We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance. Carrara, M., Chiffi, D., De Florio, C., & Pietarinen, A. Synthese, June, 2019. ![We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.
@article{carrara_we_2019,
title = {We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance},
issn = {1573-0964},
shorttitle = {We don’t know we don’t know},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02300-y},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02300-y},
abstract = {The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2020-10-29},
journal = {Synthese},
author = {Carrara, Massimiliano and Chiffi, Daniele and De Florio, Ciro and Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko},
month = jun,
year = {2019},
keywords = {Assertion, Ignorance, Pragmatic logic, Uncertainty},
}
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