@inproceedings{byres_use_2004,
	address = {Lisbon, Portugal},
	series = {{IISW}'04},
	title = {The use of attack trees in assessing vulnerabilities in {SCADA} systems},
	url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.1887&rep=rep1&type=pdf},
	abstract = {Protocol standards, particularly those in the controls and power industry, have traditionally been designed to address a specific application with little regard for security in their design or specification. At best, there has been only passing concern for security issues that may arise in deployment; at worst, protocol designers assume a closed (and therefore secure) environment, which, in many cases, no longer exists. Where security has been a consideration, there has been no clear methodology to assess the security risks in the protocol specification. This paper describes the application of attack tree methodology to the common SCADA protocol MODBUS/TCP with the goal of identifying security vulnerabilities inherent in the specification and in typical deployments.},
	urldate = {2015-10-05TZ},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the {International} {Infrastructure} {Survivability} {Workshop}},
	publisher = {Citeseer},
	author = {Byres, Eric J. and Franz, Matthew and Miller, Darrin},
	month = dec,
	year = {2004},
	note = {00098},
	keywords = {SCADA, SCADA control system, SCADA system security, SCADA systems, supervisory control and data-acquisition (SCADA) systems}
}

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