Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does

Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does. Cevolani, G. & Tambolo, L. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44(4):590-593, 2013.

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In a recent paper entitled "Truth does not explain predictive success" (Analysis, 2011), Carsten Held argues that the so-called No-Miracles Argument for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude), survives Held's criticism unscathed.

@Article{gcHeld,
  author     = {G. Cevolani and L. Tambolo},
  journal    = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
  title      = {Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does},
  year       = {2013},
  number     = {4},
  pages      = {590-593},
  volume     = {44},
  abstract   = {In a recent paper entitled "Truth does not explain predictive success" (Analysis, 2011), Carsten Held argues that the so-called No-Miracles Argument for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude), survives Held's criticism unscathed.},
  catalogato = {28.45.2013},
  doi        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.05.004},
  owner      = {Gustavo},
  url        = {PubsPDF/Cevolani & Tambolo 2013 - Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does.pdf},
}

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