Imagining and remembering. Casey, E. S. Review of Metaphysics, 31(2):187–209, 1977. abstract bibtex [first paragraph] Imagining and remembering, two of the most frequent and funda mental acts of mind, have long been unwelcome guests in most of the many mansions of philosophy. When not simply ignored or over looked, they have been considered only to be dismissed. This is above all true of imagination, as first becomes evident in Plato's view that the art of making exact images (eikastik?) tends to degenerate into the making of mere semblances (phantastik?). Kant, despite the importance he gives to imagination in the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, nevertheless considers images to be lowly "mono grams" that are unruly and thus untrustworthy. In more recent times, Sartre, who is nearly as.ambivalent as Kant on the subject, has stressed imagination's "essential poverty"?its character as "debased thought"?while Ryle, in covert counterpoint, has attempted to conceive imagining as parody and pretense: as mere make-believe.
@article{Casey1977,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Imagining and remembering, two of the most frequent and funda mental acts of mind, have long been unwelcome guests in most of the many mansions of philosophy. When not simply ignored or over looked, they have been considered only to be dismissed. This is above all true of imagination, as first becomes evident in Plato's view that the art of making exact images (eikastik?) tends to degenerate into the making of mere semblances (phantastik?). Kant, despite the importance he gives to imagination in the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, nevertheless considers images to be lowly "mono grams" that are unruly and thus untrustworthy. In more recent times, Sartre, who is nearly as.ambivalent as Kant on the subject, has stressed imagination's "essential poverty"?its character as "debased thought"?while Ryle, in covert counterpoint, has attempted to conceive imagining as parody and pretense: as mere make-believe.},
author = {Casey, Edward S.},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Casey - 1977 - Imagining and remembering.pdf:pdf},
journal = {Review of Metaphysics},
number = {2},
pages = {187--209},
title = {{Imagining and remembering}},
volume = {31},
year = {1977}
}
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