@article{Chadha,
abstract = {The paper evaluates a well-known argument for a self from episodic memories—that remembering that I did something or thought something involves experiencing the identity of my present self with the past doer or thinker. Shaun Nichols argues that although it phenome- nologically appears to be the case that we are identical with the past self, no metaphysical conclusion can be drawn from the phenomenology. I draw on literature from contemporary psychology and Buddhist resources to arrive at a more radical conclusion: that there is no phe- nomenological sense of identity with a past self; the sense of self in episodic memory depends on narrative construc- tion of the self. KEYWORDS},
author = {Chadha, Monima},
doi = {10.1111/mila.12204},
file = {:Users/khm/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Chadha - 2018 - Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self.pdf:pdf},
journal = {Mind {\&} Language},
title = {{Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self}}
}

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