The Making of a Zimbabwean Rogue (State): Robert Mugabe, Neoliberalism, Civil Society and NEPAD. Carmody, P. In Neoliberalism, Civil Society and Security in Africa, of International Political Economy Series, pages 162–190. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, 2007.
The Making of a Zimbabwean Rogue (State): Robert Mugabe, Neoliberalism, Civil Society and NEPAD [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
As noted previously, neoliberalism is in some cases associated with state strengthening, as in Ethiopia; in others with state collapse depending on preexisting conditions, policy choices, institutions and resource inflows (Bauer and Taylor, 2005). There is an extensive literature on the political economy of reform in Africa. In the theory of the World Bank, markets are meant to counter corruption by substituting for the state as a social coordination mechanism. Market efficiency, through privatization is meant to be the antidote to the soft budget constraints of public enterprises and the potential for corruption evident in administrative allocation. However, as even the World Bank now recognizes African elites have shown themselves to be very inventive in the reconfiguration of what Bayart (2000) calls ‘the strategy of extraversion.’ Graham Harrison (2005) has argued that clientelism and neoliberalism are mutually compatible in sub-Saharan Africa. By giving access to policy rents it can even bolster clientelistic regimes (van de Walle, 2001). However, how neoliberal reform plays out is contextually dependent.
@incollection{carmody_making_2007,
	address = {London},
	series = {International {Political} {Economy} {Series}},
	title = {The {Making} of a {Zimbabwean} {Rogue} ({State}): {Robert} {Mugabe}, {Neoliberalism}, {Civil} {Society} and {NEPAD}},
	isbn = {978-0-230-59838-6},
	shorttitle = {The {Making} of a {Zimbabwean} {Rogue} ({State})},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230598386_7},
	abstract = {As noted previously, neoliberalism is in some cases associated with state strengthening, as in Ethiopia; in others with state collapse depending on preexisting conditions, policy choices, institutions and resource inflows (Bauer and Taylor, 2005). There is an extensive literature on the political economy of reform in Africa. In the theory of the World Bank, markets are meant to counter corruption by substituting for the state as a social coordination mechanism. Market efficiency, through privatization is meant to be the antidote to the soft budget constraints of public enterprises and the potential for corruption evident in administrative allocation. However, as even the World Bank now recognizes African elites have shown themselves to be very inventive in the reconfiguration of what Bayart (2000) calls ‘the strategy of extraversion.’ Graham Harrison (2005) has argued that clientelism and neoliberalism are mutually compatible in sub-Saharan Africa. By giving access to policy rents it can even bolster clientelistic regimes (van de Walle, 2001). However, how neoliberal reform plays out is contextually dependent.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2021-11-24},
	booktitle = {Neoliberalism, {Civil} {Society} and {Security} in {Africa}},
	publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan UK},
	author = {Carmody, Pádraig},
	editor = {Carmody, Pádraig},
	year = {2007},
	doi = {10.1057/9780230598386_7},
	keywords = {archived},
	pages = {162--190},
}

Downloads: 0