Cracking-Resistant Password Vaults Using Natural Language Encoders. Chatterjee, R., Bonneau, J., Juels, A., & Ristenpart, T. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), pages 481-498, 5, 2015.
Cracking-Resistant Password Vaults Using Natural Language Encoders [link]Website  abstract   bibtex   
Password vaults are increasingly popular applications that store multiple passwords encrypted under a single master password that the user memorizes. A password vault can greatly reduce the burden on a user of remembering passwords, but introduces a single point of failure. An attacker that obtains a user's encrypted vault can mount offline brute-force attacks and, if successful, compromise all of the passwords in the vault. In this paper, we investigate the construction of encrypted vaults that resist such offline cracking attacks and force attackers instead to mount online attacks. Our contributions are as follows. We present an attack and supporting analysis showing that a previous design for cracking-resistant vaults -- the only one of which we are aware -- actually degrades security relative to conventional password-based approaches. We then introduce a new type of secure encoding scheme that we call a natural language encoder (NLE). An NLE permits the construction of vaults which, when decrypted with the wrong master password, produce plausible-looking decoy passwords. We show how to build NLEs using existing tools from natural language processing, such as n-gram models and probabilistic context-free grammars, and evaluate their ability to generate plausible decoys. Finally, we present, implement, and evaluate a full, NLE-based cracking-resistant vault system called NoCrack.
@inProceedings{
 title = {Cracking-Resistant Password Vaults Using Natural Language Encoders},
 type = {inProceedings},
 year = {2015},
 identifiers = {[object Object]},
 keywords = {context-free-grammars,crypto,nlp,password-managers,passwords},
 pages = {481-498},
 websites = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.36},
 month = {5},
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 abstract = {Password vaults are increasingly popular applications that store multiple passwords encrypted under a single master password that the user memorizes. A password vault can greatly reduce the burden on a user of remembering passwords, but introduces a single point of failure. An attacker that obtains a user's encrypted vault can mount offline brute-force attacks and, if successful, compromise all of the passwords in the vault. In this paper, we investigate the construction of encrypted vaults that resist such offline cracking attacks and force attackers instead to mount online attacks. Our contributions are as follows. We present an attack and supporting analysis showing that a previous design for cracking-resistant vaults -- the only one of which we are aware -- actually degrades security relative to conventional password-based approaches. We then introduce a new type of secure encoding scheme that we call a natural language encoder (NLE). An NLE permits the construction of vaults which, when decrypted with the wrong master password, produce plausible-looking decoy passwords. We show how to build NLEs using existing tools from natural language processing, such as n-gram models and probabilistic context-free grammars, and evaluate their ability to generate plausible decoys. Finally, we present, implement, and evaluate a full, NLE-based cracking-resistant vault system called NoCrack.},
 bibtype = {inProceedings},
 author = {Chatterjee, R and Bonneau, J and Juels, A and Ristenpart, T},
 booktitle = {Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)}
}

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