Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory. Casey, E. S. In Phillips, J. & Morley, J., editors, Imagination and Its Pathologies, pages 65–91. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003. abstract bibtex [first paragraph] It is a remarkable fact that many previous philosophies and psychologies of mind, however perspicuous or profound that they may be in other ways, have failed to provide adequate accounts of basic di¤erences among imag- ining, remembering, hallucinating, and fantasying. Even the most elemen- tary descriptions of such di¤erences are often lacking. Perhaps it has been presumed that the four acts in question are so closely a‰liated as not to need descriptive di¤erentiation. In this vein, they are frequently regarded as sibling acts having the same progenitor: perception. Yet each of the acts is related to perception very di¤erently, ranging from apparent replication (in hallucination) to distinct discontinuity (in imagination). It is not my present purpose, however, to delineate this particular series of relationships. Rather, in this chapter I will concentrate on eidetic di¤erences between imagining, on the one hand, and memory, hallucination, and fantasy, on the other. Each of the latter three acts will be described in terms of its most salient features, features that distinguish it from imagining in fundamental respects.1 Thus the present project represents an exercise in the comparative phe- nomenology of mind—a neglected but important part of the eidetics of human experience.
@incollection{Casey2003,
abstract = {[first paragraph] It is a remarkable fact that many previous philosophies and psychologies of mind, however perspicuous or profound that they may be in other ways, have failed to provide adequate accounts of basic di¤erences among imag- ining, remembering, hallucinating, and fantasying. Even the most elemen- tary descriptions of such di¤erences are often lacking. Perhaps it has been presumed that the four acts in question are so closely a‰liated as not to need descriptive di¤erentiation. In this vein, they are frequently regarded as sibling acts having the same progenitor: perception. Yet each of the acts is related to perception very di¤erently, ranging from apparent replication (in hallucination) to distinct discontinuity (in imagination). It is not my present purpose, however, to delineate this particular series of relationships. Rather, in this chapter I will concentrate on eidetic di¤erences between imagining, on the one hand, and memory, hallucination, and fantasy, on the other. Each of the latter three acts will be described in terms of its most salient features, features that distinguish it from imagining in fundamental respects.1 Thus the present project represents an exercise in the comparative phe- nomenology of mind—a neglected but important part of the eidetics of human experience.},
address = {Cambridge, MA},
author = {Casey, Edward S.},
booktitle = {Imagination and Its Pathologies},
editor = {Phillips, J. and Morley, J.},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Casey - 2003 - Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory.pdf:pdf},
pages = {65--91},
publisher = {MIT Press},
title = {{Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory}},
year = {2003}
}
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