Edges of time, edges of memory. Casey, E. S. In Morris, D. & Maclaren, K., editors, Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self, pages 254–274. Ohio University Press, Athens, 2015.
abstract   bibtex   
[first paragraph] Merleau-Ponty's thought was guided by three closely related philosophical passions: continuism, plenarism, and wholism. I will come to wholism, but will focus first on continuism and plenarism. By “continuism” I mean an aversion to lacunary phenomena such as gaps and holes and vacua along with a corresponding commitment to seeking continuities wherever they can be found—connections at the least, though not necessarily samenesses. Where Sartre, his lifelong philosophical foil, was fascinated with holes and the nothing—with the “not”—Merleau-Ponty was on the side of those who, from Parmenides to Descartes, Leibniz to Darwin, held that “Nature knows no gaps” and that it likewise “abhors a vacuum.” If one had to choose, Merleau- Ponty preferred Being to Nothingness. By the same token, he opted for full- ness rather than emptiness—for the plenary, the complete if not the total. His philosophical cup was always at least half-full. Or more likely fully full, chock-full of things and people and sensuous displays. An axiomatic utter- ance from the Phenomenology of Perception is this: “The problem of the world and, to begin with, that of one's own body, consists in the fact that it is all there [tout y demeure]” (230/230; his italics).
@incollection{Casey2015,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Merleau-Ponty's thought was guided by three closely related philosophical passions: continuism, plenarism, and wholism. I will come to wholism, but will focus first on continuism and plenarism. By “continuism” I mean an aversion to lacunary phenomena such as gaps and holes and vacua along with a corresponding commitment to seeking continuities wherever they can be found—connections at the least, though not necessarily samenesses. Where Sartre, his lifelong philosophical foil, was fascinated with holes and the nothing—with the “not”—Merleau-Ponty was on the side of those who, from Parmenides to Descartes, Leibniz to Darwin, held that “Nature knows no gaps” and that it likewise “abhors a vacuum.” If one had to choose, Merleau- Ponty preferred Being to Nothingness. By the same token, he opted for full- ness rather than emptiness—for the plenary, the complete if not the total. His philosophical cup was always at least half-full. Or more likely fully full, chock-full of things and people and sensuous displays. An axiomatic utter- ance from the Phenomenology of Perception is this: “The problem of the world and, to begin with, that of one's own body, consists in the fact that it is all there [tout y demeure]” (230/230; his italics).},
address = {Athens},
author = {Casey, Edward S.},
booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Casey - 2015 - Edges of time, edges of memory.pdf:pdf},
pages = {254--274},
publisher = {Ohio University Press},
title = {{Edges of time, edges of memory}},
year = {2015}
}

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