theories are defined and distinguished. I argue that Zimmerman fails to formulate a clear and coherent distinction between The Prospective View and the Objective View, which he rejects. Then I turn to the so-called constraint \#2, a crucial premise in Zimmerman's master argument against the Objective View. Here I argue that it should be given up so that we can give the right verdict in cases of fundamental moral uncertainty. More specifically, I shall argue that a morally conscientious agent can rationally choose the option that is guaranteed to be morally wrong in a Jackson-case of fundamental moral uncertainty. Finally, I shall argue that the Prospective View, in its most recent guise - according to which moral obligation depends on empirical and evaluative evidence the agent has actually availed herself of - has very troubling substantive implications that go against all traditional moral theories, as well as an earlier version of Zimmerman's Prospective View. © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018},
	number = {4},
	journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
	author = {Bykvist, K.},
	year = {2018},
	keywords = {Moral conscientiousness, Obligation, Prospective view, Uncertainty},
	pages = {383--400},
}

{"_id":"afD2wT5iGg8GsWJv3","bibbaseid":"bykvist-somecriticalcommentsonzimmermansignoranceandmoralobligation-2018","author_short":["Bykvist, K."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"Some critical comments on Zimmerman's ignorance and moral obligation","volume":"15","doi":"10.1163/17455243-01504001","abstract":"In his recent book, Michael Zimmerman continues to defend the Prospective View, according to which moral obligation depends on evidence about both empirical and evaluative factors. In my commentary, I shall first focus on Zimmerman's framework in which different moral theories are defined and distinguished. I argue that Zimmerman fails to formulate a clear and coherent distinction between The Prospective View and the Objective View, which he rejects. Then I turn to the so-called constraint #2, a crucial premise in Zimmerman's master argument against the Objective View. Here I argue that it should be given up so that we can give the right verdict in cases of fundamental moral uncertainty. More specifically, I shall argue that a morally conscientious agent can rationally choose the option that is guaranteed to be morally wrong in a Jackson-case of fundamental moral uncertainty. Finally, I shall argue that the Prospective View, in its most recent guise - according to which moral obligation depends on empirical and evaluative evidence the agent has actually availed herself of - has very troubling substantive implications that go against all traditional moral theories, as well as an earlier version of Zimmerman's Prospective View. © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018","number":"4","journal":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Bykvist"],"firstnames":["K."],"suffixes":[]}],"year":"2018","keywords":"Moral conscientiousness, Obligation, Prospective view, Uncertainty","pages":"383–400","bibtex":"@article{bykvist_critical_2018,\n\ttitle = {Some critical comments on {Zimmerman}'s ignorance and moral obligation},\n\tvolume = {15},\n\tdoi = {10.1163/17455243-01504001},\n\tabstract = {In his recent book, Michael Zimmerman continues to defend the Prospective View, according to which moral obligation depends on evidence about both empirical and evaluative factors. In my commentary, I shall first focus on Zimmerman's framework in which different moral theories are defined and distinguished. I argue that Zimmerman fails to formulate a clear and coherent distinction between The Prospective View and the Objective View, which he rejects. Then I turn to the so-called constraint \\#2, a crucial premise in Zimmerman's master argument against the Objective View. Here I argue that it should be given up so that we can give the right verdict in cases of fundamental moral uncertainty. More specifically, I shall argue that a morally conscientious agent can rationally choose the option that is guaranteed to be morally wrong in a Jackson-case of fundamental moral uncertainty. Finally, I shall argue that the Prospective View, in its most recent guise - according to which moral obligation depends on empirical and evaluative evidence the agent has actually availed herself of - has very troubling substantive implications that go against all traditional moral theories, as well as an earlier version of Zimmerman's Prospective View. © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tjournal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},\n\tauthor = {Bykvist, K.},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tkeywords = {Moral conscientiousness, Obligation, Prospective view, Uncertainty},\n\tpages = {383--400},\n}\n\n","author_short":["Bykvist, K."],"key":"bykvist_critical_2018","id":"bykvist_critical_2018","bibbaseid":"bykvist-somecriticalcommentsonzimmermansignoranceandmoralobligation-2018","role":"author","urls":{},"keyword":["Moral conscientiousness","Obligation","Prospective view","Uncertainty"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}}},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://bibbase.org/zotero-group/science_et_ignorance/1340424","dataSources":["zX4acseCDM6D58AW7"],"keywords":["moral conscientiousness","obligation","prospective view","uncertainty"],"search_terms":["critical","comments","zimmerman","ignorance","moral","obligation","bykvist"],"title":"Some critical comments on Zimmerman's ignorance and moral obligation","year":2018}